J. KUMARADASAN NAIR & ANR. v. IRIC SOHAN & ORS

Citation: [2009] 3 S.C.R. 238

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: S.B. SINHA, MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA

Case summary

J. KUMARADASAN NAIR & ANR. v. IRIC SOHAN & ORS.pdf

Judgment text

[2009) 3 S. C. R. 238 -" J. KUMARADASAN NAIR & ANR. II. IRIC SOHAN & ORS. (Civil Appeal Nos. 943-944 of 2009) FEBRUARY 12, 2009 [S. 8. SINHA AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, JJ. ] r LIM/TA TION ACT, 1963: ' Section 14 - Interpretation/application of - In the facts of the case especially since the party was prosecuting the first appeal and second appeal before the wrong forum, and mentioning a wrong provision, S. 14(2) per se may not be applicable but the principles thereof would be applicable for ) the purpose of condonation of delay in terms of S. 5 - Matter remitted to High Court with a request to dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible preferably within three months. Interpretation and/or application of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is in question in this appeal as the appellant was prosecuting the first and second appeals before a wrong forum, mentioning a wrong provision.

On behalf of the appellant, it was contended that the High Court committed a serious error insofar as it failed to take into consideration that the appellant was bona fide prosecuting the first appeal and second appeal before a wrong forum and, thus, Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Limitation Act would be attracted. On behalf of the respondents, it was contended that the provision of Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is not applicable as the same applied in a suit; and that the appellants in fact filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act but withdrew the same. Allowing the appeal, this Court HELD: 1. The provisions of Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act alike should, thus, be applied in a broadbased manner. When Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Limitation Act per se is not applicable, the same would not 8 mean that the principles akin thereto would not be applied. Otherwise, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply.

There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the same would be applicable to a case of this nature. [Para 12] [245-G; 246-A] 2. There cannot furthermore be any doubt whatsoever that having regard to the definition of 'suit' as contained in Section 2(1) of the Limitation Act, a revision application will not answer the said description. But, although the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitatio·n Act per se are not applicable, the principles thereof would be applicable for the purpose of condonation of delay in filing an appeal or a revision application in terms of Section 5 thereof. [Para 13] [246- B] 3. 1. It is also now a well-settled principle of law that mentioning of a wrong provision or non-mentioning of any provision of law would, by itself, be not sufficient to take away the jurisdiction of a court if it is otherwise vested in it in law. While exercising its power, the court will merely consider whether it has the source to exercise such power or not.

The court will not apply the beneficient provisions like Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act in a pedantic manner. When the provisions are meant to apply and in fact found to be applicable to the facts and . f circumstances of a case, there is no reason as to why the court will refuse to apply the same only because a wrong provision has been mentioned. In a case of this nature, Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Limitation Act per se may not be applicable, but, as indicated hereinbefore, the , of the Limitation Act per se are not applicable, in our opinion, the principles thereof would be applicable for the purpose of condonation of delay in filing an appeal or a revision application in terms of Section 5 thereof. . 14. It is also now a well-settled principle of law that mentioning of a wrong provision or non-mentioning of any provision of law would, by itself, be not sufficient to take away the jurisdiction of a court if it is otherwise vested in it in law.

Wile exercising its power, the court will merely consider whether it has the source to exercise such power or not. The court will not apply the beneficient provisions like Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act in a pedantic manner. When the provisions are meant to apply and in fact found to be applicable to the facts and circumstances of a case, in our opinion, there is no reason as to why the court will refuse to apply the same only because wrong provision has been mentioned. In a case of this nature, Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Limitation Act per se may not be applicable, but, as indicated hereinbefore, the principles thereof would be applicable for the purpose of condonation of delay in terms of Section 5 thereof. In Ram/al and others v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [AIR 1962 SC 361], this Court held as under: "12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after ...

,~ sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in ... the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona tides may fall for consideration; but . ,, the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary ~ power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the court may regard as relevant.

It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the court is dealing with applications made under ~ Section of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. " In Ghasi Ram and Others v. Chait Ram Saini and Others .. [(1998) 6 SCC 200], this Court opined: "10.

Learned counsel appearing for the respondents urged that, assuming the High Court suffered from disability to decide the rights of party on facts, the plaintiff-appellant did not prosecute the revision petition before the High Court in good faith; therefore, the appellant cannot derive any ~· benefit of Section 14 of the Act. Before the High Court, it was not disputed that the plaintiff-appellant has prosecuted the other civil proceeding with due diligence. What is ' disputed is that the plaintiff did not prosecute the civil ,r proceeding in good faith. "Good faith" is defined in the Act as under: "2. (h) 'good faith' -- nothing shall be deemed to be done in good faith which is not done with due care and attention;" The aforesaid definition shows that an act done with due care and attention satisfies the test of "good faith". "Due " care" means that sufficient care was taken so far as circumstances demanded and there was absence of negligence.

In other words, the plaintiff has taken sufficient care which a reasonable man is expected to take in order to avoid any injury. It is not shown here that the plaintiffappellant has not taken sufficient care in prosecuting the remedy. Where a plaintiff is illiterate and is not acquainted • with the procedural law, the only thing that he can do is to consult some lawyer for advice. It is not disputed that the plaintiff-appellant filed the revision before the High Court on the advice of his counsel, although it may be that he was ill-advised. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that any act done in violation of law cannot be described as act done with due care. No doubt, when a party proceeds contrary to a clearly expressed provision of law, it cannot be regarded as prosecuting the other civil proceeding in good faith. It is based on sound principle of law. But the said rule cannot be enforced in rigidity in every case. Each case has to be judged on its own merits.

In the present case, the plaintiff-appellant is not a legallytrained person and thus he sought advice of his counsel for future course of action. The counsel advised him to file revision in the High Court instead of bringing a fresh suit under Order 21 Rule 103 CPC. It is also true that at that . ,,~ time, there was no unanimity about remedy of revision amongst the various High Courts. The plaintiff-appellant's revision was entertained for hearing by the High Court and J. KUMARADASAN NAIR & ANR. v. ! RIC SOHAN & ORS. 249 that gave expectation to the plaintiff- appellant that the order --"· of the executing court may be set aside and further, there was no inordinate delay in filing the suit under Rule 103. If, on examining the facts, it is found that there was no lack of due care, there is no reason why the plaintiff-appellant should not be accorded the benefits of Section 14 of the Act.

Does the interest of justice demand that the plaintiff should be refused the benefit of Section 14 of the Act on ,, account of the negligence on the part of his counsel, illadvising him to file a revision instead of filing a fresh suit? An illiterate litigant cannot be made to suffer when he is ill-advised by his counsel. On the facts and circumstances of this case, we are satisfied that the plaintiff-appellant prosecuted the earlier civil proceeding in good faith. " In Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal .. Secretary, Irrigation Department and Others [(2008) 7 SCC 167], this Court held: "22. The policy of the section is to afford protection to litigant against the bar of limitation when he institutes a proceeding which by reason of some technical defect cannot be decided on merits and is dismissed.

While considering the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, proper approach will have to be adopted and the provisions will have to be interpreted so as to advance the cause of justice rather than abort the proceedings. It will be well to bear in mind that an element of mistake is inherent in the invocation of Section 14. In fact, the section is intended to provide relief against the bar of limitation in cases of mistaken remedy ~r selection of a wrong forum. On reading Section 14 of the Act it becomes clear that the legislature has enacted the said section to exempt a .. ~ certain period covered by a bona fide litigious activity. Upon the words used in the section, it is not possible to sustain the interpretation that the principle underlying the said section, namely, that the bar of limitation should not affect a person honestly doing his best to get his case tried .

ion merits but failing because the court is unable to give him such a trial, would not be applicable to an application filed under Section 34 of the Act of 1996. The principle is clearly applicable not only to a case in which a litigant brings his application in the court, that is, a court having no jurisdiction to entertain it but also where he brings the suit or the application in the wrong court in consequence of bona fide mistake or (sic on law or defect of procedure. Having regard to the intention of the legislature this Court is of the firm opinion that the equity underlying Section 14 should be applied to its fullest extent and time taken diligently pursuing a remedy, in a wrong court, should be excluded. " See Mis. Shakti Tubes Ltd. Through. Director v. State of Bihar and Ors. [(2009) 1 SCC 786]. • 15. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly.

The appeals are allowed and the matter is remitted to the High Court for consideration thereof on merits. However, we would request the High Court to dispose of the revision application filed by the appellants herein as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of three months from the date of communication of this order. We are making this unusual request keeping in view the fact that the respondents have obtained a decree as far back as in 1969. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. G. N. Appeal dismissed. # . •