ILLACHI DEVI (D) BY LRS. AND ORS. v. JAIN SOCIETY, PROTECTION OF ORPHANS INDIA AND ORS

Citation: [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. 62

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: V.N. KHARE, S.B. SINHA

Judgment text

ILLACHI -DEVI (D) BY LRS. AND ORS. v. JAIN SOCIETY, PROTECTION OF'ORPHANS INDIA AND ORS. SEPTEMBER 26, 2003 [V. N. KHARE, CJ. AND S. B. SINHA, J. ] Indian Succession Act ss. 218, 223, 236-Whether society registered under Societies Registration Act, 1860 can obtain letters ofadministration- H 2] 3 SCC 533, it was held : "The rival pleas regarding rewriting of statute and casus omissus need careful consideration. It is well-settled pinciple in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The Iangauge e. nployed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. The first and primary rule ofconstruction is that the intention of the legislation must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed ILLACl-U DEVI'" JAIN SOCIETY. PROTECTION OF ORPHANS [KHARE, CJ. ] 79 and has been intended but what has been said.

"Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid", Judge Learned Hand side, "but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them". (Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, (218 FR 547) The view was reiterated in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama, AIR (1990) sc 981 : [1990] 1 sec 277. " This Court again in Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council ofIndia and Others, [2002] 3 SCC 722 stated the law thus : "Clearly, the language of sub-section (7) of Section 6 abovesaid, is plain and simple. There are two manners of reading the provision. Read positively, it confers a right on a retiring member 1 to seek renomination. Read in a negative manner, the provision speaks of a retiring member not being eligible for renomination for more than one term. The spell of ineligibility is cast on "renomination" of a member who is "retiring".

The event determinative ofeligibility or ineligibility is "renomination'', and the person, by reference to whom it is to be read, is "a retiring member". · "Retiring member" is to be read in contradistinction , with a member/person retired sometime in the past, and so, would be called a retired or former member. "Re" means again, and is freely used as a prefix. It gives colour of"again" to the verb with which it is placed. "Renomination" is an act or process of being nominated again. Any person who had held office of member \ sometime in the past, ifbeing nominated now, cannot be described as being "again nominated". It is only a member just retiring who ,F can be called "being again nominated" or "re-nominated". No other meaning can be assigned except by doing violence to the language employed. The legislature does not waste its words.

Ordinary, grammatical and full meaning is to be assigned to the words used while interpreting a provision to honour the rule legislature chooses appropriate words to express what it intends, 1 and therefore, must be attributed with such intention as is conveyed by the words employed so long as this does not result in absurdity or anomaly or unless material - intrinsic or external - is available to permit a departure from the rule. ,_ Cross in Statutory Interpretation (3rd Edn. , 1995) states : "The governing idea here is that if a statutory provision is intelligible in the context of ordinary language, it ought, without more, to be interpreted in accordance with the meaning an ordinary speaker ofthe language would ascribe to it as its obvious meaning, unless there is sufficient reason for a different interpretation.... Thus, an 'ordinary meaning' or 'grammatical meaning' does not i!

llply that the Judge attributes a meaning to the words of a statute independently of their context or of the purpose of the statute, but rather that he adopts a meaning which is appropriate in relation to the immediately obvious and unresearched context and purpose in and for which they are used. By enabling citizens (and their advisers) to rely on ordinary meanings, unless notice is given to the contrary, the legislature contributes to legal certainty and predictability for citizens and to greater transparency in its own decisions, both of which are important values in a democratic society. " Yet again in Mis. Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs Bombay, JT (2002) 3 SC 551, it is stated : "No words or expressions used in any statute can be said to be redundant or superfluous. In matters of interpretation one should not concentrate too much on one word and pay too little attention to other words.

No provision in the statute and no word in any section can be construed in isolation. Every provision and every word must be looked at generally and in the context in which it is used. It is said that every statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle ofinterpreting any word while considering a statute is to gather the means or sententia legis ofthe legislature. Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and there is no ambiguity and the intention of 'the legislature is clearly conveyecl, there is no scope for the. court to take upon itself the task of amending or altering the statutory provisions. " It is equally well settled that when the Legislature has employed a plain and unambiguous language, the Court is not concerned with the consequences arising therefrom. Recourse to interpretation of statutes may be resorted only when the meaning of the statute is obscure.

The Court is not concerned with the reason as to why the Legislature thought it fit to lay emphasis on one category of suitors than the others. A statute must be read in its entirety for the purpose of finding out the purport and object thereof. The Court, in the event of its C? ming to the conclusion that a Iiteral meaning is possible to be rendered, would not embark upon the exercise ofjudicial interpretation thereof and nothing is to be added or taken from statute unless it is held that the same would lead to an absurdity or manifest injustice. It is well-established that a disabling legislation must be characterized by clarity and precision. In the present instance, the prohibitions laid down by Sections 223 and 236 of the Act are categorical and · comprehensive~ and leave no scope for creative interpretation. The Court, it is trite, cannot supply casus omissus. Reference in this regard may be made on Dr. Baliram Waman Hirav v. Mr. Justice B.

Lentin and Others, AIR (1988) SC 2267, wherein it was observed : "Law must be definite, and certain. If any of the features of the law can usefully be regarded as normative, it is such basic postulates as the requirement of consistency in judicial decisionmaking. It is this requirement of consistency that gives to the law much of its rigour. At the same time, there is need for flexibility. Professor H. L. A. Hart regarded as one of the leading thinkers of our time observes in his influential book "The Concept of Law", depicting the difficult task of a Judge to strike a balance between certainty and flexibility : · Where there is obscurity in the language ofa statute, it results in confusion and disorder. No doubt the Courts so frame their judgments as to give the impression that their decisions are the ' necessary consequence of predetennined rules.

In very simple cases it may be so; but in the vast majority of cases that trouble the Courts, neither statute nor procedents in which the rules are legitimately contained allow ofonly one result. In most important · cases there is always a choice. The judge has to choose between alternative meanings to be given to the words of a statute ·or between rival interpretations of what a precedent amounts to. It • is only the tradition that judges 'find' and do not 'make' law that •• conceals this, and presents. their decision as . ifthey were deductions smoothly made from clear pre-existing rules without intrusion of the judge's choice" (See also Kanta Devi (Smt. ) v. Union of India and Another, [2003] 4 sec 753). In Shrimati Tarulata Shvam and Others v. Commissioner ofIncometax, West Bengal, [1977] 2 sec 305, it was held that if there be a COSltS omissus, the defect can be remedied only by legislation and not by judicial interpretation.

Keeping in view the legislative policy we are of the opinion that the High Court was not correct in its view that an Administration can be granted in favour of a society registered under Act 21 of 1860. The apprehension of the High Court that in a case of this nature, in . 1 the event, a Letter of Administration is not granted in favour of the beneficiary society, the purport ofthe 'Will' will be frustrated is not wholly correct and for grant of Letter of Administration what is necessary is that the person duly authorised by the Society in accordance with the law may file such an application. Furthermore, the validity of the Sections 223 an 236 of the Act is not in question. So long the said provisions are not declared unconstitutional, the same must be allowed to hold their feild.

We may state that, as noticed hereinbefore, in terms of rules framed by States under the Societies Registration Act, a society may sue or may be sued through its President or Secretary or in absence of any specific provisions in that behalf, any person authorised by the Society. Grant of probate in favour of society registered under the Societies Registration Act is refused, as discussed hereinbefore, inter alia on the ground it is not a juristic person. It, in a litigation, must be represented ) through a person authorised in this behalf either in terms of its bye-laws \ or otherwise. • We, however, intend to lay emphasis on the fact that a will or gift in favour of a society is not totally unenforceable in law.

A probate or Letter ofAdministration with a copy of the will annexed although may not be granted in favour of a society but may be granted in favour of a person authorised by a society either in terms of the statute or a resolution adopted in this behalf by the society, as the case may be, so that such person may be answerable to the Court. On grant of Letter ofAdministration the person so nominated by the society shall carry out the wishes of testator for the benefit of society. Before parting, however, we may add that growing needs of the country in this field of law appears to have not received sufficient attention of the Parliament. Existing law is required to be suitable amended to meet the requirement of changing scenario. A Society registered under the Societies Registration Act in the changed scenario play an important role in society. They discharge various functions which are beneficial to the society. They run educational and other institutions.

They sometimes work in public interest and act in aid of State functions. They have their own accountability. They sometimes incur liabilities. Public Interest Litigations filed by Societies are galore. For reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed in part. The judgment under challenge stand modified. The matter is sent back to the High Court with liberty to respondent to amend the petition for grant of Letter of Administration. It would be open to the respondent-society to nominate any of its office-bearer to whom Letter of Administration is granted. Such nominated person may move application for substitution for his name for grant of Letter of Administration. Ifsuch amendment application is made, the High Court shall permit this amendment and grant Letter of Administration in favour of person nominated by the society for carrying of the wishes of the testator which is for the benefit of the society. S. M. Appeal partly allowed.