COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, MADRAS v. STANDARD MOTOR PRODUCTS, ETC

Citation: [1989] 1 S.C.R. 824

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: SABYASACHI MUKHERJI, S. NATARAJAN, M.H. KANIA

Case summary

When this Court decides questions of law, its decisions are, under Article 141, binding on all courts within the territory of India, and so, it must be the constant endeavour and concern of this Court to introduce and maintain an element of certainty and continuity in the...

Judgment text

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J, In these matters, the question that arises for consideration is, whether a. learned Single Judge sitting in Chambers is competent to dismiss application for condonation of delay in statutory appeals under Order XX-A of the Supreme Court 4 Rules, 1966, regarding appeal under section 55 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 as well as under Order XX-B regarding appeals under Section 130-E of the Customs Act, 1962 and Section 35-L of the Central Excises & Salt Act, 1944. It appears that an -. application for condonation of delay came before a learned Single Judge and in the circumstances mentioned in the Review Petition No. 557 of 1987, the application was dismissed by the learned Single ·t- Judge. That application was dismissed by one of us on 11. 11. 86. That I order was passed by learned Single Judge under Order VI rule 2(14) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966.

The application had been filed for the condonation of delay along with the Statutory Appeal against the Judgment/Order of the Customs, Excises and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal. The revenue being the Collector of Central Excise, Madras in this case filed a review petition on the ground that the application for condonation of delay made in Statutory Appeals arising out of final orders of the Tribunal under several Acts should be heard by a bench ~· of at least two Judges. The ·matter was posted before this bench for consideration whether the learned Single Judge had jurisdiction to dismiss such application for condonation of delay or not . . In order to decide this question, it is necessary to have a cons- ,,1 :: pectus of the relevant rules.

In the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 4' (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules'), as amended in 1983, under Order XX-B, of the said rules, provision has been made for appeals under clause (b) of Section 130-E of the Customs Act, 1962 and under Section 35-L of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. According to Rule 1 thereof, the petition of appeal shall, ·subject to the provisions of Sections 4, 5 & 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 be presented within 60 'f days from the date of the order sought to be appealed against or within 60 days from the date on which the order sought to be appealed against is communicateiJ to the Appellate, whichever is later. The time required for obtaining a copy of the order should be excluded. There }--> is, however, no provision providing for limitation in the concerned Statutes.

According to Rule 2 of Order XX-B, Rules 1 to 7 of Order XX-A of >\ the Rules relating to appeals under Section 51 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 shall with necessary modifications and adaptations, apply to appeals under that Order. Rule 3 of Order XX-A provides as under: "After the appeal is registered, it shall be put up for hearing ex-parte before the Court which may either dismiss it summarily or direct issue of notice to all necessary parties, + or may make such orders as the circumstance,. of the case may require". According to this provision, it appears that all such statutory appeals have to be placed before a Court for ex-parte admission. ·-t According to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963: I "Any appeal or any application .... may be admitted after a prescribed period if tbe appellant or tbe applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making an application within such a period.

" Some grounds, according to the appellant, had been made for condonation of delay. Apparently, in the facts of the case, the learned Single ...... Judge did not find any merit in those grounds and refused to condone the delay. Consequently, it was contended that the effect of the refusal of condonation of delay was dismissal of the· appeal following as a result thereof. The question is, can the learned Single Judge do it? The COLLECTOR OF C. E. v. MOTOR PRODUCTS [MUKHARJI, J. I 829 learned Single Judge has done it by virtue of Rule 2(14) of Order VI of -+ the said Rules. Order VI deals with the 'Business in Chambers'. Order VI, Rule 1 provides that the powers of the Court in relation to the matters enumerated thereunder would be exercised by the Registrar. Order VI, Rule 2 provides that the powers of the Court in relatiorr to certain matters may be exercised by a single Judge sitting in Chambers. Thereafter 28 such matters are enumerated.

Rule 2(14) of Order VI provides as follows: "Applications for enlargement or abridgement of time ~~ except where the time is fixed by the Court and except applications for condonation of delay in filing special leave petitions". ,. Reading the rule simply, it appears to us that it means all applications for the enlargement or abridgement of time would be cognizable by the learned Single Judge in Chambers except, those applications time . for which has been fixed by the Court in terms of Order VII and also applications for condonation of delay in filing special leave petitions. This appears to us to be logical and literal meaning of the said rule. The question, however, has been posed is this-an application for condonation of delay or an application for enlargement or abridgement of time. This question, it appears to us, is concluded by the decision of ~ this Court in Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay City v. R. H. Pandi Managing Trustees of Trust, Bombay, [1975]2 SCR 7.

There a bench of three learned Judges of this Court had occasion to consider ..... this question. A question arose there as to whether the application for condonation of delay in filing petition of appeal could be heard by the Judge in his Chambers. Ray, C. J. observed in the said judgment an argument was advanced before the Hon'ble Judge in Chambers that if an application for condonation of delay was refused by the Judge in r Chambers it would amount to dismissal of the appeal by the Judge in Chambers. Therefore, it was said that these applications should be heard by 'the Court' which alone was competent to dismiss the appeal. By Court, it was urged, meant a bench of two learned Judges. After giving notices to the le \ 1918. On the 30th August, 1918, being the last date of sitting of the Court, at about 5. 00 P. M. after the Court of Appeal had risen an application was made to Mr.

Justice Chaudhuri sitting on the Original Side for leave to file the memorandum of appeal without a copy ofthe order against which the defendant desired to appeal. The learned Judge granted leave to the defendant to file the memorandum of appeal subject to any objection which might be taken on behalf of the plaintiff. When the matter came before the appeal Court, the plaintiff :+took the point that the appeal was out of time. The appeal Court decided that the appeal was out of time, being barred by tne Limitation Act, and the Court further refused an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to admit the appeal after the prescribed time and > the appeal was dismissed. Having regard to the adovementioned facts, Sanderson, C. J. observed that it cannot be held that the order was not one 'passed on appeal'. Sanderson, C. J. had some doubts on that '"-1 proposition but agreed with Woodroffe, J. that the appeal involved substantial question of law.

In that appeals, a certificate was granted. t In our opinion, this decision is not relevant for the issue before us. Whether an order dismissing an application for condonation of delay in case of Statutory Appeal is an order or appeal is not quite in issue here and is not decisive of the matter. It does not solve the question whether a learned Single Judge can dismiss an application for condonation of delay in a statutory appeal. After all, the Court functions by its arrangement under the Rules. Order VI mentions the Chamber -1-- Business and the Business to be transacted by the Registrar and Single Judge sitting in Chambers. The powers of the Court, that is to say, the whole Court and the powers of Division Bench normally, except those mentioned in Order VI, will be as enjoined by Rule 1 of Order VII, -f. that is to say, a bench consisting of not less than two Judges.

In that view of the clear provisions of the Rule, we are of the opinion that the said decision of the Calcutta High Court upon which reliance has been placed does not in any manner detract the decision of this Court in C. I. T. , Bombay City v. R. H. Pandi. Our attention was also drawn to a decision of this Court in Mis. Mela Ram & Sons v. The Commissioner t of ! name-Tax, Punjab, [1956] SCR 166. There the appellant firm had filed appeals against orders assessing it to income-tax and super-tax for two years 1945-46 and 1946-47 beyond the time prescribed by Section 30(2) of the Income Tm: Act. The appeals were numbered and notices . c-·- the abstract question as to whether such a power vests in this Court or not need not detain us.

In exercising this inherent power, however, this Court would naturally like to impose certain reasonable limitations and would be :ii reluctant to entertain pleas for the reconsideration and revision of its earlier decisions, unless it is satisfied that there are compelling and substantial reasons to do so. It is general judicial experience that in matters of law involving questions of construing statutory or constitutional provisions, two views are often reasonably possible and when judicial approach has to make a choice between the two reasonably possible views, the process of decision-making ~ is often very difficult and delicate.

When this Court hears appeals against decisions of the High Courts and is required to consider the propriety or correctness of the view taken by the High Courts on any point of law, it would be open to this Court to hold that though the view taken by the High Court is reasonably possible, the alternative view which is also reasonably possible is better and should be ·-+ preferred. In such a case, the choice is between the view ~ taken by the High Court whose judgment is under appeal, ' and the alternative view which appears to this Court to be more reasonable; and in accepting its ~_wn view in preference to that of the High Court, this Court would be discharging its duty as a Court of Appeal. But different considerations must inevitably arise where a previous decision of this Court has taken a particular view as to the construelion of a statutory provision as, for instance, Section 66(4) + of the Act.

When it is urged that the view already taken by this Court should be reviewed and revised, it may not necessarily be an adequate reason for such review and revision to hold that though the earlier view is a reasonably possible view, the alternative view which is pressed on the + subsequent occasion is more reasonable. In reviewing and revising its earlier decision, this Court should ask itself whether in the interests of the public good or for any other valid and compulsive reasons, it is necessary that the earlier decision should be revised. When this Court decides questions of law, its decisions are, under Article 141, binding on all courts within the territory of India, and so, it must be the constant endeavour and concern of this Court to introduce and maintain an element of certainty and continuity in the interpretation of law in the country. Frequent exercise by this Court of its power to review its earlier decisions on the ground that the view pressed before it later appears.

to the Court to be more reasonable, may incidentally tend to make law uncertain and introduce confusion which must be consistently avoided. That is not to say that if on a subsequent occasion, the Court is satisfied that its earlier decision was clearly erroneous, it should hesitate to correct the error; but before a previous decision is pronounced to be plainly erroneous, the Court must be satisfied with a fair amount of unanimity amongst its members that a revision of the said view is fully justified. It is not possible or desirable, and in any case it would be inexpedient to lay down any principles which sould govern the· approach of the ·• Court in dealing with the question of reviewing and revising its earlier decisions. It would always depend upon several relevant considerations:-What is-the nature· of the infirmity or error on which aplea for a review and revision of the earlier view is based?

On the earlier occasion, did some patent aspects of the question remain unnoticed·, or was the attention of the Court not drawn to any previous decision of this Court bearing on the point not noticed? fa the Court hearing such plea fairly unanimous that there is such an error in the earlier view? What would be impact of the error on the general administration of law or on public goodT Has the earlier decision been followed on subsequent occasions either by this Court or by the High Courts~ And, would the reversal of the earlier decision lead to public inconvenience, hardship or mischief? These and other relevant considerations must be carefully borne in mind whenever this Court is called upon to exercise its jurisdiction to review and revise its·earlier decisions. '' r • t, [ J This view was again reiterated by this Court in the Pillani Investment Corporation Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, "A" Ward, Calcutta, and Another [1972] 83 I. T. R. 217.

In the facts and circumstances of the case, in the light of the provisions of the said Rules as noticed before, we cannot say that we are satisfied that the earlier decision of this Court in C. I. T. Bombay City v. R. H. Pandi, (supra) was clearly erroneous. In that view of the matter, it is not necessary to refer this question to a larger bench or to disturb the settled practice of this Court. There is no substance in the contention of any discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution or in Order VII rule 2(14). Applications under Article 136 is a special class and are sui juris. These are and should legitimately be treated separately other than all other applications including applications under Statutory Appeals. If a separate and distinct provision is made for application of condonation of delay under Article 136 of the Constitution, we do not see any conceivable ground which can be taken for contending that it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

After all Article 136 is the residuary power of this Court to do justice where the Court is satisfied that there is injustice. These are class apart. The practice of the learned Single Judge disposing of in Chambers applications for condonation of delay in statutory appeals is just, fair and reasonable. Every court has the right to arrange its own affairs. We find no reason either to upset that practice or to cast doubt on the propriety of such practice. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of this Court in P. N. Eswara Iyer etc. , etc. v. The Registrar, Supreme Court of India, I1980] 2 SCJ 119 where this Court upheld the circulation system for the disposal of the Review Petitions and held that early hearing was the essential requirement if a review petition is found devoid of substance. Such different treatment in respect of different applications has always been within the domain of Court's arrangement of business.

These do not involve any violation of the fundamental right. In the premises, we do not find any reason to interfere with the order passed. We hold that a Single Learned Judge in Chambers is and was always competent to dismiss all applications for condonation of dealy in statutory appeals. We find nothing repugnant in the same and no substance in the contention that otherwise the same would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitu, lion. The Review Petitions therefore, fail and are dismissed. N. P. V. Petitions dismissed.