CHURCH OF NORTH OF INDIA v. LAVAJIBHAI RATANJIBHAI AND ORS

Citation: [2005] 3 S.C.R. 1037

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: B.P. SINGH, S.B. SINHA

Case summary

CHURCH OF NORTH OF INDIA v. LAVAJIBHAI RATANJIBHAI AND ORS.pdf

Judgment text

CHURCH OF NORTH OF INDIA v. LAVAJIBHAI RATANJIBHAI AND ORS. MAY 3, 2005 [B. P. SINGH AND S. B. SINHA, JJ. ] Public Trusts : Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950-Sections80, 2(13), 17, 19, 21, 22, 26, 36, 41, 51 & 79-Bar ofjurisdiction ofCivil Court under S.

80--Extent of- 'Brethren Church' registered as society under the Societies Registration Act --as also as public trust under the Bombay Public Trusts Act-Consequent merger ofchurches in name ofAppellant-Civil suit filed a) for declaration that the 'Brethren Church' had ceased to exist and Appellant was its legal successor with rights over its property andb) for injunction against obstruction in functioning of Appellant-Maintainability of-Held, not maintainable- Averments made in the plaint indicate that the dispute was in relation to management ofthe churches as a religious trust and not as a society-Control and management of the religious trusts vests in the Charity Commissioner ·appointed under the BPT Act-BPT Act is a complete code in itself-Civil Court will have no jurisdiction in relation to a matter where the statutory authorities have the requisite jurisdiction-Societies Registration Act, 1860-- Section 13-Code ofCivil Procedure, 1908-Section 9.

The 'Brethren Church' was established for the propagation of the protestant faith ofChristian religion. It was registered as a religious society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 in 1944 and also as a public trust under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 (BPT Act) after the same came into force. The 'Brethren Church' was allegedly dissolved and unified Church by the name of "The Church of Northern India" (CNI) i. e. Appellant was formed. However the dissolution of the 'Brethern Church' was disputed and the functioning of the Appellant obstructed.

Consequently, a civil suit was filed praying a) that it be declared that the 'Brethren Church' had ceased to exist; b) that it be declared that Appellant is the legal continuation and successor of the said 'Brethren Church' together with the right, title, claim, interest in or over its properties and the constitution, decisions and resolutions of the Appellant, its Synod and Gujarat Diocesan Council are binding on all the Pastorates on Gujarat which were functioning as local Churches or congregations under the 'Brethren Church' and c) that the defendants and their associates be restrained by a perpetual injunction from acting in any manner contrary to the constitution, decisions and resolutions of the Appellant, its Synod and Gujarat Diocesan.

Council and from obstructing in any manner the plaintiffs and other members/ office bearers of these pastorates under the Appellant in acting in accordance with the said constitution, decisions and res~lutions and in their use, enjoyment and possession of the Churches and their properties. The question which arose for consideration in the present appeal is whether the suit involved questions within the exclusive domain of the Charity Commissioner appointed under the BPT Act and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred in terms of Section 80 of the BPT Act. Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD : 1. The question as regard ouster of a jurisdiction of a Civil Court must be construed having regard to the Scheme of the Act as also the object and purport it seeks to achieve. Further, a plea of bar to jurisdiction of a Civil Court must be considered having regard to the conte~t,ions raised in the . ,1aint.

For the said purpose, averments disclosing cause'·of action and the reliefs sought for therein must be considered in their entirety. The Court may not be justified in determining the question, one way or the other, only having regard to the reliefs claimed de'hors the factual averments made in the plaint. When the plaint read as a whole · d~ not disclose material facts giving rise to a cause of action which can be entertained hv a civil court, it may be rejected in terms of Order 7, Rule 11 of the CPC. The same, however, would not mean that in a given J case if the court has the jurisdiction to determine a part of the relief I-claimed, it will not confine itself thereto and reject the plaint in its entirety. (1059-C, D, E; 1061-A-BI Dhulabhai and Ors. v. The State ofMadhya Pradesh and Anr. , (1968) 3 SCR 662, Rajasthan Siate Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. Krishna Kant and Ors. , [1995) 5 SCC 75, Dwarka Prasad Agarwal v. Ramesh Chand . - Agarwal, .

(2003) 6 SCC 220, Sahebgouda v. Ogeppa, (2003) 6 SCC 151, Dhruv Green Field ltd. v. Hukam Singh, (2002) 6 SCC 416; Swamy Atmananda and Ors. v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam and Ors. , (2005) 4 SCALE 116 and Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and Ors. v. Assistant Charity CHURCHOFNORTH OF INDIA v. LAVAJIBHAI RATANJIBHAI 1039 Commissioner and Ors. , (20041 3 SCC 137, relied on. 2. 1. In the present case, in the plaint itself it is accepted that the Church which was registered as a society under the Societies Registration Act was a public trust as defined under Section 2(13) of the BPT Act. The plaint nowhere suggests that the society and the trust had ever been treated as two different entities. No case has been made in the plaint to the effect that the society as registered under the Societies Registration Act plays any role or discharges any function which is not done by the trustees of the trust.

It also does not appear from a perusal of the plaint that the society and the trust comprises of different persons or for different functions to perform. (1065-C, D, E) 2. 2. In fact the Appellants have categorically admitted that the Memorandum of Association of the Snciety itself became the deed of trust. It also stands admitted that only with a view to have one body to administer and manage the properties, the trust so created by the society was also registered. It is not a case where the trust was created for the benefit of the society. (1068-B, CJ 2. 3. It is not alleged that whereas the properties belong to the trust it was managed by the society. The plaint furthermore does not disclose that the decision as regard dissolution of the churches and congregation of Brethren Church had been taken by anybody other than the trustees. The committees constituted for the aforementioned purpose, viz.

, Continuation Committee and Negotiating Committee, evidently were represented by the authorities of the congregations and not ofany society. There is nothing on record to show that the concerned churches were being managed by the societies registered under the Societies Registration Act It is clear that the properties have vested in the trustees and not in the governing body of the society. [1065-E, F; 1066-C, BJ Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College, Delhi v. State ofDelhi (Now Delhi Administration) and Anr. , AIR (1962) SC 458, Dharam Dutt and Ors. v. Union ofIndia and Ors. , [200411 SCC 712 and 11/achi Devi (Dead) By LRs. and Ors. v. Jain Society, Protection of Orphans India and Ors. , (2003) 8 SCC 413, relied on. " Athmanathaswami Devasthanam v. K Gopalaswami Ayyangar, AIR (1965) SC 338, referred to. ........ 3. The suit in question also does not conform to the provisions of Section 13 of the Societies Registration Act.

Unless a suit is filed in terms of Section 13 of the said Act, the Society is not dissolved. Even assuming that the society stands dissolved in terms of its Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association, the same would not ipsofacto mean that the properties could be adjusted amongst the members of the society in terms of the provisions of the said Act. Concededly, the properties of the trust being properties of the religious trust had vested in such trust. Such a provision also exist in the BPT Act. Thus, only because the society has been dissolved, ipso facto the properties belonging to the trust cannot be said to have been adjusted. The Appellants, ~hus have averred in the plaint that the suit relates to the property of the trust and their administration. If the properties of the churches did not belong to the society, the Appellant cannot claim the same as their successor. The plaint has to be read meaningfully.

So done, it leads to the only conclusion that the dispute was in relation to the management of the church~s as religious trust and. not as a society. Even if it is contended that the administration of the property would mean the properties of the Brethren Church both as a trust and as a society, still then having regard to the legal position, the property belonging exclusively to the trust, the suit will not be maintainable. [1066-D, E, F, G, H; 1067-A) . --fl 4. L The BPT Act provides for finality and conclusiveness of the order passed by the Charity Commissioner in Sections 21(2), 22(3), 26, 36, 41(2), 51(4) and 79(2). Such finality clause would lead to a conclusion that the Civil Court. 's jurisdiction is excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Courts would normally do in a Civil suit. In this case, this Court is not concerned with a dispute as regard absolute title of the trust ·property. It is alsc. .

iOt concerned with the question as regard creation of any right by the trust in a third party which would be otherwise beyond the jurisdiction of the Charity Commissioner. It is also not a case where the plaintiffs made a complaint that the provisions of the BPT Act were not complied-with or the statutory tribunal had not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. In fact no order has been passed on the Appellant's application for changes in the entries made in the registers maintained under Section 17 of the Act. [1068-E, F, G, HJ -- 4. 2. The BPT Act provides for express exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. In fact, the trustee of a public trust is enjoined with a statutory duty to make an application for registration wherein all CHURCHOF NORTH OF INDIA v.

LAVAJIBHAI RATANJIBHAI 104J necessary descriptions of movable and immovable property belonging to the trust including their description and particulars for the purpose of identification are required to be furnished. Section 19 of the BPT Act provides for an inquiry for registration with a view to ascertaining inter alia the mode of succession to the office of the trustee as also whether any property is the property of such trust. It is only when the statutory authority satisfies itself as regard the genuineness of the trust and the properties held by it, an entry is made in the registers and books, etc. maintained in terms of Section 17 of the BPT Act in consonance with the provisions of Section 21 thereof. Such an entry is final and conclusive. Changes can be brought about only in terms of Section 22 thereof. (1068-H; 1069-A, B, C, DI 4. 3.

A change notice having been given, it would now be for the appropriate authority to consider the matter and if a change has occurred, a finding is required to be arrived which must contain the reasons therefor. The defendants are disputing that any such change in accordance with law·was effected. An order passed by Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner is appealable. Yet again, when an amendment is made in the entry in the register, the same would be final and conclusive. Even a power exists for holding a further inquiry. (1069-D, El 4. 4. Section 31 of the BPT Act bars a suit to enforce a right on behalf of a public trust. Appellant got itself registered as a public trust in the year 1981. A suit evidently was filed by the plaintiffs in the year 1980 because Appellant was not then entitled to file a suit.

It may be true that the suit was filed under Order 1, Rule 8 of the CPC but therein the question as to whether the Appellant herein, being a registered trust became entitled to the properties of Brethren Church could not have been gone into. What is prohibited is to enforce a right on behalf of a public trust. When the plaintiffs intended to enforce a right on behalf of the Appellant, the suit was evidently not maintainable. (1069-F, GI 4. 5. Furthermore, the purported resolutions of the churches affiliated to the Brethren Church and merger thereof with the Appellant, having regard to the provisions of the Act was required to be done in consonance with the provisions thereof. It is not necessary to consider as to whether such dissolution of the churches and merger thereof in the Appellant would amount to alienation of immovable property but even suth alienation is prohibited in law. The control and management of the religious trusts vests in the Charity Commissioner.

The trustees of the Trust are statutorily enjoined with a duty to render all cooperation to the Charity Commissioner. The directions issued by the Charity Commissioner to the trustees are binding. Dissolution of a trust is a matter which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Charity Commissioner. (1069-H; 1070-A, BJ Dhu/abhai and Ors. v. The State ofMadhya Pradesh and Anr. , (19681 3 SCR 662, relied on. 5. 1. Prayer (a) in the plaint is for a declaration. Such declaration cannot be granted by a civil court as regard succession of the District Church of Brethren as the same was a religious trust registered under the BPT Act. (1070-CJ 5. 2. Prayer (b) of the plaint also could not have been granted, as the question as to whether the applicant is the legal continuation and successor of the First District Church of Brethren is a matter which would fall for exclusive determination of Charity Commissioner keeping in view the provisions of the deed of trust as regard its succession.

It would necessarily follow that whether the First Appellant became a legal successor of the properties held by the First District Church of Brethren could not also have been granted. The decision and resolution purported to have been adopted by the Synod and Gujarat Diocesan Council are binding on all churches or not would again be a question which could have been gone into by the Charity Commissioner as the same had direct bearing not only with t. he administration and management of the Church registered with it but also related to the properties held by it. Such a decision of the Charity Commissioner is again final and conclusive subject to the decision of the. appellate authority, viz. , Bombay Revenue Tribunal. (1070:-D, E, Fl 5. 3. Grant of prayer (c) for perpetual injunction would also give rise to adjudication on the question as to whether the Appellant had the legal right to own the properties of the First District Church of Brethren and.

administer or manage the same although at the relevant time it was not registered trust and although no amendment had been effected in the registers and books maintained by the Charity Commissioner in terms of Sect~on 17 read with Sections 21 and 22 of the BPT Act. "fhe plaintiffs with a view to obtain an order of injunction furthermore were required to establish that they could file a suit ,for enforcement of right of the Appellant as a religious trust and such a legal right vests either in the plaintiff or in the Appellant indirectly. Such a prayer, related to the CHURCHOFNORTH OF INDIA v. LAVAJIBHAI RATANJIBHAI }043 possession of the property, comes squarely within the purview of the BPT Act.

If the question as regard recovery of possession of the property belonging to a public trust squarely falls within the purview of Section 50 of the Act, had such application been filed before the Charity Commissioner he was required to go into the question as to whether the plaintiffs are persons having interest in the trust and whether a consent should be given to them to maintain a suit. Only when, inter a/ia, such consent is granted, a suit could have been filed interms of Section 51 of the Act. In the event of refusal to give consent, the persons interested could have preferred an appeal. Yet again the question as regard existence of trust is a matter which squarely falls within the purview of Section 79 of the Act. There is no doubt that the Charity Commissioner was impleaded as a party at a later stage of the suit only with a view to fulfill the requirements of Sub-section (3) of Section 50 of the BPT Act. (1070-G-H; 1071-A, B, C, DJ Virupakshayya Shankarayya v.

Neelakanta Shivacharya Pattadadevaru, (1995) Supp 2 SCC 531, Narmadabai and Anr. v. Trust Shri Panchvati Balaji Mandir and Ors. , (1995) Supp 3 SCC 676 and Shree Gol/aleshwar Dev and Ors. v. Gangawwa Korn Shantayya Math and Ors. , (1985) 4 SCC 393, referred to. 6. 1. The provisions of the BPT Act and the Scheme thereof leave no manner of doubt that the BPT Act is a complete code in itself. It provides for a complete machinery for a person interested in the trust to put forward his claim before the Charity Commissioner who is competent to go into the question and to prefer appeal if he feels aggrieved by any decision. The bar of jurisdiction created under Section 80 of the Act clearly ... ,.. points out that a third party cannot maintain a suit so as to avoid the rigours of the provisions of the Act. The matter, however, would be different if the property is not a trust property in the eye of law.

The civil court's jurisdiction may not be barred as it gives rise to a jurisdictional question. If a property did not validly vest in a trust or if a trust itself is not valid in law, the authorities under the Act will have no jurisdiction to determine the said question. (1072-C, D, E) 6. 2. With a view to determine the question as regard exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Court in terms of the provisions of the Act, the Court has to consider what, in substance, and not merely in form, is the nature of the claim made in the suit and the underlying object in seeking the real relief therein. If for the purpose of grant of an appeal, the Court comes to t~e conclusion that the question is required to be determined or dealt with by an authority under the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court must be held to have been ousted. The questions which ate required to be determined are within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities whether simple or complicated.

Section 26 of the Act must be read in that c. ontext as it specifically refers to those questions wherewith a court of competent jurisdiction can deal with and if the same is not expressly or impliedly barred~ Once a decision is arrived at, having regard to the nature of the claim as also the reliefs sought for, that Civil Court has no jurisdiction, Section 26 per force will have no application whatsoever. 6. 3. Civil Court will have no jurisdiction in relatic;-n to a matter whereover the statutory authorities have the requisite jurisdiction. On the other hand, if a question arises, which is outside the purview of the Act or in rellltion to a matter, unconnected with the administration or possession of the trust property, the Civil Court may have jurisdiction. In this case, having regard to the nature of the lis,. the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was clearly barred. Ramesh Chand Ardawatiwa v. Anil Panjwani, [20031 7 SCC 350, distinguished. State of Madras v.

Kunnakudi Melamatam and Anr. , AIR (1965) SC 1570, Sri Vedagiri Lakshmi Narasimha Swami Temple v. Jnduru Pattabhirami Reddi, AIR (1967) SC 781, Chiranji/al Shrilal Goenka (Deceased) Through LRs. v. Jasjit Singh and Ors. , (19931 2 SCC 507, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Anr.. v. Krishna Kant and Ors. , [1995) 5 SCC 75, Sahebgouda (Dead) ByLRs. and Ors. v. Ogeppa andOrs. , (2003) 6 SCC 151, NDMC v. Satish Chand (Deceased) By LR. Ram Chand, (2003) 10 SCC 38, . F K. Shamrao and Ors. v. Assistant Charity Commissioner, (2003) 3 SCC 563, Yeshwantrao Laxmanrao Ghatge and Anr. v. Baburao Bala Yadav (Dead) By LRs. , (1978) I SCC 669, Suresh Ramniwas Mantri and Anr. v. Mohd. lftequaroddin s! o Mohd Badroddin, (1999) 2 Mh. L. J. 131, Mahibubi Abdul Aziz and Ors. v. Sayed Abdul Majid and Ors. , (2001) 2 Mh. L. J. 512, Keki Pestronji Jamadar and Anr. v. Khodadad Merwan Irani and Ors. , AIR (1973) (Born) 130 and Nagar Wachan Mandir, Pandharpur v.

Akbaralli Abdulhusen and Sons and Ors. , (1994) 1 MhW 280, referred to. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 9419 of2003. From the Judgment and Order dated 21. 3. 2003 of the Gujarat High Court in $;A. No. 303 of 1986. CHURCHOF NORTHOF INDIAv. LAVAJIBHAI RATANJIBHAI [S. B. SINHA, J. ] }045 WITH I. A. Nos. 5-10 of 2005. C. A. Sundaram, Ms. Rohini, Sashank Kumar, Ms. Manjula Gupta with him for the Appellant. K. Ramamoorthy, Huzefa Ahmadi, MJ. Marchant, Ejaz Maqbool, Nakul Dewan, Ms. Saloni Sinha, Abhimit Sinha, Vikash Singh, M. N. Shroff, Naveen • Chawla, D. M. Nargolkar and Shivaji M. Jadhav with him for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S. B. SINHA, J. INTRODUCTION The extent of bar ofjurisdiction of Civil Court under Section 80 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as 'the BPT Act') , is the question involved in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 21. 03.

2003 passed by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad , in S. A. No. 303 of 1986. BACKGROUND FACT: The basic fact of the matter is not much in dispute. In or about 1895, some American Missionaries established a religious institution (Church) at Valsad for propagation of protestant faith ofChri! :itian religion and to establish and manage the churches for the people professing that faith. The object of the 'Brethren Church' was to propagate the work of the church of the brethren in western India in order to reveal Christ by means of evangelistic, educational, medical, literary, industrial school, social and charitable activities leading to the establishment of the kingdom of God. A Continuation Committee is said to have been appointed in the year 1930 by the representatives of the Brethren Church and other churches in a Round Table Conference held in New Delhi with a view to consider the modalities and other details for amalgamation of churches.

The Committee is said to have worked out a broad basis for the unification of churches which was ' accepted by the participant churches whereupon a new committee came into being in the year 1951. The First District Church of the Brethren in India (Brethren Church) was registered as a religious society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 bearing Registration No. 1202/44; the object whereof was to promote the work of the church of the brethren in Western India with the same object wherefor the church was established.

Another Round Table Conference is said to have been held in the year 1951 at New Delhi resulting in appointment of a new committee known as 'Negotiating Committee' in order to continue deliberations for the union ofchurches; five other associations were included in the Committee, namely, The Council ofthe Baptist Churches in North India, The Church of India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon, The Methodist Church (British and Australian Conference), The Methodist Church in Sou_them Asia and The United Church of Northern India. The. Brethren Church (First District Church ofthe Brethren) was registered as a public trust in Gujarat bearing No. E-643, Bharuch in tenns of the BPT Act.

The Negotiating Committee made its final recommendations which came to be known as the '4th Plan ofthe Union' which was published in a book entitled 'Plan of Church Union in North India and Pakistan'; the principal recommendation of the Committee being that all the six uniting churches should be dissolved and united to become one church to be known as "The Church of Northern India" (hereinafter referred to as "the CNI) which should be the legal continuation and successor of the united churches and all the properties, assets, obligations etc. thereof would vest in or devolve on CNI. The booklet of the 4th Plan is said to have been circulated to the governing bodies of the uniting churches with a view to enable them to deliberate thereover and to take appropriate decision in that behalf. On or about 17. 02. 1970, a Resolution bearing No. 70/08 is said to have been passed by the majority of members for effecting the dissolution as a society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860.

The Negotiating Committee thereafter on or about 29. 11. 1970 took a decision to formally inaugurate the CNI at Nagpur. The Brethren Church allegedly placed the said Resolution No. 70/08 at the altar wherein it was explicitly affirmed that the CNI shall be deemed to be the_legal continuation and successor of the bre~hren church and the rights, titles, claims, estates and the interests of the church together with its privileges and obligations shall vest in the CNI as its legal heir on or from the date ofinauguration. The Church ofNorth India Trust Association was registered as a company under the Companies Act, 1956, in the year 1976. The original defendant Nos. 1 to 4 who were said to be initially part of the CNI and were parties to the resolution dated 17. 02. 1970 raised a contention that the Brethren Church continued to exist.

They started Qbstructing the functioni'1g of the CNI, and in particular the worship in churches, and asserted that the First ~rethren Church had not been dissolved and continued and they represented the same. CHURCHOFNORTH OF INDIA'" LAVAJIBHAI RATANJIBlIAI [S. B. SINHA, J. ] l047 The original plaintiffs, namely, Ambelal Okarial Patel, Shantilal Lakshmichand Purani, Bishop T. L. Christachari and Samuel Nagarji Bhagat (since deceased) said to be the former office bearers of the Brethren Church filed a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Bharuch, marked as Civil Suit No. 72 of 1979. The CNI was impleaded as defendant No. 5 therein, although no relief B' thereagainst was claimed contending that it was a necessary and/or a proper paity. The Brethren Church were not made parties in the said suit. It is stated at the Bar that the said churches were impleaded at a later stage of the proceedings but the said applications were later on dismissed. The original defendant No.

4 in his written statement filed in the said suit took a categorical C. stand that there had been no dissolution of the Brethren Church and their separate entity was not lost. According to the said defendant they were temporarily suspended till it was revived again and, thus, they were entitled to work for and on behalf of the Brethren Church. In the said proceedings, certain interim orders were passed wherewith we are not concerned. However, with a view to complete the narration of facts, we may notice that the CNI filed an application for its registration before the Charity Commissioner in terms ofthe provisions of the BPT Act, which was granted by an order dated 12. 5. 1980 with effect from 19. l l. l97l. The CNI thereafter filed a change report before the Charity Commissioner on or about l 5. l. 198 l. Admittedly, the said application has not yet been disposed of.

While things stood thus, the Charity Commissioner was impleaded as a party in the suit and in its written statement a plea was raised that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred in terms of Section 80 of the BPT Act contending : "4. In view of provisions of Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. The question whether or not a trust of particular property is the property of such trust, is to be decided exclusively by the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner appointed under the Act, the Assistant Charity of the Brethren "as a public trust at No. E-643 (Bharuch) under the Bombay Public Trusts ct, 1950. The decision ofthe Assistant Charity G ' Commissioner, Bharuch unless set aside as provided under the Act, is final and conclusive. It is further submitted that the jurisdiction of the Hon'ble Court is also barred under Section 80 of the Act. The plaintiffs are, therefore, not entitled to the reliefs as prayed for by them. The suit, deserves to be dismissed.

" PROCEEDINGS : The learned Civil Judge by judgment and decree dated 31. 3 . 1984 decreed the suit; findings in support whereof would be noticed a little later. An appeal was preferred thereagainst on or about 4. 5. 1984 by the original. defendants in the Court of the District Judge, Bharuch, which was marked as RCA No. 72 of 1984. By judgment and decree dated 11. 8. 1986, the said appeal was allowed whereagainst the CNI (Appellant herein) preferred a Second Appeal before the Gujarat High Court, which was marked as Second Appeal No. 303 of 1986. On or about 29. 3. 2002, the Charity Commissioner is said to have filed a detailed affidavit in support of the Change Report No. 665/81. By reason of the impugned judgment and order dated 21. 3. 2003, the said Second Appeal was dismissed. Hence the Appellant is before us. CONTENTIONS : Mr. C. A.

Sundaram, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalfof the Appellant would submit that the Court of First Appeal as also the High Court committed a manifest error in passing the impugned judgments insofar they failed to take into consideration the scope and purport of the suit. According to the learned counsel, the learned Trial Judge had rightly decreed the suit having taken into consideration the fact that the matter relating to formation of churches and their merger in the name of the CNI was not a matter which could be determined by the Charity Commissioner in exercise ofhis powers under the BPT Act. The learned counsel would contend that the society and the trust are two separate entities. The Society being not a juristic person although cannot own any property but manage the affairs of the trust which would be the owner of the property.

According to the learned counsel the Court of First Appeal and the High Court misdirected themselves in passing the impugned judgments insofar as they proceeded on the premise that having regard to the fact that properties belonging to the Brethren Church were registered in the books maintained by the Charity Commissioner under Section 17 of the Act, any church affected thereby would fall within his jurisdiction and consequently the dissolution of the society and managing of the churches and consequently their merger would also come within the purview of the provisions of the BPT Act. Mr. Sundaram would submit that a society registered under the Societies CHURCHOf NORTH Of INDIA v. LAVAJIBHAI RATANJIBHAI [S. B. SINHA, J. ] }049 Registration Act, 1860 and a trust registered under the BPT Act are two different entities.

Whereas the activities and the dealings ofthe latter may fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities specified under the BPT Act, the activities of the society would be governed by the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The Civil Court, therefore, according to Mr. Sundaram, had the requisite jurisdiction to deal with the question as to whether the resolution adopted in the year 1970 resulting in dissolution and the merger of the churches was valid. Such a dispute, Mr. Sundaram would argue, is beyond the jurisdiction of the Charity Commissioner. The learned counsel would urge that once the dissolution of the Brethren Church and consequent merger in the Appellant is held to be valid, in terms of the Section 26 of the BPT Act, the Charity Commissioner is enjoined with a duty to make necessary changes in the books maintained under Section 17 of the BPT Act. Sections 3l, 50, 51, 79 and 80 of the BPT Act, according to Mr.

Sundaram, do not clothe the Charity Commissioner or any other authority thereunder to determine a question as r~gard the validity ofa resolution ofa society and/or its merger. Mr. K. Ramamoorthy, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf n' the Brethren Church supporting the Appellant would contend that administration ofa religious property must be understood in its proper context. According to the learned counsel, administration of a property belonging to trust may not have anything to do with the actual possession or dealing with the administration thereof. Th~ learned counsel would draw our attention to the judgments in State of Madras v. Kunnakudi Melamatam and Anr. , AIR (1965) SC 1570; Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka (deceased) Through L. Rs. v. Jasjit Singh and Ors. , (1993] 2 SCC 507 and Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. Krishna Kant and Ors.

, [1995] 5 SCC 75 and contended that in various situations, the Civil Court and the Probate Court alone have been held to have exclusive jurisdiction and not the Charity Commissioner. According to the learned counsel, the Charity Commissioner being a creature of statute must exercise its jurisdiction within the four-comers thereof and the matters which do not come within the purview of the_ BPT Act must necessarily be left to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. According to the learned counsel the provisions of Section 50 of the BPT Act do not show that requirements contained therein must be carried out even in a case where the Charity Commissioner may not have any jurisdiction. As regard interpretation of Section 31 of the BPT Act, the learned counsel would contend that the provision thereof bars hearing and decision in the suit and not the institution thereof.

Although in the year 1979, the· Appellant herein was not registered but as before hearing of the suit was taken up, it became registered in the year 1980, the Civil Judge had the jurisdiction to hear and decide the said suit even it involved dealing with the trust property. Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting Respondents, on the other hand, would submit that for the purpose ofdetermining the question as to whether the suit before the Civil Court was maintainable or not, the averments made in the plaint must be read as a whole and substratum thereof must be noticed. As adjudication was sought for in relation to administration and possession of the properties of a trust; the suit was not maintainable. It was pointed out that the true identity of the Appellant had not been disclosed, i. e. , as to whether it is a trust registered under the BPT Act, or a company registered under the Indian Companies . J Act, 1956.

The learned counsel submitted that although a distinction is sought to be made between the activities of a society which runs the administration of a trust and a trust which owns the property, no such distinction was made in the proceedings before the courts below. Drawing our attention to certain grounds taken in the Special Leave Petition, Mr. Ahmadi would urge, that in fact the finding of the High Court to the effect that the society and the trust are two separate entities had been questioned. Taking us through the plaint, the learned counsel would contend that plaintiffs as also the learned Trial Judge proceeded on the basis that the trust had ceased to exist and wherever the expression "Brethren Church" has been used in the judgment, the learned - Trial Court referred to it as a trust and not as a society. Mr.

Ahmadi would contend that the learned Trial Court proceeded on the basis that there existed inconsistencies between the provisions of the Societies Registration Act which is a Parliamentary Act and the BPT Act. which is a State Act and relying on or on the basis of clause (2) of Article 254 of the Constitution of India, it came to the decision that the former shall prevail over the latter. It is in that context, issues were decided and not on the basis that the society and the trust are. two separate entities. We were taken through the relevant paragraphs ofthe BPT Act and in particular Sections 2(10), 2(13), 13(b), 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 31, 36, SO, 51, 74, 79 and 80 by Mr. Ahmadi to show that the said provisions clearly indicate that the DPT .... ,.. _ CHURCH OF NORTH OF ! NOIAv. LAVAJIBHAI RATANJIBHAI [S. B. SINHA,J. ] lOSL Act is a self-contained code and deals with all questions governing a trust and the properties held by it.

It was urged that the provisions of Section 26 thereof must be read in that context. The learned counsel would submit that the provisions of Section 26 of the BPT Act, in the facts and circumstances of the case, would have no application where a suit was expressly barred which regulates management of a trust, as the BPT Act created a specialized machinery to determine the issues governing the same. Drawing our attention to the prayer (b) of the plaint, Mr. Ahmadi would argue that the same would squarely fall within the purview of Sections , 50 and 51 of the BPT Act and, thus, would be barred as no permission of the , Chief Commissioner was sought for and obtained. The learned counsel would contend that the plea that the suit related to the affairs of the society is merely a ruse or a camouflage. It was argued that the society itself is a religious trust and, thus, both stand on the same footing ' and in·that view of the matter, the suit will not be maintainable.

The learned counsel would further submit that a finding of fact had· bet:n arrived at by the Court of Appeal that the Brethren Church had not ceased to exist, this Court should not interfere therewith. - Mr. M. N. Shroff, the learned counsel appearing on behalfofthe Charity Commissioner, adopted the submission of Mr. Ahmadi and would further 'E contend that the substantial issue before the learned Civil Judge was as to whether the Brethren Church which was registered as trust had ceased to exist and/or stood dissolved or not.

SOCIETIES REGISTRATION ACT, 1860 'p The Societies Registration Act was enacted, as it was found expedient that provisions should be made for improving the legal condition of societies established for the promotion of literature, science, or the fine arts, or for the - -as to whether the applicant is the legal continuation and suci:essor of the First >-- I District Church of Brethren is a matter which would fall for exclusive " determination ofCharity Commissioner keeping in view the provisions of the deed oftrust as regard its succession. It would necessarily follow that whether ti the First Appellant became a legal successor of the properties held by the ( First District Church of Brethren could not also have been granted.

The -1decis~on and resolution purported to have been adopted by the' Synod and ~ Gujarat Diocesan Council are binding on all churches or not would again be a question which could have been gone into by the Charity Commissioner as the same had direct bearing not only with the administration and management of the Church registered with it but also related to the properties held by it. _,. - Such a decision of the Charity Commissioner is again final and conclusive ,---subject to the decision of the appellate authority, viz. , Bombay Revenue ~- Tribunal. ,.

~ Grant of prayer (c) for perpetual injunction would also give rise to adjudication on the question as to whether the Appellant herein had the legal right to own the properties of -the First District Church of Brethren and administer or manage the same althl)ugh at the relevant time it was not ~"" registered trust and although no amendment had been effected in the registers ) and books maintained by the Charity Commissioner in terms of Section 17 ~ read with Sections 21 and 22 of the Act.. The plaintiffs with a view to obtain an order of injunction furthermore were required to establish that they could r file a suit for enforcement of right of the Appellant as a religious trust and ,_ '- CHURCHOF NORTH OF INDIA"· LAVAJIBHAI RATANJIBHAI [S. B. SfNHA,J. ) 1071 such a legal right vests either in the plaintiff or in the Appellant herein indirectly. Such a prayer, related to the possession of the property, comes squarely within the purview ofthe BPT Act.

Ifthe question as regard recovery of possession of the property belonging to a public trust squarely falls within the purview of Section 50 of the Act, had such application been filed before the Charity Commissioner he was required to go into the question as to whether the plaintiffs are persons having interest in the trust and whether a consent should be given to them to maintain a suit. Only when, inter alia, such consent is granted, a suit could have been filed in terms of Section 51 of the Act. In the event of refusal to give consent, the persons interested could have preferred an appeal. Yet again the question as regard existence of a trust is a matter which squarely falls within the purview of Section 79 of the Act. We have no doubt in our mind that the Charity Commissioner was impleaded as a party at a later stage of the suit only with a view to fulfill the requirements of Sub-section (3) of Section 50 of the Act. · In Virupakshayya Shankarayya v.

Neelakanta Shivacharya Pattadadevaru, (1995] Supp 2 SCC 531, this Court categorically held that the suit for recovery of possession of property as validly appointed Mathadhipati is hit by Sections 50 and 51 of the Act. The matter might have been different if the suit was not for dedaration or injunction in favour or against the public trust or where the plaintiffs are not beneficiaries either. Narmadabai and Anr. v. Trust Shri Panchvati Balaji Mandir and Ors. , [ 1995] Supp 3 SCC 676 was a case where a suit for injunction was filed for restraining the defendants from interfering with the implementation of the scheme for better management and administration of the public trust settled by the Charity Commissioner. In that view of the matter, it was held that a suit was not required to be filed in conformity with the provisions of Sections 50 and 51 of the Act. In Shree Gollaleshwar Dev and Ors. v. Gangawwa Korn Shantayya Math and Ors. , (1985] 4 SCC 393], it was held: "14.

It is clear from these provisions that Section 50 of the Act created and regulated a right to institute a suit by the Charity Commissioner or by two or more persons interested in the trust,·in the form of supplementary statutory provisions without defeasance of the right of the manager or a trustee or a shebait of an idol to bring a suit in the name of idol to recover the property of the trust in the usual way. There is therefore no reason why the two or more persons interested in the trust should be deprived of the right to bring a suit as contemplated by Section 50(ii)(a) ofthe Act. Although sub-section (I) of Section 52 makes Sections 92 and 93 of the Code inapplicable to public trusts registered under the Act, it has made provision by Section 50 for institution of such suits by the Charity Commissioner or by two or more persons interested in the trust and having obtained the consent in writing of the Charity Commissioner under Section 51 of the Act.

" The provisions of the Act and the Scheme thereof leave no manner of doubt that the Act is a complete code in itself. It provides for a complete machinery for a person interested in the trust to put forward his claim before the Charity Commissioner who is competent·to go into the question and to prefer 'appeal if he feels aggrieved by any decision. The bar of jurisdiction created under Section 80 of the Act clearly points out that a third party cannot maintain a suit so as to avoid the rigours of the provisions of the Act. The matter, however, would be different ifthe property is not a trust property in the eye of law. The civil court's jurisdiction may not be barred as it gives rise to a jurisdictional question. If a property did not validly vest in a trust or i. f a trust itself is not valid in law, the authorities under the Act will have no jurisdiction to d_et~rmine the said question.

With a view to determine the question as regard exclusion ofjurisdiction of civil court in terms of the provisions of the Act, the court has to consider what, i! 1 substance, and not merely in fonn, is the nature of the claim made in the suit and the underlying object in seeking the real relief therein. If for the purpose of grant of an appeal, the court comes to the conclusion that the question' ls required to be -· . ;termined or dealt with by an authority under the Act, the j~ris~iction of the ci~il court must be held to have been ousted. The questions \\hich are required to be determined are within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities whether simple or complicated. ·Section 26 of the Act must be read in that context as it specifically refers to those questions wherewith a court of competent jurisdiction can deal with and if the same is not expressly or impliedly barred.

Once a decision is arrived at, having regard, to the nature of the claim as also the reliefs sought for, that civil court has no jurisdiction, Section 26 per fore~ will have no application whatsoever. We mayat this stage notice the decisions relied upon by the learned CHURCH OFNORTHOF INDIA v. LAVAJIBHAI RATANJIBHAI (S. B. SINHA,J. ] l073 counsel for the parties. Jn State ofMadras v. Kunnakudi Melamatam and Anr. , AIR (l965) SC 1570 a composite suit for injunction was filed claiming two different reliefs, viz. (I) an injunction restraining the levy of contributions and audit fees under Act JI of 1927; and (2) an injunction restraining the levy ofcontributions and audit fees under Act XIX of 1951. It was, in that context, held that although the decision under Section 84(2) of Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act that an institution is outside the purview of the Act, the demand of contribution as being not enforceable under the 1951 Act was maintainable.

In Sri Vedagiri Lakshmi Narasimha Swami Temple v. Induru -- Pattabhirami Reddi, AIR (1967) SC 781, this Court was concerned with a question as to what constitutes an administration of religious property. In that case, the provisions ofthe Act did not impose a total bar on the maintainability of a suit in a civil court and having regard to that aspect of the matter visa-vis Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure it was held that Section 93 of Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act would apply in the matter for which provision has been made in the Act and would not bar the suit under the general law which do not fall within the scope of any section ofthe Act. This decision instead ofhelping the Appellant runs counter to their claim. In Chiranjila/ Shrilal Goenka (Deceased) Through LRs. v. Jasjit Singh and Ors. , (1993) 2 SCC 507 it was held that in matters relating to will the Probate Court has exclusive jurisdiction.

The said decision was rendered having regard to the fact that the decision of a probate court is a judgment in rem and conclusive and binds not only the parties but also the entire world. In Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. Krishna Kant and Others. , (1995) 5 SCC 75, this Court following Dhulabhai (supra) held that having regard to the provisions contained in the Industrial Disputes Act and Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, the civil court will have no jurisdiction as enumerated in paragraph 35. In Sahebgouda (Dead) By LRs. and Ors. v. Ogeppa and Ors. , (2003) ,. 6 sec 151 the allegations made in the plaint showed that the only right claimed by the Appellants was that of being ancestral pujaris of the temple. They did not claim to be the trustees of any trust.

No declaration regarding the existence or otherwise ofthe trust or any particular property is the property of such trust had been claimed and in that view of the matter, it was held that the reliefs so claimed do not come within the purview of Section 19 or Section 79 ofthe Act wherefor the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner will have the exclusive jurisdiction to hold an inquiry and give a decision. Ramesh Chand Ardawatiwa v. Anil Panjwani, [2003] 7 SCC 350 has no application in the present case as therein the Charity Commissioner took a specific objection that the civil court's jurisdiction is ban:ed whereupon several additional issues were framed and determined. In NDMC v. Satish Chand (Deceased) By LR. Ram Chand, [2003] JO SCC 38, this Court clearly held that Sections 84 and 86 ofthe Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 bar the jurisdiction ofthe civil court as the Act provided a complete -remedy to the party at plea as also a remedy by way of an appeal. In K. Shamrao and Ors. v.

Assistant Charity Commissioner, [2003] 3 SCC 563, this Court held : "17.... Functions of the Assistant Charity Commissioner are predominantly adjudicatory. The Assistant Charity Commissioner has almost all the powers which an ordinary civil court has including power ofsummoning witnesses, compelling production ofdocuments, . examining witnesses on oath and coming to a definite conclusion on the evidence induced and arguments submitted. " In ·reshwantrao Laxmanrao Ghatge and Anr. v. Bahurao Bala Yadav (Dead) By LRs. , (1978] I SCC 669, this Court observed : "8. Mr Datar placed reliance upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in Dev Chavata v. Ganesh Mahadeo Deshpande in order to take advantage of Section 52-A of the Act. The ratio of the case has to be appreciated in the background of the facts found therein. The principles of law as enunciated cannot be fully and squarely applied. But yet the decision, if we may say so with respect, is correct.

This would be on the footing that the decision given by the Assistant 'G Charity Commissioner under Section 79 read with Section 80 of the Act was conclusive and final. He had exclusive jurisdiction to decide the question as to whether the suit land belonged to the trust. He had I"" so decided it on November 5, 1954. The suit was filed on July 21, 1955. In that view, the High Court was right in holding that a suit filed under Section 50 of the Act was not barred under Section 52- CHURCHOFNORTH OF INDIA v. LAVAJIBHAI RATANJIBHAI [S. B. SINHA,J. ] l075 A because the decision of the Assistant Charity Commissioner given in 1954 had declared the property to be a trust property and which decision was final. " In Suresh Ramniwas Mantri and Anr. v. Mohd lftequaroddin s/o Mohd Badroddin, (I999) 2 Mh. L. J.

131 it was observed that a society although formed either for religious or charitable purposes or for both cannot be held to a public trust ipso facto although registered under the Societies Registration ' Act unless it is registered also under the BPT Act as the question whether such a trust was validly formed or not would come within the purview of Sections 18, 19 and 20 of the BPT Act. In that case the plaintiff was not registered as a public trust and in that situation it was held that Section 80 would operate. In Mahibubi Abdul Aziz and Ors. v. Sayed Abdul Majid and Ors. , (2001) 2 Mh. L. J. 512], a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court held that a civil suit cannot be entertained only because a complicated questions of title has been raised. In Keki Pestronji Jamadar and Anr. v. Khodadad Merwan Irani and Ors.. AIR (1973) (Born) 130 the question was as to whether the author of trust was the lawful owner of the property of which he has created the trust.

The Full Bench of Bombay High Court held that the author of the trust has no title over the property and Section 80 would not operate as a bar. In Nagar Wachan Mandir, Pandharpur v. Akbaralli Abdulhusen and Sons and Ors. , (1994) I MhLJ 280 a question arose as regard power of cotrustee to delegate a matter relating to grant or determination of lease ·to another co-trustee keeping in view of Section 47 of the Act which deprives the trustee from delegating his office or any of his duties to a co-trustee or a stranger unless conditions mentioned therein are complied with. The principle enunciated in each of the decision laid down relate to the fact situation obtaining therein. In each case indisputably the lis arose for determination of a question relating to interpretation of one or the other clause enumerated in different provisions of the BPT Act which come either within the exclusive jurisdiction of the statutory authorities or otherwise.

The Civil Court will have no jurisdiction in relation to a matter whereover the statutory authorities have the requisite jurisdiction. On the other hand, if question arises, which is outside the purview of the Act or in relatiQn to matter, ·unconnected with the administration or possession ofthe trust property, the Civil Court may have jurisdiction. In this case; having regard to the nature of the lis, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was clearly barred. CONCLUSION : Having given our anxious thought in the matter, we are of the opinion that the suit has rightly been held to be not maintainable by the High Court and, thus, the impugned judgments must be affirmed. The applications for impleadment filed by various persons, in view of the aforementioned findings, need not to be dealt with separately. For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly. No costs. B. B. B. Appeal dismissed. I l ~