HARLA v. THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN
Citation: [1952] 1 S.C.R. 110; 1951 INSC 42
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, VIVIAN BOSE
Judgment date:
Case summary
1951 INSC 42. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1951-09-24. HARLA v. THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN. Read the judgment and case details on LawSphereX.
Judgment text
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952] HARLA ti. THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN and V1v1AN BosE JJ. J Jaipur Laws Act, 1923, . des of publication, if an Order in Council so directs, so· that the people at large may know what these special laws are. The Crown Office Act directs His· Majesty in Council carefully to consider the be. <t mode of making these laws known to the public and empowers that body to draw up rules for the same and embody them in an Order in Council. We take it that if these Proclamations are not published strictly in accordance with the rules so drawn up, they will not be valid law, The principle underlying this question has been judicially considered in England. · For example, on a somewhat lower plane, it was held in fohnson. v.
Sargant(') that an Order of the Food Controller under the Beans, Peas and Pulse (Requisition) Order, 1917 does not become operative until it is made known to the public, and the difference between · an Order of that kind and an Acr of the British Parliament is stressed. The difference is obvious. Acts of the British Parliament are pμblicly enacted. The debates are open to the public and the Acts are passed by the accredit- 'ed representatives of the people who in theory can be trusted to see that their constituents know what has been do11e. They also receive wide publicity in papers and, now, over the wireless. Not so Royal Proclamations and Orders of a Food Controller and so forth. There must therefore be promulgation and publication in their cases. The mode of publication can vary; what is a good method in one country may not neces-sarily be the best in another. But reasonable publication of some sort there must be. Nor is the principle peculiar to England.
It was applied to France by the Code Napoleon, the first Article of which states that the laws are executory "by virtue of the promulgation thereof" and that they shall come into effect "from the moment at which their (! ) (1918] I K. B. 101; 67 L. J. K. B. 122. I s. c. R.. SUPREME COUllT REPORTS 115 promulgation can have been known. " . So also it has been applied in India in, for instance, matters ansmg under Rule 119 of the Defence of India Rules. See, for example, (Crown v. Manghumal Tekumal(1), Shakoor 2 3 v. King Emper01'( ) and Babulal v. King Emperor( ). It is true . none of these cases is analogous to the one before us but they are only particular applications of a deeper rule which is founded on natural justice. The Council of Ministers which passed the Jaipur Opium Act was not a sovereign body nor did it func-tion of its own right.
It was brought into being by · the Crown Representative, and the Jaipur Gazette Notification dated the 11th August, 1923, defined and limited its powers. We are entitled therefore to import ,into this matter consideration of the principles· and . notions of · natural justice which underlie the British .. Constitution, for it is inconceivable that a representative of His Britannic Majesty could have contemplat-ed the creation of a body which could wield powers so . abhorrent to t;he fundamental principles of natural justice which all freedom loving peoples share. We hold that, in the absence of some specific law or custom · to the contrary, a mere resolution of a Council of Ministers in the Jaipur State without further publication or promulgation would not be sufficient to make a law operative. It is necessary to consider another point. It was urged that section 3(b) of the Jaipur Laws Act of 1923 saved all regulations then in force from the necessity of publication in the Gazette.
That may be so, but the Act only saved laws which were valid at the time and not resolutions which had never acquired the force of law. · The appeal succeeds. The conviction and sentence are set aside. The fine, if paid, will be refunded. Appeal allowed. Agent for the appellant : R. A. Govind. Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta. (1) I. L. R. 1944 Karachi 107. (3) I. L. R. 1945 Nag. 762. (2) I. L. R. 1944 Nag. 150.
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