BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR

Citation: [2009] 16 S.C.R. 618

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: TARUN CHATTERJEE, V.S. SIRPURKAR

Case summary

BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR.pdf

Judgment text

[2009) 16 (ADDL. ) S. C. R. 618 j • BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR. (Civil Appeal No. 8452 of 2009) DECEMBER 17, 2009 8 [TARUN CHATTERJEE AND V. S. SIRPURKAR, JJ. ] t • Labour laws: Maharashtra Mathadi, Hamal and other Manual Worl : person does not earn the wages, as contemplated in s. 2(13), such person who is engaged to do manual work in any scheduled employment, would be a worker. Further, even if such worker is not employed in the strict sense of the term by an employer or a contractor, but is working with the permission or under the agreement with the employer or contractor, even then such worker would be a 'worker' within the meaning of s. 2(12) of the t Act. The only exception is that such worker should not be a member of employer's family. The definitions of 'worker' and 'unprotected worker' given in ss. 2(11) and 2(12) of the Act would have to be read together for realizing the scope of the s. 2(1 ~) of the Act.

Therefore, I • the language of s. 2(11) is plain, unambiguous and clear and thus, is not capable of any other meaning. It means that every worker, who is doing manual work and is engaged or to be engaged in any scheduled employment, would be covered by that definition and would become an unprotected worker. The use of the 8 word 'means' which then positively rules aside any other meaning than the one which is dependent upon the plain and unambiguous language of the provision. [Paras 14 and 19] [654-D-H; 655-A-B; 658-A-B] *Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra 2000 II CLR 279; Kay Kay Embroideries Pvt. Ltd. vs. Cloth Market and Shops Board, Mumbai & Ors. 2006 Ill LLJ 824 Born; Krantikari Suraksha Rakshak Sangathana vs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited & Ors. 2008 (10) SC 166; O Cable Corporation of India vs. Addi. Commissioner of Labour 2008 (7) SCC 680; Feroz N. Dotivala vs. P. M. Wadhwani 2003(1) SCC 433; P. Kasilingam & Ors. vs. P. S. G.

College of Technology & Ors. AIR 1995 SC 1395; Bhaiji vs. Sub- Divisional Officer, Thandla & Ors. 2003(1) SCC 692; Baldev Singh Bajwa vs. Monish Saini 2005(12) sec 778; Printers (Mysore) Ltd. & Anr. vs. Asstt. Commercial Tax Officer & Ors. 1994 (2) Sec 434; K. V. Muthu vs. Angamuthu Ammal 1997(2) SCC 53; Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. & Ors. vs. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha & Ors. 1980(2) SCC 593, referred to. 2. 2. Where the language is clear and admits of no doubts, it is futile to look for the meaning of the provision on the basis of the external aids. It is possible that the plain meaning runs counter to the objects or creates absurdity or doubts by attributing that plain language. It is very difficult to find out any such absurdity or contradiction if the plain language of the s. 2(11) is accepted and acted upon for the purposes of interpretation. It must be noted that in spite of s. 2(11 ), which included the words "but for the provisions of this Act STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR.

• + is not adequately protected by legislation for welfare and benefits of the labour force in the State", these precise words were removed by the legislature and the definition was made limited as it has been finally legislated upon. The legislature being conscious of the fact and being armed with all the Committee Reports and also being armed with the factual data, deliberately avoided those words. This is clear pointer to the legislative intent. What the appellants ' ... are asking was to read in that definition, these precise words, which were consciously and deliberately omitted from the definition. But that would amount to supplying the casus omissus and it is not possible, in the instant case. Though this Court may supply the casus omissus, it would be in the rarest of the rare cases and thus supplying of this casus omissus would be extremely necessary due to the inadvertent omission on the part of the legislature, but .. that is not the case here.

[Paras 19 and 24] [657-8; 662- . F-H; 663-A-E] Bhaiji vs. Sub-Divisional Officer, Thandla and Ors. 2003(1) SCC 692; State of Jharkhand and Anr. vs. Govind Singh 2005 (10) sec 437, relied on 2. 3. The definition is not to be read in isolation and it must be read in the context of the phrase which would 'I( define it. It should not be vague or ambiguous and the definition of the words must be given a meaningful application; where the context makes the definition given in the interpretation clause inapplicable, the saine meaning cannot be assigned. The ratio Will not apply since the definition given in section 2(11) of the Act is extremely clear and there is no vagueness or ambiguity about it.

The omission of the words as proposed earlier from the final definition is a deliberate and conscious act on the part of the legislature, only with the objective to provide protection to all the labourers or workers, who were the manual workers and were engaged or to be engaged in any scheduled emplcvment. Therefore, there ~ • was a specific act on the part of the legislature to enlarge the scope of the definition and once it is accepted, all the submissions regarding the objects and reasons, the Committee Reports, the legislative history being contrary to the expressed language, are relegated to the background and are liable to be ignored. (Para 24) (663- F-H; 664-A·D] U. P. State Electricity Board vs. Shiv Mohan Singh & Anr. ~ . 2004(8) SCC 402; Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2003(4) SCC 200; The State of M. P. & Ors. vs. Mis. Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel and Co. & Anr. 1972 (1) SCC 209; R. D. Goyal & Anr. vs. Reliance Industries Ltd.

2003 (1) SCC 81, Held inapplicable. Ramesh Mehta vs. Sanwal Chand Singhvi & Ors. 2004 (5) sec 409, refe"ed to. 2. 4. It was suggested that only where the other legislations are unable to provide for the welfare and the better conditions, then alone the Mathadi Act would be brought Into and, therefore, necessarily the unprotected workmen would be such workmen, who are deprived of the better conditions of service. The argument that if the workers were adequately protected, they cannot be covered under section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act is Incorrect for the reason that the mention of "unprotected manual workers" In the Preamble is clearly mentioned in the wider sense and even the Preamble of the Mathadi Act displays the intention of the State Government to make better provision for the unprotected manual workers. Merely because some workmen are manual workers and not casual workers, would not make any difference. In the Preamble, terminology of "casual workers" Is not to be found.

Therefore, even on this basis, the definition cannot be restricted. [Para 26) (666-A·D] Mukesh K. Tripathi vs. Senior Divisional Manager, UC STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR. ~ t 2004(8) SCC 387; State of Maharashtra vs. Indian Medical Association 2002 (1) SCC 589; Printers (Mysore) Ltd. & Anr. vs. Asstt. Commercial Tax Officer & Ors. 1994 (2) SCC 434, Held inapplicabfe. Pandey & Co. Builders (P) Ltd. vs. State of Bihar & Anr. 2007(1) SCC 467; Ramesh Mehta vs. Sanwal Chand Singhvi 2004 (5) sec 409, referred to. . ~ 2. 5. Section 22 of the Act provides that the State Government may exempt from the operation of all or any of the provisions of the Act or any scheme, all or any of the classes of unprotected workers employed in any scheduled employment or the establishment or part of any establishment, if in the opinion of the State Government, all such unprotected workers are in the enjoyment of benefits, which are, on the whole, not less J.

favourable to such unprotected workers than the benefits provided by or under the Mathadi Act, of course, subject to certain conditions and after the consultation with Advisory Committee. It cannot be said that by the acceptance of the plain meaning of the wider definition given out in section 2(11) of the Act, there would be creations of contradictions. A Statement of Objects and Reasons for introducing the Bill is an external aid, which should be of no consequence if the language is clear. Even if the Statement of Objects and Reasons is read, it does not further the case of the appellants~ Appellants, while relying on the Statement of Objects and Reasons j submitted that it was because the workers in various employments were not receiving adequate protection and benefits within the ambit of existing labour legislation that this Bill was introduced alongwith Statement of Objects • ~ & Reasons.

If inspite of this, the legislature went on to delete those words, the intention of the legislature must be loud and clear and it cannot persuade to hold that there is anything contradictory to the definition in the • • Statement of Objects and Reasons. Even if that was so, when the legislature consciously deletes certain words, then there will be no question of relying and insisting upon those words. [Paras 29 and 30) [668-A-H; 669-A-B) 2. 6. The submission that when all the persons working in a scheduled industry, doing manual work, become the unprotected workers, then there is no question of the Inspector examining any such person, ~ because everybody would be an unprotected worker, is clearly wrong. What is required is that every unprotected worker has to be registered with the Board.

If the Inspector suspects that any such worker, though an unprotected worker, is either not registered or does not get the protection of the Board and is engaged by the employer, then he can examine such a person. Section ,,. 15 would not become unworkable. [Paras 30 and 31) [669- F-H] 2. 7. Section 17G provides that the provisions of Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 would be applicable in case of trial of offences under this Act. Section 18 provides that provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 shall mutatis mutandis apply to registered unprotected workers and they shall be deemed to be workmen within the meaning of that Act. Section 19 makes the similar provision regarding the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 to the workers, while Section 20 provides the application of Maternity Benefit • Act, 1961. These sections are not of any relevance to arrive at the correct meaning of section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act.

In all these Sections, the words used are 'registered unprotected workers'. There is a provision for J creation of the Boards under section 6 of the Mathadi Act and every unprotected worker has to register himself with the Board. Therefore, the reliance on these provisions would be no consequence. The terminology of 'registered STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR. unprotected workers' in sections 18, 19 and 20 of the Mathadi Act was brought into force by Maharashtra Act No. 40 of 1974 . and under that, these words deemed always to have been substituted for the original terminology of 'unprotected workers'. Therefore, there is no reason to take any different view in the light of these sections. [Para 32) [670-A-E] 2. 8. It is accepted thats. 2(12) is a general provision r 1 and s. 2(11) is a specific provision. So long as that language of section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act is clear enough, there will not be any question of cutting the scope of the term 'unprotected workman'.

As regard the submission that this interpretation would lead to absurd results, whereby ss. 2(11) and 2(12) would be identical, there is no such possibility. The Sections have to be read together. Section 2(12) specifies the worker, which in turn is used in Section 2(11) further. Therefore, they would not be identical under any circumstances. [Para 33) [670-F- H; 671-A-B] 2. 9. Once a workman is engaged to do the manual work, he automatically becomes an unprotected workman and would have to be registered with the Board. The interpretation that is proposed to be given, does not make any of the provision absurd c,nd does not lead to manifest the injustice or the absurdity. [Para 34) [671-E-F; 672-A] Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran vs. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd. & Ors. 2007(8) SCC 705, referred to. 2. 10. The golden rule of interpretation is that the statutes are to be interpreted according to grammatical .

and ordinary sense of the word in grammatical or literal meaning unmindful of consequence of such interpretation. It was only when such grammatical and 626 SUPREME COURTREPORTS (2009) 16 (ADDL. ) S. C. R. literal interpretation leads to unjust results which the legislature never intended that the said rule has to give place to the 'rule of legislative intent'. In the instant case, the golden rule of interpretation would not lead to any injustice. [Para 35] (672-C-O] National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Laxmi Narain Dhut 2007 (3) SCC 700; Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. vs. Bombay Environmental Action Group & Ors. 2006(3) SCC 434, referred to. 2. 11. No absurdity, inconsistency or any contradiction with the other provisions of the Act is found.

It will be seen that the absurdity which the appellants are referring again and again has to be such that it should be contrary to the sense and reason and, therefore, should include a result, which is unworkable or impracticable, 0 inconvenient, anomalous or illogical, futile or pointless, artificial or productive of a disproportionate countermischief. There would arise no absurdity of any kind if the literal interpretation is given. Once the literal construction is accepted, there will be no further question of holding otherwise on the basis of the intent of the legislature. [Para 35) [674-A-C] 3. The application of doctrine of stare decisis cannot help the appellants in the instant case. While rejecting the arguments, those thousands of workmen who are otherwise exploited by Toliwalas, Mu. kadams and at tim~s. the employers are in mind.

The enactment is a beneficial enactment, providing the protection to such workers, who do not have the honest representation and it is with this lofty idea that a progressive State like State of , Maharashtra has brought about this legislation. The definition would have to be all the more broad, engulfing maximum area to the advantage of a workman. [Para 38) [680-F-H; 681-A] STEEL LABOUR BD. & ANR. i- ' State of Gujarat vs. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat & Ors. 2005 (8) sec 534, relied on. I Mishri Lal (Dead) by Lrs. vs. Dhirendera Nath (Dead) by Lrs. & Ors. 1999 (4) SCC 11; Pradeep Kumar Biswas vs. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology & Ors. 2002 (5) SCC 111; Union of India & Anr. vs. Azadi Bachao Ando/an & Anr. 2004 (10) SCC 1; C. Jairam Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra Misc. Petition No. 150 of 1973 decided on 19. 4. 1974; S. B. More . \ ' & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. Misc. Petition No. 414 of 1973 decided on 24. 4. 1974; Lal/ubhai Kevaldas & Anr. vs.

The State of Maharashtra & Ors. Writ Petition No. 119 of 1979 decided on 16. 1. 1980; lrkar Sahu's & Anr. vs. Bombay Port Trust 1994 I CLR 187; Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra 2000 II CLR 279; Maharashtra Rajya Mathadi Transport and Central Kamgar Union vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 1995 Supp. 3 SCC ; 28; Sarva Shramik Sanghatana (KV), Mumbai vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2008 (1) SCC 494; Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors 2003(4) SCC 200; Danial Latifi & Anr. vs. Union of India 2001 (7) SCC 740; Mis. Good Year India Ltd. vs. State of Haryana AIR 1990 SC 781; Ambica Quarry Works vs. State of Gujarat . 1987 (1) SCC 213; Bhavnagar University vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. 2003 (2) SCC 111; Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. ' preceding year ending on the 31st day of March of that year. Every report so received shall be laid as soon as may be after it is received before each BHUWALKA STEEL ! NOUS. LTD. v.

BOMBAY IRON & 641 STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR. [VS. SIRPURKAR, J. ] House of the State Legislature, if it is in session, or in the session immediately following the date of receipt of the report. 7(4) In exercise of the powers and discharge of its functions, the Board shall be bound by such directions, as the State Government may, for reason to be stated in writing, give to it from time to time. ~ 15(1) The Board may appoint such persons as it thinks fit to be Inspectors possessing the prescribed qualifications for the purpose of this Act or of any scheme and may define the limits of their jurisdiction.

15(2) Subject to any rules made by the State Government in this behalf, an Inspector may- {a) enter and search at all reasonable hours, with such assistants as he thinks fit, any premises or place, where unprotected workers are employed, or work is given out to unprotected workers in any scheduled employment, for the purpose of examining any register, record of wages or notices required to be kept or exhibited under any scheme, and require the production thereof, for inspection; (b) examine any person whom he finds in any such premises or place and who, he has reasonable cause to believe, is an unprotected worker employed therein or an unprotected worker to whom work is given out therein; (c) require any person giving any work to an ....

unprotected worker or to a group of unprotected "· workers to give any information, which is in his power to give, in respect of the names and addresses of the persons to whom the work is given, and in respect of payments made, or to be made, for the said work; (d) seize or take copies of such registers, records of wages or notices or portions thereof, as he may consider relevant, in respect of an offence under this Act or scheme, which he has reason to believe has been committed by an employer; and 'f, (e) exercise such other powers as may be prescribed: Provided that, no one shall be required under the provisions of this section to answer any question or make any statement tending to incriminate himself. 15(3) Every Inspector appointed under this section shall be deemed to be public servant within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. 21.

Nothing contained in this Act shall affect any rights or privileges, which any registered unprotected worker employed in any scheduled employment is entitled to, on the date on which this Act comes into force, under any other law, contract, custom or usage applicable to such worker, if such rights or privileges are more favourable to him than those to which he would be entitled under this Act and the scheme: Provided that such worker will not be entitled to receive any corresponding benefit under the provisions of this Act and the scheme. 22. The State Government may, after consulting the Advisory Committee, by notification in the Official ' ....

Gazette, and subject to such conditions and for such period as may be specified in the notification, exempt from the operation of all or any of the ~ provisions of this Act or any scheme made thereunder, all or any class or classes of unprotected workers employed in any scheduled employment, or in any establishment or part of any establishment of any scheduled employment, if in the opinion of the State Government all such unprotected workers or such class or classes of workers, are in the enjoyment of benefits which are on the whole not less favourable to such unprotected workers than the benefits provided by or under this Act or any scheme framed thereunder: Provided that before any such notification is issued, the State Government shall publish a notice of its intention to issue such notification, and invite objections and suggestions in respect thereto, and no such notification shall be issued until the objections and suggestions have been considered and a period of one month has expired from the date of first publication of the notice in the Official Gazette: Provided further that the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, at any time, for reasons to be specified, rescind the aforesaid ' notification.

10. It is in the backdrop of these provisions generally that it has to be seen as to whether the interpretation put forward by the Full Bench in two separate but concurrent judgments, is correct or not. Though the question referred to the Full Bench was restricted to the correctness of the interpretation of the term ... '\ 'unprotected worker' in Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act as given in the case of Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra), in our opinion, the scope of the question has to be properly understood. In that case, it was held by the Division Bench of that Court that the workers who were working in the factory of the petitioner could not be termed as 'unprotected workers'. It was held specifically that the Mathadi Act did not deal with the employees engaged on monthly basis, as such workers were protected under the Shops and Establishments Act and other enactments.

It was further held that it was only the casually engaged workmen, who would come within the purview of the Mathadi Act. The High Court further said that where the material produced on record clearly show that the workmen are protected workmen, more ~ particularly, with reference to the Agreement under Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Act in question would not apply. Therefore, the referred question was whether it was only casually engaged workers, who came within the purview of the Act. The majority judgment gave a straight answer to this question that the meaning of the term 'unprotected worker' was only the casual workman, was not correct, while the Learned Single Judge did not stop at that and gave a broader answer ..

1 interpreting Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act and held that every manual worker engaged or to be engaged in any scheduled employment, irrespective of whether he is protected by other labour legislations or not, would be termed as 'unprotected worker', and further that the definition was not restricted to those manual workers who are casually engaged. Though the judgment of the Learned Single Judge was criticized by Shri J. P. Cama, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that it "1 went beyond the reference made, we feel that the Learned Single Judge has not travelled beyond the reference. The reference has to be read as requiring the correct interpretation of Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act and the term 'unprotected worker' and, therefore, in our opinion, it would have to be explained as to what is the true scope and meaning of the term 'unprotected worker' as envisaged by Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act. In that, the debate cannot be restricted to the ...

f narrower question as to whether the term means only the casually engaged workers. In our opinion, the true impact of the term 'unprotected worker' has to be considered and it will have also to be pointed out as to who can be said to be 'unprotected STEEL LABOUR BD. & ANR. [V. S. SIRPURKAR, J. ] worker'. The objection in that behalf raised by the appellant to the Full Bench judgment is not correct. When we see the judgment in Kay Kay Embroideries Pvt. Ltd. vs. Cloth Market and Shops Board, Mumbai & Ors. [2006 Ill LLJ 824 Born], it is clear that the Court had posed two questions:- (i) Whether the expression 'unprotected worker' means a worker not protected by labour legislation .. ~ or whether the expression means a manual worker who is engaged or to be engaged in any scheduled employment as defined in Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act? (ii) Whether a Mathadi worker, who has been engaged directly by an employer, would fall outside the purview of the Mathadi Act?

~ The Division Bench in this case did not agree with the judgment in the case of Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra). The referring judgment clearly goes on to show that it did not agree with the narrower judgment in the case of Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra), but it cannot be forgotten that the two questions framed by it clearly show that the consideration could not be restricted to the narrower question \ as to whether the view taken in the case of Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra) was correct or not, instead the question which arose for consideration on account of the two Benches not agreeing was as to what was the true scope of the definition of the expression 'unprotected worker' in Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act. Considering the clear language and the questions considered in the referring judgment by Hon'ble F. K. Rebello and Dr. D. Y. ~ - Chandrachud, JJ.

, we feel that the Learned Single Judge did not exceed the question referred in considering the full scope of the Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act and the term 'unprotected worker'. We will, therefore, proceed on the basis that the Full Bench had to decide the true scope of the term '• 'unprotected worker' as defined in Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act and to point out as to who could be covered under that definition. 11. Basically, the contentions raised by the parties are as follows: Legal Submissions on behalf of the A~~ellants ~ j specifically quoted from the decision in Quinn vs. Leathern [1901 Appeal Cases 495] as follows:- "Before discussing Allen vs. Flood [1898 Appeal Cases ...

1] and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character, which I wish to make; and one is to repeat what I have very often said before that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but are governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of t reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always lugical at all.

" (Emphasis supplied) The Court therein again referred to the decision in Ambica Quarry Worl particularly, the Executive Branch to interpret the law; that is the task of the Courts. Even if the State Government understood the Act in a particular manner, that cannot be a true and correct interpretation unless it is so held by the Courts. Therefore, how the State Government officials understood the Act, is really irrelevant. The Learned Senior Counsel, in his address, relied on the decision in Godawat Pan Masala Products l. P. Ltd. & Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors. [2004(7) sec 68) and more particularly, para 32 therein. There, Hon'ble Srikrishna, J. accepted the meaning of the concerned provision as it was understood by the State authorities. However, the Learned Judge was careful enough to say that:- "While this may not be really conclusive, it certainly indicates the manner of the State authority viewing its power and the Rules under which it was exercising the power.

The Court can certainly take into·account this situation on the doctrine of contemporanea expositio. (Emphasis supplied) Therefore, this cannot be viewed to be an absolute doctrine. There are number of authorities, which speak about the powers of the Court, vis-a-vis, this doctrine. It has been held in Clyde Navigation Trustees vs. Laird [1883 (8) Appeal Cases 658], Assheton Smith vs. Owen [1906 (1) Ch 179], Goldsmiths' Co. vs. Wyatt (1907 (1) KB 95], Senior Electric Inspector vs. Laxminarayan Chopra [AIR 1962 SC 159], Raja Ram Jaiswal vs. State ofBihar[AIR 1964 SC 828], J. K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. vs. Union of India [AIR 1988 1 SC 191], Doypack Systems Ltd. vs. Union of India (AIR 1988 SC 782] that even if the person who dealt with the Act understood it in a particular manner, that does not prevent the Court in giving to the Court, its true construction. It is pointed out in the decision in Doypack Systems Ltd. vs.

Union of India (cited supra) that the doctrine is confined to the construction of ambiguous language used in very old statutes where indeed .. , the language itself have had a rather different meaning in those ·days. The Learned author Justice Shri G. P. Singh, in his celebrated treatise quoted that:- "Subject to use made of contemporary official statements and statutory instruments the principle of contemporanea expositio is not applicable to a modern statute. " Same subject has been dealt with in Punjab Traders vs. ~State of Punjab [1991 (1) SCC 86]. Considering this settled position, we do not think we are in a position to accept the contention raised. Same logic applies that even if the Mathadi Board's stand was somewhat contradictory in the case of lrkar Sahu's &Anr. vs. Bombay Port Tn. st (cited supra), it did not really create a bar against it from changing its stance for a correct interpretation of Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act. 41.

The next argument was based on Article 254 of the Constitution of India. It was suggested that the said Article prescribes that in the matters falling in the Concurrent List, any 8 Central legislation, whether made before or after a State legislation, supersede such State legislation, if they both cover the same field. An exception to this lies in sub-Article (2), which ~ preserves and protects a State enactment to the extent it has received the assent of the Vice President. Needless to say that this challenge is in the nature of a challenge to the constitutional validity of the provision of the State Act. Such was not the challenge. The appellants never urged that the Act was constitutionally invalid and in fact, the constitutional validity of the Act has already been upheld. Article 254 does not provide guide for the interpretation of a State statute. The appellants are also not certain about the proposal of the assent of the Vice I. President, which was received on 5. 6.

1969, since the said proposal could not be located by them. Therefore, all the arguments must fall to the ground once the Presidential assent under Article 254(2) is received to the Act. This is apart from the fact that the grounds on the basis of Article 254 cannot be used for the interpretation of the Act. In strict sense, this question was never before the Full Bench and in our opinion, ) the Full Bench rightly rejected this argument on the ground that this was not the case of the appellants. Therefore, reliance placed on the decisions in Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. vs. National Textile Corporation Ltd. [2002 (8) SCC 182) and Thirumuruga Kirupa Nanda Variyar Thavathiru Sundara Swamigal Medical Educational and Charitable Trust vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. [1996 (3) sec 15] is of no consequence. The argument is thus rejected. . , 42. Thus, in our considered opinion, the Full Bench was absolutely correct in coming to the conclusions that it did. 1 43.

Before parting with the judgment, we must refer to the fact that this legislation, which came way back in 1969, have in its view, those poor workmen, who were neither organized to be in a position to bargain with the employers nor did they have the compelling bargaining power. They were mostly dependent upon the Toliwalas and the Mukadams. They were not certain that they would get the work everyday. They were also not certain that they would work only for one employer in ,. a day. Everyday was a challenge to these poor workmen. It was with this idea that the Board was created under Section 6 of the Mathadi Act. Deep thoughts have gone into, creating the framework of the Boards, of the schemes etc. With these lofty ideas that the Act was brought into existence. In these days when Noble Laureate Professor Mohd.

Yunus of Bangladesh is advocating the theory of social business as against the business to earn maximum profits, it would be better if the 0 employers could realize their social obligations, more 1 particularly, to the have-nots of the society, the workers who are all contemplated to be the inflicted workers in the Act. Again, before parting, we must appreciate the valuable contributions made on behalf of the appellants and the respondents, more particularly, Shri J. P. Cama, Shri C. U. Singh~ Shri Sudhir Talsania, Shri K. K. Singhvi and Ms. Indira Jaising, Learned Senior Counsel. In the result, all the appeals are dismissed and under the circumstances, there shall be no orders as to the ~ costs. SLP (C).... CC No. 4065 of 2007 And SLP (C).... CC No. 4046 of 2007 Permission to file Special Leave Petition in these two . ,,_ cases is not granted. Dismissed. N. J. Matters dismissed.