DASAUDHA SINGH & ORS. ETC. ETC. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.

Citation: [1973] 2 S.C.R. 1006; 1972 INSC 283

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: A.N. GROVER , KUTTYIL KURIEN MATHEW, A.K. MUKHERJEA

Judgment date: 1972-11-16

Case summary

1972 INSC 283. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1972-11-16. DASAUDHA SINGH & ORS. ETC. ETC. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. Read the judgment and case...

Judgment text

lOOS SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1973] 2 S. C. R. :a 006 DASAUDHA SINGH & ORS. ETC. ETC. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. November 16, 1972 (With connected appeals) [A. N. GROVER, K. K. MATHEW AND A. K. MUKHERJEA, Ji. J East Pun;ab Utilisation of Lands A. ct 1949-Ss. 7 and 11-Scope- Whtthtr afttr . th. e expiry of the lease the owntl' can get back liis propcrty- Power of the Collector under S. 7(1 )-Wlwher eviction possible onlv under Pun/ab Tenancy A. ct. · Section 7 of the East Punjab Utilisation of Lands Act 1949, provides 'that wbero any land taken possession of by the Collector under Section 3 is, on the expiry of the lease to be returned to the owner, the Collector may, after enquiry, specify by order in writing, the person to whom pos· UISlion of the land shall be given and that delivery of possession of land shall be a full discharge of the Collector of all liability etc.

Further where the right person cannot be found, the Collector shall aftlx a notice on the land declaring it to have been released. After such a notice, the Collector or the Government shall uot be liable for nny compensation. Section 11 provides that the Collector may use force 'for enforcing- his order made under this Act. In the appeals, the main question for detern1ination was the scope, ambit and interpretation of S. 7 read with S. 11 of the Act. It waa contended by the appellants that under S. 7, the Collector had no po9•er to evict a lessee after the expiry of the lease. For that purpose resort must be had to the provisions of the Punjab Tenancy Act 1887, of the Oenerai Lav:. Dismissing the appeal, HELD : ( 1) Section 7 (! ) of the Act cannot be read in isolation, but bas to' be interpreted in the light of the purpose and scheme of the Act as also the other relevant provisions.

The sole purpose for which the Act wu enacted was to ensure that such lands as were capable of producing food or fodder but which owing to the neglect on the part of the owners were not beina C'Ultivated, are utilised for cultivation. Under S. 3, the Collector is empowered to take possession of any cultivable land which remained fallow for the last six or more harvests. The Collector was to give a lease for the minimum period Of 7 years, but not more thaa 20 years. The tenant, however, knew beforehand that on the expiry of the period of the lease, he would have to surrender possession to the owner. The Act, '"'where contemplated that tl:e owner should be completely depfr:ed of his ownership right. The compensation to which he was en· !. 'l! «i under s. 4 was for the temporary deprivation of the exercise of hi f s. 7. Once delivery of possession of the land to the person specified in the order made under sub-s.

( 1) had been effected the Collector stood discharged from all liability iq respect of such deliveT). Sub-ss. ( 3) and ( 4) were meant for a similar purpose when a person to whom possession of land was to be given could not be found. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention raised on behalf of the appellants that s. 7 read with s. 11 of the Act did not empower the Collector to make an order which would involve tlJe eviction of the tenant in case he refused to deliver possession to the person specified therein. The contention raised chat s. 7 of the Act is violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution . because there would be two or more remedies available to the authorities to which they can resort is wholly untenable. Section 14-A contained a complete bar to the civil court having any jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of the eviction of any person to whom land had been leased out under s. 5 of the Act. Sub-s. 4 of s.

6 as amended also bars the jurisdiction of any civil or revenue court to entertain any proceedings in respect of the determination of lease . or eviction of a tenant. 1. t has been suggested that sub-s. ( ( 4) of s. 6 is confined only to a case where a lease has been determined by the Collector before its expiry under the provisions of sub-s. ( 1) of s. 6. Sub-s. ( 4) is in general terms and. we are unable to see how it can be confined only to a lease determined under sub-s. ( 1) of that section. It appears tl:at it was primarily for this reason that s. 14A has now been deleted as already mentioned. The next q4estion which has been vehemently argued is whether the provisions of the Tenancy A<>t are applicable and whether the eviction could take place only under that Act: Reliance has also been placed on t!

le provisions of the Tenancy Act for sustaining the argument that no eviction could take place of the tenant unless compensation had been awarded to him under the provisions of that Act. "Land" has been defined by the Tenancy Act bys. 4(1) to mean, land which is not occupied as the site of any building in town or village and is occui. ied or has been let for agricultural purposes or for purposes sub-servient to agriculture, or for pasture and includes the sites of buildings and other structures on such land. "Tennat" has been defined by s. 4( 5) to mean a person who holds land under another person and is, or but for a special contract would b_e, liable to pay rent for that land to that other person. Certain categories of persons are not included but we are not concerned with them. Sub-s. ( 6) defines "Landlord" to mean a person under whom a tenant holds land and. to whom he is, or but for a special contract would be, liable to pay rent for that land.

Section 40 giv::s the grounds of ejectment of tenants for a fixed term and s. 42 places certain restrictions on the ejectment of the tenant. He shall not be ejected otherwise than in execution of a decree for ejectment except in cases mentioned illl clauses (a) and (b) of that section. Under s. 48 relief against forfeiture can be given in case~ mentioned therein to a tenant. Chapter VI deals with improvements by landlords and tenants. Under s. 64 a tenant not having a right of occupancy can make improvements on his tenancy with the assent of his landlord. Where improvements are begun in anticipation of ejectment the tenant cannot claim any compensation by virtue of s. 66. Under s. 67 if a landlord tenders to a tenant a lease of his tenancy for a term of not less than 20 years from the date of the tender at the rent then paid by the tenant or at sue)!

othet rent as may be agreed on the tender if accepted by the tenant the 'claim to compensation in respect of improvements previously made on the tenancy stands barred. Section 68 savs that a tenant who has made improvements on his tenancy shall not be ejected until he has received compensation for the improvements made by him. This fa, however, subject to other sections. DASAUDHA SINGH v. HARYANA (Grover, I. ) ! 015 As has been noticed already, in the Act the word "tenant" has b~en defined to mean a person to whom the land is leased by the Collector under the provisions of the A. ct. The definition of "land" is also different from the one given in the Tenancy Act. There is no definition of landlord at all in the Act. The entire scheme of the Act establishes that it was intended to be exhaustive for the purpose for which it was enacted. It is hardly possible to regard a tenant of the Collector under the Act as falling within the definition of a "tenarit" under the Tenancy Act.

The whole purpose of the Act would be defeated if the provisions of the Tenancy Act were made applicable to it. If that had been intended there was nothing to stop the legislature from making a provision in the Act itself about the applicability of the Tenancy Act. The High Court appears to be right in coming to the con-clusion that from the provisions of the Act no intention can be attributed to the legi~lature of creating a. relationship of landlord and tenant between the Collector and the tenant as defined by the Act of the same nature as was provided for by the Tenancy Act. Once the above concli;sion is reached the argument based on the provisions of the Tenancy Act with regard to compensation for improvements is bound to fail. As regards the general sub-mission tliat a person cannot be deprived of his property without payment of compensation it must be remembered that no provision has been made for payment of any compensation for such improvements.

The tenants, namely, the appellants had agreed to the term in 1he lease by which they were bound that they would not claim any compensation for the improvements made by them ·during the currency of the lease. Moreover when the tenant knew that the lease was for as long a period as 20 years, improvements must have been made with the full knowledge 1hat on the· expiry of that period possession would have to be surrendered. The ~enants had also reaped all the advantage that they could by having a lease for such a long period. It is true that in the Act itself s. 4 provides for payment of compensation to owners and s.. 6 contains a specific clause that where a lease has been determined by the Collector the lessee shall not be entitled to any compensation. Section 7 does not contain any such provision.

It is significant that although where the Iegislatt1re intended to provide for compensation it did so and where it did not intend to do so it was clearly provided that the tenant shall not be entitled to any compensation. Section 7 is silent on the question of compensation. The legislature being fully alive to the matter of compensation it would be legitimate to assume that it did not intend to make any provision when possession was to be handed over by the tenant to the original owner pursuant to ... ( an order made. under s. 7. The reason apparently for not. making any provision for compensation one way or the other was that it was clearly contemplated that the tenant would have to give up possession on the expiry of the term of the lease which was for a long period and during which he was expected. as has been observe_d before, to derive the maximum benefit by means of cultivation of food and foodgrain crops.

Since the provisions of the Tenancy Act have been held to be inapplicable lo the tenant as defined by the Act we are unable to hold that he was entitled to any compensation before giving up possession in compliance with the order made under s. 7 of the Act. Before the High Court it had been urged on behalf of the appellants that they could be ejected only in accordance with the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act 1953. The High Court held that owing to s. 21 (I) nothinE contained in. that Act shall affect any land held by a tenant or lessee under the Government. Mr. Dutta who represented some of the appellants before us did not press any argument relating to the applicability of the provisions of the Land Tenures Act to the case of o the ;;. ppellants.

At any rate, and this position has been rightly conceded by the counsel for the respondents, the appellants cannot be debarred from taking benefit of or seeking protection μnder any enactment if they can establi~h that they are governed bv its 1mwisions ' Dr. ' Singhvi who argued Civil Appeal No. 825/72 has raised some other points in addition to those already disposed of. According to him after the Registrar of Cooperative Societies had settled the dispute between the Kamal Society and the Lyallpur Society the latter took no interest in 175 acres of land situate in village Pehowa which had been allotted to it and which F. were brought under cultivation by the appellants Dasuadha Singh and others. This, it is said was done with the tacit approval of the Collector.

It is, however, admitted that the lease was in favour of the aforesaid societies and the allegation that the appellants brought this land under cultivation with the tacit approval of the Collector contained in para 5 of the writ petition was denied in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. In the Jamabandi entries of 1963-64 the entry was as follows:- "The Collector, Karna! , Lessor, Karna\ Cooperative Farn1ers, Kamal, Lyallpur Coope~ati~e Farmers, Kamal in equal shares, lessees. CulUvaUon Lyal. lpur Cooperative Farn1ers, Karna! , through Dasaudha Singh ................ tenants-at-will". t It is difficult to understand how the Jamabandi e. ntry helps the appellants at all. It seems to indicate that the persons who were DASAUOHA SINGH v. HARYANA (Grover, I. ) 1017 shown as tenants-! lt-will were cultivating it under the societies which were ! he lessees.

They could not, therefore, claim any better rights than the societies which were the tenants of -the Collector and amenable to his jurisdiction under the Act. It may be mentioned that in the High Court this point does not appear to have been argued and we do not have the benefit of any find-ing of that court on that poi"nt. It has. further, been submitted on behalf of the appellants that before any orders were made under s. 7 of the Act the tenants or the persons in occupation of the lands in question should have been given an opportunity of being heard to satisfy the well· settled rule of natural justice. Under s. 7 the Collector has to decide and name the owners to whom possession shall be given. The tenant can have no locus standi in that matter in which if there are any rival claimants they aione would be interested. The scheme of s.

7 is such that it is not possible to read into it any requirement of a nootice being' issued to, the tenants before any ord :r is made by the Collector under that· section. Before the High Court only in one case i. e. C. W. 217 l /7 l it was pointed ounhat the petitionel'S therein had purchased 6 acres of land from the original land owner and as such the Collector could not legally dispossess them from that portion of the land. The Additional Advocate General conceded that in case that area had been purchased by the petitioners in that writ petition they would not be dispossessed and the possession would be res-torecl to them if dispossession had taken place. On behalf of a number of appellants it has been contended that several portions of lands in dispute have been purchased from the original owners and the purchasers are actually in' possession.

It is riot disputed by the counsel for the respondents that if any person has acquired the ownership rights in any of tl'te lands which were the subject matter of the writ petition he can approach the Collector who will consider his case fully and if it is proved that he has become an owner then his possession will not be disturbed and no orders will be made with regard to the area in his occupation or possession under s. 7. This will fully safeguard the interest' of those persons who have acquired ownership rights eithe~ before or during the pendency of the proceedings in the High Court or even in this Court. 1018 SUI-REME COURT REPORTS [1973] 2 S. C. R, Lastly we cannot help observing that the appellants will be A put to a good deal of hardship by being asked to give up all lands wh\ch they had been cultivating for so many years and which probably are the main source of their livelihood. But that hardship could be alleviated or some relief given by legislation alone.

The court is unable to do anything in the matter. n In the result the appeals fail and they are dismissed but there will be no order as to costs. s. c. Appeals di~missed.

Source: Supreme Court eSCR. Dataset: Dattam Labs, CC BY 4.0. Text extracted automatically; compare with the source PDF for layout and accuracy.