K. GOPAL REDDY v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Citation: [1979] 2 S.C.R. 363; 1978 INSC 238
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: JASWANT SINGH, O. CHINNAPPA REDDY
Judgment date:
Case summary
1978 INSC 238. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1978-11-22. K. GOPAL REDDY v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH. Read the judgment and case details on LawSphereX.
Judgment text
K. GOPAL REDDY V. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH November 22, 1978 (JASWANT SINGH AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ. j Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate JurisdictkJn) Act, 1970-Appellant acquitted by trial court on the ground that two views were pcssible on the evidence-High Court convtcted and sentenced hhn-AppeUate G'ourt-TVhc11 cn11 review evidence- Words a11d phrases-"Proof beyond reasonable doubt' n1eani11g of. The iappellant was charged with the offence of committing the murder of his wife. The trial court acquitted him on the ground that the prosecution had failed to establish any motive for the offence, that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses was discrepant, conflicting and improbable and that when two views were possible on the basis of two divergent versions given by the prosecution and the defence, the benefit of doubt should be given to the accused. The High Court reversed the order of !
acquittal and convicted and sentenced the appellant to imprisonment for life on the view that the trial court had magnified the importance to be attached to the discrepancies which were of a minor nature. In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant the. ,t in aJI c·ases \vhere two views of the evidence were possible the accused was entitled to the benefit of doubt arising from the two views and that on this principle the High Court should not have interfered with the order of acquittal merely because another view Mis also possible. Dismissing the appeal, llELD ; (1) Where the trial court allow~ itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely poSsible, it is the obvious duty of the High €ourt to interfere in the interest of justice. lest the admini. ;tration of justice be brought to ridicule. f370DJ (2) After the deci11:ion of this Court in Sanwat Singh v.
State of Rajasthan (AIR 1961 SC 715) this Court has consistently recognised the right of the appellate court to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion bearing in mind the considerations mentioned hy the Privy Council i•_1 Sheo Swarup v. Emperor (61 I. A. 389). Occasionally phrases like "manifestly illegal'', "grossly unjust" have been m1ed to de. cribe the ocders of acquittt\J which warrant interference. But such expre:Mions have been U3ed. more as :flourishes of language to emphasise the reluctanc. e of the appellate court to interfere \vith an order of acquittal than to curtail the power of the appellate court to review the entire evidence and to come to its own con- u dasion. In two other cases it has been held that io the principles laid down in Sanwat Singh's oose may added the further principle that if :wo· reasonable conclusions could be reached on the basis of the evidence on record the appellate court should not disturb the finding of the trial court.
This principle stems out of the fundamental principle of our criminal juris~ prudence that the accused is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt- Jf two reasoniably probable and evenly balanced views of the eyidence arc possible, one must necessarily concede the existence of a reasonable doubt. But fanciful and remote possibilities must be left out of account. To entitle an accused person to the benefit. of a doubt arising fro·m the possibility of la duality of views, the possible view in favour of the accused must be as nearly reasonably probable as that against him. If the preponderance of probability fa all one way, a bare possibility _of another view will not entitle the accused to claim the benefit of any doubt. It is, therefore essentilail that, any view of the evidence in favoYr of the accused must be reasonable even as any doubt, the benefit of which an accused person may claim, must be reasonable.
A reasonbble doubt does not mean some light, airy, insubstantial doubt that may flit through the mind of a Judge about almost anything at any time or other, it does not mean a doubt begotten by sympathy out of reluctance to convict, it means a real doubt, a doubt founded upon reason. "Proof beyond a reasonable doubt'' does not mean proof beyond a shadow of doubt. The la\\' would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful po~sibilitics to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so J strong against a man las to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which c\"1>n be disn1is «'-' " \ version of the accused that the occurrence took place at about 10 p. m. was substantiated by what was mentioned in Ex. P. 15 the wound certificate given by P. W. 13 the Medical Officer in respect of the injuries which he found on the person of the accused. He urged that the knife was not seized by the Police under any seizure Memo nor was the knife sent to any finger print expert.
He urged that all the reasons given by the learned Sessions Judge had not been met by the High Court. He also contended that two views were possible on the evidence and the accused was entitled to the benefit of doubt. We have perused the relevant evidence as well as the judgments of the Sessions Judge and the High Court. We are unable to find any substance in the submi'ssions made by the learned Counsel for the appellant. The High Court was well justified in commenting that the discrepancie£ on the basis of which the Trial Court rejected the evidence of P. Ws. 1, 2 and 3 were of a minor character and that they had been unduly magnified by the learned Sessions Judge. The discrepancies were in regard to which of them woke up first, where was the lantern and which of the neighbours came first to the scooe on hearing their 'Cries. The High Court was also right in holding that the medical evidence supported the prosecution version and not the defence version.
Merely because the Medical Officer stated that the victim could have received the injury if she was standing, it did not follow that the injury could have been received in the circumstances mentioned by the accused. The injury was infucted with great force and its direction was upward. The location of the in}ury was 6 ems. below the arm pit on the left side. According to the accused the deceased received the injury when she placed herself between P. W. 1 and himself. We do not think that an injury of the nature received liy the deceased could have been caused in the, manner suggested by the accused. The injury must have been cansed in the manner suggested by the prosecution thati is, when the deceased was lying on her right side. It is true that the accused did not have any deep motive to kill the deceased. It is obvious that he must have been upset by the persistent refusal of the brother and mother of the deceased to send her with him to his house.
He probably attributed the refusal to reluctance on the part of his wife to accompany him straightaway. We may also refer here to the comment of the learned Counsel for the appellant that realizing that the motive would assume considerable importance if the case was one based on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution tried to make P. W. 3 depose as if she had witnessed occurrence. We do not think that the comment is justified. P. W. 3, an old woman of 69 years, stated in her evidence that 'she saw the accused who was sitting by the side of the deceased on the cot make. a gesture as if he was 'stabbing the deceased and that the deceased cried out 'Amma. ' Ih cross-examination shie stated that she did not remember if she had told the Police that the accused made a gesture as if he was stabbing the deceased. The Inspector of Police P. W. 15, however, stated that P. W. 3 did not state before him that she saw the accused making a gesture as if he was stabbing the deceased.
We do not think that we will be justified in rejecting the evidence of all the prosecution witnesses on the basis of this statement of P. W. 3. At the worst the so called improvement made by her may be rejected but no more. We are unable to discover any good reason to reject the e. vidence of P. Ws. 1 to 3 or the evidence of P. Ws. 4 and 5. We are afraid the learned Sessions Judge allowed himself to be assailed by airy and fanciful doubts. We are satisfied that the High Court was justified in interfering with the order of acquittal. The learned Couusel for the appellant advanced the usual argument . ""'-- . submitted in all cases where an order of acquittal is reversed, namely, that where two views of the evidence are possible, the accused is entitled to the benefit of the doub!
arising from the two views and that where the Trial Court has taken a possible view and acquitted the accused, the High Court should not interfere with the order of acquittal merely because another view is also possible. The principles are now well settled. At one time it was thought that an order of acquittal could be set aside for "substantial and compelling reasons" only and Courts used to launch on a search to discover those "substantial aud compelling reasons''. However, the 'formulae' of "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficiently cogent reasOns" and "strong reasons" and the search for them \Vere abandoned as a result of the pronouncement of this Court in Sanwal Singh & Ors. v. State of Rajastlwn(I), In Sanwat Singh's case, this Court harked (1) A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 715. K. GOPAL v. A. P. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, l. ) 36 9 back to the principles enunciated by the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup v. Emperor(! ) and re-affirmed those principles. After Sanwat Siugh v.
State of Rajasthari, this Court has consistently recognised the right of the Appellate Court to review the entire evidlence and to come to its own conclusion, bearing in mind the considerations mentioned by the Privy Council in Shea Swarup' s case. Occasionally phrases like 'manifestly illegal', "grossly unjust', have been used to describe the orders e>f acquittal which warrant interference. But, such expressions have been used more, as flourishes of language, to emphasise the reluctance of the Appellate Court to interfere with an order of acquittal than tq curtail the power of the Appellate Court to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion. In some cases Ramabhupala Reddy & Ors. v. The State of A. P. ('), Bhim Singh Rup Singh 'v.
State of Maharashtra(") it has been said that to the principles laid down in Sanwat Singh's case may be added the further principle that "if two reasonable conclusions can be reached on the basis of the evidende on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of the Trial Court". This, of course, is not a new principle. It stems out of the fundamental principle of our criminal jurisprudence that the accused is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt. If two reasonably probable and evenly balanced views of the evidence are possible, one must necessarily concede the existence of a reasonable doubt. But, fanciful and remote pos. ibilities must be left out of account. To entitle an accused person to the l:enefit of a doubt arising from the possibility of a duality of views, the possible view in favour of the accused must be as nearly reasonably probable as that against him. If the preponderance of !
probability is all one way, a bare possibility of another view will not entitle the accused to claim the benefit of any doubt. It is, therefore, essential that any view of the evidence in favour of the accused must be reasonable even as any doubt, the benefit of which an accused person may claim, must be reasonable. "A reasonable doubt", it bas been remarked, "does not mean some light, airy, insubstantial doubt that may flit through the minds of any of us about almost anything at some time or other, it does not mean a doubt begotten by sympathy out of reluctance to convict; it means a real doubt, a doubt founded upon reason"('). As observed by Lord Denning in Miller v. Minister of Pensions(') "Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not m<;an proof beyond a shadow of a doubt. (I) 61 I. A. 389. (2) A. LR. 1971 S. C. 460. (3) A. LR. 1974 S. C. 286. (4) Salmon J. in his charge to the jury in R. V. Fan/le reported in 1959 Criminal Law Review 584. (5) (1947] 2 All. E. R. 372. ! The Jaw would !
ail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour, which can be dismissed with the sentence 'of course it is possible but not in the least probable' the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short of that will suffice". In Khem Karan & Ors. v. State of • U. P. & Anr. (1). , this Court observed: "Neither mere possibilities nor remote possibilities nor mere doubts which are not reasonable can, without danger to the administration of justice, be the foundation of the acquittal of an accused person, if there is otherwise fairly credible testimony''.
Where the Trial Court allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it i's the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the intocest of justice, lest the administrahin of justice be brought to ridicule. That is what the High Court has done in this case. The appeal is dismissed. P. B. R. Appeal dismissed. (I} A. I. R. 1974 S. C. 1567.
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