GAJENDRA NARAIN SINGH v. JOHRI MAL PRAHLAD RAI
Citation: [1963] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 30; 1962 INSC 319
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR , K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA, J.C. SHAH
Judgment date:
Case summary
1962 INSC 319. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1962-11-13. GAJENDRA NARAIN SINGH v. JOHRI MAL PRAHLAD RAI. Read the judgment and case details on...
Judgment text
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) SUPP. GAJENDRA NARAIN SINGH v. JOHRI MAL PRAHLAD RAI (P. B. GA. JENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WA:' bts of that firm ; that he was not served with summons in the suit; that he had appeared in the suit in which the decree was passed not as a partner, but in his individual capacity; and that he had in: formed the Court that he was not a partner of the defendant firm. The plaintiffs then applied for execution of the decree claiming that no order of the Court granting leave to execute the decree was nece-ssary. The District Judge, Patna, by his order dated May 12, 1955 held that the execution could not be directed against Singh relying upon sub-clauses (b) or(c)ofrule50, 0, 21, for the question whether he was a partner of the defendant firm was left undecided by the City Civil Court. The learned District Judge further held on the evidence that Singh was not a partner of the defendant firm.
In appeal against the order of the District Judge rejecting the· application for execution against Singh, the High Court at Patna I:~ 1d that on the facts proved the plaintiffs were entitled as of right to execute the-decree under 0. 21 rule 50(l)(b) against Singh. The High Court accordingly reversed the order . passed by the District. Judge and directed execution to proceed against Singh. With certificate under Art. 133(1 )(a) granted by the High Court, this appeal has been pre-ferred by Singh. Order 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with the manner in which suits may be filed by or against firms. Two or more persons carrying on business in India may be sued in the name of the firm of which they were partners at the time of the accrual of the cause of action. Where a suit has been filed against the firm summons may be served in the manner prescribed by rule 3.
That rule, in so far as it is material, provides- ''Where persons are sued as partners in the name of their firm, the summons shall. be served either- (a) upon any one or more of the partners, or (b) at the principal place at which the partnership business is carried on within India, upon any person having, at the time of service, the control or management of the partnership business there, as the Court may ·direct; and such service shall be deemed good service upon the firm so sued, whether all or any of the partners are within or without India : Provided x x x " The plaintiffs had sued the partners of M/s. Tirbut Umbrella Works in the firm name, and the summqns was served on Singh at Road 8, R Block, Patna . The original summons would normally be with Singh but he did not care to produce it before the District Judge, Patna. The High Court on a review of the circumstances arrived at the conclusion that Singh was served with summons of the suit as a partner of the defendant firm.
That conclusion is amply supported by the evidence, and the presumption which arises under rule 5 of 0. 30 which proyides : "Where a summons is issued to a firm and is served in the manner provided by rule 3, every person upon whom it is served shall be informed by notice in writing given at the time of such service, whether he is served as a partner or as a person having the control or management of the partnership business, or in both characters, and, in default of such notice, the person served shall be deemed to be served as a partner. " It is not possible to say whether the summons was accompanied by the notice contemplated by rule 5, but it is clear by the express words of the rule that in default of such notice the person served shall be deemed to be served as a partner. Singh has in his affidavit sworn in the suit, and also in his testimony at the hearing in the execution proceeding admitted that he was served ~ith a summons in the suit, and Mr.
Vishwauath Sastri appearing for Singh has fairly uor challenged the finding that Singh must be deemed to have been served as a partner of the defendant fir'll. Rule 8 of O. 30 provides :- "Any person served with summons as a partner under rule 3 may appear under protest, denying that he is a partner, but such appearance shall not preclude the plaintiff from otherwise; 2 s;c. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 35 serving a summons on the firm and obtaining decree against the firm in default of appearance Gojmtlra where no partner has appeared. " The rule enables the person served as a partner to appear under protest and to deny that he is -a partner of the firm which is sued. Appearance under protest by the person sued renders the service of summons as regards the defendant firm ineffective. The plaintiff may obtain a fresh summons against the firm and serve it in the manner prescribed by O.
30 rule 3 against another person who is alleged to be a partner by the plaintiff or against the person who has the control or management of the partnership business. A decree against the defendant firm so obtained may with leave under 0. 21 rule 50 (2) be executed against the firm and also against the person who had been initially served as a partner and who had appeared under protest denying that he was a partner. The plaintiff, however, is not obliged to obtain a fresh summons : he may ·request the Court to adjudicate upon the plea of denial raised by the person served and . appearing under protest. The Court will then proceed to determine the issue raised by that plea. If the Court finds on evidence that the person served was not a partner at the material time, the suit cannot proceed, unless summons is served afresh under rule 3 : if the Court holds that he was a partner service on him will be regarded as good service on the firm and the suit will proceed against the firm.
· In the present case Singh did not enter appearance under protest. He filed an a~pearance ~n his individua1 name in the suit, and obtamed an adjournment from the Court to enable\ him to file his written statement. The appearance so filed must be deemed to be on behalf of the firm. At the hearing of the summons for directions he contended that he was not a part11~r of the defendant firm and applied for. leave to withdraw his appearance which was filed without protest. Unless the Court permitted S~h to withdraw the appearance initially filed, it continued to be an appearance under rule 6 of 0. XXXon behalf of the firm. We are not concerned in this case to decide whether the application of Singh for leave to withdraw his appearance was properly rejected. That question could only be raised in a proceeding adopted by Singh in the proper Court challenging the decISion of the City Civil Court and not in the proceeding for execution of the decree.
Order 21 rule 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with execution of decrees against firms. By cl. (1) it is provided : "Where a decree has been passed against a firm, execution may be granted- (a) against any property of the partnership ; (b) against any person who has appeared in his own name under rule 6 or rule 7 of Order XXX or who has admitted on the pleadings that he is, or who has been ad-judged to be, a partner ; (c) against any person who has been individually served as a partner with a summons and has failed to appear.
Provided x x x x " Clause (2) provides : "Where the decree-holder claims to be entitled to cause the decree to be executed against any person other than such a person as is referred to in sub-rule (1), clauses (b) and (c) as being a partner in the firm, he may apply to the Court which passed the decree for leave, and where the liability is not disputed, such Court may grant such leave, or where such liability is disputed, may order that the liability of such person be tried and determined in any manner in which any issue in a suit may be tried and determined. " By cl. (3) it is provided : "Where the liability of any person has been tried and determined under sub- rule ( 2), the order made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree.
" Manifestly relying upon sub-clauses (b) and (c) of sub-rule (1) a plaintiff who has obtained a decree against a firm may execute it against any person who has been individually served with the summons as a partner and has failed to appear and also against any person who has appeared in his own name under rule 6 or rule 7 of. Order XXX. Singh being a person who had after being served as a partner appeared under rule 6, the decree of the City Civil Court, Bombay was executable against him. The plaintiffs did undoubtedly make an application for leave to execute the decree against Singh on the footing that he was a person other than a per· son referred to in els. (b) and (c) of sub-rule (1) of r. 50 0. 21,. but that p_roceeding was plainly the result of an incorrect appreciation of the t1·ue position in law. On that account his right under 0. 21 rule 50 (1) (b) was not lost.
The plaintiffs were entitled to abandon the application for leave under sub-rule (2) and to execute the decree under sub-rule (1). The record of the City Civil Court, Bombay, tendered before the District Judge clearly establishes that Singh who was served as a partner of the defendant firm filed an appearance under rule 6 0. 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and thereafter his application for withdrawal of appearance was rejected and the suit was decreed against the firm. This decree again>t the firm was by virtue of sub-rule (l)cl. (b) of rule 50 0. 21, liable to be executed against Singh. The High Court was thorefore, in our judgment right in directing eKecution of the decree of the City Civil Court, Bombay, against Singh. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. A pper1l dism isserl. MAULUD AHMAD v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH (S. J. IMAM, K. SuBnA RAO and J. R. MuDHOLKAR, JJ.
) Criminal Trial-Framing incorrect record-Head Conslable-malcing false entry to save ""other ierson-Arquittal of ! he other person-Conviction of Head Constable, if smtainable- Limitation-Prosec,. tion after 3 months of ~ffence-lj' barred-Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act XLV of 1860), s 218-l'olice Act, 1861 (V of 1861), '"· 36, 42. C and some other persons \Vent on a shoot with gt111s where two persons were shot dead. In ordrr to create evidence in his favour C got a faJ. e report entered by the appellant, a Head constable, in the General Diary purporting to have been made on the previous day to the effect that C had deposited his gun. C and the appellant and the others were tried for various offences including offences under ss. 304~. 1\ and 218/! 09 Indian Penal Code. All the accussed were acquitt-rd but the appellant was convicted under s, 218. The appellant contended (i) that after the acquittal of C, his conviction under s.
218 could not be sustained and (ii) that the prosecu-tion having been launched n1ore than three months after the entry was 1narle w:i,s h&rred by limit. 1tion t111def s. 42 Pol ice Act.
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