G.M. ARUMUGAM v. S. RAJGOPAL & OTHERS
Citation: [1976] 3 S.C.R. 82; 1975 INSC 335
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Y.V. CHANDRACHUD , P.N. BHAGWATI, R.S. SARKARIA
Judgment date:
Case summary
1975 INSC 335. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1975-12-19. G.M. ARUMUGAM v. S. RAJGOPAL & OTHERS. Read the judgment and case details on LawSphereX.
Judgment text
84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [J 976] 3 S. C. R. G. M. ARUMUGAM v. S. RAJGOPAL & OTHERS December 19, 1975 ! Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, P. N. BHAGWATI AND R. S. SARKAR! A, JJ. ] Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, Paras 2 and 3-Adi Dravida, l·o111'ertcd to Clnislia11ity and reconverted to Hinduisn1-lf and wlu'n could be treated as Adi Dravida. When conversion affects caste. Code of Civil Procedure (Act 5 of 1908) s. 11-Res judicata-Dec1sio11 . iboiil caste of a candidat€ in one ell·ction petition if res~judicata lVhen question ari5es in another later election. In the 1967 election to the State Legislative Assembly, the appellant and the 1st respondent clai1ning to be Adi Dravidas, stood as candidates for a seat reserved for Scheduled Castes. The respondent was declared elected. The appellant's election petition challenging the election was allov-'ed by the High Court. This Court dismissed the respondent's appeal holding, (I) that the res· pon of the caste as belonging to their fold.
But ultimately it must depend on the structure of the caste and its rules aud regulations whether a person would cease to belong to the caste on his abjuring Hinduism. If the structure of the caste is such that its members must necessarily belong to Hindu religion, a member, who ceases to be a Hindu, would go out of the caste, because no non- Hindu can be in the caste according to its rules and regulations. Where, on the other hand, having regard to its structure, as it has evolved over the years, a caste may consist not only of persons professing Hindu religion but also persons professing some other religion as well, conversion from Hinduism to that other religion may not involve loss of caste, because even persons professing such other religion can be members of the caste.
This might happen where caste is based on economic or occupational characteristics and not on religious identity or the cohesion of the caste as a social group is so strong that conversion into another religion does not operate to snap the bond between the convert and the social group. This is indeed not an infrequent phenomenon in South India where, in some of the castes, even after conversion to Christianity, a person is regarded as continuing to belong to the caste. When an argument was advanced before the Madras High Court in G. Michael's case (supra) "that there were several cases in which a member of one of the lower castes II who has been converted to Christianity has continued not only to consider himself as still being a member of the caste, but has also been considered so by other members of the caste who had not been converted," Rajamannar, C. J.
, who, it can safely be presumed, was familiar with the customs and practices prevalent in South India, accepted the position "that instances can be found ill which in spite of conversion the caste distinctions might continue", though he treated them as exceptions to the general rule. ' _ The High Court of Andhra Pradesh also affirmed in Kothapalli Narasayya v. Jammana Jogi(') that "notwithstanding conversions, the converts whether an individual or family or group of converts, may like to be governed by the law by which they were g,averned before they became converts-and the community to which they originally (1)- A. l. R. 1952 Mad. 474. (2) 30 EL. R. I.
belonged may also continue to accept them within their fold notwithstanding conversion", and proceeded to add : "While tendency to divide into sects and division to form new sects with their own religious and social observances is a characteristic feature of Hinduism-it should be remem-bered that sects were formed not only on community of reli-gions but also community of functions. Casteism which has taken deep roots in Hinduism for some reason or other may not therefore cease its existence even after conversion. May be that the religion or faith to which conversion takes place, on grounds of policy or otherwise, does not take exception to this social order which does not interfere with its spiri-tual or theological aspect which is the main object of the religion.
That is why we find several members of lower castes converted to Christianity in Madras State-still c011·· tinue to the members of their castes-Thus a conversion docs not necessarily result in extinguishment of caste and notwithstanding conversion, a convert may enjoy the pri-vileges social and political by virtue Of his being a member of the community with its acceptance. " The elected candidate in this case was held to continue to belong to the Mala Andhra Caste which was a Scheduled Caste, despit. e his conversion to Christianity. It was again reiterated by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in a subsequent decision reported in K. Narasimha Reddy v. G.
Bhupathi(l) that survival of caste after conversion to Christianity is not an unfamiliar phenomenon in this part of the country and it was held that, even after his conversion ,to Christianity, the elected candidate, who belonged to Bindla caste, specified as a Scheduled Caste, continued to retain his caste, since he never abjured his caste nor did his caste people ostracize or excommunicate. him. The caste system is indeed so deeply ingrained in the Indian mind that, as pointed out by this Court in Ganpat v, Returning Officer,(') "for a person who has grown up in Indian society, it is very difficult to get out of the coils of the caste system·· and, therefore, even conversion to another religion like Christianity, has in some cases no impact on the membership of the caste and the other men,. t bers continue to regard the convert as still being a member of the caste.
This Court pointed out in Ganpat's case (supra) that "to this day one sees matrimonial advertisements which want a Vellala Christian bride or Nadar Christian bride" which shows that Vellala and Nadar comprise both Hindus and Christians. It seems that the correct test for determining this question is the one pointed out by this Court in Chatturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani v. Moreshwar Prasahram. (") Bose, J. , speaking on behalf of the Court in this case pointed out that when a question arises whether conversion operates as a break away from the caste "what we have to (1) 31 E. L. R. 211. (2) [197511 S. C. C. 589. (3) [19541S. C. R. 817. . G. M. ARUMUGAM v. s. RAJGOPAL (Bhagwati, J. ) 93 determine are the social and political consequences of such conversion that, we feel, must be decided in a common sense practical way rather than on theoretical and theocratic grounds".
The learned Judge then proceeded to add : "Looked at from the secular point of view, there are three factors which have to be considered : ( 1) the reac-tions of the old body, (2) the intentions of the illilividua[ himself and (3) the rules of the new order. If the old order is tolerant of the new faith and sees no reason to outcaste or ex-communicate the convert and the individual himself desires and intends to retain his old social political ties, the conversion is only nominal for all practical purposes and when we have to consider the legal and political rights of the old body, the views of the new faith hardly matter. " What is, therefore, material to consider is how the caste looks at the question of conversion. Does it outcaste or ex-communicate the convert or does it still treat him as continuing within its fold despite his conversion ?
If the convert desires and intends to continue as a member of the caste and the caste also continues to treat him as a member, notwithstanding his conversion, he would continue to be a member of the caste and, as pointed out by this Court "the views of the new faith hardly matter". This was the principle on which it was decided by the Court in Chatturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani's case (supra) that Gangaram Thaware, whose nomination as a Scheduled Caste candidate was rejected by the Returning Officer, continued to be a Mahar which was specified as a Scheduled Caste, despite his conversion to the Mahanubhav faith. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 also support the view that even after conversion, a person may continue to belong to a caste which has been specified in the Schedule to that Order as a Scheduled Caste.
Paragraph 2 provides that the castes specified in the Schedule to the Order shall be deemed to be Scheduled Castes but Paragraph 3 declares that, notwithstanding anything contained in Paragraph 2, that is, notwithstanding that a person belongs to a caste specified as a Scheduled Caste, he shall not be deemed to be a member of the Scheduled Caste, if he profess a religion different from Hindu or Sikh religion. Paragraphs 2 and 3 read together thus clearly recognise that there may be castes specified as Scheduled Castes which comprise persons belonging to a religion dif· ferent from Hindu or Sikh religion and if that be so, it must follow a fortiori, that in such castes, conversion of a person from Hinduism cannot have the effect of putting him out of the caste. though by reason of Paragraph 3 he would be deemed not to be a member of a ;t; Scheduled Caste.
It cannot, therefore, be laid down as an absolute rule uniformly applicable in all cases that whenever a member of a caste is converted from Hinduism to Christianity, he loses his membership of the caste. It is true that ordinarily on conversion to Christianity, he would cease to a member of the caste, but that is not an invariable rule. It would depend on the structure of the caste and its rules and regulations. There are castes, particularly in South India, where this consequence does not follow on conversion, since such castes comprise both Hindus and Christians. Whether Adi Dravida is a caste which falls within this category or not is a question which would have to be determined on the evidence in this case. There is on the record evidence of Kakkan (PW 13) J. C. Adimoolam (RW 1) and K. P. Arumugam (RW 8), the last two being witnesses examined on behalf of the appellant, which shows that amongst Adi Dravidas, i there are both Hindus and Christians and there are inter-marriages.
between them. It would, therefore, prima facie seem that, on conversion to Christianity, the 1st respondent did not cease to belong to Adi Dravida caste. But in the view we are taking as regards the last contention, we do not think it necessary to express any final opinion on this point. The third question in controversy between the parties was whether the 1st respondent was reconverted to Hinduism. This question stands concluded by the decision of this Court in the earlier case and it must be held. for the reasons set out in that decision, that at any rate since prior to January-February 1967, the 1st respondent was reconverted to Hinduis! Il and, therefore, at the material time, he was professing the Hindu religion, so as to satisfy the requirement of Paragraph 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950. The last contention, which formed the subject matter o[ controversy between the parties, raised the issue whether on reconversion to Hinduism, the !
st respondent could once again become a member of the Adi Dravida caste, assuming that he ceased to be such on conversion to Christianity. The argument of the appellant was that once the 1st respondent renounced Hinduism and embraced Christianity, he could not go back to the Adi Dravida caste on reconversion to Hinduism. He undoubtedly became a Hindu, but he could no longer ·claim to be a member of the Adi Dravida caste. This argument is not sound on principle and it also runs counter to a long line of decided cases. Ganapathi Iyer, a distinguished scholar and jurist, pointed out as far back as 1915 in his well known treatise on 'Hindu Law' : "~ - - caste is a s«;ial combination, the members of which are enlisted by birth and not by enrolment. People do not join castes or religious fraternities as a matter of choice (in one respect); they belong to them as a matter of neces-sity; they are born in their respective . castes or sects.
It cannot be said however that membership by caste zs determined only b/ birth and not by anything else. " (emphasis supplied) .. "I · · l · 1 Chandravarkar, J. , observed in Nathu v. Keshwa11( ) : • t. is w1. t i~n the power of a caste to admit into its fold mei: n? l born ~n 1t as 11 1s within the power of a club to admit an)'. one 1t hkes as its . men:iber. To hold that the membership of a caste 1s detcrmmed by birth 1s to (I) I. L. R 26. Bom. 174. \ G. M. ARUMUGAM v. s. RAJGOPAL (Bhagwati, J. ) 95 hold that the caste cannot, if it likes, mix with another caste and form both into one caste. That would be striking at the very root of caste autonomy. " Sankaran Nair, J. , made observations to the same effect in Muthusami's case (supra) and concluded by saying : "It is, of course, open to a community to admit any person and any marriage performed between him and any member would in my opinion, be valid".
Ganapathi Iyer, after referring to these two decisions, proceeded to add : "Of course it is open to a person to change his caste by entering another caste if such latter caste will admit him-in this sense there is nothing to prevent a person from giving up his caste or community just as the caste may re-admit an expel-led person or an outcasted person if he conforms to the caste observances. " Since a caste is a social combination of persons governed by its rules and regulations, it may, if its rules and regulations so provide, admit a new member just as it may expel an existing member. The rules and regulations of the caste may not have been for-malised : they may not exist in black and white : they may consist only of practices and usages. If, according to the practices and usages of the caste any particular ceremonies are required to be performed for readmission to the caste, a reconvert to Hinduism would have to perform those ceremonies if he seeks readmission to the caste.
That is why Parker, J. , dealing with the possible readmission of a Ieconvert to Brahminism observed in Administrator-General of Mad- 1 ras v. Anandchari( ) : "His conversion to Christianity according to the Hindu law, rendered him an outcaste and degraded. But accorcl· ing to that law, the degradation might have been atoned for, and the convert readmitted to his status as a Brahmin, had he at any time during his life renounced Christianity and performed the rites of expiation enjoined by his caste. " The rites of expiation were referred to by the learned Judge because they were enjoined by the Brahmin caste to· which the reconvert wanted to be readmitted. But if no rites or ceremonies are required to be performed for readmission of a person as a member of the caste, the only thing necessary for readmission would be the acceptance of the person concerned by the other members of the caste. This was pointed out by Varadachariar, J. , in Gurusami Nadar v.
Iru/appa Konar('); where after referring to the aforesaid passage from Admi-nistrator-General of Madras v. Anandchari (supra), the learned Judge said : "The language used in 9 Mad 466 merely refers to the expiatory ceremonies enjoined by the practice of the com· munity in question; and with reference to the class of people ' we are now concerned with, uo suggestion has anywhere been made in the course of the evidence that any particular expiatory ceremonies am observed amongst them. No particular ceremonies are prescribed for them by the Smriti wri-ters nor have· they got to perform any Homas. One has therefore only to look at the sense of the community and (1) I. L. R. 9 Mad. 466. (2) A. I. R. 1934 Mad. 630. from that point of view it is of particular significance that the community was prepared to receive Vedanayaga and defendant 5 as man and wife and their issue as legitimate. '" The. se observations of Varadachariar, J. , were approved by Mockett, J. , 111 Durgaprasada Rao v.
Sudarsanaswami( 1) and he pointed out that in the case before him, there was no evidence of the existence of any ceremonial in Vada Baligi fishermen community of Gopalpur for readmission to that community. Krishnaswami Ayyangar, J. , also observed in the same case that "in matters affecting the wBII being or composition of a caste, the caste itself is the supreme judge". (emphasis supplied). The same view has also been taken in a number of decisions of the Andhra Pradesh and Madras High Courts in election petitions arising out of 1967 General Election. These decisions have been set out in the judgment of this Court in Rajagopal v. C. R. Arumugam (supra). These cases show that the consistent view taken in this country from the time Administrator-General of Madras v.
Anandachari (supra) was decided, that is, since 1886, has been that on reconversion to Hinduism, a person can once again become a member of the caste in which he was born and to which he belonged before conversion to another religion. if the members of the caste accept him as a member. There is no reason either on principle or on authority which should compel us to disregard this view which has prevailed for almost a century and lay down a different rule on the subject. If a person who has embraced another religion can be reconvened to Hinduism, there is no rational principle why he should not be able to come back to his caste, if the other members of the caste are prepared to readmit him as a member. It stands to reason that he should be able to come back to the fold to which he once belonged. provided of course the community is willing to take him within the· fold.
It is the orthodox Hindu society still dominated to a large extent, particularly in rural areas, by medievalistic outlook and status-oriented approach which attaches social and economic disabilities to a person belonging to a Scheduled Caste and that is why certain favoured treatment is given to him by the Constitution. Once such a person ceases to be a Hindu and becomes a Christian, the social and economic disabilities arising because of Hindu religion cease and hence it is no longer necessary to give him protection and for this reason he is deemed not to belong to a Scheduled Caste. But when he is reconverted 10 Hinduism, the social and econon1ic disabilities once aQain revive and become attached to him because these are disabilities inflicted by Hinduism.
A Mahar or a Koli or a Mala would not be recognised as anything but a Mahar or a Kali or a Mala aft~r reconversion to Hinduism and he would suffer from the same social and economic disabilities from which he suffered before he was converted to another religion. It is, therefore, obvious that the ob. iect and puroose of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order. 1950 would be advanced rather than retarded by taking the view that on. (1) A. 1. R. 1940 Mad. 513. G. M. ARUMUGAM v. s. RAJGOPAL (Bhagwati, J. ) reconversion to Hinduism, a person can once again become a mem- A, ber of the Scheduled Caste to which he belonged prior to his conversion. We accordingly agree with the view taken by the High Court that on reconversion to Hinduism, the ! st respondent could once again revert to his original Adi Dravida caste if he was accepted as such by the other members of the caste. That takes us to the question whether in fact the !
st respondent B· was accepted as a member of the Adi Dravida caste after his reconversion to Hinduism. This Court in the earlier decision between the parties found that the ! st respondent had not produced evidence to show that after his reconversion to Hinduism, any step had been taken by the members of the Adi Dravida caste indicating that he was being accepted as a member of that caste. The ! st respondent, therefore, in the present case, led considerable orai as well as documentary evi- C" dencc tending to show that subsequent to January-February 1967, the ! st respondent had been accepted as a member of the Adi Dravida caste. The High Court referred to twelve circumstances appearing from the evidence and held on the basis of these twelve circumstances, that the Adi Dravida caste had accepted the l st respondent as its member and he accordingly belonged to the Adi Dravida caste at the material time.
Now, out of these twelve circumstances, we do not attach any importance to the first circumstance which refers to the celebrations of the marriages of his younger brother Govindaraj and Manickam by the I st respondent in the Adi Dravida m~nner, because it is quite natural that if Govindaraj and Manickam were Adi Dravida Hindus, their marriages woukl be celebrated according to Adi Dravida rites and merely because the I st respondent, as their elder brother, celebrated their marriages, it would not follow that E. he was also an Adi Dravida Hindu. The scccud circumstance that the ! st respondent was looked upon as a peace-maker among the Adi Dravida Hindus of K. G. F. cannot also be regarded as of much significance, because, if the ! st respondent was a recognised leader, it is quite possible that the Adi Dravida Hindus of K. G. F. might go to him for resolution of their disputes, even though he himself might not be an Adi Dravida Hindu.
But the third, fourth and fifth cir- • cumstances are of importance, because, unless the 1st respondent was recognised and accepted as an Adi Dravida Hindu. he would not have been invited to lay the foundation stone for the construction of the new wall of the temple of J ambakullam. which was essentially a temple of Adi Dravida Hindus, nor would he have been requested to participate in the Maroazhi Thiruppavai celebration at the Kanna-bhiran Temple situate at II! Line, Kennedy Block, K. G. F. , which was also a temple essentially maintained by the Adi Dravida Hindus and equally, he would not have been invited to preside at the Adi Krittikai festival at Mariamman Temple in I. Post Office Block, Marikuppam, K. G. F. where the devotees are Adi Dravidas or to start the procession of the Deity at such festival. These three circumstances are strongly indicative of the fact that the lst respondent was accepted and treated as a member by the Adi Dravida community.
So also does the sixth circumstance that the ! st respondent was a member of the Executive Committee of the Scheduled Caste Cell in the organisation of the Ruling Congress indicate in the same direction. The seventh and eighth circumstances are again of a neutral cha~acter. The funeral ceremonies and obsequies of the father of the ! st respondent would naturally be performed according to the Adi Dravida Hindu rites if he was an Adi Dravida Hindu and that would not mean that the 1st respondent was also an Adi Dravida Hindu. Similarly, the fact that the ! st respondent participated in the first annual ceremonies of the late M. A. Vadivelu would not indicate that the ! st respondent was also an Adi Dravida Hindu like late M. A. Vaidivelu. But the ninth circumstance is again very important. It is significant that the children of the 1st respondent were registered in the school as Adi Dravida Hindus and even the appellant himself issued a certificate stating that R. Kumar, the son of the !
st respondent, was a Scheduled Caste Adi Dravida Hindu. The tenth circumstance that the first respondent participated in the All India Scheduled Castes Conference at New Delhi on 30th and 31st August, 1968 may not be regarded as of any particular importance. It would merely indicate his intention and desire to regard himself as a member of the Adi Dravida Caste. The eleventh circumstance is, however, of some importance, because it shows that throughout the ! st respondent was treated as a member of the Adi Dravida Caste and· he was never dis-owned by the members of that caste. They always regarded him as an Adi Dravida belonging to their fold. But the most important of all these circumstance is the twelfth, namely, the Scheduled Caste Conference held at Skating Rink, Nundydroog Mine, K. G. F. on 11th August, 1968. The High Court has discussed the evidence in regard to this conference in some detail.
We have carefully gone through the evidence of the witnesses on this point, but we do not find anything wrong in the appreciation of their evidence by the High Court. We are particularly impressed by the evidence of Kakkan (PW 13). The cross-examination of J. C. AdimOQ! am (RW 1) is also quite re-vealing. We find ourselves completely in agreement with the view taken by the High Court that this conference, attended largely by Adi Dravida Hindus, was held on 11th August, 1968 inter alia with the object of re-admitting the ! st respondent into the fold of Adi Dravida caste and ant only was a purificatory ceremony performed on the ! st respondent at this conference with a view to clearing the doubt which had been cast on his membership of the Adi Dravida caste by the decision of this Court in the earlier case but an address Ex. P-56 was also presented to the ! st respondent felicitating him on this occasion. It is clear from these circumstances, which have been discussed .
G and accepted by us, that after his reconversion to Hinduism, the ! st respondent was recognised and accepted J! S a member of the ~di Dra- , vida caste by the other members of that commumty. The High Court ~ was, therefore, right in coming to the concfosion t~at at the material . time the 1st respondent belonged to the Adi Drav1da caste so as to · fall within the category of Scheduled Castes under Paragraph 2 of the Constitution (. Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950. Jn the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. V. P. S.
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