FRANCIS JOHN v. DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION AND ORS

Citation: [1989] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 252

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, K.N. SINGH, N.M. KASLIWAL

Case summary

Obviously, no decision of an Officer of the Government is being challenged in the present case and hence, Tika Ram's case is easily distinguishable. Aggrieved by the said order dated November 26, 1976, the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court of Bombay on the...

Judgment text

ORDER Whereas a Dispute Settlement Committee was constituted to enquire into the proposed case for Termination of Services of Shri Francis John, the Headmaster of Don Bosco High School, Calangute, Bardez, Goa, vide order referred to above; And whereas the accused Shri F. John participated in the deliberations of the Dispute Settlement Committee along with his nominee for some time and thereafter remained absent from the deliberation of the Committee inspite of all reasonable opportunities given to him by the Convenor; And whereas the said Committee, in majority, has decided that the termination of services of the said Shri F. John, Headmaster of Don Bosco High School, Calangute, is justifiable. The undersigned is inclined to agree with the findings of the Dispute Settlement Committee and it is hereby ordered that the finding of the majority report of the Committee is accepted and the Principal of the School' is permit- ted to terminate the service of Shri F.

John, as per Rule 74 (amended) of the Grant-in-aid Code and the vacancy so caused be filled up as per Rules. The Principal is further directed to revoke the order of suspension forthwith under intimation to the undersigned . • Sd/- L. Khisngte If Director of Education. '' > It was on the basis of the approval given by the Director of Education, as stated above, the services of the appellant were terminated. From a reading of the relevant rule of the Grant-in-aid Code which is a part of the Public Law oi the land it becomes obvious that the reference of the dispute between the Management of the school and the appellant to the Dispute Settlement Committee was made by the Director of Education in exercise of the powers. conferred on him by the Grant-in-aid Code, which is issued by the Government in exercise of its executive power, even though it may not have been done under a statute.

The Director of Education who is a public functionary has given his approval to the decision of the Dispute Settlement Committee before it was communicated to the School. While granting his aproval to the decision the Director of Education is discharging a governmental function as an authority constituted for the said purpose by the Government. It is obvious that the Management, in the circumstances could not have terminated the services of the appellant without the communication received by it from the Director of Education. In such circumstances it cannot be said that the decision is that of a just private management governed by private law. It is the part of the process of the public law which affects publiic exchequer. When the matter came up before the High Court a preliminary objection was taken by the Management regarding the maintainability of the Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The appellant contended in the Writ Petition that the proceedings of the disciplinary Committee are in contravention of the principle of natural justice and fair play and the approval given by the Director of Education was unsustainable. The appellant relied upon the decision of this Court in Tika Ram v. Mundikota Shikshan Prasarak Manda/ & Ors. , [1985] 1 SCR 339 and contended that he was not asking for any relief against the private body but he was challenging the order of the Director of Education who had granted'approval to his ·removal on the basis of a report submitted to him by the Dispute Settlement Committee and hence the Director of Education, who was a public authority and whose orders had been questioned before the Court was amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court distinguished the 'above case by observing ii) Para 11 of its judgment thus: " ... Mr. Kakodkar had placed reliance on Tika Ram v.

Mundikota Shiksha Prasarak Manda/, AIR 1984 SC 1621 in support of liis proposition that a writ petition would be maintanable in the case of a Headmaster of a private school who is dismissed by the management of a private school. In Tika Ram's case, the petitioner was not seeking any relief against-tt{e management on the basis of the clauses in the Schools Code. But the Court has observed: 'In the instant case the appellant is seeking a relief not against a private body but against an officer of Government who is always amenable to the jurisdiction of the Court. ' Obviously, no decision of an Officer of the Government is being challenged in the present case and hence, Tika Ram's case is easily distinguishable. " With great respect to the High Court we should say that we do not find any substantial difference at all between the facts of this case and the facts involved in the Tika Ram's case (supra). In Tika Ram's case (supra) the facts were these.

The appellant in that case was also working as a Headmaser in a private school. On account of certain earlier events the Management instituted a disciplinary enquiry against the appellant and on July 7, 1975, the appellant was informed by the Management that it had imposed on him the punishment of reversion to the post of Assistant Teacher which according to the Management was the substantive post held by him. Aggrieved by that order of reversion, the appellant filed an appeal before the Deputy Director of Education, Nagpur Division, contending that the enquiry had been vitiated on account of violation of principles of natural justice and that he had never held the post of an Assistant Teacher to which he had been reverted. After hearing both the parties, the Deputy Director of Education passed an order F. JOHN v. DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION (VENKATARAMIAH, J.

J 259 dated October 3, 1975 setting aside the decision of the Management and remanding the case to the Management for fresh decision on the ground that the enquiry had been. vitiated on account of violation of principles of natural justice. Instead of filing an appeal against that order, the Management filed a review petition before the Deputy Director. himself on October 17, 1975. That was rejected by the Deputy Director by his order dated November 11, 1975 on the ground that no such review could be filed b~fore him. Against that order the Management filed an appeal before the Director of Education and that was dismissed on May . 12, 1976 affirming the order of remand passed by the Deputy Director of Education to reconsider the case. The Management again filed a petition before the Director of Education to · reconsider the case.

This petition for review was allowed by the Director of Education on November 26, 1976 and the order passed by the Deputy Director on October 3, 1975 remanding the case to the Management for a fresh decision was set aside. Aggrieved by the said order dated November 26, 1976, the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court of Bombay on the principal ground that the Director had· no jurisdiction to review his earlier order May 12, 1976 by which he had dismissed the appeal against the order of the Deputy Director. The High Court dismissed that writ petition holding that the appellant could not file a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against the order passed by the Director on the ground that the teachers working in private schools could not enforce their right under clause 77 and con. nected clauses of the School Code which were . not statutory rules. !

twas against that~order the appellant in that case had filed the appeal before the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Allowing the said appeal this Court observed thus: "In the writ petition the appellant was not seeking any relief directly against the management on the basis of the clauses in the School Code. If the management does not obey the order passed by the Deputy Director or the Director, it is open to the State Government to take such action under the School Code as may be permissible. In such an event, the recognition accorded to the school may be withdrawn or the grant-in-aid may be stopped. In the instant case the appellant is seking a relief not against a private body but againsi an officer of Government who· is always amenable to the jurisdiction of the Court. The appellant has merely sought the quashing of the impugned order dated November 26, 1976 passed by the Director on review setting aside the order of the Deputy Director.

What consequences follow from the quashing of the above said order in so far as the management is concerned is an entirely different issue. In the circumstances, the High Court was wrong in holding that a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution did not lie against the impugned order passed by the director. We are aware of some of the decisions in which it is observed that no teacher could enforce a right under the School Code which is non-statutory in character against the management. But since this petition is principally directed against the order passed in a quasijudicial proceeding by the Director, though in a case arising under the School Code and since the Director had assumed a jurisdiction to review his own orders not conferred on him, we hold that the' appellant was entitled to maintain the petition under Article 226 of the Consti,tution. " In the instant case also we are concerned with the Grant-in-aid Code.

The decision which was challenged before the High Court was the order of the Director of Education dated July 12, 1984 which is fully extracted above. It is further seen that a copy of the above order has been communicated by the Director of Education not merely to the Management of the School but also to the Zonal Officer, North Education Zone, Mapsa and the Grant-in-aid Section of the Directo. '. rate of Education. If the impugned orders of the director of Education and of the Dispute Settlement Committee to which he had referred the case are set aside then the order of termination of service of the appellant, which is pursuant to them would also have to fall.

Any private school which receives aid from the Government under the Grant-inaid Code, which is promulgated not merely for the benefit of the Management but also for the benefit of the employees in the School for whose salary and allowances the Government was contributing from the public funds under the Grant-in-aid Code cannot escape from the consequences flowing from the breach of the Code and particularly where the Director of Education who is an instrumentality of the State is participating in the decision Jnaking process. Under these circumstancc;s we find that the High Court was wrong in upholding that the orders of the Director of Education and of the Dispute Settlement Committee were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution since the matter squarely falls within the principles laid down by this Court in Tika Ram's case (supra).

We, therefore, set aside the judgment of the High Court holding A that the writ petition was not maintainable before it. Since the Higb Court has not gone into the merits of the ca. se we remand the case to the High Court and direct it to hear the writ petition on merits in accordance with law. The appeal is accordingly allowed, but there shall be no order as to costs. B R. N. J. Appeal allowed.