DAYA NAND v. STATE OF HARYANA

Citation: [2008] 5 S.C.R. 1043

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT, P. SATHASIVAM

Case summary

DAYA NAND v. STATE OF HARYANA.pdf

Judgment text

[2008] 5 S. C. k 1043 ,. _j DAYA NANO V. STATE OF HARYANA (Criminal Appeal No. 595 of 2005) APRIL 3, 2008 '4- (DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND P. SATHASIVAM, JJ. ) Penal Code, 1860; Ss. 299, 300, 302, 304 Part I and Ill Arms Act, 1959; S. 27: Culpable homicide/murder - Appellant, at the instance of his father; allegedly fired a shot at the deceased resulting in his death - F /. R. - Investigation - Charge-sheet - Trial Court found appellant guilty of committing the offence of murder punishable u/s. 302 /PC and s. 27 of the Arms Act but found evidence against accused father of the appellant insufficient to convict him - Appeal dismissed by High Court - ~ Correctness of - Held: According to the law laid down in the case of Virsa Singh vs.

State of Punjab even if the intention of the accused was limited to the infliction ofbodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and did not extend to the intention of causing death, the offence would not be murder - Considering the evidence on record in the background of the principles of law, the inevitable conclusion is that the appropriate conviction would be u/s. 304 Part II ! PC - Conviction altered accordingly - Sentence restricted to the period already undergone - Sentencing. ~ 'Culpable homicide' and 'murder' - Distinction between - Discussed. According to the prosecution, on the fateful day, an altercation took place between PW5 and his brothers including the deceased on the one side and accused persons including the appellant on the other. Accused 'A' allegedly exhorted his son, appellant, to fire a shot at the deceased. Appellant fired a shot, which hit the deceased resulting in bleeding injury.

PW5 and PW6, brothers of the deceased, had taken the victim to a hospital, where he was declared dead. On the basis of an information received from the hospital, an FIR was recorded by the Police and after investigation of the case, charge sheet was filed against the accused appellant u/s. 302 IPC and s. 27 of the Arms Act and against his father u/s. 302 r/w s. 34 IPC. Trial Court found the prosecution evidence cogent and credible as against the appellant and accordingly convicted him for committing the offence of murder punishable u/s. 302 IPC and sentenced him accordingly but found the evidence as against father of the appellant insufficient, and acquitted him. Appeal filed thereagainst by the appellant was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court. Hence the present 0 appeal. Appellant contended that s. 302 IPC has no application in the facts and circumstances Of the case. Partly allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.

1 'Culpable homicide' sans 'special characteristics of murder is culpable homicide not amounting to murder'. For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of the generic offence, the IPC practically recognizes three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, 'culpable homicide of the first degree'. This is the gravest t-" form of culpable homicide, which is defined in s. 300 IPC as 'murder'. The second may be termed as 'culpable homicide of the second degree'. This is punishable under the first part of s. 304 IPC. Then, there is 'culpable homicide of the third degree'. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is also the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Cul. pable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of s. 304 IPC. (Para - 10) [1050-E, F & G] 1.

2 The academic distinction between 'murder' and 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' has always vexed the Courts. The confusion is caused, if Courts ... losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms -+ used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Ss. 299 and 300 IPC. (Para - 11) [1050-H; 1051-A & B] 1. 3 For cases to fall within clause (3) of s. 300 IPC, it is not necessary that the offender intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues from the intentional 0 bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. (Para - 14) [1053-D & E] Rajwant and Anr. vs. State ofKera/a, AIR (1966) SC 1874 - relied on. 1. 4 Under clause thirdly of s. 300 IPC, culpable homicide is murder, if both the following conditions are satisfied: i.

e. (a) that the act which causes death is done with the intention of causing death or is done with the intention of causing a bodily injury; and (b) that the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It must be proved that there was -v an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which, in the ordinary course of nature, was sufficient to cause death, viz. , that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted. According to the rule laid down by this Court in Virsa Singh's case, even if the intention of accused was limited to the infliction of bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary ~ course of nature, and did not extend to the intention of causing death, the offence would not be murder. Illustration (c) appended to S. 300 clearly brings out this point. (Paras - 18 & 19) [1055-C, D, E & F] Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR (1958) SC 465 relied on. 1. 5 Clause (c) of s.

299 and clause (4) of s. 300 IPC both require knowledge of the probability of the act +' causing death. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to dilate much on the distinction between these corresponding clauses. It will be sufficient to say that clause (4) of s. 300 would be applicable where the knowledge of the offender as to the probability of death of a person or persons in general as distinguished from a particular person or persons - being caused from his imminently dangerous act, approximates to a practical certainty. Such knowledge on the part of the offender 0 must be of the highest degree of probability, the act ' having been committed by the offender without any 1' • excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury. (Para""'. ' 20) [1055-G & H; 1056-A & B] State ofAndhra Pradesh vs. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr. (1976) 4 SCC 382; Abdul Waheed Khan @ Waheed and Ors. vs. State ofAndhra Pradesh (2002) 7 SCC 175; Augustine Sa/danha vs.

State ofKamataka (2003) 10 SCC 472; Thangiya vs. State of TN. (2005) 9 SCC 650 and Rajinder vs. State of Haryana (2006) 5 SCC 425 - relied on. 2. Considering the evidence on record in the background of the principles of law, the inevitable conclusion is that the appropriate conviction would be under s. 304 Part II IPC. The conviction is accordingly altered. The accused has suffered custody of nearly 8% years. The sentence is restricted to the period already undergone. (Paras - 23 & 24) [1056-E & F] · CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 595 of 2008. ~ From the Judgment/ final Order dated 27. 2. 2007 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Crl. A. No. 789-DB/1997. Naresh Kaushik, Satish Dayanandan, Parag Goyal and Lalita Kaushik for the Appellant. . Rajeev Gaur 'Naseem', Rajesh Ranjan and Naresh Bakshi . , -+ for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was deliver -· 6.

In appeal, it was submitted that the evidence of Shankar (PW5) and Nain Sukh (PW6) should not have been relied upon. It was further submitted that a single shot that too on the hip cannot attract application of Section 302 IPC. Prosecution with reference to the evidence of Shankar (PW5) and Nain Sukh (PW6) submitted that the evidence was clear and cogent and, therefore, the accused persons were to be convicted. The High ... " Court, as noted above, dismissed the appeal. 7. Basic challenge in this appeal is to the conviction under Section 302 IPC. 8. It was contended, as was done before the Trial Court and the High Court, that Section 302 IPC has no application. . 9. Learned counsel for the State, on the other hand supported the impugned judgment. 10. The crucial question is as to which was the appr<>priate , provision to be applied. In. the scheme of the IPC culpable 1homicide is genus and 'murder' its specie. AH',. murder' is 'culpable homicide' but not vice-versa.

Speaking generally, 'culpable homicide' sans 'special characteristics of murder is culpable homicide not amounting to murder'. For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of the generic offence, the IPC practically recognizes three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, ·culpable homicide of the first degree'. This is the gravest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as 'murder'. The second may 1 • be termed as 'culpable homicide of the second degree'. This is 'r punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is 'culpable homicide of the third degree'. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is also the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304. 11.

The academic distinction between 'murder' and 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' has always vexed ~ the Courts. The confusion is caused, if Courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature · in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300. The following comparative table will be helpful in ·~· appreciating the points of distinction between the two offences.

Section 299 · Section 300 A person commits culpable homicide Subject to certain exceptions if the act by which the death is culpable homicide is murder caused is done if the act by which the death is caused is done - INTENTION (a) with the intention of causing (1) with the intention of death; or causing death; or (b) with the intention of causing (2) with the intention of such bodily injury as is likely causing such bodily injury to cause death; or as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; or (3) With the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or KNOWLEDGE **** (c) with the knowledge that the act (4) with the knowledge that is likely to cause deattr the act is so imminently [2008] 5 S. C. R.

dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as is mentioned above. 12. Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with clauses (2) and (3) of Section 300. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the internal harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of a person in normal health or condition. It is noteworthy that the 'intention to cause death' is not an essential requirement of clause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledgE?

of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause. This aspect of clause (2) is borne out by illustration (b) appended to Section 300. 13. Clause (b) of Section 299 does not postulate any such knowledge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling under clause (2) of Section 300 can be where the assailant causes death by a fist blow intentionally given knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause death of that particular person as a result of the rupture of the liver, or spleen or the failure of the heart, as the case may be.

If the assailant had no such knowledge about the disease or special frailty of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally given. In clause (3) of Section 300, instead of the words 'likely to cause death' occurring in the corresponding clause (b) of Section 299, the words "sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real and if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. The difference between ~ clause (b) of Section 299 and clause (3) of Section 300 is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury.

To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The word 'likely' in clause (b) of Section 299 conveys the sense of probable as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words "bodily injury....... sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" mean that death will be the "most probable" result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature. 14. For cases to fall within clause (3), it is not necessary ~ that the offender intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues from the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Rajwant and Anr. v. State of Kera/a, (AIR 1966 SC 1874) is an apt illustration of this point. 15. In Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, (AIR 1958 SC 465), Vivian Bose, J. speaking for the Court, explained the meaning and scope of clause (3).

It was observed that the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under Section 300, "thirdly". First, it must establish quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; secondly the nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry ~~ proceeds further, and fourthly it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out t above was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. .. 16.

The ingredients of clause "Thirdly" of Section 300, IPC were brought out by the illustrious Judge in his terse language 8 as follows: ~ "To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following +. facts before it can bring a case under Section 300, "thirdly". First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present. Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and, Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.

This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. " 17. The learned Judge explained the third ingredient in the following words (at page 468): -Y 'The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If he can show that he did not, or if the totality of the circumstances justify such an inference, then of course, the intent that the section requires is not proved. But if there is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference is that he intended to inflict it. Whether he knew of its seriousness or intended serious consequences, is neither here or there.

The question, so far as the intention is concerned, is not whether he intended to kill, or to inflict an injury of a particular degree of seriousness but whether he intended to inflict the injury in question and once the existence of the injury is proved the intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion. " 18. These observations of Vivian Bose, J. have become locus classicus. The test laid down by Virsa Singh's case (supra) for the applicability of clause 'Thirdly" is now ingrained in our legal system and has become part of the rule of law. Under clause thirdly of Section 300 IPC, culpable homicide is murder, if both the following conditions are satisfied: i. e. (a) that the act which causes death is done witr the intention of causing death or is done with the intention of causing a bodily injury; and (b) that the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which, in the ordinary course of nature, was sufficient to cause death, viz. , that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted. 19. Thus, according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh's case, even ifthe intention of accused was limited to the infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and did not extend to the intention of causing death, the offence would not be murder. Illustration (c) appended to Section 300 clearly brings out this point. 20. Clause (c) of Section 299 and clause (4) of Section 300 both require knowledge of the probability of the act causing death. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to dilate much on the distinction between these corresponding clauses. It will be sufficient to say that clause (4) of Section 300 would be applicable where the knowledge of the offender as to the )...

~ probability of death of a person or persons in general as distinguished from a particular person or persons - being caused from his imminently dangerous act, approximates to a practical certainty. Such knowledge on the part of the offender must be of the highest degree of probability, the act having been committed by the offender without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. ~ 21. The above are only broad guidelines and not cast iron imperatives. In most cases, their observance will facilitate the task of the Court. But sometimes the facts are so intertwined and the second and the third stages so telescoped into each other that it may not be convenient to give a separate treatment to the matters involved in the second and third stages. 22. The position was illuminatingly highlighted by this Court in State ofAndhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr. (1976 (4) SCC 382), Abdul Waheed Khan @ Waheed and Ors. v.

State ofAndhra Pradesh (2002 (7) SCC 175), Augustine )<. Saldanha v. State ofKarnataka (2003 (10) SCC 472), Thangiya v. State of TN. (2005 (9) SCC 650) and in Rajinder v. State of Haryana (2006 (5) SCC 425). 23. Considering the evidence on record in the background of the principles of law, the inevitable conclusion is that the appropriate conviction would be under Section 304 Part 11 IPC. The conviction ls accordingly altered. 24. Undisputedly, the accused has suffered custody of nearly 8~ years. The sentence is restricted, therefore, to the period already undergone. The appeal is allowed to that extent. The accused person be set at liberty forthwith unless required in custody in any other case. S. K. S. Appeal partly allowed.