KAVALAPPARA KOTTARATHIL KOCHUNI AND OTHERS v. THE STATE OF MADRAS AND OTHERS

Citation: [1960] 3 S.C.R. 887; 1960 INSC 100

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA , SYED JAFFER IMAM, A.K. SARKAR, K. SUBBA RAO, J.C. SHAH

Judgment date: 1960-05-04

Case summary

1960 INSC 100. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1960-05-04. KAVALAPPARA KOTTARATHIL KOCHUNI AND OTHERS v. THE STATE OF MADRAS AND OTHERS. Read the...

Judgment text

3 S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 887 against the excess dividends. In our opinion, the question of modification of the language cannot arise in the circumstances of the case. Our reasons have been given in Civil Appeal No. 427 of 1957, decided today, and we need not go over the ground again. · 1 t" f · t · 1 d Th Jalgaon There is a so no ques 10n o unJUS ness invo ve . e Income-tax law seeks to p11t in the net certain class of income, and can only successfully do so, if it frames a provision appropriate to that end. If the law fails and the tax-payer cannot be brought within its letter, no question of unjustness as such, arises. The answers given by the High Court to the two questions were correct in the circumstances of the case. In the result, the appeal fails, and will be dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed . KA V ALAPPARA KOTTARATHIL KOCHUNI AND OTHERS v. THE STATE OF MADRAS AND OTHERS (B. P. SINHA, c. J. , JAFER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR, K. SUBBA RAO and J. C. SHAH, JJ.

) Marumakkathayam Law-Enactment for removal of doubts- Constitutional validity-Madras Marumakkathayam (Removal of Doubts) Act, I955 (32 of r955)-Constitution of India, Arts. r9(r) (f), ]I, 3rA. These petitions by the holder of Kavalappara Sthanam, his wife, daughters and son challenged the constitutional validity of the Madr8s Marumakkathayam (Removal of Doubts) Act, 1955, passed by the Madras Legislature soon after the Privy Council had declared the properties in possession of the Sthanee to be Sthanam properties in which the members of the tarwad had no interest. Section 2 of the Act, which contained the substantive provision, was as follows:-- " 2.

Notwithstanding any decision of Court, any sthanam in respect of which :- ~a) there is or had been at any time an intermingling of the properties of the sthanam and the properties of the tarwad, or (b) the members of the tarwad have been receiving maintenance from the properties purporting to be sthanam properties as of right, or in pursuance of a custom or otherwise, or (c) there had at any time been a vacancy caused by there being no male member of the tarwad eligible to succeed to the Sthanam, shall be deemed to be and shall be deemed always to have been a Marumakkathayam tarwad and the properties appertaining to such a sthanam shall be deemed to be and shall be deemed always to have been properties belonging to the tarwad to which the provisions of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1932 (Mad. XXII of 1933), shall apply. " Madt"as The question for decision was whether the impugned Act infringed the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed by Arts.

4, 19(r)(f) and 31 of the Constitution. Held (per Sinha, C. J. , Subba Rao and Shah, JJ. ) that the three tests laid down by the Act were contrary to the well-settled principles of Marumakkathayam Law with regard to which there could be no scope for doubt and as such not only not germane but extraneous to the object it sought to achieve. They were a device to deprive the sthanam of its properties and vest them in the tarwad and as such directly hit by Art. 19(r)(f) and could not be saved by Art. 1915). Assuming that the Sthanam properties were held in janmam right and as such were estates within the meaning of Art. 31A, tbe impugned Act was immune from challenge. That Article, properly construed, envisages agrarian reform and provides for the acquisition, extinguishment or modification of proprietory and various other kinds of subordinate rights in a tenure called the estate solely for that purpose arid must be limited to it.

Although it may not be permissible to refer to the statement of objects and reasons of its amendment for purposes of construction, it can be referred to for the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time and purpose underlying the amendment. Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, [1953] S. C. R. 1, considered. There is no substance in the argument that since the impugned Act seeks to regulate the rights of the Sthanee and the junior members of the tarwad inter se it falls within by cl. (2)(b) of Art. 31A. That clause has to be read with cl. (1)(a) of the Article and since the impugned Act does not contemplate any agrarian reform or seek to regulate the rights inter se between landlords and tenants or modify or extinguish any of the rights appertaining janmam right, leaving all its characteristics intact, it does not come within the purview of Art. 31A of the Constitution. Sri Ram Ram Narain v. State of Bombay, [1959] Supp. I S. C. R. 489, and Atma Ram v.

State of Punjab, [1959] Supp. I S. C. R. 748, referred to. Fundamental rights have a transcendental position in the Constitution and before an Article embodying a fundamental right can be construed to exclude another every attempt should be made to harmonise them and not until it is found impossible to do so, can one be made to yield to the other. Barring .. such exceptional cases, any law that infringes any of the fundamental rights must be void, The word 'law' in Art. 31(1) must mean a valid law, and such a law must satisfy two tests, (1) that the legislature must be competent to enact it and (2) that it must not infringe any fundamental rights. A law that deprives a citizen of his property must, therefore, be invalid if it infringes Art. r9(1)(f) of the Constitution. Deep Chand v. State of U. P. , [1959] Supp. (2) S. C. R. 8, and Basheshwar Nath v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi, [1959] Supp. l S. C. R. 528, referred to.

Article 31 of the Constitution, since its amendment by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, is no longer a self-contained Article prnviding for a subject different from that dealt with by Art. 19, but deals with two different subjects, els. (2) and (2A) dealing with acquisition and requisition and cl. (1) with deprivation of property by authority of law, and can no longer be construed on the analogy of Art. 21 so as to exclude the operation of Art. 19. The State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, [1954] S. C. R. 587, A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras, [1950] S. C. R. 88, referred to. State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji and Anr. , [1955] l S. C. R. 777, held inapplicable. Nor does Art. 31(1) deal with police power. Although such power, as understood in America, is no arbitrary power divorced from social control and public good, there can be no need of importing such a doctrine into the Indian Constitution. I The word 'law' used by Art.

31(1) indicates its limitation and refers back to Art. 19 and any law made under Art. 31(1) can be sustained only if the restrictions it imposes are reasonable and in the interest of the general public. The Constitution does ( not confer on the Indian Parliament the same power which the Parliament of England possesses and while it does contemplate a welfare State, that has to be brought about within its frame-work of the Constitution itself. The correct approach should, therefore, be first to ascertain the fundamental right and then to see whether the law infringes that right. If ex facie it does so, it has to stand the test of Art. 19(5). In certain circumstances, however, deprivation of fundamental right to property may also amount to a reasonable restriction under the Article. Narendra Kumar v. The Union of India, [1960] 2 S. C. R. 375, referred to.

Individual proprietary rights being ordinarily inviolable unless a clear case is made out for restricting them, there must be a harmonious balancing between the fundamental rights declared by Art. 19(1) and social control permitted by Art. 19(5). It is a. ::_,, implicit in the nature of restrictions that no inflexible standard r: can be laid down and each case must be decided on its own facts. But the restrictions must not be arbitrary and must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved and shall be in the interest of the general public. State of Madras v. V. G. Rao, [1952] S. C. R. 597, Henry Webster v. Peter Cooper, 14 Law Ed. 5ro, and The Citizens' Savings and Loan Association and Cleaveland, Ohio v. Topeka City, 22 Law Ed. 455, referred to. Although the redress of a real and genuine grievance of a . section of the community may be in public interest, it is impos- Madras sible to hold that the impugned legislation was either justified or in such public interest.

. Iswari Prasad v. N. R. Sen, A. LR.. 1952 Cal. 273, held inapplicable. . Marumakkathayam Law is a body of customs and usages that have received judicial recognition, and is fundamentally different from Hindu Law, being a matriarchal system. The family, called tarwad, consists of all the descendants of one common ancestor. It consists of a mother and her male and female children and the children of those female children and so on. Only the senior-most male member can attain the sthanam, which is a position of dignity with specific properties attached to it. When he does so and becomes the Sthanee he ceases to have. any interest in the tarwad properties. Occasionally a female member also becomes the Sthanee. Like a Hindu widow or an impartible estate-holder the Sthanee has an absolnte interest in the income of the Sthanam properties or acquisitions therefrom.

A member of the tarwad has no right to maintenance from out of the Sthanam properties nor can such property be converted into tarwad property by the grant of such maintenance by custom or otherwise or intermingling of the Sthanam properties with the tarwad properties by the Sthanee. His position approximates to that of a member separated from a Hindu family and there can be no scope for the application of the doctrine of blending. Like the Sthanee who ceases to have any present proprietary interest in the tarwad, the members of the tarwad also can have no present proprietary interest in the sthanam property. They continue to be blood relations with a contingent right of succession to each others' property that is no more than a spes successionis. The right of a subsequently born male member of the tarwad to succeed to the Sthanam and its property is judicially recognised. Case-law reviewed. Per Imam and Sarkar, JJ. -The impugned Act is protected by Art.

31A and is not open to question in the ground that it violates Arts. 14, 19(1)(f) and 31(1) of the Constitution. There is no basis for the contention that Art. 31(1)(a) contemplates a law relating to agrarian reform only. The Article makes no mention of any such reform and there can be no doubt that under it a janmam right may be acquired, extinguished or modified whether the land held in such right is agricultural or not. It is not permissible to refer to the objects and reasons stated in the Bills, by which the Acts amending Art. 31A of the · Constitution were introduced, for the construction of the statute and, therefore, the word 'law' in Art. 31A(1) cannot be read in relation to sub-cl. (a) only as a law intended to achieve agrarian reform on the basis of the supposed object of the Legislature in enacting Art. 31A. Aswini Kumar Ghos~ v. Arabinda Bose, [1953] S. C. R. l, referred to.

It is not correct to say that the impugned Act does not effect any modification of janmam rights and therefore it does not come within Art. 31A. When the Article speaks of modification of janmam rights, it does not speak of such rights in the abstract but contemplates the modification of such rights held by a person. It would be as much modification of janmam rights, if such rights held by one person are directed to be held by a number of persons jointly, as when the incidents of such rights are altered. Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. The State of Bombay, [1959] Supp. l S. C. R. 489, and Atma Ram v. State of Punjab, [1959] Supp. l S. C. R. 748, relied on. It is not correct to say that the Legislature in giving the provisions of the impugned Act retrospective operation or in providing that they should prevail notwithstanding any decision of the court to the contrary, was acting judicially and not in a legislative capacity and that the Act was on that ground invalid.

The rule obtaining in America that legislative action cannot retroact on past controversies and reverse decisions of courts and the relevant American decisions can have no application in India. I;iare Dusadh's case, [1944] F. C. R. 6I, referred to. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 443 of i955 and 40-41 of 1956. Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights. M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, S. N. And-ley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the petitioners (In all the petitions). fl. H. Dhebar and T. M. Sen, for the State of Madras. K. V. Suryanarayana Iyer, Advocate-General for the State of Kerala and T. M. Sen, for the State of Kerala. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and M. R. Krishna Pillai, for respondents Nos. 2 to 9. Purshottam Trikamdas and M. R. Krishna Pillai, for respondent No. 12 (In Petn. Nos. 40-41 of 56). A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and K. R. Krishnaswami, for respondents Nos. 13 and 15-17 (In Petn. No.

443 of 55). K. R. Krishnaswami for respondents Nos. 11 and 14 (In all the petitions). Purshottam Trikamdas and K. R. K rishnaswami, for respondent No. 12 (In Petn. No. 443 of 55). A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and M. R. Krishna Pillai, for Intervener No. 1. Sardar Bahadur, for Intervener No. 2. 1960. May 4. The judgment of Sinha, 0. J. , Subba Rao and Shah, JJ. , was delivered by Subba Rao, ;r. · The judgment of Imam and Sarkar, JJ. was delivered by Sarkar, J. SuBBA RAO, J. -These three connected petitions filed under Art. 32 of the Constitution raise the ques-t. ion of the const. itutional validity of the Madras Marumakkathayam (Removal of Doubts) Act, 1955, (Madras Act 32 of 1955) (hereinafter referred to as the impugned Act). These petitions were heard by this Court on a preliminary question raised by the res·-pondents and the judgment thereon was delivered on March 4, 1959. This Court rejected t.

he preliminary objection and directed the petitions to be heard on merits, and pursuant to that order, these petitions were posted for disposal on merits. The facts have been fully stated by Das, C. J. , in the prelimina. ry judgment and it would, therefore, be sufficient if the relevant facts pertaining to the ques· tions raised were stated here. The petitioner in Petition No. 443 of 1955 is Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochunni @ Moopil Nair. He is the holder of the Kavalappara sthanam to which is attached Kavalappara estate situate in Walluvanad Taluk in the district of South Malabar. In pre-British times the Kavalappa. ra Moopil Nair, who was the seniormost male member ofKavalappara Swaroopam (dynasty), was the ruler of Kavalappara territory. He had sovereign rights over his territory.

Besides the Rajasthanam, the Kavalappara Moopil Nair held five other sthanams granted by the Raja of Palghat for rendering military services and two other sthanams granted to his ancestors by the Raja of Cochin for rendering similar services. Properties are attached to . each of these sthanams. The petitioner's immediate predecessor died in 1925 and· the petitioner became the Moopil Nair of Kavalappara estate and as such the sthanee of the properties -· attached to the various sthanams held by him. The petitioner in Petition No. 443 of 1955 will herea. fter Kov,lrippara be referred to as "the sthanee ". Respondents 2 to 17 K oltarathil Krchuni are the junior members of the Kavalappara tarwad, v. and, according to the sthanee, they have no interest State of Madras in the said properties. In 1932, the Madras Marumakkathayam Act (Wad. Suiba Rao].

Act XXII of 1932) came into force whercunder the members of a Malabar tarwad were given a right to enforce partition oftarwad properties or to have them • registered as impartible. After some infructuous proceedings under the provisions of the said Act, respondents 10 to 17, who then constituted the entire Kavalappara ta,rwad, filed O. S. No. 46 of 1934 in the court of the Subordinate Judge of Ottapalam for a declaration that all the properties under the management of the sthanee were tarwad properties belonging equally and jointly to the sthanee and the members of the tarwad. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the s11it. On appeal, the High C. mrt of Madras on April 9, 1943, allowed the appeal and reversed the decision &f the Subordinate Judge and decreed the suit. On further appeal to the Privy Council, the Board by its judgment dated July 29, 1947, restored the judgment of the Subordinate Judge.

The Privy Council found that the Kavalappara estate in Walluvanad Taluk was an impartible estate and that nothing had hap-pened to alter the original character of the property in its relation to the members of the family. On that finding, the Privy Council held that respondents 10 t0 17 were not entitled to the declaration they sought in that case. The result of that litigation was that all the properties in the possession of the sthanee were declared to be sthanam properties and that the members of the. tar wad had no interest therein. After the title of the sthanee was thus established, the Madras Legislature passed the impugned Act in 1955. Under the impugned Act, every sthanam possessing one or other of the three characteristics mentioned therein-it is common case that the impugned Act applies to the petitioner's sthanam-shall be deemed and shall be deemed always to have been properties belonging to the tarwad.

The sthanee n6 states that the impugned Act is ultra vires the Madras Legislature, void and inoperative and that the said Act cannot affect the rights of the sthanee or his estate to any extent. The first petitioner in Petition No. 40 of 1956 is the wife of the sthanee, who has also been added as respondent 18 to this petition; and petitioners 2 and 3 therein are their daughters. The first respondent to the said petition is the State of Madras and respon. dents 2 to 17 are the members of the tarwad. On August 3, 1955, the sthanee executed a gift deed in favour of the petitioners in the said petition in respect of properties granted to his predecessor by the Raja of Palghat. This petition raised the Sil-me questions as Petition No. 443 of 1955 and seeks for the same reliefs. Petition No. 41 of 1956 is filed by Ravunniarath Rajan Menon, who is the son of the sthanee.

The first respondent therein is the State of Madras and respondents 2 to 17 are the members of the tarwad itnd respondent 18 is the sthanee. This petitioner alleges that on August 3, 1955, the sthanee executed a gift deed in his favour in respect of the properties granted to the sthanee's predecessor by the Raja of Cochin. This petition contains similar allegations as the other two petitions and asks for similar reliefs. The learned Attorney-General, appearing for the petitioners in all the three petitions, raised before, us the following points: (1) The impugned Act is constitu-tionally void, because it offends against Art. 14 of the Constitution. (2) It is also void because it deprives the sthanee of his fundamental right to hold and dispose of property and thereby offends against Art. 19(1) (f) of the Constitution and is not saved by cl. (5) of Art. 19. (3) The impugned A_ct is further bad because it has been.

made by the Legislature not in exercise of its legislative power but in exercise of judicial power. Learned counsel for the respondents while counter-ing the arguments advanced by the learned Attorney- General raised two further points, viz. , (1) the petitioner's sthanam is an " estate " within the meaning of Art. 31A of the Constitution and therefore the Act extinguishing or modifying the rights pertaining to the said sthanam cannot be questioned on the ground that it infringes Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution ; and (2) the impugned Act purports to deprive the petitioner of his sthanam properties by aut. hority oflaw within the meaning of Art. 31(1) of the Constitution and, as he is legally deprived of his properties, Art. 19(1) (f) of the Constitution has no application, for, it is said, Art.

19(1) (f) pre-supposes the existence of the petitioner's title to the sthanam and its properties, and, as he is deprived of his title therein by the impugned Act, he can no longer rely upon his fundamental right under Art. 19(1) (f). Learned counsel for the respondents further contended that the gifts of the sthanam properties by the sthanee in favour of the petitioners in the other two petitions were void and that, therefore, they have no fundamental right to enable them to come to this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution. Before we pass on to the merits of the case, it would be convenient at the outset to clear the ground. It cannot be disputed that the impugned Act passed by the Madras Legislature could not have had any extra-territorial operation so as to affect the properties in the quondam Cochin State.

It is not disputed that, after the States J{eorganization, the provisions of the Act were not extended by any legal process to the properties situate in that area of the Kerala State which originally formed part of Cochin State. In the premises, we are not called upon to decide the fundamental right of the sthanee in respect of the sthanam properties in the said area. We do not also propose to express any opinion on the validity or otherwise of the gift deeds executed by the sthanee in favour of his wife and daughters, and son; for, if the gifts were valid, the donees would have a right to maintain the petitions, and if they were not valid, the donor would continue to be the owner of the properties gifted. The title inter se is not really germane to the present enquiry, for the validity of the Act in respect of sthanam properties other than those in the Cochin State falls to. be decided in the first petition itself..

We, therefore, leave open the question of the validity of the gift deeds. We shall take first the contention of the respondents based on Art. 31A of the Constitution, for, if that contention was accepted, no other questions except one would arise for consideration. Learned Attorney-Genera! contends that the question was not specifically raised in the pleadings, that it was a mixed question of fact and law, and that if it was allowed to be raised at this stage, his clients would be irreparably prejudiced. Further, he argues that there is no material on the record on the basis of which we can decide whether the properties of the petitioners are held in janmam right or not. In the counter-affidavit filed by respondents 2 to 17, no plea on the basis of Art. 31A is taken. Only in the counter filed by the State of Kerala, this contention is raised.

~ Paragraph 6 of the counter-affidavit contains the said plea and it is : "I am advised that the impugned statute is not open to attack on any of the grounds set forth in the petition and further and in any view of the case that it is saved by virtue of the provisions of Art. 31 A of the Constitution as amended by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955. " Except this bald statement, no statement is made to the effect that all the properties of the sthanee, or any . portion thereof, are held in janmam right.

Learned Advocate-General, appearing for the State of Kerala, while conceding that the plea could have been more precise, and supported by definite particulars, contends that there is material on the record contain-ing the admission of the petitioner in the first petition that the properties are janmam properties, and, even apart from such admission, whatever properties the petitioner held as appertaining to the sthanam, they could not be other thau janmam properties or properties held as a subordinate tenure-holder under a janmi and that in either case they would form part of an "estate" within the meaning of Art. 31A of the Constitution. It is true that in the previous proceedings which went up to the Privy Council, there is a statement ::> S. C. 1\, ~U. PHEME COU]:{,T HE. POH.

T~ 897 that in regard to the properties under the manage- 1960 ment of the Court of Wards, " sthanam registration K • valappara took place in Malabar and all the properties belong- Kottarathil ing to the sthanee were registered in the name of l<ochuni v. Kavalappara Moopil Nair". But that in itself does State of Madras not conclude the matter. Ordinarily, when a question raised depends upon elucidation of further facts not Subba Rao ]. disclosed in the statements already filed, we would be very reluctant to allow a party to raise such a plea at the time of arguments. But in this case we do not think we would be justified in not allowing the respondents to raise the contention, as the validity of the impugned Act depends upon the application of Art. 31A of the Constitution. We would, therefore, for the purpose of this petition, assume against the petitioner that he is in possession of the properties in janmam right and proceed to consider on that basis the contention raised.

Learned counsel for the respondents contends that Art. 31A of the Constitution excludes the operation of Art. 13 in the matter of the extinguishment or modification of any rights in an estate, that the impugned legislation either extinguishes or modifies the sthanam right in the janmam property which is an "estate" as defined in the said Article and that, therefore, the impugned Act cannot be challenged on the ground that it infringes Arts. 14, 19 and 31 in Part III of the Constitution. To appreciate this contention it will be convenient to read the material portions of Art. 31A. , ' Article 31A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained ii;i article 13, no law providing for- (a) the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or . modification of any such rights, ...............................................................

shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by article 14,. article 19 or article 31. o o 0 0 0 o o 0 o 0 o 0 o o o o o o 0 0 o 0 o o o o o 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o 0. 0 I 0 0 o 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 I (2) In this article,- (a) The expression "estate" shall, in relation to any local area, have the same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing law relating to land tenures in force in that area, and shall also include any jagir, inam or muafi or other similar grants and in the States of Madras and Kerala any janmam right. (b) the expression" right", in relation to an estate, shall include any rights vesting in a proprietor, sub-proprietor, under-proprietor, tenure-holder, raiyat, under-raiyat or other intermediary and any rights or privileges in respect of land revenue. " This Article was introduced in the Constitution by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951.

As it originally stood, the said Article only provided that no law affecting rights of any proprietor or intermediate holder in any estate shall be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with any of the fundamental rights included in Part III of the Constitution. Article 31A has been amended by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955. The object of the amendment was explained in the Statement of the Objects and Reasons and the relevant part thereof reads : "It will be recalled that the Zamindari abolition laws which came first in our programme of social welfare legislation were attacked by the interests affected mainly with reference to articles 14, HJ and 31, and that in order to put an end to the dilatory and wasteful litigation and place these laws above challenge in the courts, articles 31A and 31B and the Ninth Schedule were enacted by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act.

Subsequent judicial decisions interpreting articles 14, 19 and 31 have raised serious difficulties in the way of the Union and the States putting through other and equally important social welfare legislation on the desired lines, e. g. , the following :- (i) While the abolition of zamindaries and the numerou" '~'°F rn<>diaries between the State and the tiller of tne soil has been achieved for the most part, our next objectives in land reform are the fixing of limits to. the extent of agricultural land that may be owned or occupied by any person, the disposal of ·any land held in excess of the prescribed maximum and the further modification of the rights of land owners and tenants <in agricultural holdings. It is accordingly proposed in clause 3 of the Bill to extend the scope of article 31A so as to cover these categories of essential welfare legislation.

" The object of the amendment relevant to the present enquiry was only to enable the State to implement its next objective in the land reform, namely, the fixing of limits to the extent of agricultural lands that may be owned or occupied by any person, the disposal of any land held in excess of the prescribed maximum and the further modification of the rights of land owners and tenants in agricultural holdings. The object was, therefore, to bring about a change in the agricultural economy but not to recognize or confer any title in the whole or a part of an estate on junior members of a family. This Court has held in Aswini 1 Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose( ) that the statement of objects and reasons is not admissible as an aid to the construction of a statute. But we are referring to it only for the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time the bill was introduced, and the purpose for which the amendment was made.

Unhampered by any judicial decision, let us now scrutinize the express terms of the Article to ascertain its scope and limitations. Sub-cl. (a) of Art. 31A(l) enables the State to acquire any estate or of any rights therein or to extinguish or modify any such rights. "Estate" is defined in cl. (2)(a) to have the same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent bas in the existing law relating to land tenures in force in that area, and by inclusive definition it takes in any jagir, inam, or muafi or other similar grants and in the States of Madras and Kerala any janmam right. Clause (2)(b) defines the expression " rights", in relation to an estate, to include any rights vesting in a proprietor, sub-proprietor, under-proprietor, tenure-holder, raiyat, under-raiyat or other intermediary and any rights or privileges in respect of land revenue. If (1) [r953J S~C.

,R, I, [1960] an estate so defined is acquired by the State, no law enabling the State to acquire any such estate can be questioned as inconsistent with 1the rights conferred by Arts. 14, 19 or 31 of the Constitution. So too, any law extinguishing or modifying any such rights mentioned in cl. (l)(a) and defined in cl. (2)(b) cannot be questioned on the said grounds. The broad contention that a law regulating inter se the rights of a proprietor in his estate and the junior mem hers of his family is also covered by the wide phraseology used in cl. (2)(b ), may appear to be plausible but that argument cannot be sustained if that clause is read along with the other provisions of Art. 31A. The definition of "estate" refers to an existing law relating to land tenures in a particular area indicating thereby that the Article is concerned only with the land tenure described as an "estate ".

The inclusive definition of the rights of such an estate also enumerates the rights vested in the proprietor and his subordinate tenure-holders. The last clauqe in that definition, viz. , that those rights also include the rights or privileges in respect of land revenue, emphasizes the fact that the Article is concerned with land- tenure. It is, therefore, manifest that the said Article deals with a tenure called "estate" and provides for its acquisition or the extinguishment or modification of the rights of the land-holder or the various subordinate tenure-holders in respect of their rights in relation to the estate. The contrary view would enable the State to divest a proprietor of his estate and vest it in another without reference to any agrarian reform.

It would also enable the State to compel a proprietor to divide his properties, though self-acquired, between himself and other members of his family or create interest therein in favour of persons other than tenants who had none before. Such acts have no relation to land-tenures and they are purely acts of expropriation of a citizen's propertv without any reference to agrarian reform. Article 3IA deprives citizens of their fundamental rights and such an Article cannot be extended by interpretation to overreach the object implicit in the Article. The unqoundness of the wider interpretation will be made clear if the Article is construed with reference to the 3 S. C. R. SUPREME COURT . REPORTS 901 janmam right. Under the definition, any janmam right in Kerala is an "estate". A janmam right is Kavalappara the freehold interest in a property situated in Kerala. Kot,arath1l J<ochuni Moor in his "Malabar Law and Custom" describes it v. as a hereditary proprietorship.

A janmam interest State of Madras may, therefore, be described as "proprietary interest of a landlord in lands", and such a janmarn right is Subba Rao]. described as "estate" in the Constitution. Substituting " janmam right " in place of "estate" in cl. 2 (b ), the "rights" in Art. 31A (1) (a) will include the rights of -a proprietor and subordinate tenure-holders in respect of a j1mmarn right. It follows that the extingnishment or modification of a right refers to the rights of a proprietor or a subordinate tenure-holder in the janmam right. A proprietor called the janmi or his subordinate tenure-holder has certain defined rights in a "janmam right". Land-tenures in Malabar are established by precedents or immemorial usage. Janmam right is a freehold interest in property and the landlord is called "janmi ".

He can create many subordinate interests or tenures therein, such a,; vprum-pattom (simple lease), kusbikanom (mortgage of waste land with a view to its being planted on), kushikana-pattam (mortgage of waste land for improvements, the tenant paying rent), kanom kuzhikanom (mortgage of w1iste land for improvements, the landlord receiving some pecuniary consideration), kanom (mortgage with possession, a fee being generally paid), mel-ka.

nom (higher mortgage), koyu panayam (mortgage of the right of cultivation), kanom poramkadam (loan advanced on the security of land already held on mortgage), otti usufructuary mortgage, the full value of the land being advanced), kaivituka otti (usufru<>tua,ry mortgage, with relinquishment of the power nf transfer), ottikkumpuram (where a surn is advanced beyond the otti amount), neerrnuthal (where a further sum is advanced on an otti mortgage in addition to the ottikkumpuram), peruvartham (usufructuary mortgage, the land being redeemable at its value in the market at the time of redemption}, anubham or anubhavam (relinquishment of land for enjoyment by the tenant in perpetuity), karankari or jamma koyu (sale or transfer in perpetuity of the right of cultivation), kariama (right of perpetual enjoyment), cooderoopad or nelamuri (assignment of rent produce), kutti kanom (mortgage of forests, the mort-gagee felling the timber for trade and paying a fee on each stump or tree to the landlord).

These rights may be extinguished or modified. A law may regulate the rights between a janmi and his subordinate tenure-holders ; but it may also affect his rights un-connected with the tenure. To illustrate : A janmi holds 10 acres of land in janmam right, out of which he may sell 2 acres each to five persons; the land is divided into 5 plots held by different holders, but each one continues to have full rights of a janmi; the janmam right is not extinguished or modified, though the land is divided between 5 persons. That is what the imp_ugned Act purports to do. It does not modify any of the rights appertaining to "janmam right", but only confers shares in the property on other members of the tarwad. It is said that the inclusive definition of the expression " rights " in cl. (2) (b) takes in such a case as it extinguishes or modifies the proprietor's right in the land. This is a superficial reading of the Article.

We have already explained how such a modification is not a modification of a right pertaining to a " janmam right ", but only a deprivation of a particular janmi of his right in his property or a curtailment of his right therein, leaving all the characteristics of a janmam right intact. It is said that a contrary construction has been accepted by this Court in two decisions. The first is that in 1 Sri Ram Ram Narain v. State of Bombay ( ). In that case, the constitutional validity of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1956 (Born. XIII of 1956), was canvassed. Under that Act the title to the land which vested originally in the landlord passes to the tenant on the tiller's day or within the alternative period prescribed in that behalf. This title is defeasible only in the event of the tenant failing to appear or making a statement that he is not willing to purchase the land or committing default in payment of the price thereof as determined . (1) [1959] Supp.

1 S. C. R. 489. by the Tribunal constituted for that purpose. This Act was, therefore, enacted to implement the agrarian reform in that part of the country and it expressly confers certain rights on tenants in respect of their tenements which they did not have before. The Act creates absolute rights in a tenant which was either by the extinguishment or by modification of a landlord's rights and conferment of the same on the tenant. This law is, therefore, one pertaining to the land-tenure of the State. The second decision is that in Atma Ram v. State of Punjab (1). There, this Court was concerned with the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenure Act (10 of 1953) (as amended by Act 11 of 1955).

Under that Act, the substantive rights of a land-owner were modified in three respects, namely, (1) it modified his rights of settling his lands on _any terms and to any one he chooses ; (2) it modified, if it did not altogether extinguish, his right to cultivate the surplus area as understood under the Act; and (3) it modified his right of transfer in so far as it obliged him to sell lands not at his own price but at a price fixed under the statute, and not to any one but to specified persons, in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It is clear from the said Act that the provisions thereof purport to regulate the rights in respect of lands which are estates within the meaning of the law relating to land-tenures in Punjab. It was contended therein that in the purview of Art. 31A, only the entire estates were included but not portions thereof, but that contention was negatived. Sinha, J. (as he then was), who delivered the judgment of the Court, observed at p.

526 thus: "Keeping in view the fact that Art. 31A was enacted by two successive amendments-one in 1951 (First Amendment), and the second in 1955 (Fourth Amendment)-with retrospective effect, in order to save legislation effecting agra;rian reforms, we have every reason to hold that those expressions have been used in their widest amplitude, consistent with the purpose behind those amendments". ( l) (1959] Supp. x s. c. R. 748. This Court has, therefore, recognised that the amendments inserting Art. 31A in the Constitution and subsequently amending it were to facilitate agrarian reforms and in that case it was held that the impugned Act affected the rights of the landlords and tenants. Neither of the two decisions, therefore, supports the contention that Art. 31A comprehends modification of the rights of an owner of land without reference to the law of la. nd-tenures. The impugned Act does not purport to modify or extinguish any right in an estate.

The avowed object of it is only to declare particular sthanams to be Marumakkathayam tarwads and the property pertaining to such sthanams as the property of the said tarwads. It declares particular sthanams to have always been tarwads and their property to have always been tarwad. property. The result is that the sole title of the sthanee is not recognised and the members of the tarwad are given rights therein. The impugned Act does not effectuate any ~grarian reform and regulate the rights inter se between landlords and tenants. We, therefore, hold that the respondents cannot rely upon Art. 31A to deprive the petitioner of his fundamental rights. Now coming to the arguments advanced by the learned Attorney-General, as we propose to hold in his favour on point (2), we are relieved of the necessity to express our opinion on points (1) and (3) raised by him.

On the basis of this elimination, the question that falls to be decided is whether the impugned Act deprives the petitioner of his fundamental right to hold and. dispose of property and is not protected by cl. (5) of Art. 19 of the Constitution. This question is inextricably connected wit'h the contention raised by the respondents that Art. 31(1) excludes the operation of . Art. 19(l)(f) of the Constitution. We shall, therefore, proceed to consider both these questions. The argument of the learned counsel for the respondents is that Art. 19(l)(f) must give place to Art. 31(1) of the Constitution. In other words, a :::: 8. C. R. SUPREME COURT l{. EPOl~T~ 905 person's fundamental right to acquire, hold and dispose of property is con. ditioned by the existence of property and if he is deprived of that property by authority of law under Art. 31(1), his fundamental right under Art. 19(l)(f) disappears with it. Fundamental rights have a transcendental position in the Constitution.

Our Constitution describes certain rights as fundamental rights and places them in a separate Part. It provides a machinery for enforc-ing those rights. Article 32 prescribes a guaranteed remedy for the enforcement of those rights and makes the remedial right itself a fundamental right. Article 13(1) declares that "All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void "; and Art. 13(2) prohibits the State from making any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution and declares that any law made in contravention of that clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. It is true that any other Article of the Constitution may exclude the operation of the fundamental rights in respect of a specific matter-for instance, Arts. 31A and 31B.

It may also be that an Article embodying a fundamental right may exclude another by necessary implication, but before such a construction excluding the operation of one or other of the fundamental rights is accepted, every attempt should be made to harmonise the two Articles so as to make them co-exist, and only if it is not possible to do so, one can be made to yield to the other. Barring such exceptional circumstances, any law made would be void if it infringes any one of the fundamental rights. The relevant Articles read : Article 19. (1) All citizens shall have the right- ······························································· (f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property ...

(5) Nothing in sub-clauses (d), (e) and (f) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub-clauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe. "Article 31. (1) No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. (2) No property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by authority of a law which provides for compensation for the property so acquired or requisitioned and either fixes the amount of the compensation or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given ; and no such la -iv shall be called in question in any court on the ground that the compensation provided by that law is not adequate.

(2A) Where a law does not provide for the transfer of the ownership or right to possession of any property to the State or to a Corporation owned or controlled by the State, it shall not be deemed to provide for the compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property, notwithstanding that it deprives any person of his property. " Clause (2) of Art. 31 has been amended and cl. (2A) has been inserted in Art. 31 by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955. The said cl. (2) in its original form, i. e.

, before the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, read as follows : "(2) No property, moveable or immoveable, including any interest in, or in any company own-ing, any commercial or industrial undertaking, shall be taken possession of or acquired for public purposes under any law authorizing the taking of such possession or such acquisition, unless the law provides for compensation for the property taken possession of or acquired and either fixes the amount of the compensation, or specifies the principles on which and the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given. " To have a correct appreciation of the scope of the amended clauses of Art. 31, it is necessary to consider, in the words of Lord Coke, the following circumstances: (i) What was the law before the Act was passed; (ii) What was the mischief or defect for which the law had not provided; (iii) What remedy Parliament has appointed; and (iv) the reason of the remedy.

The unamended clauses of the Article were the subject of judicial scrutiny by this Court in the State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose (1). There, the respondent purchased certain property at a revenue sale and as such purchaser he acquired under s. 37 of the Bengal Revenue Sales Act, 1859, the right "to avoid and annul all under-tenures and forthwith to eject all under-tenants" with certain exceptions. In exercise of that right he brought a suit for eviction of certain under-tenants and obtained a decree therein. When the appeal against the said decree was pending, the Act was amended. The amending Act substituted by s. 4 the new s. 37 in place of the original s. 37 and it provided by s. 7 that all pending suits, appeals and other proceedings which had not already resulted in delivery of possession, should abate·. It was contended on behalf of one of the respondents therein that s. 7 was void as abridging his fundamental rights under Art. 19(l)(f) and Art .. 31.

The Court by a majority held that the Act was void as it infringed Art. 31 of the Constitution. The majority of the Judges, who constituted the bench, took the view that els. (1) and (2) of Art. 31 related to the same subject of eminent domain and that the State had no power to seriously impair the rights of a citizen in property without paying compensation. Patanjali Sastri, C. J. , expressed his view thus at p. 618 : "Under the Constitution of India, however, such questions must be determined with reference to the expression " taken possession of or acquired " as interpreted above, namely, that it must be read along with the word "deprived" in clause (1) and understood as having reference to such substantial abridgement of the rights of. ownership as would (r: [1954] S. C. R. 5$7. 908 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960] amount to deprivation of the owner of his property.

No cut and dried test can be formulated as to whether in a given case the owner is "deprived " of his property within the meaning of article 31 ; each case must be decided as it arises on its own facts. Broadly speaking it may be said that an abridgement would be so substantial as to amount to a deprivation within the meaning of article 31, if, in effect, it withheld the property from tb. e possession and enjoyment of the owner, or seriously impaired its use and enjoyment by him, or materially reduced its value. " Das, J. (as he then was), observed that Art. 31(2) dealt . with only acquisition and requisition of property whereunder title passed to the State and that Art. 31(1) conferred police power on the State. Ghulam Hasan, J. , concurred with the view of the Chief Justice. Jagannadhadas, J. , did not agree with the view of Das, J. , that Art. 31(1) conferred police power on the State, but he was not also able to agree with the view of the Chief Justice that Art.

31(1) has reference only to the power of eminent domain. He also expressed his disagreement with the view of Das, J. , that acquisition and taking possession in Art. 31(2) have to be taken as necessarily involving transfer of title or possession. The result of the decision is that this Court by majority held that Art. 31(1) and (2) provided for the doctrine of eminent domain and that under cl. (2) a person must be deemed to have been deprived of his property, if he is " substantially dispossessed " or if his right to use and enjoy his property has been " seriously impaired " or the value of the property is "materially reduced" by the impugned law. This view was followed in Dwarakada;; Shrinivas of Bombay 1 v. The Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Go. Ltd. ( ) and 2 in Saghir Ahmad v. The State of U. P. ( ). Presumably, Parliament accepted the minority view of Das, J. , on the interpretation of cl. (2) of Art.

31 and amended the Constitution by the Constitution (]'ourth Amendment) Act, 1955. The amendment made it clear that cl. (2) of Art. 31 applies only to acquisition and requisition. Clause (2A) of the said Article which was inserted by the said amendment. explains that unless a law provides for the transfer of the ownership or right to possession of any property to the State or to a corporation owned ·or controlled by the State, it shall not be deemed to provide for the compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property, notwithstanding that it deprives any person of his property. The result is that it did not accept the majority view of this Court that deprivation of property need not be by acquisition alone but also by any serious impairment of an individual's right to property, whether his ownership or right to possession of the property has been transferred to the State or its nominee or not. This amendment also in effect accepted the view of Das, J.

, that deprivation of property in cl. (1) of Art. 31 covers cases other than acquisition or requisition of property by the State. But the amendment in other respects does not give any indication as regards the interpretation of Art. 31(1) of the Constitution, for no change in the phraseology of that clause is made. Therefore, we must look at the terms of that clause to ascertain its true meaning. The words are clear and unambiguous and they do not give rise to any difficulty of construction. The said clause says in a negative form that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The law must obviously be a valid law. Article 13(2) says that" the State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void".

The law depriving a person of his property cannot, therefore, take away or abridge the right conferred by Part III of the Constitution. In a recent decision in Deep Chand v. State of U. P. (1) this Court considered the limitations placed by the Constitution on the Parliament and the Legislatures of the States· in making laws. After reading Arts. 245, 246, 13 and 31 of the Constitution, this Court proceeded to state, at p. 655, thus: "The combined effect of the said provisions may be stated thus : Parliament and the Legislatures of States have power to make laws in respect of any (1) [1954] s C. R. 674. (2) [1955] I S. C. R. 707. (r) [1959] Supp. (2) S. C. R. 8. us 910 SUPREME COURT REIORTS (1960) of the matters enumerated in the relevant lists in the Seventh Schedule and that power to make laws is subject to the provisions of the Constitution including Art. 13 i. e. , the power is made subject to the limitations imposed by Part III of the Constitution ............ When cl. (2) of Art.

13 says in clear and unambiguous terms that no State shall make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III, it will not avail the State to contend either that the clause does not embody a curtailment of the power to lPgislate or that it imposes only a check but not a prohibition. A constitutional prohibition against a State making certain laws cannot be whittled down by analogy or by drawing inspiration from decisions on the provisions of other comtitutions; nor can we appreciate the argument that the words "any law" in the second line of Art. 13(2) posit the survival of the law made in the teeth of such prohibition. " The same view was expressed by this Court in Bashe- 1 shar Nath v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi ( ). Therein Das, C. J. , says at p. 158 thus : "As regards the legislative organ of the State, the fundamental right is further consolidated by the provisions of Art. 13.

Clause (I) of that Article provides that all laws in force in the territories of India immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provi•ions of Part III shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void. Likewise cl. (2) of this ' Article prohibits the State from making any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by the same Part and follows it up by saying that any law made in contravention of this clause shall,· to the extent of the contravention, be void. It will be observed that, so far as this Article is concerned, there is no relaxation of the restriction imposed by it such as there are in some of the other Articles " Bhagwati, J. , observed much to the same effect at p. 161 thus: "It is absolutely clear on a perusal of Art. 13(2) of the Constitution that it is a constitutional mandate {I) [1959] Supp. I S. C. R. 528.

to the State and no citizen can by any act or con-duct relieve the State of the solemn obligation imposed on it by Art. 13(2) ............... " One of us had also stated to the same effect, after citing Art. 13, at p. 181 : "This Article, in clear and unambiguous terms, not only declares that all laws in force before the commencement of the Constitution and made thereafter taking away or abridging the said rights would be void to the extent of the contravention but also prohibits the State from making any law taking away or abridging the said rights. " It is, therefore, manifest that the law must satisfy two tests before it can be a valid law, namely, (1) that the appropriate legislature has competency to make the law; and (2) that it does not take away or abridge any of the fundamental rights enumerated in Part III of the Constitution. It follows that the law depriving a person of his property will be an invalid law if it infringes either Art.

19(l){f) or any other Article of Part III. Learned counsel, appearing for the respondents, while conceding that the validity of a law must pass the test of the foregoing two conditions, contends that in the context of Art. 31, we should apply the construction analogous to that put upon by this Court on the word "law" in Art. 21 of the Constitution in the case of A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras(1). In the said case, the question was whether the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (IV of 1950), were ultra vires the Constitution. This Court by a majority held that the said Act, with the exception of s. 14 thereof, did not contravene any of the Articles of the Constitution and, therefore, the detention of the petitioner therein was not illegal. In that context, a question was raised whether the said Act must be struck down as infringing Art. 19{l){d) of the Constitution.

This Court held that the concept of the right " to move freely throughout the territory of India" referred to in Art. 19(l){d) of the Constitution was entirely different from the concept of the right to "personal liberty" referred to in Art. 21 and that Art. 21 (rj [1950] S. C. R. 88. should not, therefore, be read as-controlled by the provisions of Art. 19. Though the learned Judges excluded the operation of Art. 19 in considering the question of fundamental right under Art. 21, the judgment of the Court discloses three shades of opinion. As much of the argument is centred on the analogy drawn from this decision, the relevant Articles may be summarized: Under Art. 21, no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except in accordance with the procedure established by law. Clauses (1) and (2) of Art. 22 afford protection in the matter of arrest and detention in certain cases.

Clauses 4, (5) and (6) thereof provide for preventive detention and constitutional safeguards relating thereto. It may not be inappro-priate to describe these provisions as forming an exhaustive code, as they elaborately deal with a particular subject, namely, life and personal liberty. In construing the said provisions, Kania, C. J. , said at p. 100-101 thus: " So read, it clearly means that the legislation to be examined must be directly in respect of one of the rights mentioned in the sub-clauses. If there is a legislation directly attempting to control a citizen's freedom of speech or expression, or his right to assemble peaceably and without arms, etc. , the question whether that legislation is saved by the relevant saving clause of article 19 will arise.

If, however, the legislation is not directly in respect of any of these subjects, but as a result of the operation of other legislation, for1instance, for punitive or preventive detei;ition, his right under any of these sub-clauses is abridged, the question of the application of article 19 does not arise. The true approach is only to consider the directness of the legislation and not what will be the result of the detention otherwise valid, on the mode of the detenue's life. " Mahajan, J. (as he then was), gave the reason for his conclusion at p. 226: "I am satisfied on a review of the whole scheme of the Constitution that the intention was to make article 22 self-contained in respect of laws on the subject of preventive detention. " 3 S. C. R. SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS 913 The learned Judge further elaborated the point thus at p. 228: "If the intention of the Constitution was that a law made on the subject of preventive detention had to be.

tested on the touchstone of reasonableness, • then it would not have troubled itself by expressly making provision in article 22 about the precise scope of the limitation subject to which such a law could be made and by mentioning the procedure that the law dealing with that subject had to provide. Some of the provisions of article 22 would then have been redundant .................. " Mukherjea, J. (as he then was), said much to the same effect at p. 225 : " In my opinion, the group of articles 20 to 22 embody the entire protection guaranteed by the Constitution in relation to deprivation of life and personal liberty both with regard to substantive as well as to procedural law. " Patanjali Sastri, J. (as he then was), stated at p. 191 : "Read as a whole and viewed in its setting among the group of provisions (articles .

19 to 22) relating to "Right to Freedom'', article 19 seems to my mind to pre-suppose that the citizen to whom the possession of ~hese fundamental rights is secured retains the substratum of personal freedom on which alone the enjoyment of these rights necessarily rests. " The learned Judge further dilated on the point at p. 191. "Deprivation of personal liberty in such a situa-tion is not, in my opinion, within the purview of article 19 at all but is dealt with by the succeeding articles 20 and ,21. In other words, article 19 guarantees to the citizens the enjoyment of certain civil liberties while they are free; while articles 20-22 secure to all persons-citizens and non-citizens-certain constitutional guarantees in regard to punishment and prevention of crime. " Das, J. (as he then was), stated at p. 302 thus: "The purpose of article 19(l)(d) is to guarantee that there shall be no State barrier. It gives protection against provincialism.

It has nothing to do with the freedom of the person as such. " The learned Judge continued to state at p. 304: " Therefore, the conclusion is irresistible that the rights protected by article 19(1 ), in so far as they relate to rights attached to the person, i. e. , the rights referred to in sub-clauses (a) to (e) and (g), are rights which only a free citizen, who has the freedom of his person unimpaired, cari exercise. " The views of the learned Judges may be broadly summarized under three heads, viz. , ( 1) to invoke Art. 19( 1 ), a law shall be made directly infringing that right; (2) Arts. 21 and 22 constitute a self-contained code; and (-3) the freedoms in Art. 19 postulate a free man. On the basis of the said theories, this Court, with Faz) Ali, J. , dissenting, rejected the plea that a law made under Art. 21 shall not infringe Art. 19(1). Had the question been res integra, some of us would have been inclined to agree with the dissenting view expressed by Fazl Ali, J.

; but we are bound by this judgment. Even so, there is no analogy between Art. 21, as interpreted by this Court, and Art. 31(1). Article 21 deals with personal liberty. Personal liberty, Kania, C. J. , observed, includes "the right to eat or sleep when one likes or to work or not to work as and when one pleases and several such rights" and "deprivation of such liberty'', in the words of the l(larned Chief Justice, "is quite different from restriction (which is only a partial control) of the right to move freely (which is relatively a minor right of a citizen)". "Personal Liberty " is a more comprehensive concept and has a much wider connotation than the right conferred under Art. 19(l)(d). Arts. 19(1)(d) and 22 deal with different subjects, whereas both Arts. 19(l)(f) and 31(1) deal with the same subject, namely, property; while under Art. 19(1)(f), a citizen has the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property, Art.

31(1) enables the State to make a law to deprive him of that property. Such a law directly infringes the fundamental right given under Art. 19(l)(f). Further, Arts. 21 and 22 are linked up together; while Art. 21 enables the State to deprive a person of his life or personal liberty according to the procedure established by law, Art. 22 prescribes certain procedure in respect of both punitive and preventive detention. They constitute an integrated code in the matter of personal liberty. On t h. e other hand, Art. 31( 1), by reason of the amend- K avalappara ment, ceases to be a part of the guarantee against Kotlarathil Kochuni acquisition or requisition of property without t. he v. authority of law and must therefore be construed on State of Madras its own terms. The said Articles are not in pari materia and they Subba Rao ]. differ in their scope and content. There is material difference not only in the phraseology but also in their setting.

Article 31(1), therefore, cannot be construed on the basis of the construction placed upon Art. 21. The decision in The State of Bombxy v. Bhanji Munji (1), on which reliance is placed by learned counsel for the respondents in support of their contention that Art. 31(1) excludes the operation of Art. 19(1 ), is one based on the pre-existing law before the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955. In that case it was contendeu that ss. 5(1) and 6(4)(a) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 {Born. Act XXXIII of 1948), as amended by Bombay Act II of 1950 and Bombay Act XXXIX of 1950, were ultra vires Arts. 19(1)(f) and 31(2) of the Constitution. The premises in question there belonging to the respondents were requisitioned by the Governor of Bombay under the said Act.. The Act also provided for compensation, anu this Court found that there was a clear public purpose for the requisition, and upheld the law under Art. 31(2) of the Constitution.

This Court also considered the alternative argument advanced, namely, that the Act was hit by Art. 19(l)(f) of the Constitution inasmuch as unreasonable restrictions were imposed on the rights of the respondents to acquire, hold and dispose of property. In rejecting that argument, Bose, J. , speaking for the Court, observed at p. 780 thus: " We need not examine those differences here because it is enough to say that article l9(l)(f) read with clause (5) postulates the existence of property which can be enjoyed and over which rights can be exercised because otherwise the reasonable restrictions contemplated by clause (5) could not be brought into play. If there is no property which can be acquired, held or disposed of, no restriction (x) [1955] 1 s. c. R. 177.

can be placed on the exercise of the right to acquire, hold and dis1)ose of it, and as clause (5) conterr-plates the placing of reasonable restrictions on tLe exercise of those rights it must follow that the article postulates the existence of property over which these rights can be exercised. " · . For these observations the learned Judge has drawn upon the principle laid down in A. K. Gopalan's Case('). These observations primafacie appear to be against the contentions of the petitioner herein. But a further scrutiny reveals that they have no bearing on the construction of Art. 31(1) of the Constitution after . cl. (2) of Art. 31 has been amended and cl. (2A) has been inserted in that Article by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955. Before the amE1nd-ment, this Court, as we have already noticed, held by a majority in The State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal 2 Bose ( ) that els. (1) and (2) of Art.

31 were not mutually exclusive in scope and content, but should be read together and understood as dealing with the same subject, namely, the acquisition or taking possession of property referred to in cl. (2) of Art. 31. In that view, Art. 31, before the amendment, was a self. contained Article providing for a subject different from that dealt with in Art. 19. On that basis it was possible to hold, as this Court held in The State of 3 Bombay v. Bhanji Munji ( ), on the analogy drawn from Art; 21, that when the property therein was requisitioned within the meaning of Art. 31, the operation of Art. 19 was excluded. But there is no scope for drawing such an analogy after the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, as thereafter they dealt with two different subjects: Art. 31(2) and (2A) with acquisition and requisition and Art. 31(1) with deprivation of property by authority of law.

The 3 decision of this Court in Bhanji M unji' s Case ( ) no longer holds the field after the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955. · Strong reliance is placed upon the observations of Das, J. (as he then was), in Subodh Gopal Bose's Case (2). Therein the learned Judge dissented from the view of the majority on the interpretation of Art. 31(1) and (2) of the Constitution. In the course {I) (1950) S. C R. 88 . (2) [1954) S. C,R ! )87. (3) (1955) I S. C R. 777• ..... of his dissenting judgment, the learned Judge made certain observations on the effect of his interpretation Kovalappara of Art. 31 on Art. 19. The learned Judge said at K n:ta rathil Kochuni p. 632 thus: v. " Such being the correct correlation between Stale of Madras article 19(1), sub-clauses (a) to (e) and (g) on the one hand and article 21 on the other, the question Subba Rao /. necessarily arises as to the correlation between article 19(1) (f) and article 31.

Article 19(l)(f) guarantees to a citizen, as one of his freedoms, the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property but reasonable restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of that right to the extent indicated in clause (5). Article 31, as its heading shows, guarantees to all persons, citizens and non-citizens, the 'right to property' as a fundamental right to the extent therein mentioned. What, I ask myself, is the correlation between article 19(l)(f) read with article 19(5) and article 31? If, as held by my Lord in A. If.. Gopalan's Gase (1) at p.

191, sub-clauses (a) to (e) and (g) of article 19(1) read with the relevant clauses (2) to (6) ' presuppose that the citizen to whom the possession of these fundamental rights is secured retains the substratum of personal freedom on which alone the enjoyment of these rights necessarily rests', it must follow logically that article 19(l)(f) read with article 19(5) must likewise pre-suppose that the person to whom that fundamental right is guaranteed retains his property over or with respect to which alone that right may be •. exercised. I found myself unable to escape from this logical conclusion. " The learned Judge earlier expressed the same opinion 2 in Ohiranjit Lal Ohowdhuri v. The Union of India ( ).

When it was pointed out to the learned Judge that, if his view was correct, the legislature while it cannot restrict a person's right to property unless the restriction is reasonable and for a public purpose, it can deprive him of his property without any such limitations, the learned Judge negatived the objection in the following words at p. 654 : (r) [1~50] S. C. R. 88. (2) [1950J S. C. R. 869. II9 " What is abnormal if our Constitution has trusted the legislature, as the people. of Great Britain have trusted their Parliament ? Right to life and personal liberty and the right to private property still exist in Great Britain in spite of the supremacy of Parliament. Why should we assume or apprehend that our Parliament or State legislatures should act like mad men and deprive us of our property without any rhyme or reason ? " Further, the learned Judge was of the view that unless Art.

31(1) was construed in the manner he did, it would not be possible for the State to bring about a welfare State which our Constitution directs it to do. Elaborat-ing this point, the learned Judge observed, at p. 655,thus: "'1Ve must reconcile ourselves to the plain truth that emphasis has now unmistakably shifted from the individual to the community. We cannot over-look that the avowed purpose of our Constitution is to set up a welfare State by subordinating the social interest in individual liberty or property to the larger social interest in the rights of the community. As already observed, the police power of the State is 'the most essential of powers, at times most insistent, and always one of the least ! imitable powers of the government'. . .....

In the matter of deprivation of property otherwise than by the taking of possession or by the acquisition of it within the meaning of article 31(2) our Constitution has trusted our legislature and has not thought fit to impose any limitation on the legislature's exercise of the State's police power over private property". Relying upon the said observations, learned counsel for the respondents pressed on us the follo. wing three points: (1) After the . Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, cl. ( l) of Art. 31 must be read independently of cl. (2) thereof and, if so read, cl. (1) must be held to deal with police power. (2) Without such power the State cannot usher in a welfare State which the Constitution enjoins it to do.

(3) The fact that there is no limitation on the power of the legislature to make law depriving a citizen of his property need not deter us from recognising such power, as we can trust our legislatures and Parliament as the people of Great Britain have trusted their Parliament. Kavalappara We cannot agree with the contention of the learned Koftarothil Kochuni counsel that Art. 31(1) deals with "police power". In v. the view expressed by Das, J. (as he then was), the State of lvfodras legislature can make any law depriving a person of his -·-property and the only limitation on such power is its Subba Rao]. good sense. But" police power", as it is understood .... -1, in American Law, can never be an arbitrary power . " Willis on Constitutiorni I Law " says at p.

727 : \ "The United States Supreme Court has said that - 'the police power embraces regulations designed to promote the public convenience or the general prosperity, as well as regulations designed to promote the public health, the public morals or the public safety'. " In the Constitution of the United States of America, prepared by the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress (Senate Document No. 170, 82D Congress), " police power" is generally defined thus at p. 982 : "The police power of a State today embraces regulations designed to promote the public convenience or the general prosperity as well as those to promote public safety, health, morals, and is not confined to the suppression of what is offensive, disorderly, or unsanitary, but extends to what is for the greatest welfare of the State ". Prof. Willoughby states in his Constit,utional Law of the United States (Vol. III, p. 1774) : " ...... the police power knows no definite limit.

It extends to every possible phase of what the Courts deem to be the public welfare". Holmes, J. , in Noble State Bank v. Haskell (1) concisely defines "police power" thus: " It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs". It is, therefore, clear that police power cannot be divorced from social control and public good. We cannot, therefore, import . the doctrine of police power in our Constitution ~' divorced from the necessary restrictions on that power as evolved by judicial decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. Indeed, uninfluenced by any such doctrine, the plain meaning of the clear words ( ! ) ·. u9 U. S. 104. used in Art. 31(1) of the Constitution enables the State to discharge its functions. in the interest of social and public welfare which the State in America can do in exercise of police power.

The limitation on the power of the State to make a law depriving a person of his Madras property, as we have already stated, is found in the word "law" and that takes us back to Art. 19 and the law made can be sustained only if it imposes reasonable restrictions in the interest of the general public. We find it also very difficult to accept the second and third aspects of the approach to the question. The duty of this Court is only to interpret the provisions of the Constitution in a liberal spirit, but not to eradicate or modify the fundamental rights. That apart, our Constitution-makers thought otherwise. The Constitution declares the fundamental rights of a citizen and lays down that all laws made abridging or taking away such rights shall be void. That is a clear indication that the makers of the Constitution did not think fit to give our Parliament the same powers which the Parliament of England has.

While the Constitution contemplates a welfare State, it also provides that it should be brought about by the legislature subject to the limitations imposed on its power. If the makers of the Constitution intended to confer unbridled power on the Pai'liament to make any law it liked to bring about the welfare State, they would not have provided for the fundamental rights. The Constitution gives every scope for ordered progress of society towards a welfare State. The State is expected to bring about a welfare State within the framework of the Constitution, for it is authorized to impose reasonable restrictions, in the interests of the general public, on the fundamental rights recognized in Art. 19. If the interpretation sought to be placed on Art. 31(1) was accepted, it would compel the importa-tion of the entire doctrine of police power and grafting it in Art.

31(1) or the recognition of arbitrary power in the legislature with the hope or consolation suggested that our Parliament and legislatures may be trusted not to act arbitrarily. The first suggestion is not legally · permissible 11uJ the second does not stand to reason, 3 S. C. R. SUPRElfE COURT RJ<JPORTS 921 for the Constitution thought fit to impose limitations on the power of the legislatures even in the case of lesser infringements of the rights of a citizen. Another argument raised by learned counsel for the respondents may also be noticed. If the view exprrssed by us be correct, the argument proceedt>, the law depriving a person of his property-however ur~ent the need may be and whatever grave danger or serious vice it seeks to avert or suppress-can never be a reasonable restriction on the right to enjoy property and therefore every such law would be void.

The learned Attorney-General argues that in the present case the petitioner is not deprived of his property, but his right is only restricted. It depends upon the per-spective from which we look at the facts. In one sense, the petitioner has been deprived of his shares in the property given by the statute to the respondents, but, even on that assumption, we do not think that the argument of the respondents has any substance. The correct approach to the question is, first to ascertain what is the fundamental right of the petitioners; then to see, whether the law infringes that right. If the law ex facie infringes that right, the State can support that law only by establishing that the la. w imposes reasonable restrictions on the petitioner's fundamental . right in the interests of the general public. If so approached, the impugned Act by seeking to deprive the petitioner of his property certainly infringes his fundamental right.

There is absolutely nothing on the record to sustain the validity of the law under the said clause (5) of Art. 19. The apprehension that deprivation can never be a restriction and therefore every law depriving a person of his property must necessarily be void, even if justifiable, cannot help the respondents, for if it is not saved by cl. (5), that result must ft. ow from the premises. But that apprehension has no justification. This Court has held in a recent decision that under certain circumstances a law depriving a citizen of his fundamental right to property may amount to a reasonable restriction. In Narendra Kumar v. The Union of India (1), Das Gupta. , J. , observed: \II [1900] z s. c. R. 375· 922 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960] " It is reasonable to think that the makers of the Constitution considered the word 'restriction ' to be sufficiently wide to save laws 'inconsistent' with Art.

19(1), or 'taking away the rights' conferred by the Article, provided this inconsistency or taking away was reasonable in the interests of the different matters mentioned in the clause. There can be no doubt therefore that they intended the word 'restriction ' to include cases of ' prohibition' also. The contention that a Ia w prohibiting the exercise of a fundamental right is in no case saved, cannot therefore be accepted. It is undoubt-edly correct, however, that when, as in the present case, the restriction reaches the stage of prohibition special care has to be taken by the Court to see that the test of reasonableness is satisfied. The greater the restriction, the more the need for strict scrutiny by the Court. " If so, the State can establish that a law, though it purports to deprive the petitioner of his fundamental right, under certain circumstances amounts to a reasonable restriction within the meaning of cl. (5) of Art. 19 of the Constitution.

We, therefore, hold that a law made depriving a citizen of his property shall be void, unless the law so made complies with the provisions of cl. (5) of Art. 19 of the Constitution. This leads us to the question whether the provisions of the Act infringe Art. 19(l)(f) of the Constitution. The impugned Act is The Madras Marumakkathayam (Removal of Doubts) Act, 1955 (Madras Act No. XXXII of 1955). As the argument turns upon the provis

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