GANPAT RAI HIRALAL AND ANOTHER v. AGGARWAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE LTD

Citation: [1953] 1 S.C.R. 752; 1952 INSC 48

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN , N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR, NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI

Judgment date: 1952-10-24

Case summary

1952 INSC 48. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1952-10-24. GANPAT RAI HIRALAL AND ANOTHER v. AGGARWAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE LTD. Read the judgment and...

Judgment text

752 SUPREME COURT REPOR'l'S (1953] GANPAT RAI ll[RAI1AL AND ANOTHER v. AGGARWAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE LTD. MURARI LAL HARI RAM v. MARWARI CHAMBEH OF COMMERCE LTD. [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, 0HANDRASEKHABA AIYAB and BHAGWATI JJ. ] PepS1! Ordinance (X of 2006), ss. 52, 116-Patiala States Judicature Farman, 1999-Appeal frmn order of single J1ul. ge-Certificate of fitness-When necessary-Order made before Ordinance came into f01·ce-Petition for amendment th. ,·eafter-Appeal from order dismissing petition- Necessity of certificate-Right of appeal-- Vested 1·ight--Effect of change of law. Section 116 of the Pepsu Ordinance X of 2005 (1948-1949) is a transitory regulation providing for Ri change over of proceedings from one set of courts in the covenanting State to others of like status in the Union, and for their continuance etc. in the latter courts. It does not mean that the proceedings must be treated as having freshly commenced.

What is contemplated in the latter part of the section is a notional commencem0nt, and the section means that all rights which arose or are likely to arise in future shall remain intact notwithstanding the new set up and that they would be dealt with by the Union courts in place of the courts of the covenanting State. There is nothing in the section to justify the view that any taking away of a vested right of appeal retros-, pectively was intended. Under the Patiala States Judicature Farman of 1999 a certificate was necessary for an appea. l to a Division Bench from an order of a single Judge of the Patiala High Court only in. respect of judgments and orders made in the exercise of civil appellate jurisdiction. Under the Pepsu Ordinance X of 2005 (1948-49) a certificate was necessary in all cases. In Appeal No.

152 an application made on 2nd February, 1950, for amendment of an order made by a Liquidation Judge in 1946 was dismissed and an appeal from the order of dismissal to a Division Bench was dis· missed on 1st May, 1950, for want of a certificate. In appeals Nos. 167 and 167A, the paymenl; orders were made on the 18th January, 1949, and appeals from those orders were dismissed on 3rd March, 1949, for want of a certificate: Held, (i) that as a petition for amendment was not a continu· ation of the" earlier proceedings but was in the nature of an 1952 independent proooeding though connected with the order sought to be amended, it was governed by the law prevailing on its date, viz. , the Pepsu Ordinance of 2005 under which a certificate was Ganpat Rai 1 necessary, and in Appeal No. 152 the dismissal of the appeal to the Hira L l Division Bench ior want of a certificate was right; and Another (ii) that with regard to Appeals Nos. 167 and 167. A, as the v.

l law in force on the relevant dates was the Patiala States . Judi- Agga;w• cature Farman of 1999 the appellants had a right to appeal from Oharn ";!. the payment order without a certificate; this vested right could Oommsrce t ' not be taken away by a subsequent change in the law unless the ' later enactment expressly or by necessary implication was retrospective in operation and· deprived them of such a right, that there was nothing in s. 116 ol the Ordinance to show that it was intended to have retrospective effect and the order of the High Court dismissing the appeals as incompetent was, therefore, erroneous. Colonial Sugar Refining Company v. Irving [1905] A. O. 369 referred to. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 152, 167 and 167-A of 1951. Appeal from the Judgments dated April 25, and May 1, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature for P:ttiala and East Pun-jab Suates Union at Patiala (Teja Singh C. J. and Chopra J. ) in L. P. A. R. I. A. O. No.

34 of 1950 and Civil Appeals Nos. 493/494 of Samwat 2005. Rang Behari Lal (Ram Nivas Sanghi, with him) for the appellants in Civil Appeals Nos. 167 and 167-A. Udai Bhan Chaudhuri for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 152. Lachhrnan Das Kaushal for the respondent in Civil Appeals Nos. 167 and 167-A. Ram Nivas Sanghi for the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 152. 1952. October 24. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J. -These appeals are connected and raise a common question of law. They come before us on special leave granted by the Pepsu High Court at Patiala under sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of 11rticle 133 of the Constitution, 754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953] The fact5 in Civil Appeal No. 152. of 1951 are different from those in the other two appeals, and the consequences are different also. The proceedings arise out of the liquidation of two companies called the Marwari Chamber of Commerce Ltd. , (in Civil Appeal No.

152 of 1951) and the Aggarwal Chamber of Commerce Ltd. , (in the other two appeals). The Official Liquidator settled the list Ohandi·asekhai·a of contributories, and after various steps taken before the Liquidation Judge of the High Court by way of objection 0n grounds of law as well as on merits, there were payment orders on 4th June, 1946, in Civil Appeal No. 152 of 1951 and on 18th January, 1949, in the latter two appeals. · The correctness and the validity of the payment order in Civil App<lal No. 152 of 1951 was challenged in appeals taken to the High Court by the Official T~iquidator and the contributory. The order of the Liquidation Judge was modified in favour of the T~iquidator, and as against a sum of Rs. 4,762-13-3 ordered to be paid, there was au order for the payment of Rs. 24,005-7-3.

· On further appeal by the contributory to the Judicial Committee, it was he:d that the appeal to the Division Bench was barred by time, and consequently the judgment of the Bench was set aside, and that of the Liquidation Judge restored. This was on 6th December, 1949. In the other two appeals, an application for remo-val of the name of the contributory was granted by the Liquidation Judge, but on appeal a Divisiou Bench of the High Court reversed this order. On further appeal taken by the company, the Judicial Committee, Patiala, remanded the case for retrial, and the Liquidation Ju,dge m~Lde au order for payment of Rs. 8,191-0-9 on 18th January, 1949, as aforesaid. On 2nd February, 1950, the firm M urari r~al-Hari Ram, appellant in Civil Appeal No. 152of 1951, filed an application under section 152, Civil Procedure Code, for amendment of the order of the Liquidation Judge, Kartar Singh J.

, alleging that there was a clerical or arithmetical error arising from an acci- I9os dental slip or omission in that a sum of Rs. 24,005-7 -3 was taken as due by the firm instead of the correct Ganpat Rai Hira ~al figure of Rs. 21,805-7-3. This application was dis- ""d Another missed by the learned Judge on 16th March, 1950. The v. firm applied to him for a certificate for leave to Aggarwal appeal, but this again was dismissed. An appeal was 0hamber of . · · h d 0 ommerce Ltd. pre erref d f rom t h e or er d d 1sm1ssmg t e amen ment __ petition, but it was thrown out on the ground of want Ohandrasekhara of a certificate from the Single Judge. This order is Aiyar J. dated 1st May, ~950, and is couched in these terms: "We have recently held in Ganpat Bai Hira Lal v. Aggarwal Chamber of Comnurce, Ltd. , L. P. A. Nos.

493 and 494 of Samvat 2005 (Pepsu) that no appeal lies from an order of a Single Bencb to a Division Bench without a certificate by the Single Judge that the case is a fit one for further appeal. In this case it is admitted that the appellants made an applic[ltion for a certificate to the Single Bsnch, from whose decision he is appealing, but the same w:i. s refused. The appeal is therefore not competent and is dismissed in limine. " The reference in the order to the case of Ganpat Rai HiraLalv. Aggarwal Chamber ofCommerceLtd. , L. P. A. Nos. 493 and 494 of Sam vat 2005 (Pepsu) is to the o;rder m:i. de by the High Court in the connected matter which has given rise to the two Appeals Nos. 167 and 167-Aof 1951. There, an appeal w:i,~ lodged from the payment order of the Liquidation Judge, but it was dismiss~d on the same ground, namely, want of a certificate from the Single Judge. In Civil Appeal No.

152 of 1951, the argument for the appellant is that no certificate from the Single Judge is necessary, as the matter is governed not by Ordinance X of 2005 of the Patiala State but by the Patiala :::tates Judicature Farman E Shahi, 1999, Bikarmi, under which no certificate is necessary. It is true that under section 44 of the earlier Farman a certificate that the case is a fit one for appeal is required only if the judgment, decree, or order sought to be appealed is made in the e~ercise of civil ~8 756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1953) appellate jurisdiction. It is, however, tllear that we are not bo-overned h. )' this provision. The amendment application was made on 2nd February, 1950, as Anothei· stated alre~dy.. No appeal is provided nuder the Civil Procedure Code from an order amending or refusing to amend a judgment, decree or order, though ~{d an appeal· would lie from the amended decree or • order. 'l'here is no warrant for tli.

e view that the Chandrasekharn amendment petition is a continuation of the suit or proceedings therein. It is in the nature of :i. n independent proceeding, though connected with the order of which amendment is Bought. Sucli a proceeding is governed by the law prevailing on its date, which admittedly is Pepsu Ordinance X of 2005, and which provides in section 52 for a certificate. 'fhe section is in the following terms: "Subject to any other provision of law, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment, decree or order of one Judge of the High Court and shall be heard "by a Bench consisting of two Judges of the High Court: Provided that no such appeal shall lie to the High Court unless the Judge who decides the case or in his absence the Chief Justice certifies that the case is a fit one for appeal. ...

" So far as the appellant firm is concerned, there is no question of any right of appeal vested in it which is sought to be taken away by giving retrospective eff~ct to the Ordinance which came into force in August, 1g43, The order of the High Court holding that no appeal lies from an order of a single . Judge without a certificate by him that the case is a fit one for appeal, is, in our opinion, right. In the other two Appealo Nos. 167 ,ind 167A of 1951, different considerations come into play. 'rhe payment order of the' Liquidation Judge was on 18th . January, 1949, and the :1ppeal was preferred on 19th February. 1949. In the meantime, as there was some doubt on the question, the appellants took the pre-caution of applying to the Judge for a certificate, but this was dismissed on 3rd March, 1949. On the relevant dates, the Patiala States Judicature Farman, 1999 was in force, and the appellants had a right of S. C. R.

SUPREME COURT REPOR'rs 757 1 appeal from the payment order without a certificate. 952 They could not be deprived of this right by a subse- · h Ganpat Rai quent ch ange m t e law, unless the later enactment Hira Lal provides expressly or by necessary implication for and Another retrospective effect being given. Th~ learned Judges v. of the High Court conceded this in their order, but Aggarwal they thought that section 116 of Ordinance X of Chamber of 0 0 2005 (1948-49) c·ontained an express provision to the "'""'"'' Ltd. contrary. 'rhe section is in these terms: Ohandrasokhara " Notwithstanding anything contained in this Aiyar J. Ordinance, :di suits, appe:tls, revisions, applications, reviews, executions and other proceedings, or any of them, whether civil or criminal, pending in the Courts a.

nd before judicial authorities in any Covenanting St:tte shall be continued and concluded respectively in Courts or before judicial authorities of the like status in the Union ; and the Courts or authorities in the Union shall have the same jurisdiction in respect of all such snits, appeals, revisions, reviews, executions, applications aud other proceedings, or any of them, as if the same had been duly commenced and continued in such Courts or before such authorities. " It is fairly obvious that this is a transitory regulation providing for a change over of proceedings from one set of Courts in the Covenanting State to others of like status in the Union and for their continuance etc. in the latter Courts. It does not say that the proceedings must be treated as having freshly commenced. What is contemplated in the latter part of the section is a notional commencement, if such a term could be used.

'l'he section obviously means that all rights which arose or are likely to arise in the future shall remain intact notwithstanding the new set-up, and that they would be dealt with by the Union Courts in place of the Courts of the Covenant- . ing State. There is nothing in the section to justify the view that any taking away of a vested right of appeal retrospectively was intended. The decision in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving(') clearly applies to the facts, and the order of the High Court that the appeals are not competent is, in' om opinion, erroneous. The result is that Appeal No. 152 of . 1951 is dismissed with costs throughout, while Appeals Nos. 167 and 167 A of 19. 51 are allowed with costs throughout. (1) [1905] A. C. 369. Appeal No. 12. 5 dismissed. Appeals Nos. 167 and 167 A . allowed. Agents for the a. pp~llants in Appeals Nos. 167 and 167A: Mohan Behan Lal. Agent for the appellant in Appeal No. 152 : Kitn-dan Lal Mehta. Agent for respondents in Appeals Nos.

167 and 167 A: Naunit Lal. Agent for respondent in Appeal No. 152: Mohan Behari Lal. HIRALAL AND OTHERS v. BADKULAL AND OTHERS. [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and BHAGWATI JJ. ] Acknowledgment- Whether gives fresh cause of action-Practice -Party in possession of documentary evidence- Duty to produce. Where the defendants who had dealings with the plaintiffs for several years signed the following entry in the plaintiffs' ac-count book underneath the earlier entries: "After adjusting the aceounts Rs. 34,000 found correct pay-able". Held, that this amounted to an unqualified acknowledgment of liability to pay and implied a promise to pay and could be made the basis of the suit and gave rise to a fresh cause of action. Maniram v. Seth Rup Chand (33 I. A. 165), Fateh Chn. nd v. Ganga Singh II. L. R. 10 Lab. 745) and Kahan Chand Dularam v. Daya1al Amritlal (I. L. R. 10 Lah. 748) relied on. Gh11lam M11rtuza v. Fasih1mnissa (I. L. R. 57 All. 434) overruled.

It is not a sound practice for those desiring to rely upon a certain state of facts to withhold from the court written evidence which is in their possession which could throw light upon the. issues in controversy and tc rely upon the mere doctrine of onus of proof. Murugesam Pillai v. Manickavasaka Pandara (44 I. A. 99) referred to.

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