DIDIGAM BIKSHAPATHI & ANR. v. STATE OF AP

Citation: [2007] 12 S.C.R. 694

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT, TARUN CHATTERJEE

Case summary

DIDIGAM BIKSHAPATHI & ANR. v. STATE OF AP.pdf

Judgment text

DIDIGAM BIKSHAPATHI & ANR. v. STATE OF AP. NOVEMBER 29, 2007 (_ [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND TARUN CHATTERJEE, JJ. ) Code a/Criminal Procedure. 1973: s. 482-Criminal Proceedings-For offence u/s 306 IPC--On the basis of suicide noteLPetition for quashing ofproceedings- Dismissed-On appeal, held: Petition rightly rejected-Case is clearly made out from suicide note. s. 482-lnherentjurisdiction-Scope andpurpose of-Held: Such ,.. powers are providedfor administration a/justice-They are wise, but it should be exercised sparingly in rarest ofrare cases. Maxims-Maxim 'quando lex aliauid alicui condedit, concedere videtur et id sine guo res ipsae esse non potest' Proceedings were initiated against the appellants before Sessions Judge for offences punishable u/s 306 IPC. The deceased in a suicide note had held the appellants responsible for the suicide clearly narrating the circumstances under which he committed suicide. Appellants filed an application u/s 482 Cr. P. C.

seeking quashing ofthe proceedings. High court dismissed the petition in view 'r' of the suicide note. Hence, the present appeal. ,. Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. The suicide note clearly refers to the background in which the victim took the extreme step oftaking away his own life by committing suicide. It is not a case where there is no reference to • any act by the accused. Therefore, High Court rightly rejected the prayer ofexercise for power under Section 482 Cr. P. C. [Paras 11and12) [701-H; 702-A, CJ DIDIGAMBIKSHAPATHiv. STATE 695 -""' Netai Dutta v. State of West Bengal, (2005) AIR SCW 1326, distinguished. 2. 1. Courts have inherent powers apart from express provisions oflaw which are necessary for proper discharge offunctions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds - j expression in Section 482 Cr. P. C. which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers ofthe High Courts.

All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle "quando lex aliauidalicui concedit, concedere videtur et idsine guo res ipsae esse non potest'' (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). [Para 7) [698-F, H] -), 2. 2. Section 482 does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment ofCr. P. C. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under Cr. P. C. (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends ofjustice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction.

No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. [Para 7) (698-D, E] ~ 2. 3. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P. C. the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not orwhether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained, that is the function ofthe trial Judge nor does it function as a court ofappeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the Section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when '\,.. ' such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. [Para 7 and 9) (698-H; 699-A, B; H; 7Ga-A) f 2. 4. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P. C.

are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. The power should be exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. The Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Ofcourse, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. [Paras 9 and 10] (700-D; 701-D; E-G) State of!! aryana v.

Bhajan Lal, (1992) Supp 1335, relied on. R. P. Kapur v. State ofPunjab, AIR (1960) SC 866; State ofOrissa v. Saro} Kumar Sahoo, (2005) 13 SCC 540 and Minu Kumari v. State ofBihar, AIR (2006) SC 1937, referred to. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 1643 of2007. From the Judgment & Order dated 29. 3. 2006 ofthe High Court of Judicature ofAndhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Criminal Petition No. 2758/ 2002. G. V. Choudhari and K. Shivraj Choudhuri for the Appellants. P. Vinay Kumar and D. Bharathi Reddy for the Respondent. The Judgment ofthe Court was delivered by DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge ofthe Andhra Pradesh High Court, dismissing the petition DIDIGAMBIKSHAPATHI v. STATE [PASAYAT,J. ] 697 filed by the appellants under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'the Code'). Prayer was to quash the proceedings in SC No.

498 of 2001 on the file of VII Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, initiated against them for commission ofoffence punishable under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short 'IPC'). 3. Accusations which led to the institution ofthe proceedings are essentially are as follows: Budida Krishnamurthy (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') had close friendship with the appellant (Al). About four years back he appointed deceased and others as field officers in his finance firm namely; Uma Hire Purchase and Finance. While so, the appellant no. I joined as a partner in Kanaka Mahalaxmi Real Estate Ventures run by Mekala Ravi • and Mekala Venu. The deceased and two other field officers namely; ,; Budida Laxmaiah (L. W. 7) and Thandra Mallaiah (L. W. 8) sold about 15 plots in that group to Kommaipalli villagers and collected various amounts from them and handed over the same to the appellant no. I.

As he did not pay the money to the Kanaka Mahalaxmi Real Estate Ventures, the other partners did not register the plots in favour ofthe persons, who paid the money to the deceased. Since the deceased demanded for registration ofthe plots in favour ofthe prospective purchasers, he (appellant no. I) escaped with his family from Jangaon and was staying at his in-laws house. The deceased went there and demanded registration ofthe plots, but the appellants abused him in filthy language and the accused neither registered the plots nor returned the amount. Due to the mental harassment and unable to bear the pressure from the purchasers of the plots, the deceased committed suicide by falling under an un-known train in the night of 17. 4. 2001 leaving a suicide note narrating the reasons for his committing suicide. 4. Before the High Court the stand was that the ingredients necessary to constitute offence under Section 306 IPC are absent. There is no element ofabetrnent.

The High Court did not accept the contention taking note ofthe statement made in the suicide note. The High Court felt that this was not a fit case where the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code is to be exercised. 5. In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there was no question of abetment. Merely because the person committed suicide having been insulted and humiliated due to the comments or utterances made by the accused, that does not constitute an offence punishable under Section 306 IPC. Therefore, the High Court ought to have quashed the proceedings. Strong reliance was placed on a > decision of this Court in Netai Dutta v. State ofWest Bengal, (2005) AIR SCW 1326. Further it was submitted that there was only a vague reference to appellant no. 2 wife ofappellant no. 1, and on that score, the appeal deserves to be allowed so far as she is concerned. 6.

In response, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the suicide note clearly refers to various acts ofthe appellants due to which the unfortunate step ofcommitting suicide was taken by the victim and in any event it is not a fit case where jurisdiction under Section 482 is to be exercised. 7. Section 482 does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment ofthe Code. lt envisages three circumstances under which the inherentjurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code (ii) to prevent abuse ofthe process ofcourt, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends ofjustice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise ofinherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise.

Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge offunctions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section w~ich merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers ofthe High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence ofany express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration ofjustice on the principle "quando lex aliauid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine guo res ipsae esse non potest'' (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court ofappeal -+ or revision.

Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration ofwhich alone courts exist Authority ofthe court exists for advancement ofjustice and if any attempt is made to abuse ~ that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse ofprocess ofthe court, to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion ofjustice, in exercise ofthe powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding ifit finds that initiation/continuance ofit amounts to 'abuse ofthe process ofcourt or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the report, the court may examine the question of fact.

When a report is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the report has alleged and whether any offence is made out even ifthe allegations are ~ accepted in toto. 8. In R. P. Kapur v. State ofPunjab, AIR (1960) SC 866 this Court summarized some categories ofcases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings. (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the . _ institution or continuance e. g. want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 9. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where ". '--!

there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function ofthe trial Judge. Judicial process should not be an instrument ofoppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands ofa private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death.

The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 ofthe Code. and the categories ofcases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse ofprocess ofany court or otherwise to secure the ends ofjustice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992] Supp I 335. A note of caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that ,k too in rarest ofrare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows: "(! ) Where the allegations made in the first infonnation report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

• (2) Where the allegations in the first infonnation report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (I) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview ofSection 155 (2) ofthe Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support ofthe same do not disclose the commission ofany offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is pennitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) ofthe Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or "complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis ofwhich no prudent person can ever reach ajust conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code. or the Act concerned (under which criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code. or Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance ofthe aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with ma/a fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with / view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. " 10. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code.

are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise ofthis power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court ofa State should normally refrain from giving aprimafacie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are ofmagnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinaryjurisdiction ofquashing the proceeding at any stage. (See State ofOrissa v. Saro) Kumar Sahoo, [2005] 13 SCC 540 and Minu Kumari v. State ofBihar, AIR (2006) SC 1937) 11.

The suicide note clearly refers to the background in which the victim took the extreme step oftaking away his own life by committing suicide. It is not a case where there is no reference to any act by the accused. In Netai Dutta 's case (supra) para 6 it was observed as follows: "6. In the suicide note, except referring to the name of the appellant at two places, there is no reference ofany act or incidence whereby the appellant herein is alleged to have committed any willful act or omission or intentionally aided or instigated the 1 • deceased Pranab Kumar Nag in committing the act of suicide. There is no case that the appellant has played any part or any role in any conspiracy, which ultimately instigated or resulted in the commission ofsuicide by deceased Pranab Kumar Nag. " 12. In the instant case the suicide note clearly refers to the acts of the accused-appellants and the roles played by them.

Therefore, the High Court rightly rejected the prayer ofexercise ofpower under Section 482 of the Code. We make it clear that any observation made by the High Court and by us while dismissing ofthe present appeal shall be construed to be determinative factor in the trial. K. K. T. Appeal dismissed.