C.P. SIKH REGULAR MOTOR SERVICE ETC. v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & OTHERS.
Citation: [1975] 2 S.C.R. 10; 1974 INSC 168
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: A.N. RAY , KUTTYIL KURIEN MATHEW, V.R. KRISHNA IYER
Judgment date:
Case summary
1974 INSC 168. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1974-09-05. C.P. SIKH REGULAR MOTOR SERVICE ETC. v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & OTHERS. Read the...
Judgment text
12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1975] 2 s. c. R. C. P. SIKH REGULAR MOTOR SERVICE ETC. v. THE STATE OF MAHARASIITRA & OTHERS. September 5, 1974 [A. 'N. RAY, C. J. , K. K. MATHEW AND V. R. KRISHNA IYER JJ. ] Motor Vehicles Ace-1939-ss. 2( 1); 2(28) and 68C-Scope of. Section 68C of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 says that where any State Transport Undertaking is of opinion that it is necessary in the public interest thal road transport services in general should be run and operated by the Road Transport Undertaking it may prepare a scheme giving particulars of the area or route proposed to be covered and shall cause every such scheme to be published in the official gazette. Section 2 (I) says that unless there is anything repugnant in tbe subject or context in relation to any provision of the Act, area means such area as the State Government may, having regard to that provision, specify by notification in the official gazette.
The State Government established the Road Transport Corporation μnder s. 3 of the Road Transport Corporation Act 1950. The Corporation prepared a scheme proposing to operate stage carriage services in the entire State and on all routes and ·portions thereof falling within the said area to the complete exclusion of all other persons. The scheme approved by the State Government was published in the gazette. The appellants who were transport operators in the State challenged the validity of the scheme. The Jfigh Court dismissed the writ petitions. On appeal to this Court it was contended that it was necessary for the State Government to have specified the area by notification because wher~ver the word 'area' occurs in the Act the meaning to be. given to that word is the one given in s. 2( 1) unless there is something requgnant in the context or the subject matter in s. 68C. Dismissing the appeals. HELD: (a) In the con. text of s.
680-the word 'area' does not mean an area specified by the State Government in a notification in the gazette in accordance with the substantive part of the definitio,n clause 2(1 ). The context in which the word occurs makes the application of the substantive part of the definition repugnant. [13F) (b) The word 'area' concurring in s. 68C does not have the same meaning as the word 'route' in the section. A route postulates an area; but for that reason it cannot be said that the legislature made no distinction between the two. 'Area' is defined in S. 2(1) and that definition does not speak of any route. Route is defined in S. 2(28) of the Act. In fact "area" and "route" are distinct: Otherwise the legislature w f 'area' or 'route' or part thereof, it is not to be presumed that the legislature made no distinction between 'area' and 'route'. No doubt, a route must necessarily run over an area but, for that reason, one cannot equate an area to a route.
An area simplidter is certainly not a route. Its potentially to become a route would not make it a route. A route is an area plus sdmething more. At any rate, there is no justification for making an assumption that ihe legislature, in the context of s. 68C did not want to make any distinction betw~n 'area' and 'roue'. In Dosa Satyanamurty's Case('}, Subba Rao, J. e>bserved : . "Under s. 68C of the Act the scheme may be framed in respect of any area ()r a r<*Jte or a portion of any area or a portion of a route. There is no inherent inconsistency between an ~~a' and a 'route I The proposed route is also an area hm1ted to the route propclsed. The scheme may as well propose to o~rate a trapsport service in respect of a new route from pomt A to point B and ihat route would certainly be an area within the meaning rl. s. 68C''. There can be no dispute ·that a route postulates an area. But, for G that rea.
~on, as we said, it is difficult to maintain that ihe legislature made no distincti~n between th~ . two. In s. 2 ( 1), the definition is only o'f the word 'area . That defimtton does not speak cl. any route. By Act 56 of 1969, the legislature has defined the expression 'route' ·in :S. 2(28A). That reads : " 'route' means a line . of travel which specifies ihe highway which may be traversed by a moor vehicle between one H terminus and another". (I) [19'61] 1 S. C. R. 642, 664. c. P. SIKH MOTOR SERVICE v. MAHARASHTRA (Mathew, ]. ) 15 A Certainly, the line of travel which specifies the highway . which ' may be traversed by a motor vehicle is an area. but nevertheless, the two are distinct. Otherwise, the legislature would not have found it necessary tct provide a separate definition clause for 'route'.
If, therefore, in respect of a scheme in relation to a route or routes, it is not necessary that the State Government should make a B notification specifying the route or routes, we fail to understand the reasqn why the State Government should specify the area by a notification in the gazette for framing a scheme in relation to an area. In other words, it is impossible to understand the rationale behind the distinction why when a scheme is framed in relation to an area a notification in the gazette specifying its extent is necessary. and why when it is framed in relation to a rciute or routes a notification specifying c the route or routes is not required. When s. 68C says "where any State Transport Undertaking is of opinion that. . . . . .
it is necessary in the public interest that road transport services in general or any particular class of such service in relation to any area cit' route or portion thereof should be run and operated by · the State transport undertaking'", it means, in the context of the present case, that the Corporation has to form an cipinion whether it is necessary in the D public interest that road transport service should be nationalized in relation to any area or route. We· are aware of a plausible construe· tion cf. the section which would enable the Corporation to form an opinion only as to the necessity i~ the public interest of a scheme in relation to an area specified in the notification by the State Government. But we think, it comports more with the legislative purpose to hqld that the 'State transport undertaking is invested with the discretion to E select the area in relation to which it will frame the scheme than to hold that that discretion has been vested in the State Government.
If, in forming an opinicln with respect to the necessity of a scheme in relation to a route or routes, the power of 'State transport undertak·· ·ing' and, therefore, of the Corporation, is untrammelled by an outside authcirity like the State Government, we fail to see why it cannot form an opinion as to the necessity of a scheme in relation to any area in the State. As the Gorporation here was established for the whole of the State of Maharashtra, it was within its power to form an qpinion as to necessity of a ·scheme in relation to any area or route wit~in the State. We hold that there is no substance in the first contention pf the appel- G lants. The second point urged cin behalf of the appellants was that a scheme framed under s. 68C should specify all the necessary particu· Jars and as it did not specify the minimum and maximum number of vehicles to be put on a route as also the minimum and maximum trips in respect of each route, the scheme was invalid.
The decision of this 1 H Court in Aswathamarayan Singh v. State of Mysore( ) was relied on in support of this contention. (I) [1966) 1 S. C. R. 87_, at 92 and 94. . In the first place, t. his contention was not taken before the State Gqvernment in the objections filed by the appellants to the Sche~e. Quite apart from that, we think that· there is· ncl factual foundation for .. the contention. The approved scheme specifies the ·minimm . ~ m~um number of vehicles to be put on a route as also the mini· mum and maximum trips in respect of each route. . B ·We dismiss the appeals without costs. We also dismiss. the peti-tio~ fpr special leave tel appeal. i' P. B. R. Appeals dismissed.
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