HOWRAH MUNICIPAL CORPN. AND ORS. v. GANGES ROPE CO. LTD. AND ORS

Citation: [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R. 1212

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: SHIVARAJ V. PATIL, D.M. DHARMADHIKARI

Judgment text

HOWRAH MUNICIPAL CORPN. AND ORS. 'f ' v. GANGES ROPE CO. LTD. AND ORS. DECEMBER 19, 2003 [SHIVARAJ V. PATIL AND D. M. DHARMADHIKARI, JJ. ] Building Laws : Howrah Municipal Corporation Act, 1980-Sections 175 and 215- Howrah Municipal CorporatiOn Building Rules, 1991-Sections 3, 4 and 20-Construction of multi-storied buildings-Sanction for construction upto 7th floor-Grant of-Corporation not granting sanction within the prescribed period and also within four weeks period granted by Court which was further extended-High Court directing Corporation to grant sanction upto 4th . floor and permitting Company to apply for further sanction beyond 4th floor if permissible-Grant of sanction upto 4th floor-Application for sanction for construction.

of additional jloors- Rejection by Corporation, High Court expressing expectation for decision onpending application with plan withinfour weeks-Subsequent amendment to Building Rules and resolution of Corporation putting restriction on height ofhigh rising building on GT road-Company claiming creation of vested right to seek sanction irrespective ofthe amendment-Single Judge of High Court rejecting Company's prayer in public interest, however Division Bench directing grant of sanction for construction above 4th floor-Held : Such 'settled expectation ' cannot create any vested right to obtain sanction-Claim based on alleged 'vested right' or 'settled expectation' cannot be set up against statvtory provisions brought into force by State Government by amending building rules and not by Corporation against whom such vested right or settled expectation is being enforced-Further, such settled expectation or vested right cannot be countenanced against public interest and convenience sought to be served by amendment and resolution-Hence, order ofSingle Judge ofHigh Court restored and that of Division Bench quashed Respondent-company applied for sanction for constructi~n of multi-storied building· upto seven floors.

Appellant-Corporation did not grant sanction within the prescribed period and also within four HOWRAH MUNICIPAL CORPN. v. GANGES ROPE CO. LTD. 1213 weeks period granted by the Court which was further extended. High Court then directed the Corporation to grant sanction upto 4th floor level a_nd also permitted the Company to apply for further sanction beyond 4th floor if permissible. Corporation granted sanction and construction was completed upto 4th floor. Respondent then applied for sanction for three additional floors with separate building plans which was rejected. Single Judge of High Court held that as the right of the company was reserved to apply for sanction for further floors, Corporation was bound to accept the construction plan and directed the Corporation to pass appropriate orders within four weeks. Respondent again approached the Corporation and as directed submitted the required papers and documents.

While the matter was pending for sanction for construction before the Corporation, State amended the Howrah Municipal Corporation Building Rules, 1991 restricting height of the buildings; consequent thereto Corporation passed a resolution restriction height of the building on GT Road and the Corporation refused to grant the permission. Single Judge of High Court held that the sanction for additional three floors cannot be granted as the Building Rules have been amended and the resolution ofthe Corporation restricts height of the building on GT Road. However, Division Bench of High Court granted sanction for construction of three additional floors. Hence the present appeal.

Appellant-Corporation contended that order of the Court directing sanction within a specified pek'iod, did not create a vested right in favour of the company to seek sanction for construction of additional three floors, that the Division Bench of High Court erred in holding that the unamended rules and regulations in force on the date of submission of the application seeking sanction for further construction, would govern the matter of sanction and the subsequent amendment cannot take away the alleged vested right for seeking sanction by the company; that in view of the amendment to the Building Rules and the consequent resolution taken by the Corporation restricting height of buildings on GT Road, Corporation had to refuse the sanction for construction of three additional floors and this communication although delayed, cannot be described as malicious or against public interest; that it is denied th~t despite the order of the Court granting four weeks, the application for sanction was deliberately not considered by the Corporation; and that there was no time-bound mandate by the "l'.

court to the Corporation. Respondent-company contended that the Division Bench of High Court was justified in holding that on the. order of High Court fixing a period within which the Corporation had to decide the application for sanction for constructing additional floors, a vested right was created in favour of the company to seek sanction; that the time bound orders of the Court were not only disregarded but were deliberately flouted for extraneous reasons; that the Corporation cannot refuse sanction when it has deliberately delayed the processing of application for sanction beyond the period fixed by the Court and to allow the application to be rendered infructuous as a result of the amendment .

to the Building Rules; that had the application for sanction decided within the time allotted, the company would have got the sanction order, and that Rules (3) and (4) making submission of fresh plan and application for sanction apply in normal circumstances but in the instant case there was an order of the High Court reserving a 'liberty' and a right to the company to seek sanction for further construction above 4th floor. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD : I. In the matter of sanction of building for construction and restricting their height, the paramount consideration is public interest and convenience and not the interest of a particular person or a party. The sanction directed to be granted by Division Bench of High Court for construction of additional floors in favour of respondent is clearly in violation of the amended Howrah Municipal Corporation Building • Rules, 1991 and the Resolution ofthe Corporation which restrict height of buildings on GT Road.

This Court in its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution cannot support the impugned order. Single Judge of High Court was right in rejecting the prayer of the respondent company in public interest and the Division Bench of High Court erred in directing grant ofsanction for further construction above four floors. Therefore, the order ofDivision Bench ofHigh Court is quashed and that of Single Judge is restored. 11234-B-FJ ~·. 2. 1. The insistence on the part of the Corporation for documents HOWRAH MUNICIPAL CORPN. v. GANGES ROPE CO. LTD. 1215 and additional information and fresh plan cannot be termed as malicious or a deliberate attempt on their part to delay the processing of the application since by virtue of Rule 3 of the Building Rules for re-erecting or making addition to the existing building, submission of fresh plan for sanction was necessary and by Rule 4 fresh application for sanction with plans.

Further, the order th2t the applicant will not be 'prevented' from applying for further sanction cannot absolve the applicant from the obligations prescribed in Rules 3 & 4 ofthe Building Rules. The company complied with the necessary,requirement~ but thereafter, the Building Rules were amended by the State and restrictions have been imposed on Jteight of buildings on the GT Road. Therefore, the action· of the Corporation cannot be malicious. It can have no bona fide or ma/a fide hand in it. After the amended Building :Rules were notified, the Corporation on relevant ground of limited resources for civic amentities in a congested city like Howrah, with the approval of Mayor-in-Council, could legally impose legitimate restrictions on the height of buildings, on specified wards, roads and localities. Further, the restrictions are not imposed only on GT Road but there was several specified wards and areas in which restrictions are applied.

It cannot be accepted that such a legislative change and consequent resolution came to be passed and got approved only to frustrate the pending application of the company. (1231-A-D) 2. 2. It is undeniable that after the amendment of Howrah Municipal Corporation Building Rules 1991 and the Resolution passed by the Corporation thereunder restricting heights of buildings on specified wards, roads and localities would apply to all pending, applications for sanction. Regarding the case of the applicant seeking sanction who had approached the court and obtained consideration of its applications for sanction within a specified period, in the various orders passed by High Court in writ petitions successively filed by the company in an effort to obtain early sanction for its additional construction of three floors no mandate is issued to the Corporation to grant a sanction.

High Court directed in the first order merely a 'liberty' or option to the company to seek sanction for additional three floors. In the subsequent order, an 'expectation' was expressed for decision of the pending applications within a period of four weeks. Thus, there was an order of High Court in favour of the company directing the Corporation to "Y ', decide its pending applications for sanction within the allotted period but non-compliance thereof by the Corporation cannot result in creation ofany vested right in favour ofthe company to obtain sanction on the basis of the Building Rules as they stood on the date of making application for sanction and regardless of the amendment introduced to the Building Rules. Neither the provisions of the Act nor general law create any vested right.

Conceding or accepting such a so-called vested right of seeking sanction on the basis of unamended Building Rules, as in force on tit~ date of application for sanction, would militate against the very scheme of the Act contained in Chapter XU and the Building Rules which intend to regulate the building activities in a local area for general public interest and convenience. It may be that the Corporation did not adhere to the time limit fixed by the Court for deciding the pending applications of the company but the Building Rules with prohibition or restrictions on construction activities, as applicable on the date of grant or refusal of sanction, would govern the subject matter and not the Building Rules as they existed on the date of application for sanction.

No discrimination can be made between a party which had approached the court for consideration of its application for sanction and obtained orders for decision of its application within a specified time and other applicants whose applications are pending without any intervention or order of the Court. [1232-A-H; 1233-A) 2. 3. The context in which respondent-company claims a vested right for sanction and has been accepted by Division Bench of High Court, is not a right in relation to 'ownership or possession of any property' for which. the expression 'vest' is generally used, but on the basis of Building Rules, as applicable to their case on the date of making an application for sanction and the fixed period allotted by the court for its consideration, it had a 'legitimate' or 'settled expectation' to obtain the sanction. Such 'settled expectation', if any, did not create any vested right to obtain sanction.

Respondent-company which has no control over the manner of processing of application for sanction by the Corporation cannot be blamed for delay but during pendency of its application for sanction, if the State Government, in exercise of its rule making power, amended the Building Rules and imposed restrictions on the heights of buildings on G. T. Road and other wards, such 'settled expectation' has been rendered impossible of fulfilment due to change in law. The claim based on the alleged 'vested right' or 'settled expectation' cannot be set up against statutory provisions which were brought into force by the State Government by amending the Building Rules and . not by the Corporation against whom such 'vested right' or 'settled expectation' is being sought to be enforced. The 'vested right' or 'settled expectation' has been nullified not only by the Corporation but also by the State by amending the Building Rules.

Furthermore, such a 'settled expectation' or 'vested right' cannot be countenanced against public interest and convenience which are sought to be served by amendment of the Building Rules and the resolution of the Corporation issued thereupon. [1233-C-H; 1234-A) Us. man Gani J. Khatri of Bombay v. Cantonment Board, [1992) 3 SCC 455; State ofWest Bengal v. Terra Firma Investment & Trading Pvt. Ltd. , [1995) 1 SCC 125 and Chet Ram Vashist v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Anr. , [1980) 4 sec 647, referred to. Judicial Dictionary (A complete Law Lexicon), Thirteenth Edition by K. J. Aiyer, relied on. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 8561 of 1997. E: From the Judgment and Order dated 5. 9. 97 ofthe Calcutta High Court in A. No. 404/96 Arising out ofC. A. No. 3145/96 arising out of A. P. O. T. No. 520 of 1996. Tapas Ray, Dr. Rajeev B. Masodkar and L. C. Agrawala for the Appellants. Shanti Bhushan, Sunil Kumar Jain, Manish Kumar, Ansar Ahmed Chaudhary and S.

Bo1thakur for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court wad deliered by DHARMADHIKARI, J. : By this appeal, the Howrah Municipal Corporation challenges the Division Bench judgment dated 05. 9. 1997 of the High Court of Calcutta whereby it has reversed the judgment dated 6. 8. 1996 passed in Writ Petition No. 2561 of learned Single Judge ofthat -- Under amended sub-rule (3) of Rule 20, however, the Commissioner, with approval of Mayor-in-Council was granted power to restrict the height of high rising buildings in specified areas and wards keeping in view the limited civic amenities. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 20, as amended by Notification dated 15. 7.

1994, needs to be reproduced as Corporation has placed heavy reliance on the same to justify refusal of sanction :- "Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rules (I) and (2), if the Commissioner, having regard to (a) the existing water supply, sewerage and drainage system in any ward or part thereof, or (b) the traffic carrying capacity ofa street in any ward or part thereof, or (c) the density of population ofthat area, or (d) the commercial activity ofthat area, or (e) the conditions of the existing building, is of the opinion that the erection of any building exceeding I0 metres in height or execution of any work in such ward or part thereof will put additional burden on the existing civic services, he may sanction erection of such building or execution of such work subject to such restrictions ofheight and F. A. R.

or conditions including uses as he may deem fit to impose, provided that no such action shall be taken by the Commissioner without the prior approval of the Mayor-in-Council. " In exercise of powers under sub-rule (3) of Rule (20) (as amended with effect from 15. 7. 1994) with due approval of Mayor-in-Council, the Commissioner of the Corporation imposed a restriction on construction of buildings exceeding ten metres in height in the prescribed wards and streets which include GT Road on which the respondent seeks sanction for construction of additional three floors. The relevant resolution of the Corporation dated 02. 9. 1994 in its relevant parts reads thus : "Having regard to - 1. The existing water supply, sewerage and drainage system in .. any Ward or part thereof, or 2. The traffic carrying capacity of a street in any ward or part thereof, or 3. The density of population of that area or 4. The commercial activity of that area or 5.

The conditions of the existing building, it is unanimously felt that erection ofany building exceeding 10 mts. in height in the following Ward/Street will put additional burden to existing civic services and therefore following decision is taken in terms of Rule 20(3) of amended H. M. C. Building Rules: (a) The height of the building is to be restricted within 10 metres in the Ward Nos. 12 to 16, 29 to 31 and 33 to 40. (b) In case ofG. T. Roadfacing South to North ofany order Wards other than above in item (1) restriction ofnew building proposals upto JO metre of height to be imposed upon the holdings which fall within 50 metres to both sides ofthe road. But in practising so, when a holding is affected pa1tly, in that case the entire holding should be considered as affected holding. (c) In cases of holdings with reference to Kona Express Highway & l 00' HIT Road from Beliapole to Natabar Paul Road crossing they should also be dealt with as per Item (2) above.

Decision The above mentioned orders of Mayor dated 10. 7. 94 in regard to amendments of H. M. C. Building Rules, 1991 permissible height of Building, Flpor Area Ratio & conditions including uses is confirmed. Certified to be true copy of the origin. Sd/- Secretary, Howrah Municipal Corporation" (Underlining for pointed attention) On the basis of the amended Rule 20 which came into force with effect from 15. 7. 1994 and the consequential resolution dated 18. 7. 1994 of Corporation which was taken with the approval of Mayor-in-Council, the Corporation by letter dated I6. 9. I994 informed the respondent company that in view of the restrictions imposed on the height of buildings on GT Road, the sanction sought by them for additional three floors cannot be granted. The proposal for futiher construction, therefore was "treated as cancelled.

" Learned counsel appearing for the Corporation in assailing the impugned order of the Division Bench contends that in view of the amendment introduced by the State of West Bengal to the Building Rules and the consequent resolution taken by the Corporation restricting height of buildings on GT Road, the Corporation had no option but to refuse the sanction for construction ofthree additional floors and this communication of the Corporation although delayed, cannot be described as malicious or against public interest. It is also contended on behalf of the Corporation that on the orders ofthe Court directing sanction within a specified period, no vested right was created in favour of the company to seek sanction for construction of additional three floors.

The Division Bench was clearly in error in coming to the conclusion that the unamended rules and regulations in force on the date of submission of the application seeking sanction for further construction, would govern the matter of sanction and the subsequent amendment to the Building Rules cannot take away the alleged vested right for seeking sanction by the company. Learned counsel argued that a claim for such vested right for sanction for construction was negatived in comparable circumstances in two decisions ofthis Court viz. Usman Gani J. Khatri ofBombay v. Cantonment Board, (1992] 3 SCC 455 and State of West Bengal v. Terra Firma Investment & Trading Pvt. Ltd. , [1995] l SCC 125. On the other side learned counsel appearing for the respondent company took this Court through the various orders made by the High Court from time to time successive Writ Petitions filed by the company.

The provisions ofthe Act and the Building Rules were read to contend that the Division Bench was fully justified in coming to the conclusion that on the date the High Court allowed the company to submit plans for sanction for construction of additional three floors and fixed a period within which the Corporation had to decide the application for sanction, a vested right had been created in favour of the company to seek sanction on the basis of the unamended Building Rules as they existed. It is argued that on the basis of subsequent amendment to the rules, it is not open to the Corporation to refuse sanction when the Corporation is found to have maliciously and for extraneous reasons delayed the processing ofapplication for sanction much beyond the period fixed for the purpose by the last order of the High Court in the earlier writ petition.

Learned counsel submits that had the application for sanction submitted with plans by the company for constructing three addirional floors been decided within the time allotted by the High Court, the company would naturally have got the order of sanction because by that date the amended Building Rules and the consequent resolution ofthe Corporation restricting height of buildings on G. T. Road had not come into force. The main question that falls for consideration before us is whether, by the order of the Court in which a period was fixed for the corporation to take a decision on the application for sanction for construction of additional floors, any vested right has been created in favour of the company to seek sanction for the construction of additional three floors irrespective of subsequent amendment to the Building Rules and the resolution of the Corporation putting restrictions on the height of high rising buildings on GT Road.

The subject of sanction ofconstruction is governed by the provisions ofthe Act, Rules and Regulations as also the Resolution oftbe Corporation which was taken with approval of Mayor-in-Council. The statutory provisions regulating sanction for construction within the municipal area are intended to ensure proper administration ofthe area and provide proper civic amenities to it. The paramount considerations ofregulatory provisions for construction activities are public interest and convenience. On the .. subject ofseeking sanction for construction, no vested right can be claimed by any citizen divorced from public interest or public convenience. To decide on the justification of the claim raised on behalf of the company that the order of Court fixing a time limit for the Corporation to decide its application for sanction creates a vested right, it would be necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the Act, Rules and the Regulations.

Chapter XII ofthe Act contains provisions regulating sanction for construction or erection of buildings in the area within the limits ofthe Corporation. Section 173 states : "No person shall use any place of land as a site for erection of a new building except in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the regulations made under this Act in relation to such erection of building. '' Section 174 requires : "Every person who intends to erect a building shall apply for sanction by giving notice in writing of his intention to the Commissioner in such form and containing such information or document as may be prescribed. " Section 175 reads:- "Section 175. The Commissioner shall sanction the erection of building ordinarily within a period of sixty days unless any further information or document be called for or sanction be refused in the meantime on such grounds as may be prescribed.

" [Emphasis added] What is to be noted from Section 175 (quoted above) is that a period ofsixty days is not a firm outer limit as the words "sixty days" are prefixed . by the word "ordinarily. " It is also to be noted that the provisions of the Act under consideration, compared with other Corporatio11 Acts of other States, do not provide for 'deemed sanction' or 'deemed rejection' after expiry of the prescribed period fixed for deciding the application for sanction. In the case of Chet Ram Vas/. iist v. Municipal Corporation ofDelhi & Anr.

, (1980] 4 sec 647, the provisions contained in Section 313 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 came up for consideration where not only a period ofsixty days was prescribed for according or disallowing sanction for construction but proviso under sub-section (5) of that section further provided that in no case, passing of orders on the application for sanction shall be delayed beyond sixty days after necessary information demanded by the Corporation has been received. Even on such specification of fixed period, this Court held :- . ''Sub-sections (3) and (5) of Section 313 prescribed a period within which the Standing Committee is expected to deal with the application made under sub-section (1). But neither sub-section 1,. ) t declares that if the Standing Committee does not deal with the application within the prescribed period of sixty days it will be deemed that sanction has been accorded.

The statute merely requires the Standiilg Committee to consider the application within sixty days. It stops short of indicating what will be the result ifthe Standing Committee fails to do so. If it intended that the failure of the Standing Committee to deal with the matter within the prescribed period should imply a deemed sanction it would have said so. They are two distinct things, the failure of the Standing Committee to deal with the application within sixty days and that the failure should give rise to a right in the applicant to claim that sanction has been accorded. The second does not necessary follow from the first. A right created by legal fiction is ordinarily the product ofexpress legislation.

It seems to us that when sub-section (3) declares that the Standing Committee shall within sixty days of receipt of the application deal with it, and when the proviso to sub-section (5) declares that the Standing Committee shall not in any case delay the passing of orders for more than sixty days the statute merely prescribes a standard of time within which it expects the Standing Committee to dispose of the matter. It is a standard which the statute considers to be reasonable. But non-compliance does not result in a deemed sanction to the lay-out plan. " t The provisions ofthe Act, therefore, contemplate an express sanction to be granted by the Corporation before any person can be allowed to construct or erect a building. Thus, in ordinary course, merely by submission of application for sanction for construction, no vested right is created in favour of any party by statutory operation of the provisions.

The question then is whether such a vested right can be deemed to have been created by the fixation oftime limit by the Court in its order for considering the applica~ion for sanction. In th~ order dated 23. 12. 1993 sanction was granted for construction up to 4th floor level and for further construction it was observed thus : "This order will not prevent the petitioners from applying for further sanction if the same at all permissible at a later date. " After the above order, the company applied for sanction of additional HOWRAH MUNICIPAL COR. PN. v. GANGES ROPE CO. LTD. [DHARMAOHIKARI, J. ] 1227 l'llt" three floors. The stand to the company, as contained in letters, addressed to the Corporation, appears of be that it was entitled to seek sanction on the same application which it had earlier filed with plans for seven floors and on which under the orders of the courts in the first writ petition, sanction was granted up to four floors.

The Corporation sent replies :md sought documents and additional information from the company. It was insisting on the company to submit fresh application for sanction with plans of three additional floors to their existing construction. This insistence on the part of the Corporation cannot be termed as malicious or a deliberate attempt on their part to delay the processing of the application. Rule 3 of the Building Rules supports the stand ofthe Corporation that for re-erecting or making addition to the existing building, submission of fresh plan for sanction was necessary. Rule 3 reads : "Rule 3. Prohibition of building without sanction :- (1) No person shall erect a new building or re-erect or make addition to, or alteration of, any building or cause the same to be done without obtaining s~nction from the Commissioner and where necessary, a development permit from the concerned authority under the West Bengal Town and Country (Planning and Development) Act, 1979.

" Rule 4 further reinforces requirement of a fresh application for sanction with Plans for additional three floors. Rules 4 reads thus :- "Rule 4. Noticefor erection or alteration ofa building:- (l) every person who intends to make a new building on any site, whether previously built upon or not, or re-erect or make additions to, or r alteration of, any building shall apply for sanction by giving notice in writing to the Commissioner. " On behalf of the company it was argued that Rules (3) & (4) apply in normal circumstances but in this case there was an order of the High Court reserving a 'liberty' and a right to the company to seek sanction for further construction above 4th floor. -. /' It is not possible frr the court to read more into the order dated 23. 12. 1993 whereby the couit merely observed that the applic~nt will not be 'prevented' from applying for further s2nction.

This one observation cannot be read to absolve the applicant from the obligations prescribed in Rules 3 & 4 of the Building Rules. On a subsequent approach by the respondent - company to the High Court, by order dated 24. 6. 1994, learned Single Judge merely 'expected' the Corporation to pass the appropriate orders on the pending application for sanction of additional floors to the company within a period of four weeks. The relevant part of the order states :- "It is expected that the Howrah Municipal Corporation shall pass appropriate orders within four weeks from the date of submission of the Plan and receipt of copy of the order. " According to the company, on the expiry of period of four weeks fixed by order dated 24. 6. 1994, there was no justification for the Corporation to keep the application for sanction pending an<l to allow it to be rendered infructuous as a result of the amendment to the Building Rules which came into force by Gazette Notification on 15. 7. 1994.

On behalf of the Corporation it is denied that despite the order ofthe court granting four weeks, the application for sanction was deliberately not considered by the Corporation. It is submitted that there wa" no time-bound mandate by the court to the Corporation. In our considered opinion, by the order ofthe Court dated 2. 3. 12. 1993 observing that the petitioner is 'not prevented from applying' for further sanction of additional floors above fourth floor and the 'expectation' expressed in the subsequent order of the Court dated 24. 6. 1994, from the Corporation to· decide the pending application for sanction within four weeks, no vested right in favour of the respondent - company can be said to have been created to obtain sanction on the unamended rules, as they existed on the date of their second application. It has beer urged very forcefully that the sanction has to be granted un the basis of Building Rules prevailing at the time of submission of the application for sanction.

In the case of Usman Gani (supra), the High Court negatived a similar contention and this Court affirmed the same by observing thus : "In any case, the High Court is right in taking the view that the building plan can only be sanctioned according to the building regulations prevailing at the time ofsanctioning ofsuch building plans. At present the statutory bye:Jaws published on 30. 4. 1988 are in force and the fresh building plans to be submitted by the petitioners, if any, shall now be governed by these bye-laws and not by any other bye-Jaws or schemes which are no longer in force now. If we consider a reverse case where building regulations are amended more favourably to the builders before sanctioning of building plans already submitted, the builders would certainly claim and get advantage of the regulations amended to their benefit.

" (underlining to add emphasis) This Court, thus, has taken a view that the Building Rules or Regulations prevailing at the time of sanction would govern the subject of sanction and not the Rules an·d Regulations existing on the date of application for sanction. This Court has envisaged a reverse situation that ifsubsequent to the making ofthe application for sanction, Building Rules, on the date of sanction, have been amendec! more favourably in favour of the person or party seeking sanction, would it then be possible for the Corporation to say that because the more favourable Rules containing conditions came into force subsequent to the submission ofapplication for sanction, it would not be available to the person or party applying. The decision in Gani J Khatri (supra) was followed by this Court in the case ofState ofWest Bengal v. Terra Firma Investment and Trading Pvt. Ltd. , [1995] I SCC 125.

That case arose as a result of amendment introduced in the Act in the year 1990 restricting building heights within limits of Calcutta Municipal Corporation to 13. 5 metres. Applications· for sanction pending for construction with height above 13. 5. metres were rejected because of the above restriction. In that case also the applicants claimed a vested _right to get their plans passed and sanctioned as they were s1.. 1bmitted prior to the amendment made to Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act in 1990. This Court on examining the object in restricting height of buildings in the city ofCalcutta due to limited resources for civic amenities upheld the Amendment Act and negatived the claim of vested right set up by the applicants on the basis of unamended provisions and building regulations.

Relying on the decision of Usman Gani J Khatri (supra), this Court observed :- "How can the respondent claim an absolute or vested right to get his plan passed by Writ ofa Court merely on the ground that such plan had been submitted by him prior to 18. 12. 1989? By mere submission ofa plan for construction of a building which has not been. passed by the competent authority no right accrues. The learned Single Judge ofthe High Court should have examined this aspect of the matter as to what right the respondent had acquired by submission ofthe plan for construction of high rise building before its application was rejected by the st(!. tutory provision. " This court further observed :- "It is well settled that no malice can be imputed to the legislature. Any legislative provision can be held to be invalid only on grounds like invalip legislation incompetence or being violative of any Constitutional provisions.

" Relying on Usman Gani's case (supra), this Court reiterated that 'builders do not acquire any legal right in respect of the plans until sanctioned in their favour'. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent company tried to distinguish the decisions in the cast's of Usman Gani and Terra Pharma (supra) stating that in the present case the vested light arose because of . ' a time bound order of the Court. It is argued t~at the time bound orders of the Court were not only disregarded but, as has been found by the High Court, deliberately flouted for extraneous reasons. It is submitted that the claim of sanction for additional three floors available to the company on the date ofsubmission ofapplication for sanction with plans could aot have been frustrated by the Corporation by deliberate delay in processing the application and raising pleas and objections to the plan. We do not find that there was any deliberate delay on the part of the Corporation.

We have found that the stand ofthe Corporation, on the basis of Building Rules, cannot be held to be erroneous that for seeking three additional floors, the company was required to file fresh application for sanction with necessary particulars, documents, plans and enclosures. The company complied with the necessary requirements but thereafter, the Building Rules were amended and restrictions have been imposed on height of buildings on the GT Road. It cannot, therefore, be held that the action of the Corporation is malicious. The Building Rules were amended by the State and the Corporation can have no bona fide or ma/a fide hand in it. After the amended Building Rules were notified, the Corporation on relevant ground of limited resources for civic amenities in a congested city like Howrah, with the approval of Mayor-in-Council, could legally impose legitimate restrictions on the height of buildings, on specified wards roads and localities.

It is to be noted from the retevant resolution of the Corporation that restrictions with regard to the height of buildings are not imposed only on GT Road but there are several specified wards and areas in which such restrictions are applied. This Court cannot accept that such a legislative charge and consequent resolution came to be passed and got approved only to frustrate the pending application of the company. We have examined the provisions of section 175 of the Act fixing 'ordinarily' period of 'sixty days' for granting or refusing sanction. We have also examined Rule 13 of the Building Rules which also prescribes a period of 'sixty days' from the date of application for grant or refusal of sanction for construction. Neither the provisions of the Act nor the Rules, however, provide for 'deemed sanction' or 'deemed refusal' on the expiry of sixty days' period.

Therefore, without express sanction, no construction is permissible contrary to the provisions in Chapter XII ofthe Act and Rule 3 of the Building Rules which prohibit 'construction or erection of new building or addition or alteration to any existing building' without obtaining sanction for construction. The above stated legal position is not disputed on behalf of the respondent -· co1npany. What is being contended is that the order of the High Court fixing a period for the Corporation to decide its pending application for sanction creates a vested right in faovur of the applicant company to seek sanction for its additional proposed construction on the basis of Building Rules, as they stood prior to the amendment introduced to the Building Rules and the consequent Resolution of the Corporation restricting the height of buildings on G. T. Road.

lt is undeniable that after the amendment of the Building Rules and the Resolution passed by the Corporation thereunder restrictions imposed on· heights of buildings on specified wards, roads and localities would apply to all pending applications for sanction. The question is whether any exception can be made to the case of the applicant seeking sanction who had approached the court and obtained consideration of its applications for sanction within a specified period. We have extracted above, the various orders passed by the High Court in writ petitions successively filed by the company in an effort to obtain early sanction for its additional construction ofthree floors on the buildings in its multi-storeyed complex already complete up to 4th floor. In none of the orders of the High Court, there is a mandate issued to the Corporation to grant a sanction.

What was directed by the High Court in the first order was merely a 'liberty' or option to the company to seek sanction for additional three floors. In the subsequent order, an 'expectation' was expressed for decision ofthe pending applications within a period of four weeks. There was, thus, in favour of the company an order of the High Court directing the Corporation to decide its pending applications for sanction within the allotted period but non-compliance thereof by the Corporation can not result in creation of any vested right in favour of the company to obtain sanction on the basis ofthe Building Rules as they stood on the date of making application for sanction and regardless of the amendment introduced to the Building Rules.

Neither the provisions ofthe Act nor general law creates any vested right, as claimed by the applicant - company for grant of sanction or for consideration of its application for grant of sanction on the then existing Building Rules as were applicable on the date of application. Conceding or accepting such a so-called vested right of seeking sanction on the basis of unamended Building Rules, as in force on the date ofapplication for sanction, would militate against the very scheme ofthe Act contained in Chapter XII and the Building Rules which intend to regulate the building activities in a local area for general public interest and convenience.

It may be that the Corporation did not adhere to the time limit fixed by the court for deciding the pending applications of the company but we have no manner of doubt that the Building Rules with prohibition or restriction on construction activities as applicable on the date of grant or refusal of sanction would govern the subject matter and not the Building Rules as they existed on the date of application for sanction. No discrimination can be made between a party which had approached the HOWRAH MUNICIPAL CORPN. i·. GANGES R! OPE CO. LTD. [DHARMADHIKARI, J. ) 1233 court for consideration of its application for sanction and obtained orders for decision of its application within a specified time and other applicants whose applications are pending without any intervention or order of the COUit.

The argument advanced on the basis of so-called creation of vested right for obtaining sanction on the basis ofthe Building Rules (unamended) as they were on the date ofsubmission of the application and the order ofthe High Court fixing a period for decision ofthe same, is misconceived. The word 'vest' is normally used where an immediate fixed right in present or future enjoyment in respect ofa property is created. With the long usage the said word 'vest' has also acquired a meaning as ". an absolute or indefeasible right" (See K. J Aiyer 's 'Judicial Dictiona1y' (A complete Law Lexicon), Thirteenth Edition). The context in which respondent- company claims a vested right for sanction and which . has been accepted by the Division Bench of the High Court, is not a right in relation· to 'ownership or possession of any property' for which the expression 'vest' is generally · used.

What we can understand from the claim of a'vested right' set up by the respondent-company is that on the basis of Building Rules, as applicable to their case on the date of making an application for sanction and the· fixed period allotted by the court for . its consideration, it had a 'legitimate' or 'settled expectation' to obtain the sanction. In our considered opinion, such 'settled expectation', if ahy, did not create any vested right to obtain sanction. True it is that the respondent -company which can have no coritrol over the manrier of processing of application for sanction by the Corporation cannot be. blamed for delay but during pendency of its application for sanction, if the State Government, in exercise of its rule making power, amended the Building Rules and imposed restrictions on the heights of building on G. T. Road and other wards, such 'settled expectation has been rendered impossible for fulfilment due to change in law.

The claim based on the alleged 'vested right' or 'settled expectation' cannot be set up against statutory provisions which were brought into force by the State Government by amending the Building Rules al1c:f not by the Corporation against whom. such 'vested right' or 'settled expectation' is being sought to be enforced. The 'vested right':·or 'settled expectation' has been nullified not only by the Corporation but al. so. · by the. State by amending the Building Rules. Besides this, such a 'settled expectation' or so-called 'vested right' carinotbe countenanc. ed against public interest and convenience which are sought to be served by amendment of the Building Rules and the resolution of the Corporation issued thereupon. In the matter of sanction of buildings for construction and restricting their height, the paramount consideration is public interest and convenience and not the interest of a particular person or a party.

The sanction now directed to be granted by the High Court for construction of additional floors in favour of respondent is clearly in violation of the amended Building Rules-<Wd the Resolution ofthe. Corp~ratioq. which restrict heigh~ ofbuildings on GT Road: This Court in its discretionary jurisdiction. under·' ·· Articie ) 36 :ofthe Constitution cannot support the impugned order Qfthe .. · High Court of making an exception in favour ofthe respondent - company by issuing directions for grant ofsanction for construction ofbuilding with height in violation of the amended Building Rules and the resolution of the Corporation passed consequent thereupon. For all the above reasons, in our opinion, the learned Single Judge was right in rejecting the prayer of the.

respondent company in public interest and the Division Bench of the High Court committed an error in directing grant of sanction for further construction above four floors to the respondent company in clear violation of the existing building rules and the resolution of the Corporation. In the result, the appeal preferred by the Corporation succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order of the Division bench of the High Court dated 5. 9. 1997 is hereby quashed and that of the. learned Single Judge restored. In the circumstance, however, we shall direct the parties to bear their own costs in this appeal. N. J. Appeal allowed.