GAMINI KRISHNAYYA AND OTHERS v. CURZA SESHACHALAM AND OTHERS
Citation: [1965] 1 S.C.R. 195; 1964 INSC 181
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: RAGHUBAR DAYAL , J.R. MUDHOLKAR, S.M. SIKRI
Judgment date:
Case summary
1964 INSC 181. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1964-08-31. GAMINI KRISHNAYYA AND OTHERS v. CURZA SESHACHALAM AND OTHERS. Read the judgment and case...
Judgment text
195 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1965) l S. C. R: A GA MINI KRISHNA YY A AND OTHERS v. CURZA SESHACHALAM AND OTHERS August 31, 1964 I. I (RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J. R. MUDHOLKAR AND S. M. SIKRI JJ. ) Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act (4 of 1938), ss. 9(1) and B-- Debt incurred after 1st October 1932 but before commencernent of Act- Renewal after com1nencement of Act-Provision applicable. Dealings between the family of the appellants (creditors) and the family of the respondents (debtors) commenced in 1934. In September c 1938, after the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act (4 of 1938) came in! o force in March 1938, a promissory note was executed by the debtors (who are agriculturists) in favour of the creditors for the amount then found due. The debtors also agreed to pay interest at the rate of 9 i per cent per annum on that amount.
In arriving at the amount due to the creditoN in 1951, the debtors contended that the debt should be scaled down under •· 9(1) of the Act, whereas the creditors contended, on the basis that it I) was a debt incurred after the commencement of the Act, that the only relief to which the debtors were entitled, . was calculation of interest under s. 13 of the Act. HELD : Though the transaction was entered into after the commencement of the Act, since the original indebtedness arose before the commencement of the Act but after October I, 1932, s. 9(1) of the Act would be applicahlc. [210 D] £ Under s.
7 of the Act every debt'payable by an agriculturist at the commencement of the Act shall be scaled down and nothing in excess L common place that every provision of a statute has to be given full effect and wherever possible the court should not place that construction upon a provision which would tend to make it redundant or to overlap ;mother provision or to limit its application in disregard of its general applicability unless, of course, that is the only construction which could be reasonably placed upon it. If Mr. Bhimasankaram·s contention is accepted we will have to limit the applieation of s. 9 only to such of the debts incurred after October I, 1932 as were incurred prior t0· the commencement of the Act. There is nothing in the language of the section which would justify so limiting its provisions. Nor again is there anything in section 13 which would preclude the application of s. 9 to any case whatsoever of a debt incurred. after the commencement of the Act.
For, a debt may have been incurred after the commencement of the Act in the sense that the last transaction with respect to indebtedness may have been entered into, after the . II commencement of the Act. But that transaction may be in renewal of a liability which arose prior to the commencement gf the Act. Where such is the case it is difficult to exclude the applicability of s. 9 of the Act. As to how interest is to be ca:culated with respect to a debt incurred after October I, 1932 the court cannot ignore the provisions of sub-s. ( I ) of s. 9. It was, however, contend~d that where the last transaction was subsequent to the commencement of the Act the court has no power to go behind it and find out what interest has been charged by the creditor up to the date of the last transaction.
No doubt, JI where the accounts have been senled between the parties and on the basis of settled accounts a new transaction is entered into between them, normally speaking, the court has no power to enquire further, except in the circumstances envisaged in some of the provisiom of he Contract Act. But then there are special provisions like the Usurious Loans Act and the Act in question which clothe the courts with the requisite power. Here such a power is specifically given to the courts under Chapter II. Now, the proviso to sub-s. (I) of s. 9 clearly states that any part of the debt which is found to be a renewai of a prior debt shall be deemed to be a deht contracted on the date on which I) such prior debt was incurred. Therefore, though a promi Sio- "prior debt" i. , •h•t Mrt of the proviso and then in the concludirig oortion say "if such debt has been contracted orior to I st October, 1932". Then Mr. Bhimasan- II karam argued that the nroviso is to sub-s. (I) of s.
9 and should, therefore, not be extended to embrace a debt renewed after the commencement of the Act. To accc:ot this argument would give KRISHNAYYA v. SBSHACHALAM (Mudho/kar J. ) ,. , 203 rise to this curious position that a debt renewed after the commencement of the Act would for the purposes of the Act not be a debt incurred afte- October l, 1932. Another argument advanced by Mr. Bhimasankaram is that unless a statute makes a provision to the effect that a debt would in certain circumstances be deemed to be discharged, the liabi ity 8 to pay it would still remain on the debtor and that merely provid-ing for the scaling down of interest is not enough. In this connection he refers to the provision in sub;s, ( 1) of s. 8.
Under that provision interest outstanding on October 1, 1937 in favour of any creditor of an agriculturist shall be deemed to be discharged and only the principal or such portion thereof as may be outstanding shall be deemed to be the amount repayable by the agriculturist on that date. Sub-section ( 2) of s. 8 further provides that where an agriculturist has paid to the creditor twice the amount whether by way of principal, interest or both, the entire debt shall be deemed to be wholly discharged. It is true that sub-s. ( 1) of s. 9 which provides for scaling down of debts incurred on or after October l, 1932 does not use similar language. But it seems to us that the difference in language would not make any difference in the result b~cause readin~ sub-s. (I) of s. 9 along with the provisions of s.
7 it is abundantly clear that what the creditor would be entitled to obtain from the court and what the court ~ill have to do would be to award interest only to the extent permissible by sub-s. ( 1) of s. 9 and this would in effect op~rate as a discharge of the rest of the liability for interest under the con•ract between the parties. Learned counsel further said that by applying the provisions of sub-s. ( 1) of s. 9 to a debt renewed after the cornmencemerit of the Act would result in an anoma! v in that with respect to renewals of certain old debts the entire liability for interest after October 1, 1932 will be wiped out whereas with regard to others the liability would exist to the extent of 5% per annum. simole interest. Tn our judgment no anomaly re•ults because the complete discharge of interest up to Oct0ber 1. 1937 is provided for only with respect to debts fir<t incurred p•ior to October l, 1932 and this would be the position whatever be the date of renewal of such debts.
This would be the consequence of the exores~ terms of the proviso to sub-s. ( 1) of s. 9 which makes the provisions of s. 8 applicable to d~bls contracted prior to October l, 1932 but renewed after October I, 1932 but not to debts ;ncu·red subsequent to that date. The last contention of Mr. Bhirnasankaram is that there is no . ,-ovision fo- fmure interest corresponding to that in sub-a. / -. ' - -------- -------- -_-·-;-, ·~----· -.... ~· ' ( I ) of s. ·· 13 of the Act and, therefore, in so far as the interest after the co=encement of the Act is concerned, s. 13 alone will, have to be i:esorted to. As already stated, Chapter IV divides debts into two broad categories and . in. so far as debts . incurred prior to O,ctober 1, 1932 ru:e concerned transactions in renewal of older ones have been brought within the. purview of s. 8 · by· adding thereto Explanation III and ·transactions subsequent to October l, 1932 within the purview of Jl,. 9 by the proviso to sub~s .. (I).
Having made these. provisions; there was nothing further that the legiSlature need. have ~6rie in so far as ,_ transactions in renewal 'of ·debts ·contracted· prior. to the com- · mencement of the Act were concerned. As to future . intereSt, in so far. as transactioris prior to the. co~eticement of the Act were concerned, the legislature· has· made a provision. in s. 12 and in so far as transactiom after the co=encement of the Act are concerned it has made a provision in 5: 13. · Indeed, · the object of the legislature in enacting s. 13 does ricit appear to be any other than to provide for the maximum rate of interest payable on debts incurred after the commencement of the Act and since it follows s. 12 it seems that just as the legisiature divided debts into two categories it also divided rates of interest payable after the co=encement of the Act into two categories. In section 12 it has prescribed the maximum rate of intere5t payable on debts scaled down under ss ..
8 and 9 and in s. 13 has provided for an identi-cal maximum rate with resoect to debts which could not be scaled down under ss. 8 and 9 subject to the power of the State Govern- -· ment to alter it from time to time. There does not appear to be any other object such as creating a separate or independent category of debts while enacting s. 13. Upon a plain construction of these. provisions, therefore, we see no difficulty in upholding the ultimate decision of the High . Court. · · · Coming now to_ the decisions which were referred to at the bar, the earliest in point of time is Thiruvengadatha Ayyangat 1 v. Sannappan Servai( )~ This incidentally is the only decision which completely supports the appellants' contention:· In that case th_e debt was due on a promissory. note dated October 2, 1938 which discharged the prior promissory. note dated Octo· ' bcr l, 193 l. The District }1:unsifi had applied the proviso to sub-s. ( l) of s.
9 and treated the debt as renewal of an earlier debt upon which interest upto March 22; 1938 had to be re-ducecl to 5%. The High Court pointed out that the scaling down machinery under that section has the effect of only reduc-ing interest up to the da_te of the commencement of the Act and ,. , (I) I. LR. (1942) Mad. 57, KRISHNAYYA v. SESHACHALAM (Mudholkqr J. ) 205 saidr that it may reasonably be inferred from this that the legislature did not intend the section to apply to those debts which had no• existence before the last point of time up to which the scaling down under the Act could be effected. The High Court had not IOii! sight of the provisions of s. 12 which empower the court to award future interest after the commencement of the Act but it pointed out that that section would not apply to a debt which was incurred for the first time after March 22, 1938 and. tb! ll"efore s. 9 would not be applicable to an earlier debt renewed after March 22, 1938.
The High Court then observed: "It seems to us that, having regard to the scheme _of the Act, if it had been the intention of the Legislature to introduce the theory of renewals into the scaling down operations in respect of debts incurred after the commencement of the Act, some specific provisions would have been made in this behalf. We are of opinion that all debts incurred after the commo! 1 man of the Act, whether they be in discharge of prior debts or not, will fall only under sectii:;n I 3. ,. The answer to the view of the High Court would be that in th~ first place every provision in the statute must be given effect to unless by doing so any conflict with any other provision of th~ Act would arise.
In the second place we cannot ignore the object of the legislature in enacting this law which wa~ to grant relief to the agriculturists and that any beneficial measure of this kind should, as far as permissible, be interpreted in such a way ag to carry out the main object which the Legislature had in view. ?. 'hat we have said earlier in our judgment is in consonance with th~se principles and by interpreting ss. 9 and 13 in the way we have done no violence will be done to the language of either of the-;e provisions. The basis of the decision of the High Court appears to be that unless every transaction entered into after the commencement of the Act can be brought within the purview of s. 9, sub-s. ( l) that provision could not apply to it at all whatever may be the date on which the original indebtedness arose. With respect, we do not see any reason for so construing the two provisions i. e . • ss . •9(1) and 13.
In our judgment it is sufficient to say that full effect has to be given to both the provisions and they are to be construed harmoniously. The next decision fa Arunagiri Chettiar v. Kuppu. nvami Chet-tillT( ). This is a judgment by one of the two Judges wh-0 was (t) [1942] 2 M. LJ. 275. L! Sup. /64--14 206 SUPREME COURT RF. PORTS [1965) I S. C. R. a party to the earlier dccisiO! J. That was a case in which a claim wa. ~ made on behalf of a debtor for refund of excess interest which was paid by the debtor to the creditor after the commence-mem of the Act. Negativing the claim the learned Ju<lge ob,erved: "The two payments in 1938 and 1939 were definitely appropriated towards interest at the time when they were made. Neither the debtor nor the creditor has the right to tear up these appropriations by an uni-lateral act. The Court has no power to reappro- \ priate the payments to principal unless the Act con-tains a provision for such re-appropriation.
I am not aware of any such provision in Act IV of 1938. " Then the learned Judge observed that the only way in which a debtor might get back money which he has paid after the Act G1111c into force in ex. ccss of the amount properly due under the provisions of the Act would be by establishing a right to a refund under the ordinary law on the ground that the payment was made under a mistake. It will thus be seen that the matter involved in this case is different from the one before us. The next decision is Me//acheruvu Pundarikakshudu v. Kuppa 1 V enkata Krishna Shastri ( ). That was a suit based upon a promissory note dated August 18, 1948 which was in renewal of a rromissory note executed on August 14, 1945. It was thus a c:ise which was covered by s. 13 alone. The learned Judges rightly held that under s. 13 a debtor cannot trace back his debt to the original debt which itself was incurred after the Act came into force.
In this connection they relied on Thiruvengadaiha Avyangar's case(') as well as on the decision in Krishanayya v. Venka111 S11bbarayudu('). ln the latter case it was held: "It is "ell settled that a debt incurred after the commencement of Madras Act 4 of 1938. cannot be scaled down except in accordance with section 13 of that Act. " The words 'a debt incurred' were meant to include a transaction in renewal of a debt actually contracted prior to the commencement of the Act. This is, theTefore, a statement which supports the appellants 'Jut in point of fact the le? med Judges were not concerned with a pre-1932 debt and so thev did not have to decide the kind of point which arises in the case before us. While we agree that s. 13 by itself does not enable a debtor to trace back the debt to the original debt a further question can arise whether upon the facts the provisions I 11·1 ! LR. {1957] A. P. 532. (2) I. LR. 1942 Mad. 57. (l) {1952] I M. L. J. 638. KRISHNAYYA v.
SESHACHALAM (Mudho/kar. J. ) 207 of s. 9 are attracted to a debt incurred after the commencement of the Act (in the sense that the last transaotion pertaining to it was subsequent to the commencement of the Act) because the original liability arose prior to the commencem~nt of the Act. If s. 9 is attracted the proviso to sub-s. ( 1) thereof which permits the tracing back of certain debts can be resorted to if the facts permit that to be done. Then there is the decision in Mallikharjw:ia Rao v. Tripura Sundari('). That was a decision of a single Judge, Rajamannar C. J. , who held that where a promissory note is executed for an amount in excess of what was due on the basis of Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act there is failure of consideration in so far as the excess amount is concerned and the plaintiff would not be entitled to more than what would be due to him after applying the provisions of that Act to the original debt and its renewals. The next decision relied on is Nainamul v. B.
Subba Rao('). The point which was referred to the Full Bench for its opinion was as follows:. "Whether in the case of a debt incurred after the Act came into force a payment made expressly towards interest at the contract rate . can be reopened and re-appropriated towards interest payable under the provisions of s. 13 of the Act. " The question was answered by the F:ull Bench in the affirmative. This decision thus substantially goes against the contentions of Mr. Bhimasankaram. The following observations of Subba . Rao C. J. (as he then was) may be quoted in support of the view which. we have taken: "Unhampered by decided cases, I shall proceed to consider the scope of the section having regard to the afore-said declared object of the Act and the express words used in the section. The object of s. 13 is to give relief to agriculturists in the matter of interest in respect of a debt incurred after the Act.
If such a debt is sought to be enforced, it is caught in the net of the scaling down process. At that stage, all. the interest due on the debt is reduced to the statutory level or, to put it differently, whatever may be the contract rate of interest, it is replaced by the S'tatutory rate. If the appropriations ~~~~--~~~~ (1) A.!. R. 1953 Madras 975 . ' (2) A. I. R. 1957 A. P. 546 F. B 208 sur~EME COURT REPORTS (1965] I S. CR. made earl'ier are not reopened, Ille rntention of the statute woald be defeated' for tile contract rate pre-vails over the sta! utory rate up to a stage. Doubrfess the courts are concerned' with the ex-pressed intention of the legistat11re. The cruciat words in s. lJ ,are 'all interest due on any debt'. The word 8 'interest' is qualified by two words 'all' and 'due'. If interest outstanding al~me is scaled down the emphatic word 'all' becomes otiose. · If that was the intemion, the words 'interest outstanding' would serve the parpose as weU.
The word 'all', therefore, cannot be ignored and must be given a meaning. It indicates that the entire interest, which a debt earned, is scaled down. " The n~t decision referred to i1I thal in Mansoor v. Sank11Ta-pandia(1). That was a decision of the Full Bench of the High Court and the points which arose for consideration and the decision of the Court are correctly summarised in the following head note: "Section 13 of the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act (IV of 1933) deals with debts incurred after the-Act. Under that section there is no provision for any automatic discharge af interest stipulated at a rate higher than that prescribed therein. Such excess interest is only made irrecoverable if the creditor sought to enforce it in a court of law.
There being neither a prohibition again9t a stipttlatioa for payment nor an automatic discharge of higher rates of interest agreed to be paid by an agric11lturi~t debtor, it cannot he said that, when a creditor in regard to a debt contracted after the Act with the assent of his debtor added to the principal loan the interest accrued in terms of the contract and the debtor entered into a fresh contract treating the consolidated amount as principal for the fresh loan, there would be anything illegal or even a failure of consideration in regard to tfle new loan. Such a new loan would constitute the debt incurred on the date af renewal and if a suit is based on that debt, the provisions of section 13 could be attracted to that debt alone and not to the earticr debt of which it wa9 a renewal or u substitution. ! ll I. LR. [19S9] Mad. 97. KIUSHNAYYA v. SESHACHALAM (Mudholkar J.
) 209 The power to go behind a suit debt and to apply the provisions of the Act for the original liability is confined only to cases falling under sections 8 and 9 of the Act. 'But even in cases corning under section 13 it would be open to the defendants to plead and prove that the debt sued on could not form the basis of an action or that 1;here was a failure of consideration in respect of it. Suoh a defence is not by virtue of 'anything in or peculiar to the Act, but one under the general law. In · cases where a debt was contracted prior to the Act, but renewed after the Act by one or series of successive documents, such renewals including interest at the contract rate, which had been statutorily discharged by reason· of the provisions of sections 8 and 9 of the Act, there would be a failure of consideration to the extent to which. the interest was so discharged. This principle will or can have no application ·in the case of a debt incur. red after the Act and renewed thereafter.
In ,those ~ there would be no failure of consideration, for no portion of interest has been . discharged _by section 13, it being open to the debtor to agree to pay the higher stipulated rate of interest. " That again was a case where the original indebtedn~ss was subsequent to the commencement of the Act and, therefore, stands on a footing different from the one before us. The observations made by the court in the. case upon which reliance is placed on behalf of the appellants appear to have been limited by the learned Judges to cases which . fall under s. 13 alone. Since, however, the learned Judges seem to have accepted the view taken in Thiravengadatha Ayyangat's case(') it is necessary for us to say that to that extent we do not concur in the view taken by them. It has to be remembered that where the plaintiff sues upon a document executed after the commencement of the Act the Court has to bear in mind also the provisions of s.
9 inasmuch as the document is one executed after October 1, 1932. If the pleadings show that the original indebtedness commenced before the coming into force of the Act the court will first have to deal with the document with reference to the provisions which precede s. 13 of the Act. l't is not as if the Court has to shut its eyes to everything except the fact that the . document sued upon was executed subsequent to the commencement of the Act. There- (I) I. L. R. [1942] Mad. 57. fore, if the court finds that the original indebtedness arose prior I to the commencement of the Act either s. 8 or s. 9 will apply and it would not be relevant for it to consider whether by execut-ing a renewal after the commencement of the Act the parties agreed to treat the. interest accrued up to the date of renewal as principal from the date of the renewal of the debt. That consideration may b~ relevant in cases which completely exclude the applicability of ss. 8 and 9.
We were also referred to the decision in Punyavatamma. v. Satyanarayana('); Nagabushanam v. Seetharamaiah(2) and 1 Chellamma/ v. Abdul Ga/Joor Sahib( ). In the first and Uie third of these cases the original liability arose after the commencement of the Act but in ·the second one it arose before the commencement of the Act.. We agree with the view taken in the biter case that relief can be given to an agriculturist in such a c:ise under s. 8 or s. 9. as the case may be. , Thus it would appear that wherever a transaction was entered into after the commencement of the Act but the original indebtedness arose before the commencement of the Act, the prepon-derant view is that ss. 8 and 9 would not be inapplicable. That, as already stated, is also our view. In the result we dismiss the appeal with costs. . , Appeal dismis. <ed. (I) I. LR. 11960} 2 A. P. ll I. (2) I. LR. 119611 t A. P. 485. (3) l. L. R. 11961} Mad. t061.
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