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CHHOTABHAI JETHABAI PATEL AND CO. v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

Citation: [1953] 1 S.C.R. 476; 1952 INSC 80

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN , N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI

Judgment date:

Case summary

1952 INSC 80. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1952-12-22. CHHOTABHAI JETHABAI PATEL AND CO. v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH. Read the judgment and case...

Judgment text

476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953] 1952 CHHOTABHAI JETHABAI PATEL AND CO. Dec. 2i. • v. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH (and other cases) (MEHR CHAND . MAHAJAN, 0HANDRASEKHARA AIYAR and BHAGWATI JJ. ] ]fadhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Bights (Estates, Mahals and Alienated Lands) Act, 1950, ss. 3, 4-Bights t , ~· 6J . - 484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953] ws2 pointed ont at page 217 of Volume I of Baden- F' . Ohh , bh . Powell's ·Land Systems of B1·itish India, where 1. rni o~a ai Jethabai Patel . be says; ·and Co. " The first thing that will strike the student is the v. nse of the term' proprietary right' in these pages and Th',,/! ate of in Indian Revenue Books generally. It does not a hya occur in text-books on English law or J"nrisprudence. Pradesh. I presume that the nse of such a phrase is due to the Ohandrasekhara feeling that we rarely acknowledge anything like a Aiya1· J. complete unfettered right vested in any one person.

The interest in the· soil has come to be virtually shared between two or even more grades, the cause of which we just now discussed. It is true that, in many cases, only one person is called 'landlo"rd ' or ' actual proprietor' but his right is limited; the rest of the right, so to speak, is in the hands of the other grades, even though they are called 'tenants' or by some vague title such as 'tenure-holders. ' In many cases, as we have seen, this division of right is accentuated by the use of terms like' sub-proprietor' or ' proprietor of his holdip. g'. The 'proprietary right' seems then a natural expression for the interest held by a land- lora, when that interest is not the entire 'bundle of rights' (which in the aggregate make np an absolute or complete estate) bnt only some of them, the re- mainder being enjoyed by other persons. '' The definitions given in the Act do not abrogate or vary this meaning.

The respondent State cannot invoke in its aid section 3, sub-clause (1) of the Act which speaks of the vesting of proprietary rights free of all encumbrances, because the rights of the peti- tioners either as buyers or lessees or licensees are not encumbrances as ordinarily understood. The last part of clause (a) of section 4 ( L) indicates that mortgage debts and charges on the proprietary rig. ht are meant by encumbrances. In this view, it becomes unnecessary to consider the question as to when title in the property passes to the transferee. Section 4, sub-section (3) of the Indian Sale of Goods Act which lays down that in . ~h~ ca,se of saje of future g~ods the cop. tract 11/moun~s • ·J S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 485 only to an agreement to sell does not seem to be 19 5 2 applicable to the contracts and agreements here, asp· 0 -,, t bl . h d " f d " d fi d · b '""' ' '° a iai t e goo s are not uture goo s as e ne m su .

- Jethabai Patel clause (6) of the Act which states that they mean and Go. goods to·be manufactured or produced or acquired by v. the seller after the making of the contract of sale. The State of BenJ·amin says in his treatise on Sale (8th Edition) Madhya P1'adesh. at page 136: "Things not yet existing which may be sold (that Ghandrasekhara is to say, a right to which may be immediately grant- Aiya,. J. ed) are those which are said to have a potential exist- ence, that is, things which are the natural produce, or expected increase of some thing already owned or possessed by the seller. A man may sell the crop of hay to be grown in his field, the wool to be clipped from his sheep at a future time, the milk that his cows will yield in the coming month, and similar things. Of such things there could be, according to the authorities, an immediate grant or.

assignment, whereas there could only be an agreement to sell where the subject of the contract is something to be afterwards acquired, as the wool of any sheep, or the mil'k of any cows, which the seller might buy within the year, or any goods to which he might obtain title within the next six months. " The goods covered by the present petitions are goods which have a potential existence, and accord- ing to the decisions discussed by the learned author, there can be a sale of a present right to the goods as soon as they come into existence. Whether title passes on the date of the contract itself or later is really dependent on the intention of the parties, and as already stated, in these petitions the stipulated consideration has passed from the transferees to the proprietors, and possession also has been taken. We hold that the respondent has no right to inter- fere with the rights of the several petitioners under the contracts a.

nd agreements in their favour set out in their petitions, and we hereby issue a writ prohi- biting the State from interfering in any manner whatsoever with the enjoyment of those rights by the 486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953] ! 962 petitioners. In cases where the periods under the F . 0 -hh bli' . contracts have expired, or where the proprietors have i. rm ota ai- . ) h. Jethabai Patel st1l to recover anyt mg from the transferees after and ca. the date of vesting, the State will be at perfect liberty v. to assert and enforce its rights standing in the The State of shoes of the proprietors. The respondent will pay Madhya the petitioners their respective costs. Pradesh. Chandra! ekhara Aiyar J. 1953 Deo. 22. Petition allowed. Agent for the . petitioners in Petitions Nos. 232, 233, 286, 309 and 320 : Rajinder Narain. Agent for the petitioners in Petitions Nos. 350 and 351: M. S. K. Sastri. Agent for the petitioners in Petitions Nos. 319, 354 and 490: Harbans Singh.

Agent for the respondents in all petitions : G. H. R~jadhyaksha. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS. v. K. SRINIVASAN AND K. GOI'ALAN. [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, DAS and BHAGWATI JJ. ] Indian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922), ss. 2 (1), 25 (3) & (4), 26 (2)-Fir'ni charged under Act of 1918-Acc01inting year ending . -l, on 30th June each year-Transfer of bnsiness on 1st March, 1940 -Exemption from tax under s. 25 (4)- Period for which exemption ca1' be granted-"End of previoZ<s year", meaning of-Interpretation ' -Directions in Inoon~e -tax Manual, value of, Two brothers who had been carrying on in partnership a business, which ha. a been assessed to income-tax under the Indian Income-tax Act oi 1918 and the accounting year of which was a period of 12 months ending on the 30th June each year, transfer• red the business to a limited company on the 1st March, 1940, and claimed in the assessment Jar the year 1940-41 that under s.

25 (4) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, they were not liable to pay income-tax on the income of their business from 1st July, 1938, up to 29th February, 1940, a period of 20 months. The Income-tax authorities were of the view that exemption could be claimed only

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