HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN v. P.P. SINGH AND ANR

Citation: [2003] 1 S.C.R. 593

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: V.N. KHARE, S.B. SINHA, AR. LAKSHMANAN

Judgment text

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN v. P. P. SINGH AND ANR JANUARY 27, 2003 [V. N. KHARE, CJ, S. S. SINHA AND DR. AR. LAKSHMANAN, JJ.

] Service Law: Rules of High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan, 1952-Rules 14, 15 and 21(2)-Rajasthan Higher Judicial Services Rules, 1969-Rule 23- Constitution of India, 1950-Article 235-Higher Judicial Services- Administrative powers of High Court-Full Court constituting commiltee of ·j two Judges for consideration of individual merit ofjudicial officers for appointment to selection· scale-Committee making recommendations-Full Court by resolution taking decision-Acting ChiefJustice thereupon constituting committee of two Judges-Full Court on considering the report, approving the names ofofficers-Justification of-Held: ChiefJustice has jurisdiction to constitute a Committee-Further Rule I5 does not postulate the prior approval ofthe Full Court in relation to any action which may be initiated by the Chief Justice, thus High Court erred in holding constitution ofthe commillee illegal.

Full Court constituted committee of two Judges for the purpose of consideration of individual merit of the judicial omeers of Higher Judicial Service for appointment to selection scale. Committee recommended that last five years of ACRs to be considered in the merit criteria therefor. Full Court by resolution took decis_ion to take three good ACRs out of five into consideration and regarding grant of super time scale to Rajasthan Judicial Service ii adopted the criteria of five good ACRs out of seven for grant of super time scale. Acting Chief Justice of High Court constituted a committee oftwo Judges to make recommendations for formation ofofrtciating promotee RHJS officers for their substantive appointment in their service and for promotion of RHJS officers in the ordinary scale to selection scale. Committee submitted its report and the Full Court approved the names of officers who were found fit for grant ofselection scale and deferred the case of respondents.

Governor then issued notification and appointed the officers to the post of selection grade. Respondents challen11ed the non-grant of selection 11rade to them. High Court without dlsturbln11 the appointment of the officers held that the Acting Chief Justice was not authorized to constitute the two Judges Committee and also all the judges were not consulted, Committee appointed by the Acting ChiefJustice alone could not evolve the merit criteria; and the earlier policy adopted by the Full Court could not be changed as jt provides for prior consultation of judges and the subsequent approval thereof could nOt cure the illegality. Appellant contended that the Acting Chief Justice had the jurisdiction to constitute a Committee and the decision of the said Committee was approved by the Full Court, the earlier policy decision must be ·held to have been varied by High Court. . . ·· . -.. .. · . . ·· . • .

It was contended for the first respondent that as the power ofthe Chief Justice to constitute a Committee is governed by a statufory rule, he acted without jurisdiction in appointing the said Committee; Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: l. l. A Reading of the Rules oi' High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan, 1952 shows that the ChiefJustice has the requisite jurisdiction to constitute a Committee and its report upon consultation of all the Judges of . High Court in terms ofRule 15 shall become a decision of the Court. Further· Rule 29(2) and Rule 32 shows that irregularity which might have taken place E·. in the procedure laid down in Chapter III shall not affect the validity of the ,order paSsed or anything done in the Rule! : and shall be deemed to be disposed of by the Court. Also the legalfiction created must also be given its full effect (605-E, F) 1. 2 The powers of the Chief Justice under Articles 235 and 219 of the Constitution are different and distinct.

Whereas control over the subordinate · courts vests in the High Court as whole, the. controlover High Court vests in ··the ChiefJustices only•. Howeve... , it does not mean that. a. Full Court ~an~ot · authoriie Chief Justice in respect of any inatter whatsoever in relation· to certain matters keeping the rest ofit in its«rlf by the Full Court, authorization to act on its behalf in favour of the ChiefJustice on a Committee of Judges · is permissible in law. How far and to what extent such power has been· or can be delegated would be . discernible only from the rules. Such a power by the Full Court can also be exercised from time to time. (606-8-D) High Court ofJudicature for Rajasthan ~-Ramesh Chand Paliwal, [1998) 3 SCC 72; DistrictJudge Barada/canto Mishra v. High Court. o/Orissa, (1976) 3 HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN v. P. P. SINGH 595 SCC327;HighCourtofPunjabv. Stateo/Haryana, [197511 SCC843; Yoginath D. Bagde v. State ofMaharashtra, (1999[ 7 SCC 739; State o/Haryana v.

lnder Prakash Anand, [1976[ 2 SCC 977; State ofAssam v. S. N Sen, [1971[ 2 SCC 9 and All India Judges' Association v. Union of India. [1992[ 1SCC119, referred to. 1. 3. Judges of High Court under Rule 21(2) authorized the Chief Justice to constitute a committee which having been made in terms of the rule~ must· be held to. have been made by High Court itself. Such authorization is not a limited one, as thereby the extent1o which such authorization can be exercised has not been spelt out. Furthermore, authorization in terms of Rule 21(2) having been laid down in Chapter 111 which relates to the Administrative Business of the Court, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever even in the matter ofcontrol ofthe High Court in terms ofArticle 235 ofthe Constitution, the Chief Justice of the High Court had the jurisdiction to exercise the said . .... . ,. power. Once such a resolution authorizing the Chief. Jus!

ice to constitute a committee has been passed; there cannot be doubt whatsoever that the exercise of power by the Chief Justice was absolutely valid. Therefore,·it cannot be accepted that the Chief Justice could appoint the two-Judges committee only with the approval of the Full Court and High Court erred in holding that the constitution of the committee was illegal. [606-E-H; 607-BI High Court ofJudicature a/Bombay v. Shirish Kumar Rangrao Patil, (lml 6 sec 339, referred to. 1. 4. Laying down the merit criteria for appointment to the selection grade also was within the domain of the High Court and it could amend or modify the same from time to time. For the said purpose ChiefJustice could appoint a committee, the recommendation \)'. hereof was to be subject to the approval of the Full Court. Rule 15 does not say that before an action can be initiated in that behalf by the ChiefJustice all the Judges are to be consulted.

It postulates a final decision in the matter specified therein and not initiation of process therefor. Therefore, it cannot be accepted that the matter relating ·· · to fixation of criteria for the purpose of appointment to the selection grade, the two-Judges committee could not be made without consulting all the Judges. It is based on a total misconception. Further the submission that all the Judges of the High Court are required to be consulted at a time is incorrect. Also the submission that the two-Judges Committee was not justified in evolving a merit criteria different from the one approved by Full Court is incorrect. Two-Judges Committee did not take any final decision in that behalf. Having regard. to the facts and circumstances of the case, upon consideration of. the extant rules and the earlier decisions of the Full Court it applied certain principles and criteria which inevitably was subject to approval of the Full Court. f607"'. 0. FI l. S.

Rule IS provides that all the judges shall be consulted in the matters. In the event, however, such consultation is to be effected by placing the matter before a Full Court, all the Judges are therefor invited but the same would not mean that in the event, one or more Judge(s) does/do not attend the Full Court, the resolution passed by it shall be invalid. Rule 29 provides for a quorum. In the case ofa meeting ofthe Judges of the court, the quorum will be complete ifone-halfor more of the Judges attend the same. Consultation with all the Judges would, thus, not mean that even ifsome of the Judges do not choose to make themselves available in a Full Court meeting, consultation with all the Judges shall not be complete. Question of consultation with the Judges would not arise unless the subject matter therefor is identified. It is for Hon'ble ChiefJustice ofthe High Court to identify such matters and place the same before the Full Court with relevant papers and documents.

Furthermore, the terminology 'consultation' used in RulP IS having regard to purport and object thereof must be given its ordinary meanin·g. By giving an opportunity to consultation or deliberation the purpose thereof is to enable the Judges to make their respective points of view known to the others and discuss and examine the relative merits of their view. It is neither in doubt nor in dispute that the Judges present in the meeting of the Full Court were supplied with all the requisite documents and had full opportunity to deliberate upon the agenda in question. (608-A, B, G, H; 611-B-D) PermanentEdition, 1960, Volume 9, page 3 and Corpus Juris Secundum Volume 16A, Ed 1956, p. 1242, referred to. 1. 6. The Committee was constituted for the purpose ofconsidering the cases of the eligible judicial officers. It was absolutely not necessary to place the matter before the Full Court. The Acting Chief Justice constituted the Committee for a specific purpose.

The Committee merely submitted its opinion which was subject to approval by the Full Court. Once the opinion of the matter is approved by the Full Court, it must be held that there had been a compliance ofRule JS. It is, therefore, axiomatic that not only the ChiefJustice or High Court was free to initiate any proceedings and obtain the opinion of ·~ a Committee of Judges on such matters and the only legal requirement therefor is to place such proposals together with the opinion ofthe Committee . before the Judges of the High ~ourt so that the matter can be fully thrashed HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN v. P. P. SINGH 597 out. Once the Full Court approves the recommendations made by the ~... ( Committee of Judges, it becomes decision of the Court which could be sent to the Governor for acting thereupon. (608-D, E, G; 609-A-BI State o/Uttar Pradesh v. Ba111k Deo Pali Tripathi and Anr. (1978) 2 SCC 102 and Registrar, High Court of Madras v. R.

Rajiah, (1988) 3 SCC 211, referred to. 1. 7. In the instant case for all intent and purport the report of the two- Judges Committee has been approved by the Full Court. Once approved, it terminated into a decision of the Full Court itself. Even the Governor bas acted upon the recommendations of the High Court. Writ petitioners-lint respondents did not question the appointments of the appointees in the High Court. Therefore, High Court, committed a manifest error in arriving at its conclusion in so far as it failed to take into consideration that Rule 15 does not postulate the prior approval of the Full Court in relation to any action which may be initiated by the Chief Justice. (611-E, Fl 1. 8. When an approval is required, an action holds good. Once if it disapproved it losses its force. Only when a permission is required, the decision does not become effective till permission is obtained. In the instant case, both the aforementioned requirements have been fulfilled.

In terms of Rule 2(2) of the Rules, the decision of the Full Court would have retrospective effect and retroactive operation. Further, in any view of the matter, even in a case where the initial action is illegal, the same can be ratified hy a body competent therefor. (611-G, H; 612- A, B( UP. Avas Evam Vikas ParishadandAnr. v. Friends Coop. Housing Society ltd and Anr. , (1995) 3 SCC 456, referred to. Sri Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta v. The Union ofIndia, (1973) 2 SCC 543; Marathwada University v. Seshrao Ba/want Rao Chavan, (1989) 3 SCC 132; Babu Verghese andOrs. v. Bar Council ofKera/a and Ors. , (1999( 3 SCC 422; Orissa Small Industries Corpn. ltd and Anr. v. Narasingha Charan Mohanty and Ors. , (1999) 1 SCC 465 and Brij Nath Pandey v. State ofU. P. & Ors. , JT (2000) 9 SC 464, referred to. Barnard v. National Dock labour Board, (19531 1 All ER 1113, referred to. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 59 of2001. From the Judgment and Order dated· 2"3. 11.

2000 of the High Court of Rajasthan in DBCWP 671/2000. WITH C. A. Nos. 60, ·61, 62, 63 and 64/200I . Dipankar P. Gupta, Raj Kumar Gupta, Sheo Kumar Gupta, A. N. Baradaiyar, Sandhya Goswami (NP), Sushi! Balwada, Surya Kant, Devendra Singh (NP) and S. K. Bhattacharya (NP), for the appearing parties. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S. B. SINHA, J. The effect of the recommendations of a Committee of two Judges as regards criteria for grant of selection scale appointed by an · Acting Chief Justice which have subsequently been approved by a Full Court ofthe High Court is in question in these appeals which arise out of a judgment and order passed by a Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court dated 23rd November, 2000 in D. B. Civil Writ Petitions No. 671 of2000, 987 of 2000 and 1263 of 2000.

The High Court of Rajasthan in exercise of its power conferred upon it under Section 46 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance 1949 read with Article 225 of the Constitution M India and all other powers enabling it in that behalf made Rules . known as Rules of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan; 1952 (hereinafter called and referred to as "the Rules"). The Rules came into force on or about lst October, 1952. Chapter 3 of the ·said Rules refers to Administrative Business of the High Court. The Rules of the High ~ourt were amended by a Resolution of the Full Court· of the High Court on 26. 11. 1966; and the relevant portion of the Minutes thereof are as under :- "Minutes of the proceedings of the Full Court Meeting held on. Saturday, the 26th November, 1966, at 11 A. M. in the Chamber of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice. *** AGENDA: I. Amendment in the High Court Rules relating to the Administrative HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN v. P. P. SINGH [S. B. SINHA, J. ] 599 .

Business of the Court. II. Any other matter which Hon'ble the Chief Justice may like to be discussed. DECISIONS: ITEM NO. II :- The amendments proposed by the Hon'ble Administrative Judge in Chapter Ill of the High Court Rules relating to the administrative and executive business of the Court were considered. Resolved that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 46 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, and Articles 225, 227, 233, 234 and 235 of the Constitution of India and all other powers enabling the Court in that behalf, the following changes and amendments in Chapter IJI of the High Court Rules relating to the administrative and executive business of the Court be effected :- I. The words "Executive and" occurring in the heading of Chapter Ill shall be omitted; 2. For rules 14 to 22 the following rules shall be substituted :- "14. Admin. istrative business relating to control over subordinate courts and to superintendence over courts and tribunals.

-All administrative business of the Court relating to the control over subordinate courts vested in the Court under Article 235 of the Constitution or otherwise and to the superintendence over the courts and tribunals vested in the Court under Article 227 ofthe Constitution or othel"Wise shall be disposed of as provided hereinafter. 15. Matters on which all Judges shall be consulted. -On ·the following matters all the Judges of the Court shall be consulted, namely:- · (c) proposals as to changes in or the issue of new rules for the guidance of subordinate courts; (d) appointment, promotion and seniority of Judicial offices; '-- urt applied certain principles and criteria which inevitably was subject to approval of the Full Court. The procedure for holding a Full Court meeting as quoted supra would clearly show that the meeting whicli had requisite quorum as contemplated under Rule 29 would amount to compliance of the Rules.

·~ Although Rule 15 provides that all the Judges shall be consulted in the matters enumerated therein but Rule 18 provides for the mode and manner • thereof. -' If such consultation is to be made by circulation, undoubtedly, the relevant documents are required to be circulated to all the Judges. In the ;,... · event, however, such consultation is to be effected by placing the matter before a Full Court, all the Judges are therefor invited but the same would not mean that in the event, one or more Judge (s) does/do not attend the Full Court, the resolution passed by it shall be invalid: Rule 29 provides for a quorum. In the case of a meeting of the Judges of the court, the quorum will be complete if one-half or more of the Judges attend the same. Consultation -,. with all the Judges would, thus, not mean that even if some of the Judges do not choose to make themselves available in a Full Court Meeting, consultation with all the Judges shall not be complete.

We may notice that even in the Full Court meeting held on 26th November, 1966 all the Hon'ble Judges of the High Court were not present. ! ~ The Committee was constituted for the purpose ofconsidering the cases of concerned officers. It is not and cannot be the case or the contention of the writ petitions that even for the purpose of considering the case of the eligible judicial officers at the threshold, it was absolutely necessary to place the matter before the Full Court. The Acting Chief Justice constituted the Committee for a specific purpose. The Committee merely submitted its opinion I which was subject to approval by the Full Court. Once the opinion· of the A"' matter is approved by the Full Court, in our opinion, it must be held that there had been a compliance of Rule 15 of the Rules. J Interpretation ofa Statute depends upon the text and context thereof. A Statute should be interpreted having regard to the purpose and object for which the same was made.

The Chief Justice of a High Court although first amongst the Judges, by the nature of office he holds, he is the head of the State Judiciary. Authorisation by the Full Court in favour of the Chief Justice ~to constitute a Committee and/or take actions for the subordinate judiciary must be viewed from that context. Rule 15 of the Rules provides for such matters which require consultations with the other Judges of the High Court. Question of consultation with the Judges would not arise unless the subject matter therefor is identified. It is for Hon'ble the Chief Justice of the High Court to identify such matters and place the same before the Full Court with relevant papers and documents. '}--' ,_ It is, therefore, axiomatic that not only the Chief Justice of High Court was free to initiate any proceedings and obtain the opinion of a Committee · HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN v. P. P. SINGH [S. 8. SINHA, J.

] 609 of Judges on such matters and the only legal requirement therefor is to place such proposals together with the opinion of the Committee before the Judges of the High Court so that the matter can be fully thrashed out. Once the Full Court approves the recommendations made by the Committee of Judges, it becomes decision ofthe Court which could be sent to the Governor for acting thereupon. An almost identical question came up for consideration whether the High Court can delegate its power to a Judge or a small Committee of the Judges of the Court so as to authorise it to act on this behalf in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi and Another (supra). In no uncertain terms it was held :- "..... The control vested in the High Courts by that article comprehends, according to our .

decisions, a large variety of matters like transfers, subsequent postings, leave, promotions other than initial promotions, imposition of minor penalties which do not fall within Article 31 I, decisions regarding compulsory retirements, D . recommendations for imposition of major penalties which fall within Article 31 I, entries in character rolls and so forth. If every Judge is to be associated personally and directly with the decision on every one of these matters, several important matters pertaining to the High Court's administrative affairs will pile into arrears like court arrears. In. fact, it is no exaggeration to say that the control will be better and more effectively exercised if a smaller committee of Judges has the authority of the court to consider the manifold matters falling within the purview of Article 235.

Bearing in mind therefore the nature of the power which that article confers on the High Court, we are of the opinion tha(it is wrong to characterize as 'delegation' the process whereby the entire High Court authorises a Judge or some of the Judges of the Court to act on behalf of the whole Court. Such an authorization effectuates the purpose ofArticle 235 and indeed without it the control vested in the High Court over the subordinate courts will tend gradually to become lax and ineffective. Administrative functions are only a part, though an important part, ofthe High Court's constitutional functions. Judicial functions ought to occupy and do in fact consume the best part of a Judge's time, For balancing these two-fold functions it is inevitable that the admini. strative duties should be left to be discharged by some on behalf of all the Judges. Judicial functions brook no such sharing of responsibilities by any I' \_~... ,.. instrumentality. " .

'' ~: K In Registrar, High Court ofMadras v. R. Rajiah (supra),, it was observed: "23. In Rajiah's case, a Review Committee consisting of three judges was appointed by a resolution of the High Court. In the meeting of the Review Committee held on June 25, 1979 to con~ider the case of the respondent Rajiah, only two judges ofthe High CQurt were present. The two judges came to the conclusion that the respondent, Rajiah, r should be compulsorily retired with effect from April 2, 1980. The Division Bench found that the third judge had no notice ofthe meeting held on June 25, 1979, but he agreed with the view expressed by the two judges with a slight modification that the respondent would retire with effect from March 3, 1980 under Rule 56(d) of the Fundamental Rules.

The Division Bench of the High Court took the view that as 'f all the three judges had not sat together and considered the question of compulsory retirement of respondent Rajiah, and that, further the third judge having also modified the decision of the two judges, namely, that the respondent would be compulsorily retired with effect from March 3, 1980, the impugned order ofcompulsory retirement of the respondent, Rajiah, was vitiated. It is true that the members of the Review Committee should sit together and consider the question of )4; compulsory retirement, but simply because one of them did not participate in the meeting, and subsequently agreed with the view expressed by the other two judges, it would not vitiate the decision .. of the Committee to compulsorily retire the respondent.

The third judge might (sic not) be justified in correcting the date with effect from which the respondent would compulsorily retire, but that is a ~ very minor issue and would not, in our opinion, make the decision :. -invalid. ~- 24. In regard to the case of the other respondent, namely, K. Rajeswaran, the High Court took the view that the constitution of the Review Committee by the Chief Judge and not by the Full Court was illegal. We are unable to accept the view of the High Court. We fail to understand why the Chief Justice cannot appoint a Review Committee or an Administrative Committee. But in one respect the )- <; High Court is, in our opinion, correct, namely, that the decision of the Review Committee should have been placed before a meeting of the judges. In the case ofthe respondent, K. Rajeswaran, the decision ~,,_ -and recommendation ofthe Review Committee was not placed before HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN v. P. P. SINGH [S. B. SINHA, I.

] 61 J the Fu(] Court Meeting. Nor is there any material to show that the same was circulated to the judges. In that sense, the recommendation of the Review Committee was not strictly legal. " Furthermore, the terminology 'consultation' used in Rule 15 having regard to purport and object thereof must be given its ordinary meaning. In Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition, 1960, Volume 9, page 3) to 'consult' is defined as 'to discuss something together, to deliberate'. Corpus Juris Secundum (Volume 16A, Ed. 1956, page 1242) also says that the word 'consult' is frequently defined as meaning 'to discuss something together, or to deliberate'. By giving an opportunity to consultation or deliberation the purpose thereof is to enable the Judges to make their respective points of view known to the others and discuss and examine the relative merits of their view.

It is neither in doubt nor in dispute that the Judges present in the meeting of the Fun Court were supplied with an the requisite documents and had fu(] opportunity to deliberate upon the Agenda in question. There is another aspect of the matter which may require consideraiion. For an intent ,and purport the report of the two Judges Committee has been approved by the Fu(] Court. Once approved, it terminated into a decision of the Fu(] Court itself. In the instant case even the Governor has acted upon the recommendations of the High Court. The writ petitioners-first respondents herein did not question the appointments of the appointees before the High Court. Thus, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that for a(] intent and purport the opinion of the two Judges Committee received approval at the hands of the Fu(] Court.

The High Court, in our opinion, further committed a manifest error in arriving at its conclusion in so far as it failed to take into consideration that Rule 15 does not postulate the prior approval of the Fu(] Court in relation to any action which may be initiated by the Chief Justice. When an approval is required, an action holds good. Only if it disapproved it losses its force. Only when a permission is required, the decision does not become effective till permission is obtained. (See U. P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad and Anr. v. Friends Coop. Housing Society Ltd and Anr. , [1995] Supp. 3 SCC 456). In the instant case both the aforementioned requirements have been fulfi(]ed. There is another aspect of the matter. In terms of Rule 2(2) of the Rules, the decisio'1 of the Fu[]·Court would have a retrospective effect and .... retroactive operation. In any view of the matter, even in a case where the initial action is · illegal, the same can be ratified by a body competent therefor.

This aspect of the matter has not been considered by the High Court at all. In Sri Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta v. The Union of India, [1973] 2 SCC 543 this Court held : ·B "...... Even if it be assumed that the telegram and the letter terminating the services ofthe appellant by the Chairman was in pursuance to the invalid resolution of the Board of Directors passed on December 16, 1953 ·to terminate his services, it would not follow that the action of . the Chairman could not be . ratified in a regularly convened meeting :of the Board of Directors. The point is that even assuming that the ·Chairman was not legally authorised to terminate the services of the appellant, he was acting on behalf of the Company in doing so, because, he purported to act in pursuance of the invalid resolution. Therefore, it was open to a regularly constituted meeting of the Board ·of Directors to ratify that action which, though unauthorized, was . done on behalf of the Company.

Ratification would· always relate back to the date of the act ratified and so it must be ·held that the services of the appellant were validly terminated on December 17, 1953....... " (See also Marathwada University v. Seshrao Ba/want Rao Chavan, · (1989] 3SCC 132 para 28, Babu Verghese and Ors. v. Bar CouncilofKera/a and Ors. , (1999) 3 SCC 422 para 35 and Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board, [1953] 1 All ER 1113). . . In Orissa Small Industries Corpn. Ltd And Anr. v. Narasingha Charan ... Mohanty and Ors. , (supra) where upon the learned counsel has placed strong reliance, this Court held : "...... That apart, the Court is not entitled to assess the respective merit of the candidates for adjudging their suitability for being promoted . and the only right the. employee has is a right of consideration. The said right of consideration not having been infringed in the present case, the High Court was not justified in issuing the impugned direction for reconsideration of his case.....

" ·"'·· The said decision, therefore, militates against the contentions of the respondents. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN " P. P. SINGH [S. B. SINHA: J. ] 613 furthermore, the first respondent herein in these cases Shri P. P. Singh, A Shri G. P. Pandey has,. been granted selection scale in RHJS with effect from 1. 8. 2000 and Shri P. K. Bhatia has been given with effect from 29. 3. 2000. Shri P. P. Singh has also retired from service on superannuation. We are of the opinion that impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. The appeals are allowed B but in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. N. J. Appeals allowed. •