DURGA PRASAD v. DEVI CHARAN
Citation: [1979] 1 S.C.R. 873; 1978 INSC 182
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI , P.N. SHINGAL
Judgment date:
Case summary
1978 INSC 182. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1978-09-19. DURGA PRASAD v. DEVI CHARAN. Read the judgment and case details on LawSphereX.
Judgment text
874 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 1 s. c. R. DURGA PRASAD v. DEVI CHARAN • September 19, 1978 [S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND P. N. SHINGHAL, JJ. ] Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925)-Will not found on death of testator-If presumption as to revocation arises--Onus alleging revocation on whom lies. The respondent was the adopted son of the testatrix who made a will in 1935 declaring that her properties were dedicated to a private temple of hers in her house 3. nd would remain so for all times to come. Jn 1938, however, she revoked the earlier will and dedicated a part of the house and certain other items for the benefit of the temple. But she expressly prohibited the respondent from performing her funeral rites and gave certain rights over the property to the appellant and his wife.
In 1947 she again revoked the will made in 1938 and bequeathed her properties to the appellant without right of alienation and had also clearly stated that the respondent should have no concern with her estate and should not be allowed to touch her dead body. On .. her death, though the original will was not found, a draft will which was almost of the same time was discovered. The recitals in the draft were almost the same as in the will of 1947. In the appellant's petition before the District Judge for grant of letters of administration or probate the respondent contended that the testatrix was not of sound disposing mind at the time of the alleged execution of the will and that ihe appellant had exercised undue influence over· her in the execution of the will. It was further alleged that the will was subsequently revoked and that \Vas the reason why it was not found in the house despite search.
The District Judge accepted the respondent's version and rejected the petition for probate. On appeal a single Judge of the High Court found that the will · was genuine and_had not been revoked. On furthor appeal the Division Bench restored the order of the District Judge dismissing the appellant's application for probate by drawing a presumption that the testatrix had revoked the will by I . ..... __ destroying it before her death. In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the High Co\lli was in error in drawing a presumption of revocation of the will in view of the express provisions of s. 70 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and in the alternative even if the presumption was available to the respondent the. same being a rebuttable One, was sufficiently rebutted by facts and circumstances proved iD. the case.
, Allowing the appeal, HELD : The presumption that the will was revoked by the testatrix had been sufficiently rebutted and the respondent had failed to discharge the onm which lay on him to prove that the. will was revoked. The will being a product of Cree will of the testatrix there must be strong and cogent reasons for holding that it was revoked. The fact that the will was not found, despite search, was not sufficient to justify a presumption that the will was revoked. Having regard to the fact that the respondent was interested in destroying the ,vill and had access )41 to the house, the presumption would be that the will was either stolen or misplaced by him or at his instance.
[890C-E] • The correct legal position may be stated thus : (i) Where a will has been properly executed and registered by the le8tator but not found at the time of death the question whether the presumption that the testator had revoked the will can be drawn or not will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Even if such a presumption is drawn it is rather a weak one in view of the habits and conditions of our people. (ii) Such a presumption is a rebuttable one and can be rebutted by the slightest possible evidence, direct or circumstantial. For instance, where it is proved that a will was a strong and clear disposition evincing the categorical intention o~ the testator and there was nothing to indicate the presence of any circumstance which is likely to bring about a change in the intention of the testator so as to revoke the will suddenly, the presumption is rebutted.
(iii) In view of the fact that in our country most of the people are not highly educated and do not in every case take the care of depositing the will in the bank or with the1 Solicitors or otherwise take very great care of the will as a result of which the possibility of the will being stolen, lost or surreptitiously removed by interested persons cannot be excluded. the presumption should be applied carefully. (iv) \:Yhere the legatee is able to prove the circumstances from VJhich it can be inferred that there could be absolutely no reason whatsoever for revoking the will or that the Act of revoking the will was against the tempea:ament and inclination of the testator, no presumption of revocation of the will can be drawn. (v) In view of the express provision of section 70 of the Indian Succession Act the on•s lica on the objector to prove the various circttnrstances, viz . • marriage, burn. in:, tearina: or destruction of the will.
(vi) When there is no obvious reason or clear motive for the testator to revoke the will and yet the will is not found on. the death of the testator it may well be that the will W3' misplaced or lost or was stolen by the interested persons. [8871H88A] Anna Maria W income from the propertieii which he should spend in the performance of Puja in the temple and appropriate the balance himself. In this will also there was a prohibition clause under which it was said that Devi Charan would have no concern with her estate, movable and immovable, and he ~hould not oven touch her dead body. So far as the upper portion of the house is concerned, which was converted into a • private temple where a deity was installed that is not the subject matter of the will and there is no dispute about the same. The dispute between the parties centres round the ground portion of the house and other movable properties. After the death of Smt.
Jog Maya the house was locked up by the neighbours and later a search was conducted as a result of which though DURGA PRASAD v. DEVI CHARAN (Fazal Ali, J. ) 879 the original will was not found a draft will almost of the same time as the will in question was found which is Ext. C-1. No date is given in this draft but Jog Maya has described herself as being 63 years of age which would show that this draft was written almost at the same time as the will. According to this draft, apart from Durga Prashad one Pandit Ram Nath was also appointed as executor and trustee of the properties of Jog Maya. The usual directions fo. r carrying on tho Puja and other charitable purposes was also found in this draft. In the draft also it was clarified that Devi Charan had no connection with the house or with the properties which were the subject matter of the will and had executed a release deed in favour of Jog Maya.
As , regards Devi Charan the following recitals appear in the draft : "I and Devi Charan have not been given rights of alienation and it is also mentioned in the will about Devi Charan that if he remains of good conduct he will he entitled to receive Rs. 10/- p. m. As his character became bad on attaining majority, my father-in-law secured a release deed from him registered at Nq. 2200, Book I Volume 558 dated 26-8-1929 in my favour. From that time my son Devi has no connection with those houses and with my movable and immovable! property .......... Eighthly. I specially direct that Devi Charan should not perform my funeral cere-monies and the trustees should get them performed by another".
If would thus appear that the relations between the respondent and the testatrix were extremely strained at the time when the will in question was executed and it appears that the testatrix did not wish that the respondent should have anything to do with her properties and any concession she had made in his favour in her two previous wills appears to have been completely withdrawn by the impugned will. Even Prem Shankar one of the witnesses examined by the respondent clearly admitted that Devi Charan was not made a truitee by that trust deed because Smt. Jog Maya was offended with him. The appellant has also stated in his evidence that relations between the respondent and the testatrix were not good. A careful analysis therefore of the previous wills or draft' executed by Jog Maya show the presence of the following important features in all these documents :- 1. That relations between the respondent and Smt.
Jog Maya were extremely strained so much so that he was not permitted to perform her funeral rites or touch he. r body. .. lit - .. 2. Substantial provision was made for religious and charitable purposes in all the wills. 3. Express prohibition was made in all the wills regarding alienating the properties by the legatees or the trustees. 4. That in the draft will as also the impugned will Durga Prashad was constituted as the executor of the will. We will develop these features a little later after discussing the points of law involved in the case. The High Court appears to have drawn the presumption regarding the revocation of the will from two facts. In the first place, it was found that there was no positive evidence to show that the will was in existence at the time of the death of the testatrix.
In this connection, -it relied on the evidence of Durga Prashad that a few days prior to her death Jog Maya had told him that the original will was in safe custody in the bank, but this fact was falsified by the circumstance that when the sealed box kept in the bank was opened no will was found. In ou. r opinion, in the initial application which the appellant gave for grant of probate, he did not mention at all that Jog Maya told him that the original will was kept in safe custody in the bank. This averment wa:s made in an amended application which was given by him before the District Judge. In the circumstances, therefore, we feel that no such statement was ever made by Jog Maya to the appellant who tried to overstate his case which was clearly an after-thought otherwise there was no reason why he should not have mentioned this fact in the initial petition for the grant of probate which he filed before the District Judge.
In these circumstances, not much turns upon what Durga Prashad says about the will being in the box. The High Court then relied on the circumstance that in spite of every possible search while the draft Ex. C-1 was in fact found the will was not found· at all. TOO High Court, therefore, drew presumption that the testatrix must have revoked the will by destruction or otherwise. The question as to whether or not a presumption should be drawn in such cases as a rule of law is extremely doubtful. Moroever, even if any such presumption is drawn the said presumption is rebuttable and may be rebutted either by direct or circumstancial evidence. In the first place, the High Court relied on the case of Anna Marilll Welch and Luc. y Allen Welch v.
Nathaniel Phillips(') where the Privy Council observed as follows :- "Now the rule of the law of evidence on this subject, as established by a course of decisions in the Ecclesiastical Court, is this : "that if a will, traced to the possession of the (I) (1836) I Moore, P. C. 299. DURGA PRASAD v. DEVI CHARAN (Fazal Ali, !. ) 881 deceased, and last seen there, is not forthcoming on his death, it is presumed to have been destroyed by himself; and that presumption must have effect, unless there is sufficient evidence to repel it. It is a presumption founded on good sense". The. serious question for us to determine is whether the ratio of this case can be applied to Indian conditions with full force. This matter was clearly considered by the Privy Council in the case from India in Padman & Ors. v. Hanwanta & Ors. (') where the Privy Council sounded a note of caution in applying the aforesaid presumption to this country having regarding to the nature and habits of the people of our country.
While approving the observations of the Chief Court their Lordships in the aforesaid case observed as follows "We think that the more reasonable presumption in this case is that the will was mislaid and lost, or else was stolen by one of the defendants after the death of Daula .. Their Lordships think that it was perfectly within the competency of the learned Judges to come to that finding. Much stress has been laid on the view expressed by Baron Parke, in Welch v. Phillips (1836) I Moore, P. C. 299 that when a will is traced to the possession of the deceased and is not forthcoming at his death, the presumption is that he has destroyed it. In view of the habits and conditions of the people of India this rule of law, if it can be so called, must be applied with considerable caution. In the present case the deceased was a very old man and, towards the end of his I life, almost imbecile.
There is nothing definite to show '- 'that he had any motive to destroy the will or was mentally competent to do so. On the other hand, the circumstances favour the view the Chief Court has taken that the will was either mislaid or stolen". The Privy Council made it very clear that the more reasonable presumption in a case like this should be that the will was mislaid, lost ·or stolen rather than that it was revoked. The Privy Council further endorsed the fact that the presumption of English law should be applied to Indian conditions with considerable caution. The High Court in the instant case does not appear to have kept in view the note of warning sounded by the Privy Council in the aforesaid case. (I) A. I. R. 1915 P. C. 111. . ,. ___, - -~LL. 882 SUPREME COURT Rl! PORTS [1979] 1 s. c. R. There are a large number of authorities of the Indian Higb Courts which take the view that even if the presumption is applied it should be applied with very great cautions.
Before however dealing with these authorities we would like to san the English law on the point. Jarman on Wills while dwelling on this aspect of the matter observed as follows : "If a will is traced into the testator's possession, and is not found at his death, the presumption is that he destroyed it for the purpose of revoking it; but the presumption may be rebutted .............. Where the will makes a careful and detailed disposition of the testator's property, and nothing happens to make it probable that he wishes to revoke it, the presumption raised by the disappearance of the will may be rebutted by slight evidence, especially if it is shown that access to the box, or other place of deposit where the will was kept, could be obtained by persons whose interest it is to defeat the will".
It is, therefore, clear that even if a presumption of the revocation of the will is drawn from the fact that it was not found on the death of the testatrix it cannot be laid down as a general rule and can be re. -butted even by slight evidence particularly where it is shown that some party had access to the place of depooit. The Priry Council has doubted whether this presumption is a rule of law at all. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Vol. 39 at p. 896 it was thus observed : "Where a will is found destroyed or mutilated, iu a place in which the testator would naturally put it if he thought he had destroyed it, the presumption is that testator destroyed it, and that the destruction was done animo revocandi. . ............
Similarly, if a will was last traced to the possession of the testator and is not forthcoming at his decease, there is a prima facie presumption, in the absence of circumstances tending to a contrary conclusion that the testator destroyed it animo revocandi. The presumption may be rebutted by evidence, which, however, must be clear and satisfactory. Recent declarations by a testator of satisfaction at having settled his affairs, or of goodwill towards the. persons benefited by the will, or of adherence to the will and to the contents of the will itself may be used for this purpose. . . . . . . . . The presumption may, it seems, also be rebutted by a consideration of the contents of the will itself". DURGA PRASAD V. DEVI CHARAN (Fazal Ali, !. ) 883 It appears that so far as the United States is concerned no presumption as a rule of law can be drawn where the will is lost but the matter depends on the statute of a particular State. In Corpus Juris Secundum Vol.
95 it has been observed as follows :- "Since, in accordance with the general rule that a will speaks from the death of the testator, an instrument which has been duly executed as a will, and never been revoked, becomes effective on the death of the testator although it cannot be found or is not in existence, it is a well settled general rule, which in some jurisdictions is in · effect prescribed by statute, that a will which has been lost or destroyed, either after the testator's death or accidentally or fraudulently during his lifetime, may be established or admitted to probate, as by admitting a properly proved copy or duplicate of the will to probate or by a proceeding in accordance with the statute, in the court having jurisdiction thereof, and on competent and sufficient proof of its execution, loss, or destruction, and contents''.
Thus, it is manifest that in the first place when ihe will is traced to the possession of the testator but not found at the time of death, no presumption can be drawn as a rule of law but in the facts and circumstances of a particular case such a presumption may be drawn and can be rebutted even by slight evidence. hl the case of Finch v. Finch(') the Court observed as follows:- "There is no doubt that if a man . dies, after duly execu- • ting a will, and at the time of his death his will, having re-mained in his custody, is not in existence, the law presumes that it was revoked. But in all such cases the question to be determined is, whether the will was or was not in existence at the time of the death" "The evidence certainly points strongly in that direction, and there is nothing to shew any change of intention which was likely to lead to the revocation of the will.
He bad evidently not changed his mind when he last spoke to his daughter on the subject, and, as to the three weeks that • elapsed between that conversation and his death, the evidence is a perfect blank. There is nothing to shew . any change of intention, but there is evidence that, during that • interval, he was not on good terms with his son, and that, although they were living in the same house, they did not speak to each other". --- ---- (! )I P&D. 371. ---~. Although the Court stated the Jaw clearly that a presumption in such circumstances could be drawn it held that the presumption was rebutted by the important fact that there was nothing to show that there was :. any change in the intention of the testator to revoke the will. On the other hand, strained relations between the father who was the testator and the son continued. In these circumstances, it was held that the presumption was rebutted.
Against this background we shall now deal with the authorities· of the Indian High Courts. But beiore \Ve do that it may be necessary to extract section 70 of the Act : "No unprivileged will or codicil, nor any part thereof shall be revoked otherwise than by marriage, or by another will or codicil, or by some writing declaring an intention to revoke the same and executed in the manner in which an ,/ unprivileged will is hereinbefore required to be executed, or by the burning, tearing or otherwise destroying the same by the testator or by some person in his presence and by his direction with the intention of revoking the same". A perusal of this section would clearly reveal two important features. In the first place, the section has been couched in negative terms having a mandatory content. Secondly, the section provides the mode and the circumstances under which an intention to revoke can be established.
In these circumstances, therefore, the onus is on the objector who relies on the revocation to prove that the will had been revoked after it has been proved to have been duly executed: Utider • section 70 of th~ Act the will can be revoked inter alia, by burning, tearing or otherwise destroying and unless any of the circumstances has been proved by the objector by cogent evidence, the question of the revocation of the will will naturally not arise. While construing this section, this Court in the case of Anil Behari Ghosh v. Smt. Latika 1 Bala Dassi & Ors. ( ) observed as follows:- "For proving that the will had been revoked, it had to be shown that. the testator had made another will or codicil or by some writing declared his intention to revoke the will. Such a document is required by s. 70 of the Act to be • executed in the same manner as a will.
Such a revocation could also have been proved, as the section lays down, by turning, tearing or otherwise destroying the will by the testator himself or by some other person in his presence and by his direction, thus clear! Y indicating his intention of revoking the will". (I) A. I. R. 1955 S. C. 566. . DURGA PRASAD V. DEVI CHARAN (Fazal Ali, !. ) 885 Applying these observations to the facts of the present case there is 'T absolutely no evidence to show that even though Smt. Jog Maya had made a registered will in favour, of the appellant she revoked it .. at any time in the miiiiMr enjoilltd by section 70 of the Act. In the case of Kaikhushru Jehangir v. Bai Bachubai ! ehangir & Ors. (I) while construing section 70 of the Act it was pointed out -"' that a will cannot be revoked by implication. In this connection, the Court made the following observations :- ; ,- "Under the statute it is necessary to establish an intention ~ to destroy.
There cannot be any revocation by necessary implicatiofl. The revocation can only be by one or the ~ other of the modes which are specified in the statute, and ) so far as we are here concerned, these modes are specified in section 70, Snccession Act". In the case of Babu Lal Singh & Anr. v. Baijnath Singh & Anr. (2) a Division Bench of the Patna High Court while referring to the Privy Council case of Welch v. Phillips (supra) observed as follows :- "In my opinion the essential condition of the rule of English law 'if a will traced to the possession of the deceased and last seen there is not forthcoming on his death' has not been established. Therefore the presumption of law on which Mr. Das laid much stress has no application to the facts of the present case ..... The onus primarily lies on the party propounding the copy to account for the absence of the original. ......... Thus there is nothing to show any change of intention, which was likely to lead to the revocation of the will.
In the circumstances the only reasonable inference is that the document is either mislaid or Jost. The loss of a will does not operate as a revcication. It has been established that the will was duly executed by Manbody and there is no uncertainty about the contents of it as a certified copy of it has been produced". We are inclined to agree with the view taken by the Pama High Court. In the case of Arya Printinidhi Sabha, Punjab Jullundur v. Dev Raj Vir Bhan and Anr. (') it was clearly pointed out that the presump· (I) A. I. R. 1951 Bom. 339. (2) A. I. R. 1946 Pat. 24. 3) A. I. R. 1963 Pun. 208. 4-699SCI/78 tion of English law has to be applied with great caution and the Court observed as follows : "The rule is now firmly settled that the presumption of English law that when a will is traced to the possession of the deceased and is not forthcoming at his death, is that he has destroyed it, must be applied in India with considerable caution". In the case of Brundaban Chandra v. .
Ananta Narayan Singh Deo(') a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court has rightly observed as follows :- But there is formidable English authority for the propo-sition that if a testament was in the custody of the testator at the time of his death and is not forthcoming on his death it is presumed to have been destroyed by himself. ..... This ' presumption can however be rebutted; and the weight to be attached to such presumption will depend upon the character of the custody which the testator had over the will. In England wills are usually deposited either in a Bank or with a Solicitor. But the same presumption is hardly applicable ' in all circumstances in India where the habits and conditions of the people vary. Here in India, deeds are not pre·served with that amount of care as is done in England ........
On the other hand, where a document is registered no care is taken at all of its custody as a certified copy is easily available, and the law ullows its production in proof of the original. Consequently, having regard to the habits and conditions of the people here, when a document like a registered will is not forthcoming after the testator's <lea. th, presumption may well arise that it has been mislaid as seems to have happened here ........ It follows that in this country a presumption of revocation of a will cannot be drawn merely from the fact of its disappearance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Where a will makes a careful and detailed disposition of the testator's properties and nothing happens to make it probable that he wishes to revoke it, the presumption raised by the disappearance of the will may be rebutted by slight evideuce, especially if it is shown that access to the box or other place of deposit where the will was kept can be obtained by persons whose interest it is to defeat the will". ' We find ourselves in agreement with the view taken by the High ff Court. (I) A. I. R. 1956 Orisso 151 DURGA PRASAD v. DEVI CHARAN (Fazal Ali, !. ) 887 To the S'a1lle effect are the decisions in Satya Charan Pal v. - Ashutosh Pal & Ors. ,C), Efari Dasya v. Podei ! Dasya, (') Shib Sabitri 3 Prasad & Ors. v. The Collector of Meerut( ), Anwar Hossein v. Secretary of State for India('), Chouthmal Jivarjee Poddar v. Ramachandra Jivarjee PoddarC) and Pt. Devi Charan: v. Durga Porshad Chhanu 6 Lal & Ors. ( ). The conect legal position may therefore be stated as follows : 1.
That where a will has been properly executed and registered by the testator but not found at the time of death the question whether the presumption that the testator had revoked the will can be drawn or not will depend on the facts and circumstunces of each case. Even if such presumption is drawn it is rather a weak one in view of the habits and conditions of our people. 2. That the presumption is a rebuttable one and can be re" butted by the slightest possible evidence, direct or circumstantial. For instance, where it is proved that a will was ; a strong and clear disposition evincing the categorical infen-tion of the testator and there was nothing to indicate the presence of any circumstance which is likely to bring about a change in the intention of the testator so as to revoke the will suddenly, the presumption is rebutted. 3.
That in view of the fact that in our country most of the people are not highly educated and do not in every case take the care of depositing the will in the bank or with the Solicitorci or otherwise take very great care of the will as a result of which the possibility of the will being stolen, lost or surreptitiously removed by interested persons cannot be excluded, the presumption should be applied carefully. 4. That where the legatee is able to prove the circumstances from which it can be inferred that there could be absolutely no reason whatsoever for revoking the will or that the act of revoking the will was against the temperament and inclination of the testator, no presumption of revocation of the will can be drawn. 1) A. I. R. 1953 Cal. 657, 659-60. (2) 'I. L. R. 1928 Cal. 482, 486. (3) I. L. R. 1907 All. 82. 87. 14) 31 cal. 885, 892. (5) A. I. R. 1955 Nag. 126, 136. (6) A. I. R. 1967Delhi128. 132. [1979] I s. c. R. 5.
That in view of the express provision of section 70 of the Act the onus lies on the objector to prove the various circumstances, viz. , marriage, burning, tearing or destruction of the will. 6. When there is no obvious reason or clear motive for the testator to revoke the will and yet the will is not found on the death of the testator it may well be that the will was misplaced or lost or was stolen by interested pcrsons. We shall now apply the afocesaid principles to the facts of the present case. It is true that the impugned will despite search was not found at the time of death of the testatrix. At the same time it cannot be gain-said that the clear finding of the courts below is that the will was definitely executed by the testatrix with a sound disposing mind and had been attested by as many as 7 witnesses and had been proved.
We have already indicated the essential features common to all the will executed by the testatrix in the past and three things appear to be very conspicuous : 1. That relations between the testatrix and Durga Prashad were very cordial, and therefore, there could be no oc- • casion for the testatrix to suddenly change her mind to revoke the will so as to benefit the respondent a person whom she so detested that she made a provision in the will to the effect that he should not be permitted to touch her dead body or perform her funeral rites. 2. The lady was of an extremely charitable and religions bent of mind and she made substantial provision for religious and charitable purposes in all the wills including the draft will Ex. C-1. She would not without any reason revoke the will which contained clear and strong provision regarding religious and charitable purposos.
It is difficult to believe that she would shed her religious and charitable inclination by revoking the will and deleting the religious and charitable purpose corit. ained in the will so as to benefit the respondent and make him the absolute owner of the properties without any restcic-tion. This seems to be wholly improbable. 3. That in all the dispositions Smt. Jog Maya had seen to it that a clause was inserted in the will under which the legatee or trustee was prohibited from alienating the properties. Indeed, if she revoked the impugned will the result will be that the property would go to the respon- DURGA PRASAD v. DEVI CHARAN (Fazal Ali, J. ) 889 dent without any conditions or restrictions, a conduct that would be against the temperament of the testatrix. Apart from these features, there are other circumstances which go to show that the will was not revoked by the testatrix. R. W.
3 admitted that Devi Charan respondent never lived in the house (house of Jog Maya) but he used to visit it once or twice month. Similarly, R. W. 7, another witness for the respondent, admits that Devi Charan used to visit Smt. Jog Maya previous to her death. Even the respondent Devi Charan admits clearly in his evidence that as he was not well, his wife had gone to see Smt. Jog Maya on the previous evening of her illness. In this connection, the statement of Devi Charan runs thus :- "I came to know about her illness on the previous evening. As I was not well, my wife went to see how Smt. Jog Maya. was. " From the evidence adduced by the respondent himself, therefore, it appears that Devi Charan had' clear access to the house of Jog Maya which he visited off and on and his wife visited the house even during the illness of Jog Maya which resulted in her death. Devi Charan wa;; fully aware that the will executed by Jog Maya completely deprived him of any interest in the properties.
In these circumstances, the possibility that either Devi Charan or his wife may have pilfered or stolen the will in order to deprive the appellant of its benefits cannot be excluded. In this connection, it may be noted that the respondent has stated in his evidence that he complained to Jog Maya that he had been deprived of his right by making a trust in the name of Durga Prshad and Ram Nath and she assured him that she would destroy the trust deed and would make him the owner of the property. This statement is undoubtedly false and would not have been made by woman of the nature and character of Jog Maya. Indeed, if the statement was made to him in August, 1955 as mentioned by the witness in his evidence, then there was no reason why, when the respon- I dent filed his first objection on 27-1-195'6 before the Sub-Judge Delhi, he did not mention it there nor even in the second objection and the additional pleas filed by him before the District Judge, Delhi.
'This • shows that his statement in court is absolutely fals! < and is made merely for the purpose of defeating the claim of respondent. Again it appears that although tlie will was executed in 1947, about 8 years before her death, Smt. Jog Maya never expressed her intention to revoke the will at any time during this period to any of the attesting witnesses of the will or to Pt. Ram Nath who was a trustee under the draft will of her intention to revoke the will. It is difficult to believe that she would leave the entire property to the respondent whom she hated so much. Further, there is a~solutely no evidence to show that Devi Charan succeeded in gaining the favour of or winning the confidence of Smt. Jog Maya at any time before her death so as to put her in a mood to leave the entire property absolutely to him after her death by revoking the impugned will.
Nor is there anything to show that the respondent estranged the testatrix from the ap_pellant to such an extent that the appellant fell in her estimation. It is also neither pleaded nor proved that since the execution of the impugned will any circumstance existed or incident happened which brought abont a serious estrange-ment between the appellant and the testatrix so as to induce her to revoke the will. Having regard to these circumstances mentioned above which do not appear to have been considered by 1he High Court at all we are clearly of the opinion that the presumption if any, that the will was revoked by Smt. Jog Maya has been sufficiently rebutted and the objector has miserably failed to discharge the onus which lay on him fo prove that the will was revoked. Moreover, the wm being a registered one and being the product of the free will of the testatrix there mnsl: be strong and cogent reasons for h. olding that it was revoked.
The fact that the will was not found despite search at the time of death of Smt Jog Maya in the circumstances is not sufficient to justify a presumption that the will was revoked. In the circumstances of this case particularly having regard to the fact that the respondent who would be interested in destroying the will had an access to the honse of the testatrix, the presumption would be that ihe will was either stolen or misplaced by him or at his instance. For these reasons, we allow this appeal with costs, set aside the judgment of the DivisiOIJl Bench of the High Court and restore the judgment of the Single Judge of the High Court and allow the application of the appellant for probate. N. V. K. Appeal allowed.
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