DALPAT KUMAR AND ANR. v. PRAHLAD SINGH AND ORS

Citation: [1991] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 472

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: K. RAMASWAMY, G.N. RAY

Case summary

Rule 1 primarily concerns with the preservation of the property in disp1 :L~ till legal rights are adjudicated. Even thereafter 5th objection was field on May 23; 1989 which was dismissed on October 24, 1989.

Judgment text

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K. RAMASWAMY, J. Leave granted. Sri S. K. Jain, on his application, is discharged. Heard the counsel on either side. This is the fourth round of litigation relating to the same subject matter. On June 14, 1979 the first appellant claimed to have entered into an agreement to purchase the residential house situated in Jaipur for a consideration of Rs. 51,000. He laid the suit for specific performance and the suit was decreed ex-parte. On August 10, 1983, the sale-deed was executed through court. On April 28, 1984, the respondent's wife filed Suit No. 83 of 1984 and also sought for temporary injunction from dispossession. In May 1984, the Trial Court rejected the application for aci interim injunction --which was confirmed, on appeal, by the High Court on July 14, 1987. Thereafter the suit was got dismissed for non-prosecution. The first appellam filed Execution Application No. 6/85 in which the respondent filed five unsuccessful objections.

The first was dismissed on March 4, 1987. The second one on December4, 1987, which was confirmed on revision by the High Court on January 20, 1988. The third one on October 4, 1987 and fourth one on DALPATv. PRAHLAD [RAMASWAMY, J. ] 475 January 17, 1989. Even thereafter 5th objection was field on May 23; 1989 which was dismissed on October 24, 1989. This was also confirmed by the High Court in CivilRevision No. 109/90dated August 7, 1990. The third round of litigation was started at the behest of his sons in O. S. No. 278/88 claiming to be the joint family·property and for a declaration that the sale does not bind them and they sought for partition. They alf. o sought for ad interim injunction which was rejected on July, 7, 1988. On appeal, the High Court in Misc. Appeal No. 177/88 confirmed it by the order dated July 26, 1988.

The 4th round of litigation was started by the respondent in filing the present suit on December 7, 1988 pleading, that the first appellant being his counsel played fraud on him, in paragraphs 9 and 10, the details of which are not material for the purpose of this case. He also sought for an interim injunction from dispossession. In the meanwhile a part of the property, namely, shops were obtained symbolical possession by the first appellant. The Trial Court by order dated November 8, 1990 dismissed the application. On appeal, the High Court in Misc. Appeal Nos. 498/90 and 501/90 by the impugned order dated February 26, 1991 allowed the applications and granted ad interim injunction restraining the appellants fr. om talcing possession of the residential portion.

Order 39 Rule 1(C) provides that temporary injunction may be granted where, in any suit, it is proved by the affidavit or otherwise, that the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit, the court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing........ or dispossession of the plaintiff or otherwise causing injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit as the court thinks fit until the disposal of the suit or until further orders. Pursuant to the recommendation of the Law Commission clause (C) was brought on statute by s. 88(i)(c) of the Amending Act 104 of 1966 with effect from Feb. 1, 1977. Earlier thereto there was no express power except the inherent power under s. 151 C. P. C. to gr. int ad interim injunction against dispossession.

Rule 1 primarily concerns with the preservation of the property in disp1 :L~ till legal rights are adjudicated. Injunction is a judicial process by which a party is required to do or to refrain from doing any particular act. It is in the nature ofpreventive relief to a litigant to prevent future possible injury. In other words, the cowt on exercise of the power of granting ad interim injunction is to preserve the subject matter of the suit in the status quo for the time being. It is settled law that the grant ofinjunction is a discretionary relief. the exercise thereof is subject to the cowt satisfying that (1) there is a serious disputed question to be tried in the suit and that an act, on the facts before the court, there is probability of his being entitled to the relief asked for by the plaintiff/defendant; (2) the court's interference is necessary to protect the party from the species of injury.

In other words, irreparable injury or damage would ensue before the legal right would be established at trial; and (3) that the comparative hardship or mischief or inconvenience which is likely to occur from withholding the injunction will be greater than that would be likely to arise from granting it. Therefore, the burden is on the plaintiffby evidence aluandi by affidavit or otherwise that there is "a prima facie case" in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with primafacie title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial. Only primafacie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a primafacie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction.

The court further has to satisfy that noninterference by the court would result in "irreparable injury" to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury ordispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility ofreparing the injury, but means only that μie injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that "the balance of convenience" must be in favour of granting injunction. The court while granting or refusing to grantinjunction should exercise sound judicial discre~ tion to find the amount of substantial mischief of injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that it is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted.

Ifon weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the court considers that pending the suit, the subject matter shouid be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus the court has to exercise its sound judiciat discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit Undoubtedly, in a suit seeking to set aside the decree, the subject matter in the earlier suit, though became final, the court would in an appropriate case grant ad interim injunction when the party seeks to set aside the decree on the ground offraud pleaded in the suit orfor want ofjurisdiction in the court which passed the decree. But the court would be circumspect before granting the injunction and look to the conduct of the party, the probable injuries to either party and whether the plaintiff could be, adequately compensated if injunction is refused.

This case demonstrates (we are not expressing any opinion on the plea of fraud or their relative merits in the case or the validity of the decree impugned), suffice to state that the conduct of the respondent militates against the bonafides. At present there is a sale-deed executed by the court in favour DALPAT v. PRAHLAD [RAMASWAMY, J. ] 477 ofthe first appellant Ifultimately the respondent succeeds at the trial. They can be adequately compensated by awarding damages for use and occupation from the date of dispossession till date of restitution. Repeatedly the civil court and the High Court refused injunction pending proceedings. For any acts. of damage, if attempted to make, to the property, or done, appropriate direction could be taken in the suit If any alienation is made it would be subject to doctrine of /is pendense under s. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act The High Court without adverting to any.

of these material circumstances held that balance ofconvenience lies in favour ofgranting injunction with the following observations, keeping in mind history, various facts which have been brought to my notice, and looking to the balance of convenience and irreparable loss, I think it will be in the interest of justice to allow these appeals and grant temporary injunction that the appellants may not be dispossessed from the suit property". The phrases "prima facie case"; "balance of convenience" and "irreparable loss" are not rhetoric phrases for incantation, but words of width and elasticity, to meet myriad situations presented by man's ingenuinity in given facts and circumstances, but always is hedged with sound exercise of judicial discreation to meet the ends ofjustice. The facts are eloquentand speak for themselves. It is well nay impossible to find from facts primafacie case and balance of convenience. The respondents can be adequately compensated on their success.

In our considered view, the High Court committed manifest error of law in jumping t6 the above conclusion to allow the appeal. This appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The order of the High Court is set aside and that of the trial court is confinned. It is made clear that any observations made either by the trial court or the High Court or of this court should be taken to be not relevant at the trial on merits. These are our only prima facie observations, subject to adduction ofevidence and proofai the trial on merits in the suit The parties are directed to bear their own costs. · T. N. A. Appeals allowed.