G. NARASIMHAN & ORS. ETC. v. T. V. CHOKKAPPA
Citation: [1973] 2 S.C.R. 40; 1972 INSC 205
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: J.M. SHELAT , D.G. PALEKAR, S.N. DWIVEDI
Judgment date:
Case summary
1972 INSC 205. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1972-09-04. G. NARASIMHAN & ORS. ETC. v. T. V. CHOKKAPPA. Read the judgment and case details on LawSphereX.
Judgment text
46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1973] 2 S. C. R. G. NARASIMHAN & ORS. ETC. v. T. V. CHOKKAPPA (will connected appeals) September 4, 1972 [J. M. S11ELAT, D. G. PALEKAR AND s. N. Dw1vED1, JJ. ] Indian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860), s. 499 Expln. 2 and Code of Criminal' Procedure (Act 5 of 1898) s. 198-Defamarion of collection. of persons-When 111en1ber of the body ca1i co1nplain as_ aggirieved rerson. The Dtavida Kazhagam sponsored and organ·ised a conferonce. But the conferenc~ was a separate body with its own ·organisation and oftice where corrcspondenco rolating to it was received and d. ealt with> and It had its own '°cretarics. The c:onference passed a number of resol. utitlos. The draft of one ol the resolutions was put in shape by the respondent w})o was a member of . the Dravida Kazhagam. It was howe,·er m. oved hy the president of the conference and passed by the conference.
'The appellants were either editors or publishers of newspapers in which a news item was pubJ:shcd about the conference. The news· item however did not n1cntion either the Dravida Kazhc. :. gam or the respondent or any sponsor or the resolution either by name or otherwise. The respondent wrote letter to the appellants, signing and describing himself as Chairman of the Reception Committee of the conference, com? laining that the news item had distorted the resolution and asked them to publish a correction and clarification. A few days later, a lawyer's 1,otice was sent to the appellants in which the respondent complained that the news item was defamatory and had tarnished the image of the conference and demanded an apology. Thereafter, the respondent filed a complaint under Ss. 500 and 501. l. P. C. against the appellants as they u1d not tender any apology. On the basis of the complain't and the evidence he recorded, the Magistrate issued proce5'.
T"le appellants moved the High Court under s. 561A, Cr. P. C. , for quashing the proceedings. They contended th11t the respondent was not ;m aggrieved party within the meaning of s. 198, Cr. P. C. , that he had filed the complaint in his capacity as Chait defamed are numerous or not would not be apt in a cdminal prosecution where, technically >peaking, it is not by the persons injured but by the state that criminal proceedings are carried on and a complaint can lie in a t! ase of libel against a class of persons provided always that such a class is not indeterminate or 'indefinite but a definite one. There is no dilfere,nce iA principle between this rule of the Common Law of England and the rule laid down in Explanation 2 to s. 499 l. P. C. (50A-C] Sahih SinKlr Melir" v. U. P. , 11965] 2 S. C. R. 823. followed. Tck Chanel v. R. K. Karcmjia. 11969] Cr. L. J. 536, approved. J K1111pfler v. London Express Nell'spaper Ltd. , [1944) A. C. 116. ll'altid Ullah Ausari v. En1pcror, A. LR.
1935 All. 743, referred to. (4) But in the present case. the conference was a body Jbtincl from the Dravida KazhagJm party. That the conference was organised by the party would not mean that ,both were the same or jhat the members of the party and those of the conference or those who attended it were the same. In fact, the principal function of the r!.! ccption com1Uittec would be to enrol members of the conference and collect funds to defray its expenses. The evidence of the respondent also indicated that the con-fetence wa. attended not only by members of the Dravida Kazhagam party but also by outsiders. It is therefore wrong to identify one with the other or to say that a . defamation of ! he conference as a ciass or collection of persons was defamation of the Dravida KazhaglOm party. The new, item complained of cleHrly stated that the resolution was passed by the conference and not by the Dravida Kalhagam.
The respondent in his letters made no grievance that the Dravida Kazhagam suffered injury in reputation or otherwise by the alleged distorticn. His case throughout' was that the publication had tarnished the imag<>, not of the [): avida Kazhagam, but of the conference. [51C-G: 52A-lll (6). Therefore, the High Court missed the real issue. Whether the Dravida Kazhagam was an identifiable group or not was beside the point, for, what had to be decided was whether ihe conference was a determi• nate and identifiable body so that defamatory words used in relation to the resolution would be defamation of the individuals who composed it. and the respondent, "'' one df such individuals could maintain the complaint. [52C-Fl • • (7) The conference cleany was not an identifiable or definitivo bodY so that all those who attended it could be said to be its constituents, who, if the conference was defamed. would, in their turn, be said to be defamed. 42 SUPREME COURT llBPOllTS (1973) 2 S. C. ll.
It is impossible to have any definite idea . ,. to ils oompJ&tion, the num:-her of persons who attended, the ideas . ,,nd ideologies to which they subi being passed, but the resolution certainly was neither moved nor piloted by him. Indeed, if any one could be said to have piloted it, it was the president of the conference. Furthermore, the resolution was of the conference and the only contribution of the rO!! pondent to it was his having given shape to the original draft. Counsel for the appellants seriously challenged the correct-acss of the paragraph from the High Court's judgment quoted above, that being the really operative and decisive pavt of the judgment, firstly, on the ground that those obscrvatitons were aot in consonance with s. 198 of the Code even when read with s. -499, Exp!.
(2) of the Penal Code, and secondly, on the ground of the failure of the High Court to perceive the separate entitieo of the Dravida Kazhagam and the conference and its omission to realise that the resolution was t. be resolution of the ~onference and not of the Dravida Kazhagam. The news item in qur.. stion referred to the conference and not to the Dravida Kazhagam, and therefore, if anybody was defamed by the said news item, it was the conference and not the Dravida Kazhagam which had only organised that confelence. Mr. Frank Anthony, on the other hand, urged that though it was the conference which had passed ihe resolution and though the news item referred to that conference and not to the Dravida Kazhagam and the respondent was not mentioned or referred to therein, in substance and in effect it was the Dravida Kazhagam which was defamed. for, it was that party which had organised the conference and sponsored the resolutions passed thereat.
Therefore, the respondent, as a leading member of that party and the chairman of the reception committee, could claim that the defamatory imputations in the said news item were relatable to him and the other members of •he Dravida Kazhag-am, and he was consequently entitled to file the complaint. On these contentions, the principal question for determina-tion is whether the respondent could be said to be an aggrieved person entitled 'lo maintain the complaint within lhe meaning of 48 SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS [1973] 2. s. c. 1t: s. l 98 of the Code. That section lays down that no magistrate shall take cognizance of an offence falling inter alia under Ch. XX! of the Penal Code (that is, ss. 499 to 502) except upon compluint made by some persons aggrieved of such offence. Sec.
198, thus, lays down an exception to the generaj rule that complaint can be filed by anybody whether he is an aggrieved person or not, and modifies that rule by permitting only an I aggrieved person to move a magistrate in cases of defamation. The 'ection is mandatory, so that if a magistrate were to take cognizance of the offence of defamation on a complaint £led by one who is not an aggrieved person, the trial and conviction of an accused in such a case by the magistrate would b~ void and illegal. Prima facie, ther. ~fore, if s. 198 of the Code were to be noticed by itself, the complaint in the present case would be unsustain-able, since the news item in question did not mention the respondent nor did it contain any defamatory imputation against him individually. Sec. 499 of the Penal Code, which defines defamation, laid down that whoever by words, either spoken or intended to be read or by signs etc.
makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person, intending to harm or knowing or having 'reason to believe that the imputation will harm the reputation of such person, is said to defame that person. This part of the section lllakes 'defamation in respeel! of an individual an offence. But Explanation (2) to the section l~vs down the rule that it may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning: a company or an association or collection of persons as such. A defamatory imput~tion agalnsf a collection of persons thus falls within the definition of defamation. The langu-aie of the Explanation is wide, . and therefore, besides a company or an association, any collection of persons would be covered by it. But such a collection of persons must be ah identifiable body so that it is possible to say with definiteness that a group of particular persons, as.
distinguished from the rest of the community, was defamed Therefore, in a case where Explanation (2) is resorted to, the identitly of the company or the association or the collection of persons must be established so as to be relatable to the defamatory w ased on an extraneous issue, therefore, cannot be sustained. In this view of the matter, we would have ordinarily re'Illanded the case to the High Court. But such a procedure appears to hie unne'Cessary, as in our vie'V, the conference. was not such a determinate class like the one in the cases referred to earlier, where complaints by its individual member or members were held maintainable. It is impossible to have any definite idea as to its com-position, the number of persons who attended, the ideas and the idwlogies to which they subscribed, and whether all of them positively agreed to the resolution in question.
The evidence simply was that the person presiding it read out the resolution and be'Cause no one got up to oppose it, it was taken as approved of by all. The conference clearly was not an identifiable or a definitive body so that all those who attended it could be said to be its constituents who, if the conference was defamed, would in their tum, be said to be defamed. ' (I) [1969] Cr. L. J. 535. (2) [1965] 2 S. C. R. 823, 828_ G. NARASIMHAN V. T. V. CHOKKAPPA (She/at, J. ) 53 A In these circumstances and for the reasons set out above, we allow these appeals, set side the order of the High Court and quash the proceedings taken out by the Magistrate on the groun<1 that the respondent's compaint was not competent. B V. P. S. Appeals allowed.
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