K. S. SRINIVASAN v. UNION OF INDIA
Citation: [1958] 1 S.C.R. 1295; 1958 INSC 9
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: SUDHI RANJAN DAS , VIVIAN BOSE, T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR, S.K. DAS, A.K. SARKAR
Judgment date:
Case summary
1958 INSC 9. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1958-02-18. K. S. SRINIVASAN v. UNION OF INDIA. Read the judgment and case details on LawSphereX.
Judgment text
1296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958) S. C. R. SUPREME COUH'l' REPORTS 1295 K. S. SRINIVASAN v. UNION OF INDIA (S. R. DAS C. J. , VENKATARAMA AlYAR, s. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR and VIVIAN BosE, JJ. ) Union Service, Termination of-Servant in quasi-permanent status-Post kept in abeyance-Ordered to carry the status while officiating in new appointment under miisapprehension- Validity-Test--Consultation with Federal Public Service Com-misS! ion1 if mandat01rY-Servant, if entitled to Constitutional protection-Constitution of India, Art, 311(2)-Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1947, rr. 3, 4 and 6(1). The appellant held the post of a Public Relations Officer, AU India Radio, and was declared to be in quasi-permanent ·Service under r. 3. of the Central Civil Service (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949.
As a measure of war economy the Government decided to hold the post "in abeyance" and the appellant was appointed to officiate as Assistant Staion Director in a temporay capacity and was ordered to carry with him his quasi-permanent status wh. iie holding his new post. On the objection of the Union Public Service Commission, however, the service of the appellant was terminated and he was appointed to a temporary past of Assistant Information Officer . which belonged to a lower grade. The appellant moved the High Court for a writ of certiorari. His contentilon was that as, admittedly, he had not been called upon to show cause, Art. 311(2) of the Constitution was vio~ lated.
It was contended on behalf of the respondent that the order permitting the· appellant to carry his quasi-permanent status to his new post having been made under a misapprehension that the post of Assistant Station Director belonged to the same grade as that of the Public Relations Officer, his service was terminable under the relevant Service Rules: Hel'd (per Das, C. J. , Venkatarama Aiyar, S. K. Das and A. K. Sarkar, JJ. , Bose, J. Dissenting), that the post of Assistant Station Director was not a post in the same grade as that of the Public Relat:ons Officer and under the relevant Service Rules he could not carry his quasi-permanent status to the new post; as the order . permitting the appellant to carry 'his quasi--permarJent status was passed under a misapprehension and was not intended to confer ·on him that status independently in the new post, his service was terminable under r. 6(1) of the Rules. It is well settled that.
if a servant has no right to the post and his service can be terminated under the Service Rules, Art. 311 (2) is not attracted. Consequently, the appellant who was appointed on a purely temporacy capacity, could not seek. the protection of Art. 311 (2). · · Parshotam Lal Dhinura v. Union of India, [1958] S. C. R. 828, relied on. Admission is not conclusive proof of the matter admitted although it may in certain circumstances operate as an estoppel. In the present case, as the appellant was in no way misled as to his quasi-permanent status by the errom! the recruitment for nine posts of Listeners' Research Officers and nine posts of Liaison Officers, All India Radio.
It was stated in the said memorandum that the posts were permanent and pension-able, but would be filled on a temporary basis; the memoran-dwit ·further stated that if the persons doncerned were retained in ·service and confirmed in the posts, they would be -allowed pensionary benefits and would ailso be eligible to contribute . to the General Provident Fund. In the first instance the appointments were made on probation for six m011ths subject to termination on certain conditions mention· ed . in para. 4 of the memorandum, whiab. need not be set out at this stage. The duties of . a Liaison. Officer were stated in para. 5 of the memorandum, the main duty being. to organise and conduc~ · publicity for the programmes and other activities of a Radio Station. The designation Liaison Offieer was Jater changed to Public Relations Officer, and atong with other posts of Listener Research Officer and Assistant Station Director, the posts of Public Relations Officers were upgraded to Rs.
450-25-500-30-800 with effect ftom Januitty 1, 1947. On May 23, 1952, . the Director General, All India Radio, passed an order bearing No. 2(1) 1298 SUPRE111E COURT REPORTS [1958] A I 50 in which it was stated that whereas the appellant had been in continuous Government service for more than three years and a declaration had been issued to him in pursuance of rr. 3 and 4 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, and whereas an a;;>pointment to the post of Public Relations Officer was required to be made in con· sultation with the Union Public Service Commission and their concurrence to the! appointment had been obtained, the appellant wa;s appointed to the Public Relations Officer's grade in a quasi-permanent capacity with effect from May 1, 1949. On September 3, 1952, however, the appellant received an order from the said Director-General in which it was stated that his services would not be required after October 6, 1952.
The appellant was naturally taken by surprise on receipt of this order and made a representation on September 8, 1952, in which he stated that as a quasi-permanent Public Relations Officer he had a claim to an alternative post in the same grade, so long as any post in the si. 1ne grade was held by a Government servant not in permanent or quasi-permanent service. On September 13, 1952, the appellant was informed by means of an order that he wais appointed to officiate as Assistant Station Director, Madras (the appellant was then working as Public Relations Officer, All India Radio, Madras) in a purely temporary capacity until further orders. On September 19, 1952, the appellant was informed that his representation dated September 8, 1952, Wll! l under consideration and a suggestion was made that in the meantime he should apply for one of the posts of Assistant Station Directors which had been advertised by the Union Public Service Commission.
Then, on October 4, 1952, the appellant submitted a further representation in which he said that under the rules in question, namely the Central Civil Service '(Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, he was entitled to be retained in service in a post of the same grade and under the same appointing authority; and it was, therefore, not necessary that he should be re-selected for the post of Assistant Station . Director by the Union Public Service Commission. In the concluding paragraph of his representation the appellant stated that in deference to the suggestion made in the letter of the Director-Gener~! dated September 19, 1952, he was enclosing· an application to the Union Public Service Com· mission for the post of Assistant Station Director and if, after due consideration, the Director-General decided that the appellant should apply for the post of Assistant Station Director, his application should be forwarded to the Union Public Service Commission.
While Government was consider· ing the representation of the appellant, the Union Public Commission interviewed in March, 1953, candidates for the posts of Assistant Station Directors. The appellant appeared before the Commission on March 26, 1953. On April 18, 1953, the appellant was informed that the Union Public SerVice Com· mission had not selected him and the appellant was aigain informed that "it was not possible to continue him in service. " The- appellant made fresh representations to the effect that the order purporting to terminate his service on the ground that the Union Public Service Commission had not selected him for the post of Assistant_Station Director, was an illegal order inasmuch as the appellant held a quasi~permanent status a. nd was entitled to hold a post in the grade of Assistant Station Directors, as . long as anyone not in permanent or quasi-permanent service continued to hold such a post.
To these representations the appellant received a reply to the effect that Government had decided to keep in abeyance the post of Public Relations Officer held by hiln and therefore it was not possible to retain him in that post and the appellant was given an opportunity to show cause why · his service should not be termiyated on the expiry of the period of notice with effect from July 18, 1953. A reply wag asked for within 15 days. In reply, the appellant again pointed out that having been given a quasi-permanent status he was entitled to be retaJined in service under the rules governing Government servants holding such status, and the termination of his service would be in violation of Article 3 U of the Constitution. Gn July 3, 1953, the appellant received a memorandum dated June 9, 1953. This memorandum said: "Shri Srinivasan's representation has nnw been considered by Government.
As the posts of Public Relations Officers form a cadre by themselves ·and do not belong to the cadre of Assistant Station Directors, he cannot claim any protection in the post bf Assistant Station Director on irccount of his being quasi-permanent as Public Relations Officer. Shri Srinivasan may please be informed accordingly. " On July 10, 1953, the appellant made a fresh representation, this· time to the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, in which he repeated his former objections and contended that the proposed termination of his service was irregular, unjust and illegal. He submitted that the order terminating his service was in contravention of Art. 311 of the Constitution and -he further sa,id that "though the posts of Public Relations Officer and Assistant Station Director were not declared to be in the same cadre, there can be no dispute that the posts are in the same grade.
" On August 17, 1953, the appellant received a memorandum to the effect that the notice of the termination of his service as Assistant Station Director dated April 18, 1953, as subsequently amended by corrigenda dated May 12, 1953, and July 3, 1953, was withdrawn, and it also stated that the notide dated May 26, 1953, asking the appellant to show cause why his service should not be terminated was cancelled. This was followed by an order dated December 14, 1953. This order has an important bearing on the points urged befure us and must be quoted in fu! J. : "S. Noc 41(R) Government of India, Director General, All India Ral. lio. No. 1(113)-SII52. New Delhi, the 14th December, 1953. ORDER. In this Directorate Order No. 2(1)-A/50, dated the 23rd May, 1952, Shri K. S. Srinivasan, then officiating Public Relations Officer, AU India Radio, was appointed to that post in a quasi-permanent capacity with effect from K. the lst May, 1949.
Subsequently, in August 1952, all Uni st of Public Relations Officer while holding the po'st of Assistant Station Director. . • (Sd. ) M. Lal, . Dire~tor-General. " A copy of the order w~ also sent, fo the Secretary, Union Public Service Commission. Unfortunately, the appellant soon found that his troubles did not end with the order dated December 14, 1953. On August 31, 1955, the appellant was informed by the then Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 'that Union · Public Service Commission had objected to his appointment as ~ssistant Station Director, holding that such appointment was contrary to the regulations; the appellant was then asked that he should relinquish the post of Assistant Station Director and accept a temporary post of Assistant Information Officer in the Press Information Bureau or, in the alternative, he should "clear out". It may be stated here that the.
post of Assistant Information Officer offered to the appellant carried a scale of pay lower thain that of an Assistant Station Pirector, namely Rs. 350-25-500-30-620. As this new offer deprived the appellant of his quasi-permanent status and' also amounted to a reduction in his rank, the-appellant immedia~ tely sent fresh representations to the Home Minist. ey, Director-General, and the Minister for Information and Bt'Qadcast-ing. On September 7, 1955, the appellant received the final order of Gbvernment, which is the order complained of in the present appeal. That order was in these terms: "Shri Srinivasan was declared quasi-permanent in the grade of Public Relations Officer, All India Radio (Rs. 450- 25-500-EB-30-800) with effect from the 1st May, 1949. In 1952, all the posts of Public Relations Officer excepting one in the External Services Division were held in abeyance as a measure of economy. The only post that survived the ecbnomy drive was assigned to the permanent incnmbent.
Shri Srinivasan would have had to be retrenched in 1952; for quasi-permanency does not preclude retrenchment and . there was no other officer in the grade of Public Relations Officer who was non-quasi-permanent Mid who could have been dis-charged in preference to him. He was irregularly transferred as Asst. Station Director, in an officiating capacity. He applied for one of the posts of Assistant Station Director when they were ad~ertised by the Union Public Service Commission in 1953, but was rejected. Subsequently, he was allowed to carry a:lso irregularly, the quasi-permanent status in the grade of Public Relations Officer while holding the post of Assistant Station Director, vide Directorate General, All India Radio's order No. 1 (113) SI/52 dated the 14th December, 1953. The Union Public Service Commission have not accepted this transfer as it is in contravention of the Union Public Service Commission (Consultation) Regulations.
Since he has been rejected for the post of Assistant Station Director in an open selection and also since the Union Public Service Commission have not accepted his transfer, the Government of India regret that they are unable to allow him to continue in the post of Assistant Station Director. He is, therefore, required· fo relinquish charge of the post of Assistant Station Director immediately. "To save him the ha! rdship of retrenchment, the question of offering Shri Srinivasan alternative employment has been considered. There is no intention of reviving the posts of Public Relations Officer -that were held in abeyance in 1952. For publicity and public relations work of All India Radio, a few posts of Assistant Information Officer in the scale of Rs. 350-25-500. EB-30-620 have been sanctioned on J(. the strength of the Press Information Bureau and it is pro- Union posed to absorb him on temporary basis, against one of these posts.
The absorption in this post also, is subject to the approval by the Union Public Service Commission to whom a reference has been made. Meanwhile, after relinquishing the charge of the post of Assistant Station Director, he should . report himself for duty to the Principal Information Officer, Press Information Bureau, New Delhi. The question of fixa-tion of his pay in the grade of Assistant Information Officer, with a view to protecting his present salary will be taken up after he has joined duty. " The appellant continued to make some more representations which were, however, rejected, arnd on October 11, 1955, an order was palssed transferring the appellant to the Press Information Bureau as officiating Assistant Information Officer with immediate effect and the appellant was directed to hand over charge ol the post of Assistant Station Director immediately and to take over his pt>st in the Press Infonna-tion Bureau forthwith.
The validity of this order, which is also challenge verning the conditions of his service, the termination of the service of such a servant or his reduction to a lower post is by itself and prima facie a punishment, for it operates as a forfeiture of his right to hold that post or that rank and to get the emoluments and other benefits attached thereto. But if the servant has no right to the post, as where he is appointed to a post, permanent or temporary, either on proba. - (1) [19581 S. C. R 828. 8. C. R. SUPBEME COURT REPOR'rs 1305 tion or on an officiating basis and whbse temporary service has not ripened into a quasi-permanent service as defined in the Temporary Service Rules, the termination of his employment does not deprive him of any right and cannot, therefore, by itself, be a punishment.
One test for determining whether the termination of the service of a government servant is by way of punishment is to ascertain whether the servant, but for such termination, had the right to hold the post. If he had a right to the post as in the three oases here-inbefore mentioned, the termination of his service . will by itself be a punishment and he will be entitled to the protection of Art. 311. Jn other words and broadly speaking, Art. 31 I HEME COUHT Hl~POHTS [1958] tioned therein fall within the cadre of As. ,istant Station Directors, and those categories do not include Public Relations Officers. Learned Counsel for the appellant has referred us to Appendix I of the A. I. R. Manual, Vol. II, which gives the scales of pay and classification of posts in the All India Radio. He has pointed out that in that appendix the posts of Assistant Station Directors (no. 77), Listener Research Officer (no.
78) and Public Relations Officer taken to be the sole test for determining whether the posts belong to the same grade or cadre. The appendix referred to by ! eared counsel for the appellant shows that the post of Assistant Director of Monitoring Services bears the same scale of pay and also belongs to Class II; yet it is not suggested that that post has any cadre or grade affinity with the posts of Assistant Station Directors. A chemist (no. 106) and an A'8istant Engineer (no. 105) have the same scales of pay and both belong to Class II; but they do not belong to the same grade or cadre; otherwise a strange result will follow in that a chemist holding a quasi-permanent status will be entitled to be appointed as an Engineer. on the reduction of the chemist's post. On behalf bf the appellant it has been next argued that the order dated December J 4; I95J.
contains a olear admission to the effect that the post of Public Relations Officer belongs to the same grade as Assistant Station Director, and the order shows that it was made after unofficial consultation with the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. It is contended that this ad'mission should be accepted as an admission of falct and held binding on the respondent, particularly when the respondent has not produced the particular order by which a separte cadre, if any, of Public Relations Officers might have been created, in order to disprove the correctness of the admission. We a. re unable tO accept this argument. An admission is not conclusive proof of the matter admitted, though it may in certain circumstances operate as an estoppel.
It is not suggested that a question of estoppel arises in this case (a point which we shall again advert tb); at best, it may be said that the respondent having once admitted that the post of Public Relations Officer belonged to the same grade, the admission casts upon the respondent the burden of proving . that what was dt;liberately asserted on December 14, 1953, is not a fact. It is unfortunate that this case was summarily dismissed in the High Court and the respondent was not called upon to make an affidavit and file the necessary documents at that ·stage. We have now a copy of the letter dated December 15/28, 1944 by which the nine new posts of liaison officer Oater designated as Public Relations Officer) were created and the let~r dated March 20, 1950, by which the cadre of Assistant Station Directors was deolared.
These letters we have already rekrred to, and they leave little room for doubt in the matter: they show clearly enough that the posts of Public Relations Officers do not belong to the same grade or cadre as the posts of Assistant Station Directors. As. a matter of fact, the respondent said so in the memorandum of June 9, 1953, though later, on December 14, 1953, a different statement was made. It has been submitted before us that even in the impugned order of September 7, 1955, the respondent does not say that a mistake was made; the respondent merely states that the appellant was irregulaJrly transferred as Assistant Station Director and was irregularly allowed. to carry a quasi-permanent status to the new post.
We think that the impugned order of September 7, 1955, must be read as a whole, and so read, it shows that Government had earlier made mistake in thinking that the posts of Public Relations Officers belonged to the same grade or cadre as the posts of Assistant Station Direcltors, and the mistake was rectified when the Union Public Service Commission pointed it out. We shall now consider the further question if the order dated December 14. 1953, can be read a's a separate or independent declaration in favour of the appellant in respect of the post of an Assistant Station Director, under rr. 3 and 4(a) of the Temporary Service Rules. We shall consider this question from four points of view : (I) whether on the terms of the order itself, it can be read as an independent declaration under the relevant rules; ('. ~) whether the relevant authority intended the order as an independent declaration under rr.
3 and 4(a) and if the parties thereto understood the ·order in that sense; (3) if the order is so read, whether consultation with the Public Service Commission was necessary under r. 4(b); and (4) whether any estoppel arises out of the order. It seems to us that the order itself is very clear and if it is contrasted with the earlier order dated May 23, 1952 (by which a declaration was indeed made in favour of the appellant under rr. 3 and 4 of the Temporary Service Rules in respect of the post of Public Relations Officer), it is at once clear that the order dated December lfl, 1953, is not a declaration under rr. 3 and 4 of the said rules. What does the order state in terms? Firstly, it states that the appellant was appointed in a quasi-permanent capacity to the post of Public Relations Officer; secondly, it states that all the posts of Public Relations Officer are held in abeyance except.
one; thirdly, it states that as the post of Public Relations Officer belonged to the same grade as Assistant Station Director carrying identical scales of pay, the appellant was appointed as Assistant Station Director in September 1952; and fourthly, it states that under the instructions contained in a particular office memorandum issued from the Ministry of Home Affairs the appellant was entitled to carry the qumi-permanent status of S. C. H. SUPHEME COUH'l' REPORTS .
1-:U7 his former post of Public Rel iid: "That after four months' careful consideration and discussion between the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Home Ministry and the Union Public Service Commission, Government issued an ·order dated 14-12-'53 declaring that the petitioner will carry quasi-permanent status in his new post of· Assistant Station Director as per rules relating to the transfer of quasi-permanent officers," In paragraph 30 the appellant again stated that the post of Assistant Station Director and Public Relations Officer were constituted and recognised to be in the same grade and' under r. 2(c) of the Temporary Service Rules the shifting from one post to another in the same grade did not affect his status; in other words, the appellant also understood the order dated December 14, l953, not as an independent order declaring his quasi-permanent status in the post of Assistant Station Director. but merely as giving effect to r.
2(c) of the Temporary Service Rules by reason of the fact, which now appears to be incorrect. that the post of Public Relations Officer was in the same grade as that of Assistant Station Director. Even in his statement of the case, the appellant stated-"It may. be emphasised that the Government in their order dated J 4-l 2-'53 reiterated the appellant's quasi-permanent. status in the post of Assistant Station Director, not on the basis of the appellant's repr~sentation but on the authority of the Home Ministry's order No. 54/136/51-NGS, dated 24-4-'52 relating to the' lien of quasi-permanent employees". The reference to the Home Ministry's office memorandum shows how the appellant understood the order dated December 14, 1953. Rule 4(b) of the Temporary Service Rules states that when recruitment to a specified post is required to he made in consultation with the Public Service Commission, no declaration under rr. 3 and 4(a) shall be issued except after consultation with the Commission.
In the view which we have taken of the order dated December 14. 1953, it is not really necessary to decide in the present case whether the provisions of r. 4(b) are merely directory or manda:tory. It is sufficient to state that the Public Service Commission was not consulted before the order dated December 14, 1953, was issued, and the appointing authority did not intend the order as a declarntion under rr. 3 and 4(a). In State of U. P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava(') it has been held that the provisions of Art. 320(3)(c) of the Constitution. as respedts consultation of the Public Service Commission on all disciplinary matters affecting a person serving the Government of India or a State Government, are not mandatory in spite of the use of the word 'shall' therein. That decision is founded on the following grounds : (I) the proviso to Art.
320 itself indicates that in certain cases or classes of cases the Commission need not be consulted; (2) the requirement of consulting the Commission does not extend to making the advice of the Commission binding on Government as respects disciplinary matters; and (3) on a proper construction of the Article, it does not confer any right or privilege on an individual public servant. We may point out that none of these grounds have any application so far as r. 4(b) of the Temporary Service Rules is concerned. Article 320 may not be mandatory as against the President; but a subordinate appointing authority who has to make a declaration under the rules cannot ignore or abro-gate the very rules under which he has to make the declaration. Quasi-permanent status is a creature of the rules, and . r. 4(b) requires that no declaration under r.
3 shall be made except after consultation with the Public Service Commission (when recruitment to a specified post is required to be made in consultation with the Public Servic:e Commission). An officer cannot claim th'e benefit of r. 3 and ignore at the. same time the condition laid down in r. 4(b); in other words, he cannot claim the benefit of a part of the rules and refuse to be bound by the conditions of the other part. (') [1958] S. C. R. 5. 't. 'l L/S4SCI-9 l H15t! J Now. as to estoppcl : in our view.. the appellant was not misled in any way as to his quasi-permanent status-a! status which he undoubtedly held in the post of Public Relations Officer; the mistake that was made was in thinking that the post of Assisla! nt Station pirector was in the same grade as that of Public Relations -Officer and then giving effect to the Home office memorandum, referred to previously, on the basis of that mistake.
We do not think that any question of estoppel really arises, and in fairness to learned counsel for the appellant it must be stated that he has not founded the case on estoppel. Learned counsel for the appellant has contested the correctness of the opinion of the Union Public Service Commission and has suggested that the Commission had indulged in an officious opinion, because under the Union Public Service Commission (Consultation) Regulations. it was not necessary to consult the Commission. Our attention has been drawn to Regulation 3, which reads as follows so far as it is relevant for our purpose- "'3. Jt shall not be necessary to consult the Commission in regard to the selection for appointment- (a) to a Central Service, Class I, of any Officer in . the Armed Forces of the Union or any officer who is already a member of an All India Service_. Central Service. Class I, a Railway Service, Class I. (b) to a Central Servioe. Class II, of any officer from another Service.
Class I or from a Central Service, Class JI or of any officer in the Armed Forces of the Union or of a Railway Service, Class JI; Note: -·-In this regulation. the term 'officer" does not include a person in 'temporary employment'. " The correspbndence with the Union Public Service Commission has now been. placed before us. That correspondence shows that the Union Public Service Commission took the view that Regulation 3 did not apply to an officer whb was in 'temporary employment' in the sense in which that expression was used when the Regulations were made, and "quasi-permanent servant" a. s defined in the Temporary Service Rules also meant temporary service, but subject to certain benefits in the matter of leave etc. , and certain safeguards in the matter of termination of service. Whether the Union Public Service Commission is right in this view or not we are not called upon to decide, particularly when the Union Public Service Commission is not before us.
It is enough for us to hold that the post of Assistant Station Director is not a pbst in the same grade or cadre as that of the Public Relat;ons Officer. That being the position, the appellant had no quasi-permanent status in the post of Assistant Station Director and his service was liable to be terminated when there was a reduction in the number of posts of Public Relations Officers within the meaning of cl. (ii); nor was he enHtled to the benefit of the proviso to cl. (ii) so far. as the post of Assistant Station Director was concerned. For the reasons given above, we hold that there has been no violation of the constitutional guarantee ~nder Art. 311(2) in the case of the appellant. The appeal must, therefore, be dismissed. As to the petition under Art. 32 pf the Constitution, we do not think that there has been any . such discrimination against the appellant as is contemplated by Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
It is true that others who did not hold a quaBi-permanent status were subsequently appointe4 as Assistant Station Director through selection by the Union Public Service Commission. We can only say that it is unfortunate that the appellant was not so selected; but that does not involve. the breach of a•ny fundamental right. In conclusion we wish to say that apart from any con, sideration of mere legal right, this is a hard case. The appellant was in service for about nine years without any blemish and his service was terminated on the reduction of certain posts~ he was told-wrongly it now appears-that he had a quasi-permanent status in the post of Assistant Station Director. The appellant states that the Union Public Service Com- L/S4SCI-9(a) i:l24 SUPRE~LE COURT REPORTS [1958] mission did not consider his suitability for the post of Assistant Station Director, because he claimed quasi-permanent status in that post.
The correspondence with the Union Public Service Commission shows that the appellant's case was not considered' from the promotion quota of 20 per cent because he held a post which was not (to use an expression of the Commission) 'in the field for promotion'. If the appellant is right in his statement that he was not considered for direct recruitment because he claimed quasi-permanent status, then obviously there is an apparent injustice; the appellant is then deprived of consideration of his cl~im both from the promotion and direct quotas. We invite the attention of the authorities concerned to this aspect of the case and hope that they will consider the appellant's case sympathetically and give him proper relief. With these observations, we dismiss the appeal and the petition, but in the circumstances there will be no order for costs. BosE J . -With great respect I disagree.
The ~ppellant's services as Public Relations Officer, All India Radio, were terminated because of the reduction in that post. There was no other post of equal status in that grade or cadre, so I agree that he had no right to any continuance of employment. But he was appointed to officiate as Assistant Station Director in a purely temporary capacity "until further orders", on September 13, 1952. (Order No. 1 (101)-51/52). Later, on December 14, 1953, further orders were passed by the same authority (Order No. (113)-51/52). These orders confirm'ed the order appointing the appellant Assistant Station Director and concluded- "Under the provision contained in the Ministry of Home Affairs Office Memorandum No. 54/136/51-NGS, dated the 24th April, 1952, Shri Srinivasan will carry with him the quasi-permanent status of his former post of Public Relations Officer while holding the post of Assistant Station Director.
" This order is a "further order" and, in my judgment, it clearly and unequivocally makes him "quasi-permanent" in the new post. It is true that this was done under a mistake which was· discovered at a Ia. ier date but the mistake is that of Government and others cannot be made to suffer because of the uni-lateral mistake of Government. I had occasion to observe, while delivering the judgment of the Court in The Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji('), that- "Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order' of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do" (and I add in this case, "what he subsequently discovered").
"Public orders made by public authorities arc~ meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself". The principle underlying those observations applies with equal force here. Here is a man who was in no way at fault. He had served faithfully in various capacities from May 1, 1946. His services were terminated on September 3, ·1952, with effect from October 6, 1952. That was not his fault nor wa:s it the fault of Government. It was just the fortunes of war. The post was "reduced" and there was no more room for him. No one can quarrel with that. But before the termina. tion took effect he was continued in service in another post on September 13, 1952, in a purely ·temporary capacity "until further orders''.
There was consequently no break and he was still in service on December 14, 1953, when he was told that he was quasi-permanent in the post of Assistant Station Director. He accepted this position and acted on it and continued to serve in it for nearly two years. That, naturally enough. , ( ) [1952] S. C. R. 135, 140. 1326 SUPREME COUHT REPORTS [1958] has lessened his chances of seeking other employment because after a man reaches a certain age it becomes increas-ingly difficult to find new employment. I do not say this was Government's fault, for no one can be blamed for not know-ing where they arc in this wilderness of rules and regulations and coined words and phrases with highly technical and artificial meanings; and I think Government did all they could to assuage the hardships of an unfortunate situation. But equally. it was not the appellant's fault and in a case like this, a broad equity requires that the one least at fault should not be made to suffer.
The old technically rigid conceptions of contra. ct and equity have given place in modern times to a juster apprecia-tion of justice, and the fusion of law and equity in one jurisdiction has resulted in the emergence of a new equity in England more suited to modern ideas of human needs and human values. Lord Denning has cited instance· after instance in his book "The Changing Law" to show how this has come about and how it is still in the process of formation, flexible and fluid with the drive behind to do real justice between man and man, and man and the State, ra. ther than to continue to apply a set of ancient hide-bound technicalities forged and fashioned in a wholly different world with a different conscience and very different evaluations of human dignity and human rights. At pp. 54 and 55 Lord Denning. sums up this new orientation in legal thinking thus: "In coming to those decisions, the Courts expressly applied a.
doctrine of equity which says a court of equity will not allow a person to enforce his strict legal rights when it would be inequitable to allow him to do so. This doctrine warrants the proposition that the courts will not allow a. person to go back on a promise which was intended to be binding, intended to be acted on, and has in fact been acted on. " 1 ·am not advocating sudden and wild departure from doctrines and precedents that have been finally settled but I do contend that we, the ·highest Court in the land giving final form and shape to the laws of this country, should ad- _ . · K" 8 8 . nnit7fl&Jn minister them with the same breadth of vision and under- v. standing of the needs of the times as do the Courts in Union of India England. The underlying principles of justice have not Bose J. cha. nged but the complex pattern of life that is never static requires a fresher outlook and a timely and vigorous mould-ing of old principles to suit new conditions and ideas and ideals.
It is true that the Courts do not legislate but it is not true that they do not mould and make the law in their processes of interpretation. Now, what was the position here when looked at broadly and fairly as an upright and just juryman of plain common-sense and understanding would do? Here was a man with several years of service and with no blemish on his conduct and reputation. He was about to lose his job. Government felt that that was hard and sought ways and means to right a wrong-not wrong in the legal sense, for no one was at fault, but wrong in the deeper understanding of men who fook. with sympathy at the lot of those who have to suffer for no fault of theirs. Government found, or thought they found, that they could put him in' another post and they actually did so. They found that in his old post he had certain protections and they wanted and intended that he should continue to have them. Under r.
3 of the Temporary ·Service Rules they found that they could give him those protections· in a very simple way, namely, by issuing a declaration that he was quasi-permanent in bis new post. He was fully eligible for it. He had been in continuous Government service for more than three years. The appointing authority was satisfied of his qualifications, work and character for employment in a quasi-permanent capacity. The tatters of · Government to the Union Public Service Commission bear that out, quite apart from the orders of September 13, 1952, and December 14, 1953, which would not have been made if Government had not considered him a fit and proper person. How can it be contended that Government did not in- , 1328 SUPRJ quently, their act became binding despite their mistake. That is how I would interpret the law and administer justice. (') [1917) A. C. 170 I would allow the appeal and the petition with costs. BY COURT: The appeal and the petition are dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs. Appeal and Petition di. imissed. KASHINATH SANKARAPPA WANI v. NEW AKOT COTTON GINNING & PRESSING CO. , LTD. (BHAGWkTI, J. L. KAPUR and GAJENoRAGADKAR JJ. ) Limitation-Suit on deposit receipt-Acknowledgment of iiability-EUidence-Balance sheet obtained from Registrar of Companies-Admissibility-Presumption. of awthenticitu andi corr. ectness-Commercial Documents Evidence Act (XXX of 1939), s. 3(b). The appellant advanced various sums of money to the respondent, in lieu of which the respondent passed a deposit receipt for 12 months from August 1, 1939 to July 31, 1940. On June 16, 1944 the appellant filed a suit to recover the amount with in-terest on the allegation that the amount became due on May 17, 1941 when the demand for the amount was made and limitation for the suit expired on May 17. 1944 and the suit was filed on the reopening day of the Court thE>reafter.
The appellant also relied upon the acknowledgments of his debt by the i:es-pondent in the resolution passed by the Board of Directors on May 20, 1941 and in the balance sheet of the respondent for the year 1940-41 dated October 10, 1941: Held, that the suit was barred by limitation as the monies due under the deposit receipt became payable on July :n, 1941 and as no 'agreement had been proved th<it the monies due under the deposit receipt were re-payable on demand. Held further, that limitation was not saved by tile alleged. acknowledgments. The resolution Qf the Board of Directors merely· proposed ·a settlement of a claim of the appellant, which, if accepted by the appe}lant, was to be placed before a general meeting of the share-holders. The resolution onfy referred to a past liability of the respondent to the appellant and it could not be construed
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