JOHN THOMAS v. DR. K. JAGADEESAN

Citation: [2001] 3 S.C.R. 934

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: K.T. THOMAS, R.P. SETHI

Judgment text

JOHN THOMAS Jo-. v. -+ DR. K. JAGADEESAN JULY 12, 2001 [K. T. THOMAS AND R. P. SETHI, JJ. ] Criminal Procedure Code, 1973: :.. _ S. 199-Defamation-Locus Standi to file complaint-"Some persons aggrieved"-Scope of-Imputations published in a newspaper against a hospital that it was engaged in trading human kidneys-Complaint by Director of the hospital-Held, maintainable, as he would fall within the purview of "some persons aggrieved"-Even if imputation was not made against a person directly, but if he has reason to feel hurt by the same, he has locus standi to file. a complaint. Section 258-Power of Court to stop proceedings-Applicability of- Held, has no application to cases instituted upon complaints. i Penal Code, 1860-Section 500-Defamation-Jmputations not per se defamat01y-Effect of-Held, that by itself does not discharge the publisher since the complainant can establish on evidence that the said imputations were defamat01y.

Words and Phrases: "Some persons aggrieved" meaning ofin the context ofSection 199 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. A news item was published in a daily newspaper against a renowned hospital alleging that it was illegally selling human kidneys. Respondent- Director of the said hospital filed a complaint for defamation under Section 500 I. P. C. Appellant-publisher of the said newspaper took a defence that the allegations were against the hospital and not against the Director personally and therefore, there was no locus standi for the respondent to file the complaint x__ - Trial Court upholding the said contention discharged the appellant. However, on appeal High Court reversed the order of trial court and restored the ----- not done so he could not do it after the court has moved to the stage of evidence talcing. What the learned single.

Judge has stated on that aspect reads as follows: "If such an application is filed before the court immediately after entering appearance before commencement of the trial as envisaged in Chapter XX Cr. P. C. the petition is maintainable. But now, the stage has passed and the evidence of two witnesses on the side of . prosecution was recorded and at this stage in the absence of any provision for discharge of the accused the magistrate ought not to have discharged tlie accused and he should have allowed the trial to flow in accordance with the established procedure. " The appellant questioned the aforesaid view of the learned single Judge on the strength of Section 258 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short 'the Code'). It must be pointed out that the offence under Section 500 of the IPC is triable as a summons case in accordance with the provisions contained in Chapter XX of the Code.

Sections 251 to 257 of that Chapter deal with the steps to be adopted from the commencement upto culmination of the proceedings in summons cases. One of the normal rules in summons cases is that once trial started, it should reach its normal culmination. But Section 258 is included in that chapter in the form of an exception to the aforesaid normal progress chart of the trial in summons cases. It is useful to. extract the section here: "258. Power to stop proceedings in certain cases. -In any sumffions case instituted otherwise than upon complaint, a Magistrate of the first class or, with the previous sanction ofthe Chief Judicial Magistrate, any other Judicial Magistrate, may, for reasons to be recorded by him, ...

stop the proceedings at any stage without pronouncing any judgment and where such stoppage of proceedings is made after the evidence of the principal witness has been recorded, pronounce a judgment of acquittal, and in any other case, release the accused, and such release shall have the effect of discharge. " Summons cases are generally of two categories. Those instituted upon complaints and those instituted otherwise than upon complaints. The latter I .. category would include cases based on police reports. Section 258 of the Code is intended to cover those cases belonging to one category alone i. e. "summons cases instituted otherwise than upon complaints". :'he segment separated at the last part of the section by the words "and in any other case" is only a sub-category or division consisting of "summons cases instituted otherwise than upon complaints". That sub-category is not intended to cover all summons cases other than those instituted on police report.

In fact, Section 258 vivisects only "summons cases instituted otherwise than on complaints" into two divisions. One division consists of cases in which no evidence of material witness was recorded. The section permits the court to acquit the accused prematurely only in those summons cases instituted otherwise than on complaints wherein the evidence of material witnesses was recorded. But the power of court to discharge an accused at midway stage is restricted to those cases instituted otherwise than on complaints wherein no material witness was examined at all. The upshot of the above is that Section 258 of the Code has no application to cases instituted upon complaints. The present is a case which was instituted on complaint. Hence the endeavour made by the accused to find help from Section 258 of the Code is of no :tvail.

Shri Siva Subramaniam, learned senior counsel for the appellant, contended that the imputations contained in the publication complained of are not per se defamatory. After reading the imputations we have no doubt that they are prima facie libellous. The only effect of an imputation being per se defamatory is tha~ it would relieve the complainant of the burden to establish that the. publication of such imputations has lowered him. in the estimation of the right thinking members of the public. However, even if the imputation is not per se defamatory, that by itself would not go to the advantage of the publisher, for, the complaining person can establish on evidence that the publication has in fact amounted to defamation even in spite of the apparent deficiency. So the appellant cannot contend, at this stage, that he is entitled to discharge on the ground that the imputations in the extracted publication were not per se defamatory.

The contention focused by the learned senior counsel is that the respondent, who filed the complaint, has no locus standi to complain because he is only a Director of K. J. Hospital about which the publication was made and that the publication did not contain any libel against the complainant personally. It is not disputed ·that the complainant is the Director of K. J. Hospital. Explanation 2 in Section 499 of the IPC reads thus: "Explanation 2. -It may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company or an association or collection of persons as such. " In view of the said Explanation, it cannot be disputed that a publication containing defamatory imputations as against a company would escape from the purview of the offence of defamation. If the defamation pertains to an -l association of persons or a body corporate, who could be the complainant? ' This can be answered by reference to Section 199 of the Code.

The first subsection of that section alone is relevant, in this context. It reads thus: "J99. Prosecution for defamation. -( 1) No court shall take cognizance ofan offence under Chapter XXI of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence. " The collocation of the words "by some persons aggrieved" definitely indicates that the complainant need not necessarily be the defamed person himself. Whether the complainant has reason to feel hurt on account of the publication is a matter to be determined by the court depending upon the facts of each case. If a company is described as engaging itself in nefarious activities its impact would certainly fall on every Director ofthe company and hence he can legitimately feel the pinch of it. Similarly, if a firm is described in a publication as carrying on offensive trade, every working partner of the firm can reasonably be expected to feel aggrieved by it. If K. J.

Hospital is a private limited c;ompany, it is too farfetched to rule out any one of its Directors, feeling aggrieved on account of pejoratives hurled at the company. Hence the JOHN THOMAS 1·. DR. K. JAGADEESAN [THOMAS, J. ] 941 appellant cannot justifiably contend that the Director of the K. J. Hospital would not fall within the wide purview of "some person aggrieved" as envisaged in Section 199( 1) of the Code. The learned senior counsel made a last attempt to save the appellant from prosecution on the strength on the decision of this Court in KM. Mathew v. State ofKera/a, (1992) 1 sec 217. In that case prosecution against Chief Editor was quashed for want of necessary averments in the complaint regarding his role in the publication. That part of the decision rests entirely on the facts of that case and it cannot be imported to this case.

It is pertinent to point out, in this context, that the appellant did not have any such point either when he first moved the High Court for quashing the proceedings or when he moved the trial ~ourt for discharge. Hence it is too late in the day for raising any such point, even apart from non-availability of that defence to the appellant on merits. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal. S. V. K. Appeal dismissed. \·