KANGSARI HALDAR & ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL

Citation: [1960] 2 S.C.R. 646; 1959 INSC 167

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA , P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A.K. SARKAR, K. SUBBA RAO, J.C. SHAH

Judgment date: 1959-12-18

Case summary

1959 INSC 167. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1959-12-18. KANGSARI HALDAR & ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL. Read the judgment and case details...

Judgment text

r959 December I8. 646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)] KANGSARI HALDAR & ANOTHER v. TH;E STATE OF WEST BENGAL ' (B. P. SINHA, C. J. , P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR, K. SUBBA RAO AND J. c. SHAH, JJ. ) Criminal Trial-Staiute providing for trials by special Tri- bunals of specified offences committed in distt viso to s. 5 in respect of adjournment of the trial is also stricter and more stringent. Similarly, the right of an accused person to claim a de novo trial where a judge presiding over a tribunal ceases to be available before the completion of the trial is also materially affected by the provisions of s. 6. Section 10 makes applicable the provisions of the Code or of any other law for the time being in force which may be applicable to the trial of criminal cases in so far as they are not incon- sistent with the provisions of the Act.

Thus it may be conceded that the appellants are entitled to com- plain that on the whole the procedure prescribed for the trial of scheduled offences under the Act amounts to discrimination. The question is whether such dis- crimination violates the provisions of Art. 14. This question necessarily leads us to inquire whether the discriminatory provisions of the Act. are based on any rational classification, and whether the differentia- tion of the offenders brought within the mischief of the Act has a rational nexus with the policy of the Act and the object which it intends to achieve. The preamble shows that the Legislature was dealing with the problem raised by disturbances which had thrown a challenge to the security of the State and raised a grave issue about the maintenance of public peace and tranquillity and the safeguarding of industry and business. It, therefore, decided to meet the situation by providing for speedy trial of the scheduled offences.

Thus the object of the Act and the principles under- lying it are not in doubt. It is true that speedy trial of all criminal offences is desirable; but there would be no difficulty in appreciating the anxiety of the / ,, 654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2)) r959 Legislature to provide for a special procedure for K . H Id trying the scheduled offences so as to avoid all possible angsari a ar d 1 h" h b . l d "f h 1 d and Another e ay w w may e mvo ve I t e norma proce ure v. of the Code was adopted. If the disturbance facing The State of the areas in the State had to be conti"olled and the w"' Bengal mischief apprehended had to be checked and rooted Gajendmgad,\ar ]. out a very speedy trial of the offences committed was • obviously indicated. The classification of offenders who are reached by the Act is obviously reasonable.

The offences specifi- ed in the four items in the schedule are clearly of such a character as led to the disturbance and it is these offences which were intended to be speedily punished in order to put an end to the threat to the security of the State and the maintenance of public peace and tranquillity. It would be idle to contend that if the offences of the type mentioned in the schedule were committed and the Legislature thought that they led to the disruption of public peace and tranquillity and caused jeopardy to the security of the State they could not be dealt with as a class by themselves. Other offences committed by individuals under the same categories of offences specified by the Code could be rationally excluded from the classification adopted by the Act because they did not have the tendency to create the problem which the Act intended to meet.

We are, therefore, satisfied that the classification made by the Act is rational and the differentiation on which the offenders included within the Act are treated as a class as distinguished from other offenders has a rational nexus or relation with the object of the Act and the policy underlying it. Therefore, it would be difficult to accede to the argument that the Act violates Art. 14 of the Constitution. It is, however, urged that s. 2(b)(i) is not intra vires because the classification on which it is based violates Art. 14. This contention has taken a two-fold form. It is urged that the notification which is aut]J. orised to be issued under s. 2(b)(i) necessarily deals with an area which has ceased to be disturbed at the time when it is issued; and it is inevitable that when such a notific- ation is issued some of the offences which would have - S. O. R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 655 been tried under the Act as a result of the notification r959 may have already been tried under the ordinary Code, -:- d d · · 1 h d" d f h Kangsari Hal ar an it is on y sue cases as are not ispose o . on t e d A th , date of the notification which would fall within the an no 8 v. mischief of the Act and that constitutes an irrational The State of or arbitrary classification. It is also urged. that when 'West Bengal the area covered by such. a notification has ceased to - be disturbed there is no rational or valid justification Gajendragadkar f. for. applying the Act to the offences committed in such an area when in the other continuously undisturbed areas similar offences would be tried under the normal provisions of the Code. In fact it is these two aspects of the question which have been strongly pressed before us by Mr. Acharya in the present appeal.

Before dealing with these two arguments it would be relevant to recall that this Court has accepted the general principle that "if any state of facts can reasonably be conceived to sustain a classification, the existence of that state of facts must be assumed " (Vide: Ohiranjit- lal Chaudhuri v. The Union of India & Ors. (1) and Kedar Nath Bajoria v. The State of West. Bengal ( 2 ) ). It is quite true that when a notification is issued under s. 2(b)(i) specifying the period during which the area in question was disturbed some offences though falling under the schedule might have been tried under the Code while some others which may be pending at the date of the notification would be tried under the Act. But ~loes that introduce any vice in the classific- ation ?

If the area was disturbed and the notification specifying the period of such disturbance is otherwise justified in the sense that the speedy trial of the schedul- ed offences committed during the specified period can be validly directed, then the fact that some offences had already been tried before the notification cannot, in our opinion, introduce any infirmity in the statutory provision itself. It must be remembered that the classification on which the impugned notification rests is between the scheduled offences committed in an area which is declared to be a disturbed area and similar offences committed elsewhere in the State; and so the fact that some of the scheduled offences (1) [1950] S. C. R. 869 at p. 877. (2) [1954] S. C. R. 30 at p. 39. 656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)) r959 escaped the operation of the notification because they had been already tried cannot affect its legality or Kangsari Haldar andAnother validity. Such an adventitious or accidental result v.

cannot sustain the attack against the classification The State of which is otherwise rational, reasonable and valid. In West Bengal fact it would not be easy or always possible for the G . d--dk 1 Legislature to prevent such an accidental escape of a;en raga ar • f h . . f . l . c some cases rom t e prov1s10ns o a spema statute 1or the reason that they had already been decided .. If the statute had permitted discrimination between cases under the scheduled offences which 'till remained to be tried that would have been another matter. In our opinion it would be unreasonable to requisition the assistance of cases which had been disposed of and have become a matter of history to challenge the classification in question. The second contention is also without substance because it ignores the material difference between the character of the offences committed during the- speci- fied period in the disturbed area and offences commit- ted in continuously undisturbed areas.

The offences committed in areas subsequently declared to be disturbed led to and were the cause of the extensive disturbance. In consequence of such disturbance investigation into such offences is rendered difficult; it is not easy in such disturbed conditions to collect and marshal! evidence because witnesses are apt to be terrorised, and though the area has ceased to be disturbed absence of disturbance may be temporary, and unless the offenders are brought to book speedily the temporary pe"ace may turn out to be the lull before another storm. That is why even in respect of areas which have ceased to be disturbed, offences committed when the area was disturbed during the period specified in the notification are required to be , tried under the Act. Such offences cannot, in our opinion, be reasonably compared with offences com- mitted under the same sections of the Code in con- tinuously undisturbed areas.

In their essential features the two offences form two distinct and different categories and the contention that the classification of the offences made in such a case is irrational must, • - -~ - ... 2) S,C. R. 284. - ·• - S. C. R. · SUPREME COURT REPORTS 659 executive government with nothing in the law to / z959 guide or to control its action to decide which cases or - 1 f h ld b . d d th A Th Kangsari Haldar c asses o cases s ou e tne un er e ct. ere d A th were, however, two dissents. Patanjali Sastri, C. J. , an v~o er held thats. 5(1) was wholly valid, where, Das, J. , as he The State of then was, agreed with the conclusion of the High Court West Bengal that s. 5(1) was bad only in so far as it empowered . -- the State Government to direct cases to be tried by a Ga1endragadkar J. special court ; it may be added that though Bose, J.

, agreed with the conclusion of the majority, he was not satisfied that the tests laid down in deciding the validity of the classification could afford infalliable guide because he thought that the problem posed ii;i such cases is not solved by substituting one general- isation for another. It would thus be seen that the majority decision in that case was based on two principal considerations that, having regard to the bald statement made in the preamble about the. need of speedier trials, it was difficult to sustain the classific- ation marle by . s. 5(1), and that the discretion left to the executive was unfettered and for its exercise no guidance was given by the statute. It is difficult to accept the suggestion of Mr. Acharya that the impugn- ed provisions in the Act with which we are concerned are comparable to s. 5(1) in that case. The next decision to which reference must be made is Kathi Haning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra ( 1 ).

The majority decision in that case upheld the validity of ss. 9, 10 and 11 of the Saurashtra State Public Safety (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1949 (66 of 1949) and the notification issued under it. Patanjali Sastri, C. J. , and three other learned judges of this Court took the view that the preamble to the Act gave a clear indication about the policy underlying the Act and the object which it intended to achieve, that the classification on which the impugned provisions were based was a · rational classification, and that the differentia on which the classification was made had a rational nexus with the object and policy of the Act. Mahajan, Qhandrasekhara Ayyar and Bose, JJ. , how- ever, dissented. According to them the notification Ct) [195z] S. C. R. 435· • 660 SUPREME COUR1' REPORTS [1960(2)] z959 and the impugned provisions had violated Art. 14. K -. H ld It is significant that in upholding the validity of the •;,:;". ;;, 0 t;.

, "' impugned provisions and the notifications the tests v. applied were the same as laid down in Anwar Ali The State of Sarkar' s case ( 1 ). If est Bengal The third decision pronounced by this Court in the G . d-dk same year is Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja & Anr. 01 "' raga "' 1 · v. The State of Bomqay ('). Section 12 of the Bombay Public Safety Measures Act, 1947, was struck down by the majority decision in that case as it contravened Art. 14 and was void under Art. 13 on the principles laid down in the two earlier decisions to which we have just referred. Patanjali Sastri, C. J. , struck a note of dissent. He adhered to ·the view which he had expressed in Anwar Ali Sarkar's case ( 1 ) and held that the impugned provision was valid. The decision in the case of Ahuja ( 2 ) proceeded on the basis that the discrimination which may have been permissible before January 26, 1950, could not be sustained after the said date because it violated Art. 14 of the Consti- tution.

Having regard to the objects which the act intended to achieve and the principles underlying it, it was held that the said object and principles applied equally to both categories of cases, those which were reforred to the special judge and those which were not so referred; and so the discrimination made between the two categories of cases which could not be rationally put under two different 'classes was violative of Art. 14. Thus the application of the same tests this time resulted in striking down the impugned provision and the notification. In 1953 a similar problem was posed before this Court for its decision. This time it was s. 4(1) of the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1949, which was challenged in Kedar Nath Bajoria's case(').

This Act had been passed to provide for the more speedy and more effective punishment of certain offences because the Legislature thought that it was expedient to provide for the more speedy trial and more effective punishment of certain offences which were set out in the schedule annexed (I) [1952] S. C. R. 284, (2) (1952] s. c. R. 710. (3) [1954J s. c. R. 30. - S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 661 . to the Act. Section 4(1) authorised the Provincial I959 Government to allot cases for trial to a special judge K -:-H ld b 'fi · 11 t £ f angsari a at y not1 cation as we as rans er cases rom one and Another special judge to a~other or to \vithdraw any case v. from the jurisdiction of the special judge ·or make The State of such modifications in the description of a case as may West Bengal be considered necessary. _ Pronouncing the majority G . d-dk 1 judgment in that case Patanjali Sastri, C. J.

, elabor- aJen raga ar • ately considered the earlier decisions of this Court to which we have already referred, applied the tests iaid down therein, and held that s. 4 of the Act was valid and that the special court had jurisdiction to try ai;i. d con vi. ct _the appellants. Bose, J. , however, did not agree an_d recorded his diss! 'lpt with deepest regret. In dealing with the merits of the controversy raised before the Court Patanjali Sastri, C. J. , referred to the fact that according to the dissenting view "the decision of the majority in the case of Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra ( 1 ) marked a retreat from the position taken up by the majority in the - earlier case of Anwar Ali Sarkar ( 2 )".

He, however, added that the Saurashtra case (I) " would seem to -lay down the principle that if the impugned legislation indicates the policy which inspired it and the object which it seeks to attain, tbe mere fact that tbe legis- lation does not itself make a complete and precise classification of the persons or things to which it is to be applied, but leaves the selective application of the law to be made by the executive authority in accord- ance with the standard indicated or the underlying· policy and object disclosed is not a sufficient ground for condemning it - as arbitr_ary ~nd, therefore, ob~ noxious to Art. 14. " · There is is one more decision to which reference may be made. In Gopi Chand v. Delhi Administra- tion ( 3 ) this Court has upheld the yalidity of s. 36(1) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act 5 of 1949.

The provisions of this section authorised the State Govern· ment to apply the prescribed summons procedure for the trial of the specified offences in dangerously (I) [1952] S. C. R. 435· (2) [1952] s. c. R. 284. (3) A. I. R. 1959 S. C. 609. - 662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2)] r959 disturbed areas. The notification issued by the State Government under authority conferred on it by the Kangsari Haldar · d A h JI d ffi · A and Another 1mpug~e ct was c a enge as o endmg rt. 14 v. but this challenge was repelled and the statutory The State of provision and the notification were held to be valid. West Bengal The 'result of these decisions appears to be this. G . . d-dk 1 In considering the validity of the impugned statute . •Jen rag• ar · on the ground that it violates Art. 14 it would first be necessary to ascertain the policy underlying the statute and the object intended to be achieved by it.

In this process the preamble to the Act and its mate- rial provisions can and must be considered. Having thus ascertained the policy and the object of the Act the court should apply the dual test in examining its validity : Is the classification rational and based on intelligible differentia; and has the basis of differenti- ation any rational nexus with its avowed policy and object? If both these tests are satisfied the statute must be held to be valid; and in such a case the consideration as to whether the same result could not have been better achieved by adopting a different classification would be foreign to the scope of the judicial enquiry. If either of the two tests is not satisfied the statute must be struck down as violative of Art. 14. Applying this test it seems to us that the impugned provisions contained in s. 2(b) and the provisil to s. 4(1) cannot be said to contravene Art. 14. As we have indicated earlier, if in issuing the notification authorised by s.

2(b) the State Govern- ment acts mala fide or exercises its power in a colour- a. ble way that can always be effectively challenged; but, in the absence of any such plea and without adequate material in that behalf this aspect of the matter does not fall to be considered in the present appeal. The result is the order passed by the High Court is confirmed and the appeal dismissed. Before we part with this appeal, however, we would like to add that, since the offences are alleged to have been committed more than ten years ago, it is desirable that the case against the appellants should now be tried and disposed of as expeditiously as possible. , - S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 663 SARKAR J. The question that arises in this appeal is whether a certain provision of the Tribunals of Criminal Jurisdiction Act, 1952, (W. B. Act XIV of 1952) is void as it takes away the right conferred by art. 14 of the Constitution. In my view, it is. The Act came into force on July 30, 1952.

The object of the Act is set out in the preamble which so far as is relevant in this case reads, "Whereas it is expedient in the interests of the security of the State, the maintenance of public peace and tranquillity ..... . . . . .... . . . . . . .. to provide for the speedy ,trial of the offences specified in the Schedule ; It is hereby enacted .... " The provisions of the Act which have to be con- sidered in this case are set out below. S. 2. Definitions. -In this Act unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,- (a) ...................................................... •........ (b) "disturbed area" means an area in which in . the opinion of the State Government- (i) there was or (ii) there is any extensive disturbance of the public peace and tranquillity and in respect of which area the State Government has issued a notification declaring such area to be a disturbed area.

In cases falling under clause (i) the notification shall have effect during such period as may be specified therein, and in cases falling under clause (ii) the notification shall have effect from such date· as m;:i,y be speci- fied in the notificatiqn until the notification is revoked; (c ) ............................................................... . (d) "Scheduled offence" means any offence speci- fied in the Schedule. (e) "Tribunal" means a Tribunal of Criminal Jurisdiction constituted under sub-section (i) of sec- tion 3. -s. 4. (i) Scheduled offences shall be triable by the Tribunals only ; ',. ,,, ... ' ,. ,,. ' .. '' . , ..... ' ,. ,,. , ,,,,. '' ~· ... '. ,' .. , ...... ······· I959 Kangsari Haldar and Another v. The State of West Bengal Sarkar]. I959 Kangsari H aldar and Another v. The State of West Bengal Sarkar J. 664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)] SCHEDULE ' 1. ........................................................... .. 2.

An offence punishable under section 302, sec- tion 304, section 307, section 326, section 363, section 364, section 365, section 366, section 376, section 395, section 396, section 397, or section 436 of the Indian Penal Code, if committed in a disturbed area. 3. ······································ ...................... . 4. Any conspiracy to cdmmit or. any attempt to commit or any abetment of any of the offences specified in items 1 to 3. The Act provides by some of the sections which need not be set om, a special procedure for trial under it. Thus the trial is to be without a jury even in cases which are triable by a jury. Again, the Tribunal is to follow the procedure laid down for the trial of warrant cases by a Magistrate, instituted otherwise than on a police report 'and the procedure for committal for trial is omitted. Further, a Judge presiding over a Tribu- nal may act on the evidence recorded by his predeces- sor.

The procedure provided by the Act is thus clearly less beneficent to an accused than the normal pro- cedure under the Code of Criminal Procedure, which would have to be adopted for his trial if the Act had not been passed. The learned Advocate-General of West Bengal, appearing for the respondent, the State · of West Bengal, did not contend to the contra,ry. The Act, therefore, provides a disadvantageous and so, a discriminatory procedure for the persons who come under its scope. We turn now to the facts of this case. On Septem- ber 12, 1952, the Government of West Bengal issued a notification under s. 2(b) of the Act declaring the whole area within the jurisdiction of Kakdwip and Sagar police-stations to be a disturbed area and specified the period from January' 1, 1948, to March 31, 1950, to be the period during which the notification was to have effect.

The Special Public Prosecutor Kakdwip cases, of the Government of West Bengal filed a complaint against the appellants and several other persons as a result of the proceedings ta. ken by tha. t Government in case . • - S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 665 No. 1 of Judicial Department Notification No. 5916 dated October 24, 1952. The date of the complaint does not appear from the record.

The case against the appellants and the other persons appears to be that, between the dates mentioned in the Notification of September 12, 1952, they were among the leaders of the violent form of a movement called the Tebhaga movement, in the Kakdwip area and they, with the others, led the movement to kill the landlords and jotdars and burn down their houses, so that the bhag- chasis, that is, the cultivators who cultivated the lands of the landlords and jotdars on the basis of getting a share of the crop produced, might obtain full control over the lands they cultivated and the object of the movement included offering resistance to and killing the police if they intervened, and burning down school houses where the police frequently camped. On the aforesaid complaint, on March 3, 1958, pro- ceedings were started against the appellants under the Act. After examining 99 witnesses the learned Judge presiding over the Tribunal hearing the case, fram!

'ld a charge against them on May 16, 1958, under s. 120 B, read with ss. 302 and 436, of the Indian Penal Code. These offences are included in items Nos. 2 and 4 of the Schedule. On May 26, 1958, the appellants moved the High Court at Calcutta under art. 227 of the Constitution and s. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for an order quashing the proceedings against them on certain grounds. I propose to deal in this judgment with one of these grounds only. It was said that s 2(b) of the Act in so far as it allowed the Govern- ment to declare an area in which "there was" dis- turbance in the past, to be a disturbed area, offends art. 14. of the Constitution as it then discriminates between persons who had committed the same offences in that area within the specified period but whose trials had been concluded befo. re the notification and others similarly situated but whose trials had not been so concluded.

It was said that the former class of per- sons had the advantage of the normal procedure while 85 r959 Kan gsari H aldar and Another v. The State of West Bengal Sarkar ]. 666 SUPREME COURT R:JJ:l'ORTS [1960 (2)] '9.! 9 the latter, in whom the appellants are included, were to be tried by a less advantageous procedure. Kangsari Haldar and Another The application of the appellants was heard by a v. The State oj U' est Bengal bench of the High Court consisting of Mitter and Bhattacharya, J J. These learned Judges came to enter- tain different views on the question. Mitter, J. , thought Sarkar J. that the Act had been given a retrospective operation by permitting the declaration of an area as a disturbed area for a past period but th11t the Act dealt only with procedure and procedural alterations were always retrospective. Bhattacharya, J.

, seems to have been of the view that a retrospective operation even of a procedural statute is not permissible if such operation results in the statute offending art. 14; that the princi- ple of the retrospective operation of a procedural statute is not available to by-pass the constitutional safeguard guaranteed by art. 14. In view of this difference of opinion, the matter was referred to a third learned Judge of the Court, namely, Sen, J. He was of the view that the retrospective operation of the Act, by which he meant the applic- ation of the procedure laid down in it to cases in res- pect of offences committed before the Act the trial of which had not been concluded, did not offend art. 14; that there w11s no fundamental right to a particular procedure for trial and alterations in the procedural law were always retrospective unless the contrary was ' indicated.

He further observed, " The change in the procedure made by a statute in respect of offences falling within a prescribed reasonable classification, affects all pending cases of that class; and so long as all pending cases within the class are tried under the special procedure, there is no discrimination. " In the result, the appellant's application was refused. They have now appealed to this Court. It seems to me that the learned Judges of the High Court were unduly oppressed by considerations of the retrospective operation of the Act. The question is not whether the Act is prospective or retrospective in its operation. Nor is it the question whether the Act deals with procedures or substantive rights. The only question is whether the Act operates in respect only of • - - - S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 667 a class of persons and if so, whether the classification 1 959 is justifiable. Whether a law offends art. 14, does not ,,. ---:--H Id d d h h 't . . . ..

angsars a ar epen upon w et er i is prospective or retrospective. and Another There is nothing in art. 14 to indicate that a law v. operating retrospectively cannot offend it. It is possible The State of both for prospective and retrospective statutes to West Bengal contravene the provisions of that article. It is not necessary therefore to consider whether the Act is prospective or retrospective or whether it concerns procedure or substantive rights. The general rule is that a law must apply to all persons. But it is permissible within certain well- recognised limits, to validly legislate for a class of persons. The test for a valid classification is well- known. It may be read from the judgment in the recent case of Sri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar 1 • Das, C. J. , said at p.

298 : " In determining the validity or otherwise of such a statute the court has to examine whether such classification is or can be reasonably regarded as based upon some differentia which distinguishes such persons or things grouped together from those left out of the group and whether such differentia has a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute ...... Where the court finds that the classification satisfies the tests, the court will uphold the validity of the law. " Again at p. 299 he observed: "A statute may not make any classification of the persons or things for the purpose of applying its provisions but may leave it to the discretion of the Government to select and classify persons or things to whom its provisions are to apply ...................... ..

the court will strike down the statute if it does not lay down any principle or policy for guiding the exercise of the discretion by the Government in the matter of selection or classification ..................... . In such a case the court will strike down both the law as well as the executive action taken under such law. " (1) [1959] S. C. R. 279. Sarkar]. I9$9 Kangsari Haldar and' Anolher v. The State of West Bengal Sarkar]. 668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)] The statute before us has made a classification in regard to offences. It a pp lies only to those offences which are mentioned in the Schedule. I will assume that this classification satisfies the test and is good. I wish to observe here that in this case I am consider- ing the validity of the statute only in so far as it is concerned with an offence committed in a disturbed area. Such an offence comes under items 2 and 4 of the Schedule which alone, therefore, I have set out.

Now, the Act leaves it to the Government to decide which is a disturbed area and to make a classification on the basis of areas. I will also assume that the Act is not invalid in so far as it leaves it to the Govern- ment to make this classification; that it lays down a principle or policy, namely, extensive disturbance of public peace and tranquillity for gniding the Govern- ment in making this classification. Now, s. 2(b) empowers the Government to declare an area to be a disturbed area where "there was" extensive disturbance of the public peace and tran- quillity in the past. The Government has however to mention in the notification making such a declara- tion, the period during which it shall have effect; in other words, the notification has to specify the ]Jeriod in which in the area declared a "disturbed area'', disturbance of the public peace and tranquillity had taken place.

The area so declared a "disturbed area" becomes a " disturbed area" within the meaning of the Act for that period only. In such a case only such of the offences mentioned in items Nos. 2 and 4 of the Schedule as were committed in the specified area during the specified period come under the scope of the Act. This is the kind of declaration of a "disturb- ed area " that we have in this case. The effect of this kind of declaration is that it makes the Act applicable only to persons who have committed any of the specified offences in the area and during the period indicated. As will presently be seen, it does not apply to all such persons. This being a case, where there had been disturbances in the area in the past, the period mentioned in the declaration must be a period in the past. . That is what happened in the present case. The declaration was made on ,,. i ,. S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 669 September 12, 1952, and the period specified was from January 1, 1948, to March 31, 1950.

It is possible in such a case that many of the persons who had commit- ted the offences within the past period specified in the declaration, might have already been tried and their trials concluded before the declaration was made. They would in such circumstances have been tried according to the normal procedure provided by the Code of Criminal Procedure. 'To them the Act does not apply. Other persons, like the appellants who committed the same offences in the same period and in the same area but whose trials had not been concluded before the declaration was made, have to be tried under the disadvantageous procedure prescribed by the Act. The effect of the Act therefore is to group into one class, persons committing the specified offences in the specified area and in the specified period whose trials had not been concluded before the making of the declaration. It is only to them that the Act applies. This is where the difficulty arises.

There does not seem to be any intelligible differentia by which such persons can be differentiated from others who commit- ted the same offences in the same area and during the same period but whose trials had been concluded before the making of the declaration. The object of the Act, as earlier stated, is to secure speedy trials in the interests of the security of the State and the maintenance of the public peace and tranquillity in view of the extensive disturbance of the public peace and tranquillity in an area. It would be necessary to carry out this object that both the classes of persons, namely, those whose trials had been concluded as also those whose trials had not been concluded, should be treated according to the same law. The only distinc- tion between the two classes is that in one case the trials had been concluded while in the other, they had not been. Now that is not a differentia, if it may be called so, which has any reasonable relation to the object of the Act.

Indeed, in order to secure that object, it is necessary to place both the classes of persons in the same situation. By permitting a declar- ation classifying offences committed in the past, the Act makes a classification which cannot stand the r959 K angsari Hold a• and Another v. The State of West Bengal ·Sarkar]. I959 Kangsari Haldar and Another v. The State of Wesl Bengal Sarkar]. 670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)) well-known test which I have read from Ram Krishna Dalmia' s case('). It cannot be said that the object of the Act is only to provide speedy trial and that therefore as there is no question of speedy trial in the cases where the trials had alr'eady been concluded there is an intelligible differentia between such cases and those where the trial hadnot been concluded. It is quite plain that the object of the Act is not simply to provide a speedy trial. Indeed, all offences require speedy trial.

The object of the Act is expressly to provide speedy trial of certain offences committed in a specified area and during a specified period because "it is expedient in the interests of the security of the State, the maintenance of public peace and tranquillity " to do so. The classification by areas is based on disturbance in an area and the neces- sity of restoring peace there. Such being the object, a distinction made between the cases were the trials had been concluded and the cases where the trials had not been concluded, is not a distinction which has any rational relation to that object. The learned Advocate-General for the State of West Bengal contended that this case is covered by the decision of this court in Gopi Chand v. Delhi Adminis- tration('). There, no such difficulty as arises in this case, had arisen. I therefore do not think that that case is of any assistance. In my view, s.

2(b) of the Act in so far as it permits an area which was a disturbed area in the past to be declared a disturbed area for the purposes of the Act, offends art. 14 of the Constitution and is therefore un- constitutional and void. The declaration in the present case was made under that portion of s .. 2(b) and it cannot be sustained. That portion of the Act and the Notification of September 12, 1952, must therefore be held to be void. In the result I would allow the appeal. ORDER OF COURT In view of the opinion of the majority, the order passed by the High Court is confirmed and the appeal is dismissed. (1) [1959] S. C. R. 279, (2) A. I. R. 1959 S. C. p. 6o9. ' . -

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