CHATTISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. CENTRAL ELECTRICITY REGULATORY COMMISSION AND ORS

Citation: [2010] 4 S.C.R. 680

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: G.S. SINGHVI, A.K. GANGULY

Case summary

CHATTISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. CENTRAL ELECTRICITY REGULATORY COMMISSION AND ORS.pdf

Judgment text

[2010] 4 S. C. R. 680 CHATIISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD V. CENTRAL ELECTRICITY REGULATORY COMMISSION AND ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 3378 of 2010) APRIL 15, 2010 [G. S. SINGHVI AND ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, JJ. ] Electricity Act, 2003: s. 125, proviso - Appeal to Supreme Court - Period of limitation - Application u/s 5 of Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 160 days - HELD: Not maintainable - Electricity Act is a special legislation within the meaning of s. 29(2) of Limitation Act - s. 5 of Limitation Act cannot be invoked for entertaining an appeal filed against decision of Tribunal beyond the period of 120 days as specified in s. 125 of Electricity Act and its proviso - There is no provision in Electricity Act under which Supreme Court can entertain an appeal against an order of Tribunal after more than 120 days - Limitation Act, 1963 - ss. 5 and 29(2). Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (Procedure, form, fee and record of proceedings) Rules, 2007: rr. 94(2) and 98(2) rlw s.

125 of Electricity Act - Notice of pronouncement of order of Tribunal and 'communication' thereof- HELD: In view of r. 94(2), the date ofpronouncement as notified in the cause list shall be a valid notice of pronouncement of the order - Once order is pronounced after being shown in cause list with title of the case and name of the counsel, the same will be deemed to have been communicated to the parties - Rule 98(2) read in conjunction with s. 125, makes it clear that once the factum of pronouncement of the order of the Tribunal is made known & ORS. to the parties and they are given opportunity to obtain a copy thereof, the order will. be deemed to have been communicated to the parties and the period of 60 days specified in the main part of s. 125 will commence from that date - Electricity Act, 2003 - s. 125 - Interpretation of Statutes - Contextual interpretation. Words and Phrases: 'Communication' as occurring in r.

98(2) of Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (Procedure, Form, Fee and Record of Proceedings) Rules, 2007 - Connotation of The appellant-Chattisgarh State Electricity Board filed the instant appeal on 24. 12. 2007 challenging the order of the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity passed on 17. 5. 2007. Along with the appeal, the appellant filed an application o for condonation of 160 days' delay. It was stated in the application that the appellant came to know about the order in July, 2007; that the letter dated 7. 6. 2007 signed by the Deputy Registrar of the Tribunal on 11. 6. 2007 informing the appellant that the matter was disposed of on 14. 5. 2007 could not be treated as communication in accordance with the provisions contained in Chapter XVI of the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (Procedure, Form, Fee and Record of Proceedings) Rules, 2007. Respondent No.

3, the Madhya Pradesh State Electricity Board resisted the application contending that even according to appellant's assertion that it came to know about the order in July 2007, in the absence of any explanation by the appellant for remaining silent from July 2007 to December, 2007, the appeal could not be entertained. The questions for consideration before the Court ·were: (i) "Whether s. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be invoked by the Supreme Court for allowing the aggrieved person to file an appeal uls 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 after more than 120 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity? " and (ii) "What is the date of communication of the decision or order of the Tribunal for the purpose of s. 125 of the Electricity Act? " Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. 1.

The Electricity Act, 2003 is a selfcontained comprehensive legislation, which not only regulates generation, transmission and distribution of electricity but also ensures creation of special adjudicatory mechanism for expeditious adjudication of disputes emanating from operation and implementation of the provisions of the Act. The Act excludes the jurisdiction of civil courts qua an order made by the adjudicating officer. Section 111 provides for an appeal against the order of the adjudicating officer or appropriate commission to the Appellate Tribunal within the period prescribed therein. Section 125 lays down that any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Tribunal can file an appeal to this Court within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Tribunal. Proviso to s.

125 empowers this Court to entertain an appeal filed within a further period of 60 days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing appeal within the initial period of 60 days. This shows that the period of limitation prescribed for filing appeals u/ss 111(2) and 125 is substantially different from the period prescribed under the Limitation Act for filing suits etc. The use of the expression 'within a further period of not exceeding 60 days' in the proviso to s. 125 makes it clear that the outer limit for filing an appeal is 120 days. There is no provision in the Act under which this Court can entertain an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal after more than 120 days. [Para 11) [696-H; 697-A-D] ORS. 1. 2. It is evident that the Electricity Act is a special legislation within the meaning of s. 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Therefore, s.

5 pf the Limitation Act cannot be invoked by this Court for entertaining an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal beyond the period of 120 days specified in s. 125 of the Electricity Act and its proviso. Any interpretation of s. 125 of the Electricity Act which may attract applicability of s. 5 of the Limitation Act read with s. 29(2) thereof will defeat the object of the legislation, namely, to provide special limitation for filing an appeal against the decision or order of the Tribunal and proviso to s. 125 will become nugatory. [Para 11 and 16] [697-F; 703-C-E] Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. L. N. Mishra (1974) 2 SCC 133; Union of India v. Popular Construction Company 2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 619 =(2001) 8 SCC 470; Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi 1976 (2) SCR 260 =(1976) 1 SCC 392; Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel 1964 SCR 129 = AIR 1964 SC 1099; Patel Naranbhai Marghabhai v. Dhulabhai Galbabhai 1992 (3) SCR 384 = (1992) 4 SCC 264; Singh Enterprises v.

Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur and others (2008) 3 SCC 70; Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise v. Punjab Fibres Ltd. 2008 (2 ) SCR 861 = (2008) 3 SCC 73; Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Private Limited and another (2009) 5 sec 791, relied on. Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker 1995 (2) Suppl. SCR 1 = (1995) 5 sec 5, held inapplicable. 2. 1. The word 'communication' has neither been defined in the Electricity Act, 2003 nor in the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (Procedure, Form, 'Fee and Record of Proceedings) Rules, 2_002. Therefore, the same deserves to be interpreted by applying the rule of contextual interpretation and keeping in view the language of the relevant provisions. In terms of Rule 98(2), the Deputy Registrar is requfred to send the case file to the Registry for taking steps to prepare copies of the order and their communication to the parties. If Rule 98(2) is read in conjunction with s.

125 of the Electricity Act, it becomes clear that once the factum of pronouncement of order by the Tribunal is made known to the parties and they are given opportunity to obtain a copy thereof, the order will be deemed to have been communicated to the parties and the period of 60 days specified in the main part of s. 125 will commence from that date. Besides, r. 94(2) requires that when the order is reserved, the date of pronouncement shall be notified in the cause list and that shall be a valid notice of pronouncement of the order. Once the order is pronounced after being shown in the cause list with the title of the case and name of the 0 counsel, the same will be deemed to have been communicated to the parties and they can obtain copy through e-mail or by filing an application for certified copy. [Para 18 and 19] [704-C-G; 705-D-E] Assistant Transport Commissioner, Lucknow v. Nand Singh 1980 (1) SCR 131 = (1979) 4 SCC 19, relied on. Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v.

Deputy Land Acquisition Officer 1962 SCR 676 = AIR 1961 SC 1500; Muthiaha Chettiar v. I. T. Commissioner, Madras AIR 1951 Madras 2004; Secretary of State v. Gopisetti Narayanasami ILR 34 Madras 151; and Swaminatha v. Lakshmanan AIR 1930 Madras 490, referred to. Collector of Central Excise, Madras v. Mis. M. M. Rubber and Co. , Tamil Nadu 1991 (3) SCR 862 =(1992) Supp 1 SCC 471, distinguished. 2. 2. In the instant case, even though the name of the counsel for the appellant was not shown in the cause list of 14. 5. 2007 i. e. , the date on which the impugned order & ORS. was pronounc_ed by the Tribunal, the factum of A ' I pronouncement was conveyed by the Registry of the Tribunal, which communication was received in the secretariat of the appellant on 21. 6. 2007. The appellant had come to know about the impugned order on 17. 7. 2007 from another source i. e. , respondent No. 5, s which had sent communication for payment of FLEE charges. Thus, on 21. 6. 2007 or at least on 17. 7.

2007, the appellant had come to know of the order of the Tribunal through proper channel. The preparation of appeal, which bears the date 7. 9. 2007, is a clinching evidence of c the fact that the appellant had not only become aware of the order of the Tribunal, but had obtained copy thereof. The appellant has not offered any tangible explanation as to why the appeal, which was filed only on 24. 12. 2007, could not be filed for more than three and half months 0 after its preparation. Thus, the appeal having been filed after more than 120 days from the date of communication of the Tribunal's order, cannot be entertained. [Para 24] [713-B-H; 714-A-B] Case Law Reference: E (1974) 2 sec 133 relied on para 12 2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 619 relied on para 13 1976 (2) SCR 260 relied on para 13 F 1964 SCR 129 relied on para 13 1992 (3) SCR 384 relied on para 13 (2008) 3 sec 10 relied on para 14 G 2008 (2) SCR 861 relied on para 14 (2009) 5 sec 191 relied on para 15 1995 (2) Suppl.

SCR 1 held inapplicable para 17 H 1962 SCR 676 referred to para 20 1980 (1) SCR 131 relied on para 21 AIR 1951 Madras 2004 referred to para 22 ILR 34 Madras 151 referred to para 22 AIR 1930 Madras 490 referred to para 22 1991 (3) SCR 862 distinguished para 23 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3378 of 2010. From the Judgment & Order dated 17. 5. 2007 of the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity at New Delhi in I. A. No. 4 of 2007 in Appeal No. 21 of 2006. Ravi Shankar Prasad, Suparna Srivastava, Ram Swarup Sharma for the Appellant. C. S. Vaidyanathan, Sakesh Kumar, K. V. Bharathi Upadhyaya for the Responde:'lt. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by G. S. SINGHVI, J. 1.

Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, 'the Limitation Act') can be invoked by this Court for allowing the aggrieved person to file an appeal under Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 (for short, 'the Electricity Act') after more than 120 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (for short, 'the Tribunal') is the question which requires determination in this appeal filed against order dated 17. 5. 2007 passed by the Tribunal in I. A. No. 4 of 2007 in Appeal No. 21 of 2006. 2. Appellant, Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board was established under Section 58 of the M. P. Reorganization Act, 2000. In a sense, it is a successor of Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board insofar as the State of Chhattisgarh is concerned. A dispute arose between the appellant and ORS. [GS. SINGHVI, J. ] respondent No.

3 - Madhya Pradesh State Electricity Board in the matter of payment of FLEE charges to the beneficiaries in the Western Region under the "Frequency Linked Energy Exchange" scheme, which was introduced with effect from 1. 6. 1992. The FLEE charges were payable to the beneficiaries on the basis of monthly advises issued by Western Regional Electricity Board (renamed as Western Regional Board Committee) (respondent No. 5 herein). The matter was considered by respondent No. 1 - Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, which passed an order dated 8. 12. 2005 fixing the liability of the appellant and respondent No. 3 in the matter of payment of FLEE charges. 3. The appellant challenged the aforementioned order in Appeal No. 21/2006, which was allowed by the Tribunal vide its order dated 14. 11. 2006. Soon thereafter, respondent No. 3 filed IA No. 4/2007 for issue of a direction to respondent No.

5 to recalculate FLEE charges in accordance with the Tribunal's ·order in relation to post-reorganization period. By order dated 17. 5. 2007, the Tribunal allowed that application and directed respondent No. 5 to recalculate FLEE charges in accordance with order dated 14. 11. 2006. 4. Feeling aggrieved by the last mentioned order of the Tribunal, the appellant filed this appeal on 24. 12. 2007. Along with the appeal, the appellant filed an application for condonation of 160 days' delay. The reasons for not filing appeal within the period of 60 days specified in Section 125 of the Electricity Act, as disclosed in the application are as under: - (i) The impugned order had been pronounced by the Tribunal on 17. 5. 2007 but the counsel for the appellant did not receive intimation of the said pronouncement and as such he was not aware of the same.

(ii) That the procedure which was being followed by the Tribunal at that time was that the Registry of the Tribunal • used to telephonically give advance intimation to the counsel of the parties regarding pronouncement of the order. (iii) The appellant came to know about the order in July, 2007 when respondent No. 5 sent intimation for payment of FLEE charges to the beneficiaries in the Western Region. Thereupon, the appellant informed its counsel about the impugned order who then sent letter dated 26. 7. 2007 to the Registrar of the Tribunal that intimation regarding pronouncement of the order had not been given to him (the date has been wrongly typed in paragraph 3 of the application as 26. 11. 2007). (iv) Respondent No. 3 had filed a review petition against order dated 14. 11. 2006, which was not decided by the Tribunal along with I. A. No. 4 of 2007 and the same was withdrawn on 25. 10. 2007.

(v) Thereafter, the impugned order was considered and discussed by the appellant and after obtaining legal opinion, it was decided to file an appeal. (vi) In the light of the decision taken by the appellant, the counsel proceeded to prepare the appeal but some delay was caused due to extensive pleadings and voluminous documents. 5. In the reply filed on behalf of respondent No. 3, it has been averred that the impugned order was communicated by the Deputy Registrar of the Tribunal vide his letter dated 11. 6. 2007; that the appellant and the respondents before the Tribunal were informed by the said letter that the matter was disposed of on 14. 5. 2007 and the parties may request for a copy of the order in PDF format through e-mail at registraraptel@nic. in or apply for a certified copy and further that the order would also be available in the Tribunal's website CHATTISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. C. E. R. C. 689 & ORS. [GS. SINGHVI, J.

] by the Deputy Registrar of the Tribunal was received by the appellant on 21. 6. 2007 which was entered in its receipt register at serial No. 2082 and subsequently, the same was received by the office of the Chief Engineer (Commercial) on 29. 6. 2007. Respondent No. 3 has supported this assertion by placing on record photostat copies of the inward register maintained in the office of Secretary of the appellant, which were made available pursuant to an application filed under the Right to Information Act. Respondent No. 3 has then relied upon the appellant's assertion that it came to know about order dated 17. 5. 2007 in July, 2007 and prayed that in the absence of any explanation by the appellant for remaining silent from July, 2007 to December, 2007, the appeal cannot be entertained. As regards the review application, respondent No. 3 has averred that the same has no bearing on the appellant's grievance against order dated 17. 5.

2007 and in the absence of any explanation for the delay after 21. 6. 2007, the appeal should be dismissed as barred by time. 6. In the rejoinder affidavit filed on behalf of the appellant, it has been pleaded that in the absence of communication of order by the Tribunal in accordance with the provisions contained in Chapter XVI of Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (Procedure, Form, Fee and Record of Proceedings) Rules, 2007 (for short, 'the Rules'), the appeal cannot be dismissed as barred by time. It has then been averred that letter dated 7. 6. 2007 of the Tribunal, which was signed by Deputy Registrar on 11. 6. 2007 cannot be treated as communication of order dated 17. 5. 2007. It has been further averred that letter dated 7. 6. 2007 was received in the secretariat of the appellant on 25. 6. 2007 and the same was forwarded to the concerned department on 28. 6. 2007.

In paragraph 6 of the affidavit, it has been averred that officers of the appellant had no knowledge of the impugned order till the receipt of intimation from respondent No. 5 in July 2007 regarding payment to the beneficiaries in the Western Region and, thereafter, steps were taken for filing appeal. ,_ 7. Shri Ravi Shankar Prasad, learned senior counsel for the appellant argued that even though the appeal was filed after more than 120 days counted from the date of the Tribunal's order and, in terms of proviso to Section 125 of the Electricity Act, this Court can extend the time for filing an appeal up to a maximum of 60 days only, power under Section 5 read with Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act can be exercised for condonation of delay beyond the period of 120 days. In support of this argument, Shri Prasad placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Mukri Gopa/an v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayi/ Aboobacker (1995) 5 sec 5.

Learned senior counsel laid considerable emphasis on the fact that by virtue of the impugned order huge liability has been created against the appellant and if the appeal is not entertained, it will suffer irreparable injury. 8. Shri C. S. Vaidyanathan, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent No. 3 argued that in view of the plain language of the proviso to Section 125 of the Electricity Act, this Court has no power to extend the period for filing an appeal beyond 'i 20 days and the provisions of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked for negating the legislative inten ad High Court held that the date of the communication of the order will be the starting point for limitation D of filing an appeal. While approving the view taken by the High Court, this Court observec::l as under: "In our opinion, the judgment of the High Court is right and cannot be interfered with by this Court.

Apart from the E reasons given by this Cpurt in the earlier judgment to the effect that the order must be made known either directly or constructively to the party affected by the order in order to enable him to prefer an appeal if he so likes, we may give one more reason in our judgment and that is this: It is F plain that mere writing an order in the file kept in the office of the Taxation Officer is no order in the eye of law in the sense of affecting the rights of the parties for whom the order is meant. The order must be communicated either ·directly or constructively in the sense of making it known, which may make it possible for the authority to say that G the party affected must be deemed tq have known the order. In a given case, the date of putting the order in communication under certain circumstances may be taken to be the date of the communication of tf?

e order H or the date of the order but ordinarily and generally speaking, the order would be effective against the person affected by it only when it comes to his knowledge either directly or constructively, otherwise not. On the facts stated in the judgment of the High Court, it is clear that the respondent had no means to know about the order of the Taxation Officer rejecting his prayer until and unless he received his letter on October 29, 1964. Within the meaning of Section 15 of the U. P. Motor Vehicle Taxation Act that was the date of the order which gave the starting point for preferring an appeal within 30 days of that date. " (emphasis supplied) 22. In Muthiaha Chettiar v. I. T.

Commissioner, Madras AIR 1951 Madras 2004, a two-Judge Bench of Madras High Court considered the question whether the limitation of one year prescribed for filing revision under Section 33-A (2) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 is to be computed from the date when the order was signed by the Income-tax Commissioner or the date on which the petitioner had an opportunity of coming to know of the order. It was argued on behalf of the department that other provisions of the Act have been amended to provide for appeal within specified time to be counted from the date of the receipt of the order sought to be appealed against, but no such amendment was made in Section 33-A and therefore, the period of limitation will start from the date of order. While rejecting the argument, Rajamannar, C. J. , referred to earlier decisions in Secretary of State v. Gopisetti Narayanasami ILR 34 Madras 151 and Swaminatha v. Lakshmanan AIR 1930 Madras 490 and observed: "...........

The only question that we have to decide is as to whether there is anything in the reasoning of the learned Judges in Secretary of State v. Gopisetti Narayanasami, 34 Mad. 151 : (8 l. C. 398) & Swaminatha v. Lakshmanan, 53 Mad. 491:(A. l. R. (17) 1930 Mad. 490) which makes the CHATTISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. C. E. R. C. & 709 ORS. [GS. SINGHVI, J. ] application of the rule laid down by them dependent on the provisions of a particular statute. We think there is none.

On the other hand, we consider that the rule laid down by the learned Judges in the above two decisions - & we are taking the same view - is based upon a salutary & just principle, namely that, if a person is given a right to resort to the remedy to get rid of an adverse order within a prescribed time, limitation should not be computed from a date earlier than that on which the party aggrieved actually knew of the order or had an opportunity of knowing the order & therefore, must be presumed to have had knowledge of the order. " ... 23. In Collector of Central Excise, Madras v. Mis. M. M. Rubber and Co. , Tamil Nadu (1992) Supp 1 SCC 471, a three-Judge Bench highlighted a distinction between making of an order and communication thereof to the affected person in the context of Section 35-E (3) and (4) of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

The Bench noted the scheme of Section 35, distinction between sub-sections (3) and (4) thereof and held that in case where the order is subject to appeal, the same is required to be communicated to the affected person. Relevant portions of that judgment are extracted below: "5. Before we discuss the arguments of the learned counsel, it is necessary to set out some relevant provisions in the Act. Section 35 of the Act provides for an appeal by a person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under the Act by a Central Excise Officer lower than a Collector of Central Excise and that such an appeal will have to be filed "within three months from the date of the communication to him of such decision or order". Subsection (5) of Section 35-A requires that on the aisposal of the appeal, the Collector (Appeals) shall communicate the order passed by him to the appellant, the adjudicating authority and the Collector of Central Excise.

Ser;;tion 35- B provides for a right of appeal to any person aggrieved ·~ by, among other orders, (1) an order passed by the Collector (Appeals) under Section 35-A and (2) a decision or order passed by the Collector of Central Excise as an adjudicating authority. Such an appeal will have to be filed "within three months from the date on which the order sought to be appealed against is communicated to the Collector of Central Excise or as the case may be the other party preferring the appeal". The Appellate Tribunal also is required to send a copy of the order passed in the appeal to the Collector of Central Excise and the other party to the appeal. .................... .. 8. At this stage itself we may state that sub-section (4) of the Act provides that the adjudicating authority shall file the application before the Tribunal in pursuance of the order .

made under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) "within a period of three months from the date of communication of the order under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) to the adjudicating authority". 9. The words "from the date of decision or order'' used with reference to the limitation for filing an appeal or revision under certain statutory provisions had come up for consideration in a number of cases. We may state that the ratio of the decisions uniformly is that in the case of a person aggrieved filing the appeal or revision, it shall mean the date of communication of the decision or order appealed against. However, we may note a few leading cases on this aspect. 10. Under Section 25 of the Madras Boundary Act, 1860 the starting point of limitation for appeal by way of suit allowed by that section was the passing of the Survey Officer's decision and in two of the earliest cases, namely, Annamalai Chetti v. Col. J. G. Cloete and Seshama v.

Sankara it was held that the decision was passed when it was communicated to the parties. In Secretary of State for & ORS. [G. S. SINGHVI, J. ] India in Council v. Gopisetti Narayanaswami Naidu Garu construing a similar provision in the Survey and Boundary Act, 1897 the same High Court held that a decision cannot properly be said to be passed until it is in some way pronounced or 'published under such circumstances the parties affected by it have a reasonable opportunity of knowing what it contains. ''Till then though it may be written out, signed and dated, it is nothing but a decision which the officer intends to pass. It is not passed so long it is open to him to tear off what he has written and write something else. " In Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v.

Deputy Land Acquisition Officer construing the proviso to Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act which prescribed for applications seeking reference to the court, a time-limit of six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 12(2) or within six months from. the date of 0 the Collector's award whichever first expires, this Court held that the six months period will have to be calculated from the date of communication of the award. In Asstt. Transport Commissioner, Lucknow v. Nand Singh construing the provision of Section 15 of the U. P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, it was held that for an aggrieved party the limitatio~ will run from the date when the order was communicated to him. 11. The ratio of these judgments were applied in interpreting Section 33-A(2) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 in Muthia Chettiar v. CITwith reference to a right of revision provided to an aggrieved assessee.

Section 33- A( 1) of the Act on the other hand authorised the Commissioner to suo mote call for the records of any proceedings under the Act in which an. order has been passed by any authority subordinate to him and pass such order thereon as he thinks fit. The proviso, however, stated that the Commissioner shall not revise any order under that sub-section "if the order (sought to be revised) has been made more than one year previously". Construing this provision the High Court in Muthia Chettiar case held that the power to call for the records and pass the order will cease with the lapse of one year from the date of the order by the subordinate authority and the ratio of date of the knowledge of the order applicable to an aggrieved party is not applicable for the purpose of exercising suo moto power. Similarly in another decision reported in Viswanathan Chettiar v.

CIT construing the time-limit for completion of an assessment under Section 34(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, which provided that it shall be made "within four years from the end of the year in which the income, profit and gains were first assessable, " it was held that the time-limit of four years for exercise of the power should be calculated with reference to the date on which the assessment or reassessment was made and not the date on which such assessment or reassessment order made under Section 34(2) was served on the assessee. 13. So far as the party who is affected by the order or decision for seeking his remedies against the same, he should be made aware of passing of such order.

Therefore courts have uniformly laid down as a rule of law that for seeking the remedy the limitation starts from the date on which the order was communicated to him or the date on which it was pronounced or published under such circumstances that the parties affected by it have a reasonable opportunity of knowing of passing of the order and what it contains. The knowledge of the party affected by such a decision, either actual or constructive is thus an essential element which must be satisfied before the decision can be said to have been concluded and binding on him. Otherwise the party affected by it will have no means of obeying the order or acting in conformity with it or of appealing against it or otherwise having it set aside. This is based upon, as observed by Rajmannar, C. J. in Muthia Chettiar v. CIT "a salutary and just principle". The application of this rule so far as the & ORS. [GS. SINGHVI, J.

] aggrieved party is concerned is not dependent on the A provisions of the particular statute, but it is so under the general law. " (emphasis supplied) B 24. Reverting to the facts of this case, we find that even though the name of the counsel for the appellant was not shown in the cause list of 14. 5. 2007 i. e. , the date on which the impugned order was pronounced by the Tribunal, the factum of pronouncement was conveyed to the parties including the appellant vide letter dated 7. 6. 2007, which was signed by the C Deputy Registrar on 11. 6. 2007 and they were informed that they can obtain copy through e-mail or make an application for certified copy. Undisputedly, that letter was received in the secretariat of the appellant on 21. 6. 2007. The appellant had come to know about the impugned order in July 2007 from D another source i. e. , respondent No. 5, which had sent communication for payment of FLEE charges. The communication sent by respondent No.

5 was received by the appellant on 17. 7. 2007. It is, thus, evident that on 21. 6. 2007 or at least on 17. 7. 2007, the appellant had come to know E through proper channel that the order has been pronounced by the Tribunal in I. A. No. 4/2007. It is not clear from the record whether the appellant had applied for certified copy or obtained the one through e-mail, but this much is evident that the appellant did obtain/receive a copy of order dated 17. 5. 2007. F If that was not so, the appellant could not have flied appeal under Section 125 of the Electricity Act. The preparation of appeal, which bears the date 7. 9. 2007 is a clinching evidence of the fact that the appellant had not only become aware of the order of the Tribunal, but had obtained copy thereof. However, instead G of filing appeal within 60 days from the date of receipt of letter dated 7. 6. 2007 sent by the registry of the Tribunal or the communication sent by respondent No.

5, the appellant chose to file appeal only on 24. 12. 2007 and that too despite the fact that the same was prepared on 7. 9. 2007. The appellant has H A not offered any tangible explanation as to why the appeal could not be fifed for more than three and half months after its preparation. Thus, there is no escape from the conclusion that the appeal has been filed after more than 120 days from the date of communication of the Tribunal's order and, as such, the B same cannot be entertained. 25. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs. R. P. Appeal dismissed.