IBRAHIM AHMAD BATTI v. STATE OF GUJARAT & OTHERS (2)

Citation: [1983] 1 S.C.R. 540

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: V.D. TULZAPURKAR, R.B. MISRA

Case summary

By this petition lb~abim Ahmad Batti, the detenu herein, is seeking to- challenge the detention order dated ! 22 (5) read with · section 3 (3) of the COFEPOSA resulting in non-observance of the constitutional safeguards conferred on the detenu and therefore, the impugned...

Judgment text

' I IBRAHIM AHMAD BATTI v. STATE OF GUJARAT & OTHERS October 13, 1982 [V. 0. TULZAPURKAR AND R. B. MISHRA, JJ. ) Constitution of India, 1950, Article 22(5) and Section 3(3) ofthe Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention ofSmuggling Activities Act, 1941- Meaning and import of-Failure to supply the translations ofthe documents etc. relied on, in the ·language 0 knOwn to the detenu and/or delayed-Supply without communication of ihe reasons recorded for the delay Would b'e a clear violation of the coustitutionai mandate of Article 22(5). On April 15, 1982, the Customs Officers raided bungalow No.

3, Sweta Park SoCiety, Bhuderpura, Ambawadl, Ahmedabad,' allegedly belonging to the petitioner-detenu, but standing in the name of Rekhaben Champaklal Seth and during the search that followed in the presence of the p'etitioner and one Hasmukh Prabhudas Sharm~ contraband ··Of several items were ·recovered arid seized under the reasonable 1Jelief that they were smuggled goods liable to be oonsficated under the Customs Act, 1962. This seizure was followed by recording of confessional statements of t~e petitioner ·and his co-conspir~tors. During the foliow up action certain other premises were searcbCd and further contrabaitd was seized. By an order dated April 19, 1982, issued by the State • of Gujarat under Section 3(1) of COFEPOSA, the petitioner was detaioeQ in Abmedabad Central Prison, with a view to preser. ving him from keeping and transporting smuggled goods.

· Grounds of detention dated April 23, 1982 aloogwith copies of statements and documents relied upon by the detaining authority were served on the petitioner. The petitioner's represCntation to the Advisory Board was accepted, since the failure on the part of the detaining ,_ authority to supply the translations in Urdu of the grounds and documents relied upon,• amounted to a clear "'. iolation of the constitutional mandate of Article 22(5) vitiating the order of detention. Consequently, the order of detention was revoked by the State under section 8(f) of COFEPOSA and directed his release forthwith, unless he was required to be retained in custody under orders of any competent Court. gr Law. Ho~ever, on the same day i. e.

on lst of July 1982, the State Government passed another order of detention against the petitioner under section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA and served it on him on 2nd of July 1982 whilst he was in judicial custody under Court's Order in two cases, one under the Arms Act and another under the Foreigrier's Act. This detention order was also passed with a' view to preventing him from smuggling goods and engaging himself in transporting smuggled goods and keeping smuggled goods. " Gr~unds of detention tunning into 32 typed pages in. ~nglish together with copies IBRAHIM V. GUJARAT 541 of all the statements arid documents referred to and relied upon in the grounds, in regional language, were served upon the petitioner on 7th July, 1982. Urdu. ,. translations of only some . of these docuoients were supplied on 15th of July 1982 without furnishing the recorded reasons for the delay in supplying them.

The petitioner's representations made tbrollgb his counsel ori '5th August· 1982, having been rejected on 13th August, 1982 the petitioner has filed this writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, contending that ,non-supply of Urdu trRnslations of some of the statements and documents relied upon by the detaining authority. In spite of the revocation. of an earlier order on this ground, and the non-communication of the reasons for the delayed supply of Urdu translations in respect of the rest of the documents, have resulted in violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution read with section 3(3) of the COFEPOSA. ' ~ Aliowing ihe Petition, the Court, HELD : Jn section 3(3) of the COFEPOSA, the concept of "reasonable ' time"1 or "the shortest possible time" or reasonably requisite time", predicated by the expression "as soon as may be" ·bas beCn retained b~t it is only with a view to. meet the practical exigeticies of administrative affairs that the.

detainiDg authority is permitted to·communicate the grounds of detention, not latter'thin 5 days ordinarily, and not later than 15 days, if there are exceptional circum- ~tanccs and that too with a safeguard of reasons being recorded in writing. In other words, section 3(3) provideS 1for the outer limits and the grounds of detention must, therefore, be furnished to the detenu ortinarily within 5 days from tlle date of detention bui in exceptional Circumstances and for reasons to \. be recorded in writing, the time may stand extended but in any event it cannot be later than 15 days from the date of detention. Unless the first duty imposed / upon the detaining authority under Article 22(5) is discharged within the prescribed time, it wouldDot be possible for the detenu to exercise his right of 'o;iaking . a representation against bis detention-a corresponding right arising from the second duty cast on the detaining authority.

~amely, to afford the detenu 1he earliest opportunity of making Such representation against bis detention. (549 D-H, 550 A-Bl Abdul Jabbar Butt v_. State of Jammu & Kashmir, (1957] S. C. R. 51; A. K. Ray's case (198Z] I s. c. i:;. Z71, referred to. 2:1 The principle clearly enunciated in Smt lcchu Devi's case[l980] 4 S. C. C. , 53 is that copies of all documents, statemants and materials referred t9 or relied upon in the grounds of detention (meaning thereby which has influenced the mind of the detaining authority in arriving at its subjective satisfaction about the necessity to detain the detenu) must be communicate~ to him within the time prescribed under section 3(3) of the COFEPOSA and that without this the right to make representation cannot be meaningfully exercised.

[552 D-E] 2:2 From the decided cases, it would follow that if the grounds together with copies of all documents, statements and other materials i~corrorated in the gro_unds by reference on which the detaining authority ha's relied are required 542 sUJ>llllMll COlrltT Rlll>OltTS (1983) 1S. C. R to be communicated to the detenu un~er Art. 22(5) rc2d ~ ilh ~tclif'n ~(3) of COFEPOSA within the prescribed time, then, not n:erely Jhe grcunds o·r detention but also the copies of all incorporated documents, statements and other materials must be supplied to the detenu in a script or language which he understands and failure to do so would amount to a breach of the mandate contained in Article 22(5) read wit~ section 3(3) ofCOFEPOSA. [553 C-D] La//ubhai Jogibhai Patel's case [1981] 2 S. C. R. 427, Hariklsan's case [1962] Supp. 2 S. C. R. 918, Hadlba•dhu Das's case [1969) 1. S. C. R. 227, Smt. Raz/a Umar Bakshi's case [1980] Supp sec 195; Kamala ·K••»•lal Klrushala•i's COJe [l98l] l·S. C. C.

748 and Sunll Dutt's case A. l. R. 1982 SC l3. • referred to. 2:3 Not merely the exceptional circumstances must exist justifying the delay in communicating to the detenu all the material'i relied upon, but these should be communicated to the detcnu to enable him io make an effectfve representation. [554 G-HJ Blshwa Mohan Kumar Sinha v. State of Bihar & Ors I. L. R. (1974) 53 Pat. 884; Blshawanath Prasad . Keshari v. State of Blhar & prs. I. L. R. (1975) 54 Pat. 72; approved. 3:1. Preventive detention is a serious invasion of Personal Hberty and the normal methods open to a person charged with com. mission of any offence to"disprove the Charge or tO prove his innocence at the trial are not available to the person preventively•detairled and, therefore, in preventive, detention juriS. prudence whatever little safeguards the constitu'tion and the enactments authorising.

such" de_tention provide assume utmost importance and must be strictly adherCd to and one of such safeguards is that unless exceptional Circum- . /stances really obtain the delay in supply of grourids of d_etention as also thC documents and statements incorporated therein by reference beyond the normal period of five day~ would ·be fatal. [556 P. FJ Jn all the faCts and circumstances no exceptional circtimstances obtained in the case justifying the delay and as such the same constitutes a breach of the ,_ constituti9nal as well as legislative mandate. (1) Upon revocation of th~ earlier detention order on 1st of July 1982, there was no urgency to issue the imp~gn'ed ·. order on the same day or serve it on the detenu on the following day since he was already in judicial custody in other two cases, one under the Arms Act and the other under the Foreigners Act jand no bail having been granted .

to him, there was no fear ·of his absconding from Ablnedabad, there bCing no urgency the detaining, authority could have kept from 12 noon to 4. 00 p. m. and, therefore, as a special case Urdu translations were decided to be furnished to the detenu within 15 days as· prescribed by the COFEPOSA and accordingiy Urdu translations of bulk of documents and statements were furnished within 13 days of the detention. Counsel further contended that neither Art. 22 (5) nor s. 3 (3) of the COFBPOSA casts an obliga· tion upon the detaining authority to inform the detenu anything • about the exceptional circumstances due to which delay might occur or about the fact whether the reasons have been recorded in writing or not and these are matters for the Court's satisfaction when any issue in that behalf is raised before it!

As regard the non·supply of Urdu translations of some of the documents and statements referred to in the grounds it was contended that most of these documents compri· sed statements of account, which were in English figures and some of them contained. English words in capital letters, and words in Hindi and Gujarati and the material on record clearly shows that the peti· tioner knows English figures, understands l;! nglish words in capital letters and can also converse in Hindi and Gujarati and as such no prejudice was caused to him in the matter of making representation· against his detention. In these circumstances, counsel for the res· pondents contended that the impugned order could not be quashed on the ground suggested by the petitioner. , ' Since breach of constitutional safeguards contained in Art. 22(5) and s.

3(3) of the COFEPOSA has been the main ground for attacking the continued detention of the detenu as illegal, it will be desirable to consider the true meaning and import of these two provisions. Art. 22(5) of the Constitution runs thus : "When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive deten· lion, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. " Section 3(3) of the COFBPOSA provides as under: ''For the purposes of clause (5) of Art. 22 of the Constitution; the communication to a ·person detained in pur· suance of a detention order of the grounds on which the order has been made shall be made as soon as may be after tbe detentio11, but ordinarily not later than five days, and in IBitAHIM v. GUJARAT (Tulzapurkar, J.

) 549 exceptional circumstan_ces and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than fifteen ~ays, from the date of detention. " The real import of cl. (5) of Art. 22 including the true Q\eaning of the expression "as soon as may be" occurring therein was \'xplained 8 by this Court in Abdul Jabar Butt v. State of Jammu & Kashmir(') After noting that s. 8(1) of the Jammu & Kashmir Preventive Detention Act was nothing but a reproduction in substance of the provisions of cl. (5) of Art. 22 of the Constitution, this Court pointed out that the said provision imposes upon the detaining authority two duties, namely, (i) the duty of communicating 'to. the detenu the grounds on which the order bas been made and (ii) the duty of affording him the carllcs.

t opportunity of making a representation against the detention order and that the first duty is to be performed "as soon as may be", meaning thereby "within a reasonable time with an understanding to do it within the shortest possible time" the Court, however, pointed out that what could be regarded as 'reasonable time' or the 'shortest ·possible tim_e' would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case in which the question arises for decision, but the time predicated by the expression 'as soon as may be, was what was 'reasonably convenient' or 'reasonably requisite'. In s. 3(3) of tlie COFf! POSA the concept of "reasonable time" or the "shortest possible time" or "reasonably requisite,time" predicated by the expression "as soon as may be" has ·been retained 2 but . as explained in A. K. Roy's( ) case it is only with a view to meet the practical'exigencies of administrative affairs that the detaining . .

·authority is per~itted to communicate the grounds of detention not later than 5 days ordinarily and not later than 15 days if there are exceptional circumstance~ and that too with a safeguard of reasons being recorded in writing. In other words s. 3(3) provides for the outer limits and the grounds of detention must, therefore, be furnished to the detenu ordinarily within 5 days from the date of detention but in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to he recorded in writing the time for furnishing the grounds may stand extended . but in any event it cannot be later than 15 days from the date of detention. It is also clear that uriless the first duty imposed upon the detaining authority under Art. 22(5) is discharged within the (ll [1957] SCR SI. (2) [1982] I s. c. c. 271. prescribed time it would not be possible for the detenu . to ·exercise his right of.

making a representation against his detention-a corresponding right arising from the ·second duty c~st on the detaining · authority, namely, to afford the ·detenu the earliest ·opportunity of making su~h representation against his detention. · 1 . B . . In Khudi Ram's( ) case this Court has explained what is meant by "grounds on which the order is made" in the context· of the aforesaid duties- cast upon the detaining ·authority and the corres- · ponding rights accruing to the·detenu under Art. 22(5). The Court has ruled_that in· that :context the expression 'grounds' 'does not . merely mean a recital or reproduction of a ground of satisfaction of . c the authority in the language of s. 3 nor is its connotation restricted to a bare statement of conclusion of fact but "nothing less than at! the basic facts and materials which. influenced the detaining . autho~ · rity in making the order of· detention must be communicated to the · detenu" and "that is the plain requirement .

of the firsfsafeguard in Art. 22(5)". Again, what would be compi:ised in "all the basic ·facts and materials" has been elaborated by this Cciurt in Smt. Icchu 2 Devi's ( ) case where this Court has taketi the view that documents, . . ·statements and other materials referred to or relied upon in the . , grounds of detention by the detaining authority in arriving at its • • subjective satisfaction get incorporated and become part of the grounds of detention by' reference and the'right of the. detenu to be supplied copies of such documents, statements and. other materials flows directly as a necessary corollary . from the' right conferred on the detenu to be afforded the ·earliest opportunity of making a'upresentation against the , detention. because unless the former right is available the latter cannot' be meaningfully exercised ·. and in that behalf the court has gone on to observe that "on a proper construction of cl. (5) of Article.

22· read with section 3, sub-section (3) · · of the COFEPOSA Act, it is necessary for the valid continuance of detention that; subject to clause (6) of Article 22, copies of the docu- . . . _. ments;statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention should be fur'oished to ,Jhe detenu alongwith the grounds· ·G of detention or in any event not later than five days and in exceptio~al circumstances and for reasons to be-recordCd iri writing. not ·later than 15 days from the· date· of detention. If this requirement of clause (5) of Articl. e 22 read with section 3, sub-section (3) is not ·H (I) [1975] 2 S. C. R. 832. (21 ! 9BOJ 4 s. c. c. s31, ,IllRAl! ll.! v. GUJARAT {'rulzapurkar, J. ) · SSI . ' satisfied the continued detention of detenu would be . illegal and void. " It may be stated that in Shalini Soni's(') case this Court has taken the view that Smt. lc~hu Devi's case (supra) is a further development and elaboration of what wa! said e.

arlier in Khudi Ram's case '(supra) and the Court confirmed the position that the grounds communicated to the detenu must reveal the whole of the factual' material considered by the detaining authority and not merely the inferences of ! 'acts a'rrived at by the detaining authority and that. ' copies of documents to· which . reference . is made in the 'grounds' niust be supplied to the detenu as a part of the 'grounds'. \ • • Counsel for the' respondents,· however, referred to three decisions of this Court, nam'ely, Ramchandra Kamat's(')case, Hansmukh's case (3) and Mst. Ummu Saleema's (') case, but in our view, none of these decisions detracts from or affects the validity of. the principle clearly enunciated in Smt. /cchu Devi's case . (supra) and confirmed in Shalini Soni's case (supra). ·. In the first case the detaining autho- ' rity had raised a _contention that it was not incumbent ,upon it to . supply copies of all. the ·documents relied upon in the grounds of .

' · detention alongwith the grounds within five days of the deteriiion be-· cause the grounds were sufficiently detailed so as to enable'the peti~ . · - tioner to make an effective representation• against the detention and · it was in that context that this Court' made observations to the effect . that "it may not be necessary for the detaining authority to stipply,. 'eo'pies of all the documents relied upon in the grounds of detention· · at the time when the grounds are. furnished to ihe detenu but once , the detenu states that for effecti~e representation it is necessary that : · . ' he should have copies of statements and 'document referred to in the - .. grounds of detention it is the duty of the detaining authority to furnish them with reasonable expedition; the detaining authority cannot i .. decline . to· furnish the copies of the documents on the ground that I ·the grounds were suflicintly detailed to enable· the petitioner to make an effective representation.

"-· In fact, the real point decided was that once a demand was made by the detenu for copies of statements and_ doeuments relied. upon in- the grounds ·of detention for making an effective representation the detaining· authority was bound to supply co [1980J 4 sec S44. c2> [1980J 2 sec 210. 131 [19s112 sec 11s. . As regards the first aspect pressed into service by counsel for the petitioner the undisputed facts are that the impugned order of detention was. issued on ! st of July, 1982, that the same was served on the detenu on 2nd July, 1982; and immediately thereafter he was put under detention in Ahmedabad Central Pri~on; the grounds • ·of detention drawn up in English ·and translated in Urdu together with copies of ali documents and statem,ents incorporated in the ' grounds in original language (English and Hindi) were served upori the detenu on Jth July, 1982 i. e. within 5 days of his detention.

Obvi- ~·· ously, serving"'Copies of all the documents and statements in English · and Hindi on him on 7th July, 1982 was of no use and it was only on 15th of July, 1982 that Urdu translations of the bulk of such documents and statements were suppied to him. In other words effectively the grounds of detention together with b';ilk of documents. and statements incorpotated in the grounds in the script or language understood by him were served or supplied on 15th July, 1982 which was beyond th. e normal period of five days. In any event supply of bulk of documents and statements incorporated in the grounds in the script or language understood by the detenu was delayed beyond the normal period of 5 days. The question is whether such delay was justified by existence of any exceptional circu! "slances as required by s.

3 (3) of the COFEPOSA for in the · absence of exceptional circumstances delay beyond normal period of five days would be J breach of the constitutional as well as the legislative mandate. Counsel for the respondents invited our attention to the affidavit of I • Shri P.. M. Shah Deputy Secretary (Home Department), Government, of Gujarat filed on· 10th September, 1982 and an office noting app;oved and signed . by the Home ·Minister which have set out the -·tiircumstances occasioning· the delay. ·In. his affidavit all ihat Shri Shah has. stated is "time was taken as a large number of documeuts were to be translated" while in ihe office noting dated 2-7-82 it has been stated : "It may be mentioned here on account of Holy month of Ramzan, Urdu translators are not available. Handful translators who are available have expressed that they would t work from 12 noon to 4 p. m. because of Ramzan fasts . . · they observe. Under· the circumstances it is proposed as under: ' (I) .. . ' (2) ...

8 · (3) The Urdu translations of documents and other ·' materials referred to at (2) above may be 'furnished I rporated . therein· • • by reference beyond the normal period of five days would be fatal. Looked at from this angle the aforesaid explanation ·given by the · I . - detaining authority cannot, in our view, be regarded as constituting · exceptional circumstances justifying the delay in the supply of bulk of documents and statements to the 'detenu in the script cir ianguage lie understood. In the first piace, on admitted facts in the case upon revocation of the earlier detention order on ! st July, 1982 there. was •. 'no urgency to issue the impugned order of detention on the sa. me day . or serve it ori the detenu on the following day, the·detenu was in . judical custody then in. other two cases, one under . the Arms Act and - the other under the Foreigners Act and no. bail having been granted . • ,mRAHIM v. GUJARAT (Tulzapurkor, J.

) 557 to him there was no fear of his 'absconding from Ahmedabad, there being no urgency the detaining authority could have kept all the material ready in Urdu and supplied the same to him immediately after detaining him second time. Secondly, the office noting does· not give particulars of how many Urdu translators were put on the job except vaguely stating 'handful translators' were available. Thirdly the office noting clearly suggests that the translation job was entrusted to Urdu translators belonging to a particular ·community who observed Ramzan fast, instead of. restricting the ohoice in this • · manner additional Urdn translators who had nothing to do with the observance of Ramzan fasts could have been but on the job, but nothing is indicated whether and if so what efforts were made in . that behalf. It is difficult.

to swallow the proposition that the State Government (which is detaining authority here) with all its power and resources could not find requisite number of qualified persons to do that job so as to make Urdu translations ot the concerned documents and statements avail,ble to the, detenu within the normal period of. five days. With the previous detention order having been vitiated on the very ground( greater vigilance ·and expedition was expected from the detaining authority. In all the facts and circum· stances it is impossible to hold that exceptionai circumstances 'obtained in the case justifying the delay and as'such the si. me constitutes a breach of the constitutional as well as the legislative mandate. On the second aspect the contention of counsel for the peti: tioner has been that the detaining anthority while supplying the Urdu translations of the bulk do.

cuments and statements beyond the normal period of 5 days ought to have given indication to the detenu that the delay was caused due to exceptional circumstances and what the exceptional circup:istances were, as also of the fact that reasons for the delay had been recorded in writing but · this was not done and this failure prevented tbe detenu from making effective represen-. talion against his detention. Counsel for the respondents, however, contended that neither Art. 22(5) nor s. 3(3) of the COFEPOSA casts any obligation or duty on the detaining authority to inform the detenu anything about the exceptional circumstances due to' which delay might occur nor about the fact whether reasons have been recorded in writing or not and, according to counsel, these are matters for the Court's satisfaction when any issue in that behalf is raised before it. It is true that neither Art. 22(5) nor does the COFEPOSA contain any provision which casts such a duty upon SSS SUPREME dli. Jll.

T RllPoRtS (19S3) I s. c. R. the detaining authority in express terms; it is also true that the Court will of course go into and,' satisfy itself about these matters when any issue in that behalf is raised before it. But the question fs whether such a duty is cast. on the detaining authority by necessary implication ? Does it or does it not flow from the right conferred upon the the detenu to make r_epresentation against his detention? Jn this behalf it cannot be disputed that under the scheme of the COFE- POSA against his detention the detenu ha·s a right to make a representation to:. an authority which is superior to the detaining authority (e. g. to the State Government when the detai. ning authority happens to be an officer of that Government or to the Central Government where the detaining authority happens to be the State Government) as well as to the Advisory Board' and such representation against his detention can be on merits of the grounds of detention as also for.

failure on the part of the detaining authority to observe strictly the requisite safeguards and on satisfying the superior authority or the \ . 1 Advisory Board on either count he is entitled to have his detention revoked or,quashed.. We have alreadly indicated above that one of such safeguards is that unless exceptional circumstances really obtain i_n a case the delay in supply of grounds of detention and/or the documents and statements incorporated therein by reference beyond the normal period of live days would be fatal to the continued deten-. tion of the detenu. In other words, the detenu is entitled to satisfy either the-superior authority or· the Advisory Board that the delay that has occurred in the. supply of requisite material to him was not jusiified because exceptional circumstances did not exist or those put forward were unreal or invalid. Obviously, the detenu will not be in a position to do so if the alleged exceptional circumstances are not communicated ·to him.

In our v'iew, therefore, a duty to inform the detenu about the ex'istence of exceptional circumstances and what . F th~y were for delay in supplying grounds of detention and/or documents and statements incorporated therein arises by necessary implication and flow from the right which is conferred upon the detenu to make representation against his . d'etention. In tbe instant case, for instance, if the alleged exceptional Circumstances were communicated. to the detenu at the time of the delayed supply of the concerned documents and statements in Urdu language he could have satisfied the superior authority or the Advisory Board that the exceptional circumstances did not really obtain in the case and the delay had vitiated his detention. In other words, wi\at he has done before the Co~uit now, he could have done before the superior authorities or the Advisory I IBRAHIM'· GUJARAT (Tulzapurkar, J. ) 559 Board.

For these reasons we approve of the view nltimately taken by the Patna High Court in the two decisions cited above, particuc . . ' larly the decision in Bishwa Mohan Kumar Sinha's c1,1se (supra) where · both the aspects have been dealt with. In our view, therefore, the impngned failure in this case constitutes another breach of the safeguard contained in Art. 22(5) read. with s. 3(3) of the COFEPOSA and vitiates the continued detention _of the petitioner. • La~tly, _ Urdu transfations of ·quite a few documents and statements referred to in the grounds ·of detention and relied upon by the detaining authority were admittedly not supplied to the detenu at all and the only explanation given by the coun~el for the respondents at the heating has been that most of these documents (Urdu translations .

whereof were not supplied) comprised statements of accounts which had figures in English with ·some English· words written in capital letters · and some documents were in Hindi and Gujarati and the record (statements of Rekha, her ' sister Indu and one Jayantilal Soni, all co-conspirators of the detenu, recorded during the investigation) clearly· shows that the petitioner knows English figures, underst. ands English words written in capital letters and can also converse or talk in Hindi and Gujarati and as ' such the non-supply of Urdu translations of these·_-documents cannot he said to have caused any· prejudice to the petitioner in. the matter of making a representation against -his detention. In our view, the explanation is hardly satisfactory and . cannot . condone the non• supply ofUrdu translations of these' documents. Admittedly, .

the petitioner is a Pakistani national and Urdu seems to he his mother tongue and a little· knowledge of English figures, ability to read English words written in capital letters and a smattering knowledge of Hindi or Gujarati would not justify t_he, denial of Urdu translations ,lo him of the material documents and "statements referred to as incriminating documents in the grounds and relied upon by the detaining authority in arriving at its ·subjective satisfacit;on. In fact, the claim made before us on behalf of the detenu that he only knows Urdu cannot he brushed aside as false especially in view . of the fact that the same was accepted on the earlier occasion by the Advisory Board who· had actually opined that failu"re to supply: Urdu translations of grounds of detention and documents bad vitiated the earlier order of detention and following this opinion respondent No. I bad revoked the said order. Moreover, with the assist.

ance of counsel on either side we have ourselves gone through many of these documents an , ingly quash the same and direct him to be released forthwith. S. R. Petition allowed.