JOYLAL AGARWALA v. THE STATE
Citation: [1952] 1 S.C.R. 127; 1951 INSC 44
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: HARILAL JEKISUNDAS KANIA , M. PATANJALI SASTRI, BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA, SUDHI RANJAN DAS, N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR
Judgment date:
Case summary
1951 INSC 44. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1951-10-04. JOYLAL AGARWALA v. THE STATE. Read the judgment and case details on LawSphereX.
Judgment text
S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 127 Sant. bat MalttofJ . v. Kam/a P,ras1Jtl. Mukherjea /. •\ JOYLAL AGARWALA t1. THE STATE 1951 UNION OF INDIA-Intervener. Oct. 4. BICHAN CHAND MORTA t1. THE STATE * [HARILAL KANIA C. J. , PATANJALI SAsTRI, MuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA ArYAT JJ. ] ii>" Essrntial Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act (XXIV of 1946), ss. l (~), 7-Applicability to "excluded areas"-Dumtion of Act extended in British India by Governor-General, and by Constituent Assembly after Indian Independence Act, 1947-Whether Act . continues to be in force in excluded areas-Necessity of fresh notifi- a maximum period of 5 years in instalments of 1 year each, under the proviso. The fixation of the period of operation of the Essential Supplies Act is thus not left to any other enactment. It is provided by the Act itself.
As stated already, the notification of the 14th December, 1946, issued by the Governor applied the Essential Supplies Act to the Darjeeling district, and its life was extended up to 31-3-1948 by the notification of the Governor-General. It is difficult to see why a fresh notification under section 92(1) of the Government of India Act is required to continue the life of the Act in the district of Darjeeling. The Governor's notification extended the Act . tlo Darjeeling without specifying any panicular period for its applicability to that district, and it follows therefore that the Act would remain in force in the district so long as it remained in force in the rest of India. It is only if its effect had ceased earlier than the coming into force of the Indian Independence Act and there was a re-enactment by the legislature which was. sought to be applied to an excluded area, that a notification by the Governor under section 92 (1) of the Government of India Act might be necessary.
Otherwise, the question of a fresh notification does not arise. Section 19(4) ol the Indian Independence Act, 1947. provides as follows :- "In this Act, except so far as the context otherwise requires- References to the Government of ·India Act, 1935, include references to any enactments amending or supplementing that Act, and, in particu1ar, references to the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946 ; ........ " The adaptations made by the Governor-General under sections 9 and 19 of th. e Indian Jndependence Act substituted the words "Constituent Assembly" for "both Houses of Parliament" in section 4 of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, and the Constituent Assembly by two resolutions of different dates has. extended the life of the Essential Supplies Act till 31-3-1950.
As soon as the adaptations came into force by order of the Governor-General, the Constituent Assembly acquired the powers conferred on both Houses of Parliament under section 4 of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act. The validity of the adaptations is beyond question. The case of fatindra Nath Gupta v. The Province of Bihlll' and Others(1) has no application here. In the case now before us, the Legislature has itself applied its mind and has fixed the duration of the· Act, but has left the machinery to reach the maximum period by instalments to be worked out in a particular manner. There is here no question of delegation at all, much less delegation of any legislative power. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed. Criminal Appeal No. 25 of 1951. In this case, the appellant Bichan Chand Molla was charged with loading 28 bags of millmade cloth from a truck into a specially chartered aircraft at the Dum Dum airport, on behalf of his employers, Messrs.
Amarchand Pannalal, without a permit, as required under clause 4 (2) of the West Bengal Cotton Cloth. and Yam Movement Control Order, 1947. He was convicted under section 7 (1) read with section 8 of the Essential Supplies Act and sentenced to 9 months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000 by the (1) (1949] F. C. R. 5%. ;g Ist Clas5 Magistrate of Barrackpore. The Sessions Judge. of 24-Parganas dismissed the appeal preferred by the accused. A revision application filed by him in the High Court shared the same fate . The legal argument urged in this appeal was ·the same as in the earlier appeal, and has to be repelled as untenable for the reasons already stated. A special point was sought to be argued that the element of mens rea was wanting. But the the question was con-sidered by the High Court, and it was held that there are two facts from which means rea could be inferred. When questioned, the accused stated that he was loading handloom bales and not millmade cloth.
He had no permit with him and was not able to produce any even from his employers. These facts under the cir-cumstances warrant the inference of a criminal intent. This appeal also will therefore stand dismissed. Agent for the appellant : R. R. Biswas. Agent for the respondent : P. K. Bose. Agent for the intervener: P. A. Mehta.
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