CHANDRANATH MUKHERJEE v. TUSHARIKA DEBI AND OTHERS
Citation: [1959] 1 S.C.R. 226; 1958 INSC 27
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA , SYED JAFFER IMAM, K. SUBBA RAO
Judgment date:
Case summary
1958 INSC 27. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1958-03-24. CHANDRANATH MUKHERJEE v. TUSHARIKA DEBI AND OTHERS. Read the judgment and case details on...
Judgment text
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] adopted by the respondent in the present litigation. The main pleas raised by the respondent against the Lallu- binding character of the contracts themselves as well · t th th •t f L "d t · h 1 as agarns ·. e au or1 yo axm1 as o write t e etter Trikumlal for extension of time have been rejected by both the courts below, and the only ground on which the respondent succeeds before us was made on behalf of the J. respondent for the first time in appeal. Under these• circumstances we think the fair order as to costs would be that parties should bear their own costs throughout. The result is the appeal fails and is dismissed but there would be no order as to costs throughout. Appeal dismissed . • CHANDRANATH MUKHERJEE v. TUSHARIKA DEBI AND OTHERS (B. P. SINHA, JAFER IMAM and SuBBA RAO, JJ.
) • Permanent Tenure-Right of successor to recover arrears of rent by suit-Notice of sitccession to landlord within six months, if mandatory-Mutation in landlord's rent roll-Mode of proof- Bengal Tenancy Act (Act VIII of. ,r885) as amended by Bengal Act JV· of r928, ss. r5, r6. The time limit of six months provided by s. 15 of the Bengal Tenancy Act within \vhich a tenure-holder has to give notice of his succession to the landlord or have his name mutated in his rent-roJI is not mandatory but directory in character and the,l)nly effect which non-observance of that time-limit can have under • s. 16 of the Act, is to postpone his remedy to recover arrears of rent by way of suit till such time when he performs the duty cast upon him by s. 15 . ,f the Act, but it cannot, by itself, bar the remedy for all time to come. , Section 16 is a penal provision and must be subjected to its statutory limitation and the penalty it • imposes cannot be extended by implicati rds.
Instead oflii,ying down such a time-limit,. the legislature has, by the amendment af@resaid by Act IV of 1928, made it clear that the bar operates. only:so long as the duty has not been performed. No authority has been cited before us in support of the extreme proposition that ~o • • 234 SUPR,EME COURT·REPORTS [1959] the failure on the part of the landlord to serve the requisite notioe or to get the necessary mutation effected within six months, has the effect of wiping out the landlord's right to receive rent. There may be rulings to the contrary, . but this Court has to resolve the controversy on the language of the relevant sections of the statute, quoted above. That language does not clearly indicate that the result contended for on behal'f of the appellant, must necessarily ensue on his making a default to take those necessar}O steps within the time specified. The language of the statute is not so peremptory in express terms or by necessary implication.
On the other hand, as already indicated the language easily lends itself to the construction that the prescribed time is not in the nature of a statutory bar to the exercise of the landlord's right to recover rent. In this connection, it has to be remembered that pat11i tenure and all other subordinate tenures under the patnidar, are permanent tenures. Hence, the relationship of landlord and tenant, continues from generation to generation without there being any necessity of fresh attornment on the death of a ditipatnidar or other grades of tenants in the process of sub-infeudation. '. l'he relationship is all the time there, only the landlord's record has to be kept up-to-date by making the necessary substitution in the rent-roll or by giving notice of the change in the succession to the landlord's interest. The legislature ll. ad to indicate a time by way of laying down the ordinary procedure for taking the steps indicated in s. 15.
Six months' period was deem-ed by the legislature to be a sufficiently long period to eiiable those steps being taken in the ordinary course of business. But it ·is not difficult to imagine"cases. where such steps may not be feasible within the pre-' scribed· time. For example, where the landlord dies leaving him surviving only an infant heir without a proper guardian to protect the infant's interest, it may take a considerably longer period than six months to have a proper guardian appointed, if necessary, through court. It may well be that the succession it~elf is disputed, and the controversy may take some years to ? :t determined finally. It cannot . be reasonably • • S. C:R.. SUPREME 'COURT R·EPORTS 235 s11ggested . that because the requisite notice or the mutation has not been given or effected within the prescri,b~d peri? d of six months, the land. l. ord's. right to recovery of rent, disappears. That c01Hd not have ~een the . intention· of the legislature. Again, it may.
easily be sμpposed. that an honest . tem111t go~s po his new landlord and pays him rent harid to hand, even though there has been no such step ·taken withili the time as contemplated by s: 15. It' cannot be said that such a payment of retlt otit of court, will not be· recog-nized by a court, ifandrwhen a controversy about such a payment were 'to arise. In this way, instances may be multiplied where the provisions of s. 15 of the Act; have not been strictly complied with, but still the receipt and payment of rent as be. tween· the patnidar and his tenant, have continued· for a• sufficiently long period, to prove what was required to be done under that section. In our opinion, the inference is clear that the provision as regards the time-limit, is not mandatory but only directory, and that transgression of that directory.
provision has the effect of only de~ay ing the landlord's remedy of recovery of arrears of rent by suit so long as the landlord has not done what he is required by law to do. But that provision has n~t the effect of absolutely depriving the landlord of his remedy by suit for all times; he may recover through court, of couse, subject to the law oflimitation. In our opinion, therefore, acceptan~ of the appellant's arguments would be nothing more than " piling unreason upon technicality", which no court of justice can countenance. . . , . . · . In view of these considerations, it must be held th'! tt there• is no merit in this appeal which is, accordingly, 'dismissed with costs. Appeal<dismissed . .. • • • •
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