CHANDRAKANT SAHA & ORS. ETC . v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC.
Citation: [1979] 1 S.C.R. 751; 1978 INSC 172
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Y.V. CHANDRACHUD , P.N. BHAGWATI, S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, P.N. SHINGAL, D.A. DESAI
Judgment date:
Case summary
1978 INSC 172. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1978-09-14. CHANDRAKANT SAHA & ORS. ETC . v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC. Read the judgment and case...
Judgment text
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] l s. c. 11.. CHANDRAKANT SAHA & ORS. ETC . • v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC. September 14, 1978 [Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C. J. , P. N. BHAGWATI, S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, P. N. SHINGHAL AND D. A. DESAI, JJ. ) Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958, as anwnded by the A111endi11g Act 29 of 1968--Section 3(d) (i) and (ii), whether to be tear/ co11junctively in the light of Sec. 3A, 3(gg) of the Act-Interpretation of Sections 3(d), 3(. k'g), 3A, 5 and 6--Whcther classification a,~ Rice Miller & Rice llulfrr dis-crin-1inatory offending Art. 14 of the Constitut(on-Whether the provisions of the Act which insi'st on the rice-hullers to take licences is an unreasonable restriction on their right to carry on the business and violatire of Aritclcs 19 and 301 of the Constitution.
The Rice Milling Industry (Ilegu1ation) Act was passed in 1958, the object and reasons of which were to preserve and protect the indigenous and hand pounding industry of rice growers RO atS to provide sufficient employment to rural population and to ensure the modernisation of conventional type of rice mills \Vith a vie\v to producing more rice of better quality and nutritive value. Since the original Act did not include the rice hullers, by the Amendment Act 29 of 1968, Sec. 3(d) was substitued viz. "Milling rice, with it grammritical variation, means (i) recovering rice or any produce thereof from paddy; (ii) poli! hing rice with the a. id of power". Under Section 5 read with Section 3A, the petitioners \Vere required to take licences for operating their husling mills. 'The petit;oners, therefore. assailed (a) that the requirement Of t 79- 1237, 1543-1583, 1956-2111, 2810-2936, 2953-2968, 2986-2998/ 78. Majumdar and Mrs. Laxmi Arvind for the Petitioners in W. P. Nos.
823, 3514-3574, 824, 826, 975, 1617-1627, 1628-1723, 1915- I ,, 1942, 2366, 2610, 3088, 3576/78 and 3766/78. Am/an Ghosh and Ravinder Bahl for the Petitioners in W. P. Nos. 2231-2234,. 2235-2236, 2237-2238, 2475 &. 2476, 2975-2985/78, 3744-3768, 3801 and 3840/78. Rathin Das for the Petitioner in W. P. 3465/78. · J. M. Khanna for the Petitioners in W. P. Nos. 3466-3513. 78. S. K. Bisaria, for the Petitioners in W. Ps. 3786-3788/78. S. N. Kacker, Sol. Genl. (In W. P. 1135, 1759, 1943, and 221E/ 77) R. N. Sachthey and Miss A. Subhashini for Respondents in W. Ps. 1898-1908, 177-313, 1584-1592, 1313-1542/78 and for Respondents No. 1 in Rest of the W. P. excepting in W. P. Nos. 1222 and 2? 59 / 78, A. P. Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee for other appearing rc>p<>n- ing the rice hullers also within the do1m1in of the Act. We might like to consider some of the amended prm·isions whose constitutional validity has been challenged on various grounds.
To begin with, the relevant part of the object and reasons of the Amending Act runs thus :- "First, several ditliculties have been experienced with regard to the control over small hullers. These hullers arc scattered all over the country-side far away from importaut markets and, in many cases, are run along with other power-driven plants like flour, oil and dall mills or pumping sets, etc. without obtaining requisite permits or licences under the Act. These hullers sometimes operate clandestinely at night making it ditlicult to check their activities. lt is, therefore, proposed to make it clear that the attachment of hullers with other power-driven units mentioned above would amount to establishment of rice-mills and to tighten at the same time the penal provisions in respect of running of unlicensed hullers. Secondly, it is possible nnder the Act for existing or new rice mills to stop rice-milling operations for a con- ) siderable period and thereby affect the supply position.
It is, therefore, proposed to provide that if any mill ceases to operate for a continuous period of exceeding one year, it would become a defunct rice-mill and would require a fresh permit for recommencing rice-milling operations ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . Moreover, removal of bran popularly known as .. polishing of rice after its recovery from paddy is also proposed to be covered by the term 'milling rice' which at present covers recovery of rice from paddy. This will check unauthorised milling which is done in the name of polishing of rice". It would thus appear that the rice hullers were practically performing the same functions as rice millers but without any control having been exercised on them, as a result of which the poor rice growers were exploited and the hand-pounding industry suffered. Sometimes the supply position of the rice also suffered.
Coming now to the merits of the amendments of 1968, it was argued in the first place that the introduction of section 3A unmistak-ably shows that the definition in section 3(d) & (gg) did not include the rice hullers. It was also argued that clauses '(i) and (ii) of section 3(d) must be read conjunctively and not disjunctively. We are however unable to agree with these arguments. Having regard to the setting in which section 3 (d) is placed and the dominant object of ) the Amendment Act the intention of the Legislature was to widen the purport and scope of the definition of milling rice. If clauses (i) and • (ii) are read conjunctively then it will defeat the very purpose of the Act and would in fact become meaningless because clause (i) which means recovering rice or any product thereof from paddy would include products like chura etc.
which do not require polishing and yet if we have to read the two clauses conjunctively chura will have to be polished to fall within the meaning of section 3 ( d) which, in our opinion, could not have been contemplated by the Legislature. Furthermore, the definition of polishing in section 3 (gg) runs thus :- .. ~polishing' in relation to rice n1eans the removal of bran from the kernel of rice. " Polishing rice therefore includes the process of removal of bran from the kernel of rice with the aid of power in what the rice hullers do. In this connection, we might mention that the process of removing husk from the rice as defined in Encyclopaedia Britannica Col. 19 Page 284 which is as follows :- "Preparation of rice : The kernel of rice as it leaves the thresher is enclosed by the hull or husk, and is known as paddy or rough rice. Rough rice is used for seed and feed for livestock, but most of it is milled for human consumption.
Rice is a good energy food, and is consumed in vast quantities in the orient. In the western hemisphere, however, rice is not the staple cereal food, except in certain Caribbean and .. South Pacific Islands. A diet limited largely to well milled rice renders eastern people on a restricted diet liable to beri-beri, a deficiency disease caused by a shortage of essential thiamin (Vitamin Bl) and minerals. This disease, however, can be avoided by adding legumes, fish, fruits and vegetables to the diet. Rough rice that is preboiled and dried prior to milling retains more thiamin and minerals than untreated rice, and hence is less apt to cause beri-beri. It c. SAHA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, !. ) 761 appears that in preboiling the thiamin, which is largely in the germ and bran layers of the kernel, diffuses into and is fixed in the starchy endosperm. Most of the rice is milled in or near the areas in which it is produced.
In modern mills, special machines are used for removing the hull from the kernel, for removing the bran layers by attrition, for polishing, for coating and for grading. The object in milling is to remove the hull and the bran . layers of the kernel with as little breakage as possible for the \ most valuable product is the whole kernel. Milled rice often is coated with glucose and talc, or with vegetable oils, to improve its appearance. The by-products, bran and polish, are used as feed for livestock, the broken rice for brewing, distilling, and the manufacturing of starch and rice flour. The hulls are used for fuel or packing, and the straw is used for feed, for bedding livestock, for thatching roofs, and for mats, garments, packing and broom straws". Thus, on a true interpretation of section 3(d) clauses (i) and (ii) and (gg) there can be absolutetly no doubt that the section includes the operation carried out by the rice hullers.
Jn view of this interpretation it was not necessary for the Legislature to have added section 3(A) but this was done in order to put the matter beyond doubt or controversy. Counsel for the petitioners assailed these provisions of the Act on three grounds, viz. , (l) that the Act by bringing the rice hullers and rice millers within the same fold seems to treat unequlils as equals, b>ecause rice hullers cannot be equated with rice millers, (2) that )iections 5 and 6 contained uncanalised and unguided powers so as to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, and (3) that the provisions compelling the petitioners to take licences is too harsh in nature and is an unreasonable restriction on the right of the petitioners w carry on their business. So far as the first contention is concerned, it is absolutely without any substance.
Having regard to the process in which the rice is ' ' milled or dehusked by machine there is not much of a difference between a rice miller and a rice hnller. Both resort to machines driven ,; by power to effectuate the result. In fact, a husking mill with one huller not only dehusks paddy but simultaneously polishes it by suit-able adjustment of the blade, a function which is almost siruilar to that performed by the rice millers. Having regard to the object contained in the statement and reasons mentioned above it cannot be said that there is any discrimination between the rice millers and the rice hullers both of whom are obliged to take licences before conducting their business. The whole idea is that the indigenous hand pounding industry may not be wiped out by allowing rice hnller to take all the licences of de-husking so as to render the hand-pounding industry completely nugatory.
Thus, in our opinion, in the first place, rice millers and rice hullers constitute a separate class and secondly, having regard to the nature of their functions the classification is reasonable, because (1) it is founded upon intelligible differentia, (2) the defferentia has rational relation to the objects sought to be achieved by the Act, namely, the protection of the domestic hand pounding industry and improvement I / of the quality of the rice and ensuring its easy and quick distribution. ' The first contention raised by the writ petitioners is, therefore, over- • ruled. It was next contended that the provisions of the Act which insist on the rice hullers to take licences is an unreasonable restriction on their right to carry on the business. In the first place, the licensing provision is in public interest and is meant to carry out the purpose of the Act. Secondly, sections 5 and 6 are purely regulatory in character and do not amount to unreasonable restriction.
It has been helcj. by this Court that canalisation of export through selected licences causing elimination of other traders amounts to a reasonable restriction. In this connection, in the case of Narendra Kumar and Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (') this Court observed as follows :- "The first evil sought to be remedied by the law being thus the rise in price. . . . . . . . . . . . The essential subsidiary step therefore was to introduce a system of permits so that the persons acquiring copper could be known. A system of permits would also be of great help in ensuring that the raw material would go to those industries where it was needed most and distributed in such quantities to several industries in different parts of the country as would procure the greatest benefit to the general public". To the same effect is the decision of this Court in the case of Daruka & Co. v. Union of India(') where Ray, C. J. speaking for ·' the Court observed as follows :- . · "This Court in Glass Chatol!
S case (1962) I S. C. R. 862 held that if the scheme of canalisation of imports is in the interest of the general public the refusal of licence to out- (ll [1960] 2 S-. -R. 375. (2) [1974] l S. C. R. 570. c. SAHA v. UNION (Fazal Ali, !. ) 763 siders would also be in the interest of the general public. The canalisation of import was held to be per se not an unreasonable restriction in the interest of the general public. Policies of imports or exports are fashioned not only with reference to internal or international trade but also on ·B monetary policy, the development of agriculture and industries and even on the political policies. If the Government decides an economic policy that import or export should be by a selected channel or through selected agencies the court \ would proceed on the assumption that the decision is in the interest of the general public unless the contrary is shown".
For these reasons, therefore, we are unable to hold that sections 5 and 6 alllOllilt to unreasonable restrictions on the right of the petitioners to carry on their trade and business. It was next argued that sections 5 and 6 contain unguided and uncanalised power and suffer from the vice of excessive delegation or powers. In the first place, in view of the language of section 6 with which the existing rice hullers are concerned, the question of uncanalised powers being coilferred on the licensing authority does not arise. It would be seen that under section 6(3) once an application is receiv-ed by the licensing officer he shall grant a licence on such conditions as he may impooe. The statute does not leave any discretion in the licensing officer to grant or to refuse to grant a licence. He has a mandatory duty to perform, and, therefore, there is no question of the licensing officer having been conf~rred unrestricted or uncanalised powers under the Act.
It was, however, submitted that although the Jgrant of licence is mandatory under sub-section (3) of :Section 6 yet this can be granted only if a permit has been granted under section 5 sub-section (6). There is no pleading before this Court that any of the petitioners was not granted permits at all. Even so, as indicat-ed above, sub-section ( 4) of section 5 contains as many as six guidelines for the grant of perm. it. The power is to be exercised by such a high authority as the Central Government. Furthermore, under ' . section 12 an appeal lies against a decision of the licensing officer under section 6 or section 7 to an appellate officer nominated by the Central Government. . ! For the reasons, given above Writ Petitions No. 1135 to 1155 and 1759 to 1949 of 1977 are dismissed, but in the circumstances with costs, ooe set. For the reasons given in Writ Petitions No. 1135 to 1155 and 1759 to 1949 of 1977, Writ Petitions No.
1544-1758, 1952-1991, 1993- 2199, 2216-2220, 2274-2325 of 1977, 592-607, 849-862, 1898- 1908/78, 1597_-1606/78, 955-956/77, 1222/77, 4-176 & 2359/78, 967-1128/77, 314-591, 901-950, 1870-1887, 2240-2294, 2367-2390, 3063-3081/78, 1223-1526/77, 177-313, 871-900, 2319-2358/78, 2326-2430/77, 1807-1869, 1239-1312, 1584-1592, 1737-1759, 229(i... 2311, 2312-2318, 2392-2472, 2937-2951, 3380-3464, 609-821, 979- 1237, 1543-1583, 1956-2111, 2810-2936, 2986-2998, 2953-2968/73, 2472A-2472B/78, 823, 3514-3574, 824-826, 975, 1617-1627, 1628- 1725, 1915-1942178, 2366, 2610, 3088, 3576, 1313-1542, 2112-2203, I 3131-3340, 1760-1806/78, 2231-2234, 2235-2236, 2237-2238, 2475, 2476, 2975-2985/78, 3465, 3466-3513/78, 3622-3641/78, 3766, 3801 & 3786-3788/78 are dismissed but without any order as to costs. These are the reasons for our orders pronounced on 5-5-1978. S. R. Petitions dismissed. - .. •• '
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