D. K. NABHIRAJIAH v. THE STATE OF MYSORE AND OTHERS.
Citation: [1952] 1 S.C.R. 744; 1952 INSC 39
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: M. PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR
Judgment date:
Case summary
1952 INSC 39. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1952-05-26. D. K. NABHIRAJIAH v. THE STATE OF MYSORE AND OTHERS. Read the judgment and case details on...
Judgment text
suspect. The power to initiate proceedings under the Act has been vested in a very high and responsible Sinzh officer and he is expected to act with caution and impartia! 'ity while discharging his duties under the Act. This contention of Mr. Umrigar must, therefore, fail. The last point made by Mr. Umrigar d0es not seem to us to be tenable. It is true that a procedure ·'-. • different from what is laid down under the ordinary law has been provided _for a particular class of persons against whom proceedings could be taken under sec- '-... tion 27(1) of the City of Bombay Police Act, but the discrimination if any is based upon a reasonable classi- . fication which is within the competency of the legislature to make. Having regard to the objective which . • the legislation has in view and the policy underlyiag it, a departure from the ordinary procedure can certainly' 'be justified as the best means of giving effect to the object of the legislature.
In our opinion, therefore, there is no substance in the petition and it shall stand dismissed. Petition dismissed. _4· Agent for the petitioner: P. K. Chatterjee. Agent for the respondents : P. A. Mehta. D. K. NABHIRAJIAH v. THE STATE OF MYSORE AND OTHERS. [PATANJALI SASTRI C. J. , MEHER CHAND MAH,AJAN, MUKHERJEA, DAS and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ. J Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Order, 1948- Va/idity-F,,ndamental right not to be deprived of property-Con-stitutiou of India, Arts. 31 (2), 19 (! ) (! )-Order of allotment ~efore ' Constit"tion came into for'l'e-Possession taken thereafter-Valid-ity of proceedings-Writ for quashing orders-Maintainability. A house belonging to the petitioner in the Bangalore City -' - -• get over this difficulty by pointing out that the ( ) [1951] S. C:R. 228. dispossession took place on 11-4-1950. This, however, is no answer. The dispossession was a mere con-sequence which followed under clause 3, sub-clause ( 6), of the Control Order.
The right to possession was lost earlier and the landlord merely held on to the property. Article 31 (2) does not apply for another reason. There was no acquisition by the State of the house. The taking of possession can only be from a person who is entitled to possession. The petitioner landlord lost his right to possession by reason of the Controller's order. As soon as the allotment Is made, the allottee becomes a tenant and the owner becomes the landlord by reason of sub-clause (4) of the Control Order and the learned Advocate-General of the Mysore State contended that a statutory tenancy was thereby created. It is no doubt true that it is provided by sub-clause ( 4) that the terms of the tenancy may be such as may be agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant, and there is no provision, as found in the later Act, as to what is to happen in the event of there being no agreement.
If it is correct that a tenancy is brought into existence by the opera-tion of the statute, it is possible that in case the terms are not the subject of any agreement between the landlord and the tenant, the ordinary law of landlord and tenant will apply in the absence of any provision for the fixation of ·terms by the Controller. But the point does not arise for decision in this case and nothing further need be said about it. The applicability of sub-clause ( 4) of the Control Order was sought to be avoided in another manner. It was pointed out that sub-clause (2) referred in Its first part "to the purposes of the Government of Mysore" etc.
, and in its later part "for the occupation of any officer or any such Government authority, body or corporation, or for the occupation of an individual", but that when we come to sub-clause ( 4) the two categaries are kept distinct or separate and in re-ferring to the second category the Control Order [19521 speaks only of the requirement of the house for the occupation by any of the officers and nothing is said about the occupation of any individual. The amending Act did not introduce the words "or for the occupation of any individual" into sub-clause ( 4). Therefore, it was urged that the whole basis of the Advocate-General's contention about a statutory tenancy being created fell to the ground. At first sight, there seems to be something in the point.
But if sub-clause (2) is read ·as a whole, having in view the object sought to be achieved by the legislation, it is fairly clear that there is no such necessary antithesis between the two categories or clauses and that the words "for the purposes" can be so read as to include "occupation" also. The omission of the words. "for the purposes" in the latter part of sub-clause (2) was perhaps to avoid inartistic phraseology. "For the occupation" certainly reads better than "for the purposes of the occupation". Ground No. 2 regarding discrimination was not pressed. Then, we come to ground No. 3. Clause (bb ).
of sub-clause (2) of Rule 81 of the Defence of India Rules is in these terms :- " (bb) for regulating the letting and sub-letting of any accommodation or class of accommodation, whether residential or non-residential, whether furnished or unfurnished and whether with or without board, and in particular,- ( i) for controlling the rents for such accommodation (either generally or when let to specified persons or classes of persons or in specified circumstances) ; ( (ii) for preventing the eviction of tenants and sub-tenants from such_ accommodation in specified circumstances and) ; (iii) for requiring such accommodation l'<> be let either generally, or to specified persons or classes of persons, or in specified circumstances; ......
" It was urged that the power conferred under this sub-clause applied only to those cases where the house was available for letting or sub-letting and not to cases where a house was not so available, in other words, if the landlord of any premises said that they were required for his own occupation, the Government had no power to requisition the same. Emphasis was laid on the word "regulating". This, however, is an obviously unsound interpretation to be placed upon the words. They mean that the Government might provide for and regulate the letting and sub-letting etc. , and that such is the scope is clear from the words in sub-clause (2) "may by order provide". The argument for the petitioner, if accepted, would render the powers entirely nugatory, as it would then be open to every landlord to say that the premises are required for self-occupation, or even that he has already let it out to another and that therefore it is not available for being let.
There was no requisition of property in this case under section 75 (A) of the Defence of India Rules. The Control Order was promulgated under rule 81 (2) (bb) which provides for the regulation of letting and sub-letting houses. It is rather the exercise of a police power of regulation in public interest than anything done in the exercise of a power of eminent domain, in which case alone questions relating to compensation and public purpose will arise. In the course of the arguments, it was suggested that the amendment notification of 4th May, 1949, introducing the words "or for the occupation of any individual" was invalid because the regulation of letting and sub-letting under clause (bb) could only be for the Defence of British India or for the efficient prosecution of the war, or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community, and that the taking of property for the occupation of a private individual was outside the scope of the power.
Apart from the fact that no such ground has been taken in the petition, it has also to be noted that [19521 the Control Order purports to have been made not only under clause (bb) of sub-rule (2) of rule 81 of the Defence of India Rules, hut also under the Supplies, SefV! Ccs and Miscellaneous Provisions (Temporary Powers) Act of 1947. We have not got this Act before us and it was not even referred to in the course of the arguments. Hence, no decision is called for on this point. The petition fails and is dismissed without any order as to costs. Petition ditmiued. Agent for the petitioner: K. R. Kri1hnaswamy. Agent for the respondents : P. A. Mehta. UJAGAR SINGH II. THE STATE OF THE PUNJAB and JAGJIT SINGH II. THE STATE OF THE PUNJAB [SAtYID FAZL ALI, PATANJ ALI SAsTR1, Mu1rnEi. JEA, DAS and CHANDRASEKHARA AtYAi. , JJ. J Preventive Detention Act (IV of 1950), SJ.
3, 12-Detention order-Non-specification of period of detention-Ground supplied vague and same as in earlier order-Particulars supplied after '1- months-Legality of deteiJtion-Duty to supply particulars ~lls soon as may he'-Form of detention order-Order signed by Home Secretary-Validity. Non-specification of any d~finitc period in a detcntioa order made under s. 3 of the PrcventiVc Detention Act, IV of 1950, is not a material omission rendering the order invalid in view of the provisions contained in clauses (4) (a) and (7) (a) of Ar~ 22 of the Constitution and •· 12 of the Act. An order of detention which expressly states that the Go•ernor of the State concerned was satisfied of the neCCMity of
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