KISHAN SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB

Citation: [2007] 11 S.C.R. 155

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: C.K. THAKKER, P. SATHASIVAM

Case summary

KISHAN SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB.pdf

Judgment text

A KISHAN SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB OCTOBER 12, 2007 [C. K. THAKKERANDP. SATHASIVAM,JJ. ] I ,. Penal Code, 1860-ss 304B and 315-Dowry demand- Conviction under-Correctness of-Held: Prosecution case clearly established beyond reasonable doubt that victim subjected to cruelty and harassment based on dowry demand by accused-mother in law andfather in law, soon before her death-There was repeated dowry demand-Death caused within seven years of marriage-Thus, conviction and sentence by courts below uls 304B and 306justified- However, High Court acquitted husbandofvictim under s. 498A since there was no sufficient evidence ofdowry demand against him- .. Acquittal having not been challenged by State, has attainedfinality. ....

Judicial restraints-Judicial restraints and discipline are equally necessary to orderly administration ofjustice-Court should not make disparaging remark against the witness that there was falsehood on hispart-Those remarks ordered to be deletedfrom the record R was married to M-accused No. 1 who was serving in Army. According to the prosecution, R was subjected to cruelty and harassment by accused - husband, mother - in - law and father- in - -~ law in connection with demand ofdowry from the day ofher marriage. ... R was told by the accused to get scooter and golden bangle from her parents and ifthe demands ofthe accused would not be met with, she should not come back to the matrimonial home. The demand was repeated from time to time. R disclosed the same to her parents during her visit to matrimonial home. However, PW-2-mother ofR and other family members repeatedly assured R that the demand t would b~ met when Mwould come on leave and pacified her to return to matrimonial home.

R died after consuming some poisonous substance. Dowry demand was repeated 14 clays before the inddent. Mother of R lodged FIR. At the time ofdeath, R was pregnant with a child of about 12 weeks. Prosecution witnesses were examined. Accused were charged under sections 304B,315 and 498A IPC. Trial Court convicted and sentenced accused No. 3-father-in-law ofR and accused No. 4-mother-in-law ofR, under sections 304B and 315 IPC. With regard to accuS'ed No. 1, trial Court found that he was serving in Army and was occasionally attending matrimonial home after taking leave and as such could not be convicted under ss. 304B and 315 IPC. However, it held him liable under s 498A IPC. Aggrieved accused filed appeal. High Court upheld the order oftrial court with regard to accused Nos. 3 and 4; however acquitted accused No. 1 since from the evidence it was not proved that he was responsible for committing an offence punishable under s 498A IPC. Hence, the present appeal.

Appellants-accused contended that courts below erred in convicting them for offences punishable under sections 304B and 315 IPC; that there was no demand ofdowry by the accused and it could not be said that death of deceased was due to harassm~mt because ofdemand ofdowry; that the evidence PW2-mother, PW4cousin brother and PW7-real brother was not reliable and evidence ought not to have been believed by Courts below ; that there were material contradictions in their evidence as to when so called demand ofscooter and golden bangle was made; and that from the evidence of DWl and DW2 it was proved that the accused were having scooter an<! motorcycle, ifit were so, there was no occasion to demand scooter. Respondent-State contended that the order. ofconviction and sentence recorded by the trial ~ourt and upheld by the High Court did not call for interference; and that from the prosecution evidence, it was clearly establi$hed that deceased was mat-treated and harassed for dowry.

Disposing ofthe appeal, the Court HELD: 1. 1. No case has been made out by the appellants so KISHANSINGHv. STATE 157 as to interfere with the decision ofCourts below. Both the Courts were wholly right and fully justified in recording an order of conviction and in imposing sentence on appellants-accused Nos. 3father-in-law and a~cused No. 4-mother-in-Iaw. There is no infirmity and the order of conviction and sentence is upheld. Since the appellants are on bail, they are directed to surrender and to undergo the remaining period ofsentence. [Paras 18 and 29] [165-C; 168-G-H] 1. 2. From the evidence of PW3-doctor who conducted · postmortem, it was proved that R died unnatural death. R was married to Mand she died within a period offour months. Thus, the death was caused 'within seven years of her marriage'. From the prosecution evidence, it was proved that the deceased R was subjected to cruelty and harassment by the accused in connection with demand ofdowry from day ofher marriage.

The demand was repeated from time to time and it resulted in sad and untimely death of a young bride. Both the Courts considered the evidence of prosecution witnesses and recorded a finding that prosecution was able to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt as to demand of dowry by the accused. [Paras 18 and 25] [167-D-F] 1. 3. Both the Courts were right in rejecting defence version that since the accused possessed scooter as well as motorcycle, there was no necessity to make demand ofscooter. High Court observed that it was a matter ofcommon knowledge that even ifin-laws had several things in the house, still they demand dowry. Even ifone does not go to that extent, in the instant case, there was sufficient evidence in the form ofsworn testimony ofPW2-mother ofR, PW4-cousin of ' R and PW7-brother of R that there was a demand of dowry by accused and deceased R had made such complaint immediately after marriage which was repeated and reiterated.

The deceased used to inform about such demand by the accused to her parents. Therefore, it is totally irrelevant whether accused possessed motorcycle or scooter. Demand of dowry was clearly proved and conclusively established by the prosecution. [Para 26) (167-G-H; 168-A-B] 1. 4. The submission that there was material contradiction in the deposition of prosecution witnesses as to the occasion of making -A' . [2007] 11 S. C. R. demand, i. e. as shagun or as dowry cannot be accepted. From the evidence, it is proved that accused persons insisted for scooter and golden bangle as they had 'obliged' parents ofR by allowing her to marry to accused No. 1 Therefore, both the Courts were right in coming to the conclusion that there was demand of dowry by the accused. [Para 27] [168-C-D] 1. 5. Trial Court convicted accused No. 1 for an offence ti punishable under section 498A, IPC.

However, High Court, set aside the conviction observing that he was not regularly staying with Ras he was serving in Army and used to come only for few days by taking leave. Prosecution witnesses have, no doubt, deposed that demand of dowry was also made by accused No. 1 and believing the said evidence, trial Court convicted him. But the High Court was of~he view that there was no sufficient evidence to prove demand ofdowry by accused No. 1 and acquitted him. The acquittal is not challenged by the State. Thus, that part of the order has become final. [Para 28] [168-E-F] 2. 1. While dealing with a matter, the PresidingOfficerofa Co~rt may extend benefit ofdoubt to the accused in the light ofomissions, contradictions or discrepancies in the deposition of prosecution witnesses. He may also offer comment on the conduct ofparties or witnesses. He may as well make necessary observations keeping· in view their demeanour.

Judges are flesh and blood mortals with likes and dislikes, preferences and prejudices and they are also normal human traits. At the same time, however, it cannot be overlooked that judicial restraints and discipline are equally necessary to orderly administration ofjustice. [Paras 33 and 36] [170-C-D; G] 2. 2. The trial Court did not accept the evidence ofPW4-cousin ofR as to demand of dowry by accused No. 1 husband ofR. It was because PW4 had stated that accused No. 1 ill-treated deceased R soon before her death. He further stated that 10112 days prior to the incident, accused No. 1 reiterated the demand of scooter and golden bangle. Accused No. 1 stayed with his wife for more than a month before reporting for duty, after marriage ceremony on KISHANSINGHv. STATE 159 February 19, 1999. Thereafter, he again sought leave from June 14, 1999 to July 9, 1999. According to the trial Court, he must have reached his village on or after June 16, 1999 from Goa and R died on June 20, 1999.

Thus, according to the trial Court, accused No. I could not have made the demand "10/12 days prior to the incident". Therefore, the trial Court did not believe that part ofthe statement ofPW4. [Para30] [168-G-H; 169-A-D] 1 2. 3. Itis unfortunate that the trial Court made a caustic remark that there was 'falsehood' on the part ofPW4 as to demand ofdowry by accused No. 1. A Court oflaw may not accept a particular part of the evidence considering the other facts and circumstances on record. . But that does not necessarily mean that what was stated by the witness was 'false'. It may be that the witness had committed so°le mistake in giving the period during which dowry demand was made by accused No. 1. Ifthat part of the evidence is not consistent with the facts on record, the Court may not accept it. But only for that reason, the Court should not make disparaging remarks against ttte witness. The Court could have acquitted accused No. 1.

Therefore, all those remarks were ordered to be deleted from the record. [Paras 32 and 39] [169-H; 170-A-B; 172-E-F] StateofUP. v. Mohd Nairn, [1964] 2SCR363andStateo/MP. v. Nandlal, [1986] 4 SCC 566 and A. M Mathur v. Pramod Kumar, [1990] 2 sec 533, referred to. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 1612of2005. From the Judgment and final Order dated 4. 5. 2005 ofthe High Court ofPunjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. 950-SB/ 2002. R. K. Kapoor, M. K. Verma and Anis Ahmed Khan for the Appellants. Kuldip Singh, R. K. Pandey, T. P. Mishra and H. S. Sandu for the Respondent. The Judgment ofthe Court was delivered by C. K. THA. KKER, J. 1. The present appeal is filed by the two appellants against an order ofconviction and sentence recorded by the Addi. Sessions Judge, Gurdaspur on April 30, 2002 in Sessions Case No. 128 of 1999 and confirmed by the High Court ofPunjab & Haryana at Chandigarh on May 4, 2005 in Criminal Appeal No. 950-SB of2002.

By the said order, the Courts below convicted the appellants herein for offences punishable under Sections 304B and 315, Indian Penal Code (IPC). For an offence punishable under Section 304B, IPC the appellants were ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to pay fine ofRs. 1,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months, whereas for an offence punishable under Section 315, IPC, they were ordered to undergo imprisonment for three years. 2. The facts ofthe case in nutshell are that Reeta Xumari, daughter ofTilak Singh and Sudershana Rani-PW2, got married to Manmohan Singh (original accused No. 1) on February 19, 1999 as per Hindu rites and ceremonies. According to the prosecution, sufficient dowry was given by the parents ofReeta Kumari at the time ofmarriage as per their financial status and capacity.

However, Reeta Kumari, immediately after marriage, disclosed on her first visit to parental home after 3-4 days that the accused were subjecting her to taunts and harassments for not bringing scooter and golden bangle (kara) in dowry. The young bride was told in clear terms that ifthe demands ofthe accused of scooter and golden bangle would not be met with, she should not come back to matrimonial home. Even thereafter, during her visit to parental home at 2-3 occasions, Reeta Kumari informed her family members that the ace. used were repeating their demand of scooter and golden bangle. She was, however, pacified by Sudershana Rani and other family members to return to matrimonial home on an assurance that scooter and golden bangle would be given when the complainant's husband (Manmohan Singh) would come on leave. It may be stated that the husband ofdeceased Reeta Kumari was serving in Indian Army.

It is further the version ofthe prosecution that about 14 days prior to the occurrence, PW7-Dharminder Singh, brother ofReeta Kumari went to village Kahnuwan at the matrimonial home ofdeceased KISHANSINGHv. STATE[C. K. THAKKER,J. ] 161 Reeta Kumari to enquire about the welfare of his sister. On return, he infonned his mother Sudershana Rani that Reeta Kumari was being subjected to mal-treatment by the accused on account of demand of dowry and that he had brought Reeta Kumari with him to parental home. Complainant Sudershana Rani, thereafter, had a talk with the accused persons and assured that their demand of scooter and golden bangle would be fulfilled after Manmohan Singh would return. Reeta Kumari was, therefore, again sent back to matrimonial home along with PW4-Gopal Singh, cousin of Reeta Kumari. On June 20, 1999, at about 3. 30 p. m.

, one Mangat Ram, who acted as mediator for the marriage between Reeta Kumari and Manmohan Singh, infonned parents ofReeta Kumari:that Reeta Kumari died after consuming some poisonous substance. On hearing the news, Sudershana Rani-complainant, along ·with her son Dharminder Singh and nephew Daulat Singh went to the house ofthe accused at village . Kahnuwan where they found dead body ofReeta Kumari lying in a room. Statement of Sudershana Rani was recorded at Ex. PB (FIR 111) on the same day by PW 9 Swinder Singh (Station Inspector) who met them at the bus stand, Kahnuwan.. 3. The prosecution case also disclosed that at the time ofdeath,. Reeta Kumari was pregnant with a child ofabout 12 weeks gestation period in her womb. It was alleged by the prosecution that death was caused by the accused and it was a dowry death. Challan was, therefore, presented against the accused for offences punishable under Section 304B, 315 and 498A, IPC.

Since an offence punishable under Section 304B, IPC was exclusively triable by a Court of Session, the trial Magistrate committed the case to the Sessions Court, Gurdaspur. Charge was framed against the accused, the contents thereof were read over and explained to them. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed to be . tried. 4. The accused denied to have committed any offence. According to them, they were falsely implicated by the police. It was further stated that accused Manmohan Singh and deceased Reeta Kumari (husband and wife) had gone to Vaishno Devi and were returning from the temple on the previous day ofthe occurrence. When they reached near Pathankot, the decee). sed insisted that they should first visit her parental village Kahnuwan whereas husband Manmohan Singh, accused No. l'insisted that they should go to the matrimonial home first. That was the reason for consuming Aluminium Phosphate by the deceased Reeta Kumari and thus the deceased committed suicide.

5. The prosecution, in order to bring home the guilt ofthe accused, examined nine witnesses including important witnesses, PW2-Sudershana Rani, complainant and mother of deceased Reeta Kumari; PW4-Gopal Singh, cousin brother ofdeceased Reeta Kumari and PW7-Dharminder Singh, brother ofdeceased Reeta Kumari. 6. The charge was framed against five accused i. e. accused No. I- Manrnohan Singh, husband ofthe deceased; accused No. 2-Janak Singh, brother-in-law ofthe deceased, accused No. 3, Kishan Singh, father-inlaw ofthe deceased, accused No. 4, Bachni Rani, mother-in-law of the deceased and accused No. 5-Sushma Rani, sister-in-law ofthe deceased. 7. The trial Court, after appreciating the evidence on record and on the basis of depositions ofPW2 Sudarshana Rani-complainant, PW 4 Gopal Singh and PW 7 Dharminder Singh held that as far as accused No.

5-Sushma Rani was concerned, she had already married prior to the marriage ofManmohan Singh and was staying with her husband and two children at matrimonial home at village Kaulsher which was at a distance of60-70 KMs. from Kahnuwan. She had been referred to in the FIR as the sister ofaccused No. 1, Manmohan Singh. She would not have been benefited by the demand of dowry ofscooter and golden bangles. The trial Court, therefore, held that it could not be said that she was a party to demand ofdowry as also in causing death ofdeceased Reeta Kumari. She was accordingly ordered to be acquitted by the Court. 8. Regarding Manmohan Singh-accused Nq. l_, husband of Reeta Kumari, the trial Court observed that he was serving in Indian Anny. He took leave from February 15, 1999 to March 26, 1999. The marriage was performed on February 19, 1999. After the marriage, he again joined service. Thereafter ! le came on leave from June 14, 1999 to July 9, 1999.

In the circumstances, according to the trial Court, it could not be said that he was responsible for committing offences punishable under Sections 304B and 315, IPC. The Court, however, held that there was demand ofdowry by accused No. 1-Manmohan Singh, husband of Reeta Kumari KISHANSINGHv. STATE[C. K. THAKKER,J. ] 163 as stated by PW 2 Sudarshana Rani, PW 4 Gopal Singh ad PW 7 Dhanninder Singh. Accused No. 1Manmohan Singh was, therefore, held liable for an offence punishable under Section 498A, IPC. 9. As to accused No. 2-Janak Singh, brother in law ofthe deceased, accused No. 3-Kishan Singh and accused No. 4-Bachni Rani, fathet-inlaw and mother-in-law ofdeceased Reeta Kumari, the Court held that it was proved beyond reasonable doubt that they had committed offences punishable under Sections 304B and 315, IPC. As already stated earlier, sentence was awarded on accused No. 3-Kishan Singh and accused No. 4-Bachni Rani, father-in-law and mother-in-law ofthe deceased by the trial Court.

So far as accused No. 2-Janak Singh was concerned, the trial Court held that he was ajuvenile when the offence was committed which was clear from the perusal of his birth certificate. The Court, therefore, forwarded him to the Juvenile Court for passing an appropriate order ofsentence in accordance with law. 10. Being aggrieved by the order ofconviction and sentence, three accused persons, viz. accused No. 1-Manmohan Singh-husband, accused No. 3-Kishan Singh-father-in-law and accused No. 4-Bachni R~ni mother-in-law preferred an appeal before the High Court. · 11. The High Court again examined the evidence on record, heard the arguments ofthe parties and considered. the reasons recorded and conclusions arrived at by the trial Court. It held that as far as accused Nos. 3 and 4, parents-in-law ofdeceased Reeta Kumari were concerned, the trial Court was fully justified in convicting both ofthem for offences punishable under Sections 304B and 315, IPC.

Accordingly, their conviction as well as order ofsentence was maintained. 12. As to accused No. 1-Manmohan Singh-husband, however, the High Court held that from the evidence, it was not proved that he was responsible for committing an offence punishable under Section 498A, IPC. The Court observed that he was serving in Indian Army and was · occasionally attending matrimonial home after taking leave. There was no sufficient evidence ofdemand ofdowry by accused No. I. The trial Court, hence, was not right in convicting him under Section 498A, IPC. He was, therefore, ordered to be acquitted. 13. The order convicting accused Nos. 3 and 4, father-in-law and mother-in-law ofdeceased Reeta Kumari under Sections 304B and 315, IPC recorded by the trial Court and confirmed by the High Court is challenged in the present appeal. 14. On September 23, 2005, notice was issued on Special Leave Petition as also on the application for bail.

On November 28, 2005, leave was granted and the appellants were directed to be released on bail on their executing a bond for a sum ofRs. 25,0001-· each to the satisfaction of the Addi. Sessions Judge, Gurdaspur, Punjab. On September 18, 2006, an order was passed by the Court directing the Registry to post the appeal 'at an early date'. The matter thus has been placed before us. 15. We have P,eard learned counsel for the parties. 16. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that both the Courts committed an error in convicting the appellants for offences punishable under Sections 304B and 315, IPC. According to the learned counsel, there was no demand ofdowry by the accused and it could not be said that death of deceased Reeta Kumari was due to harassment because of demand of dowry. It was also urged that the evidence of PW2-Sudershana Rani, PW4-Gopal Singh and PW7-Dharminder Singh was not reliable and they ought not to have been believed by Courts below.

According to the counsel, all the three witnesses were 'interested' witnesses being close relatives ofthe deceased, PW2-Sudershana Ranimother, PW4-Gopal Singh and PW7-Dharminder Singh-cousin brother and real brother, respectively. It was also contended that there were material contradictions in their evidence as to when so called demand of scooter and golden bangle was made. According to one version, such demand was made at the time of shagun, whereas according to other version, it was towards the do\\'ry. Witnesses were aware that shagun and dowry were not one and S@ne. Thus, the prosecution was not certain as to the occasion ofalleged demand. It was also stated that from the evidence ofHarbhajan Singh-DWI and Ramesh Shirodkar-DW2, it was proved that the accused were having scoo~er as also motorcycle. Ifit were so, there was no occasion to demand scooter which was the case of the prosecution.

On all these grounds, it was submitted that both the Courts were wrong in convicting the appellants and appeal deserves to be allowed. KISHANSINGHv. STATE[C. K. THAKKER,J. ] 165 17. The learned counsel for the State submitted that the order of conviction and sentence recorded by the trial Court and confirmed by the High Court does not call for interference. According to him, from the prosecution evidence, it was clearly established that deceased Reeta Kumari was maltreated and harassed for dowry. Immediately after her marriage on February 19, 1999, when she came to parental home within few days, she complained that dowry demand was made by her in-laws and even thereafter, the demand was repeated. Reeta Kumari was pregnant at the time ofdeath. Both the Courts were, therefore, right in convicting the appellants under Section 304B and 315, IPC. · 18.

Having heard learned counsel for the parties, in our opinion, no case has been made out by the appellants so as to interfere with the decision of the Courts below. Admittedly, Reeta Kumari married to accused No. 1-Manmohan Singh on February 19, 1999. The case ofthe prosecution is very clear that in-laws ofReeta Kumari started harassing her by making demand ofdowry. She was told that her parents should · give to accused persons scooter and golden bangle. She was also told .. by the accused that she should not return to matrimonial home ifshe would not bring scooter and golden bangle. Both the Courts considered the evidence ofprosecution witnesses and recorded a finding that prosecution was able to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt as to demand of dowry by the accused. 19. Section 3048 (Dowry death) was inserted by Act 43of1986 with effect from November 19, 1986. The said section riads thus: 304B.

Dowry death (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her · death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called ''dowry death'\ and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation- For the purpose ofthis sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 ofthe Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28of1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life. 20.

In order that this section may apply, the following ingredients must be satisfied; (i) the death of a woman must have been caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circwnstances; (Ii) such death must have occurred within seven years of her mamage; (Iii) the woman must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or by relatives ofher husband; (iv) cruelty or harassment must be for or in connection with demand for dowry; (v) such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death. 21. In the instant case, the prosecution has examined PW3-Dr. Swinder Kumar. He deposed that on June 21, 1999, he conducted the post mortem on the dead body ofReeta Kwnari and found the following injuries; 1. 3 x Yz cm. abrasion on right side ofthe anterior ofthe middle of the neck. 2. 2 x 1cm. abrasion on right side ofthe anterior ofthe middle of the neck just 1cm. below injury No. l 3. 4 x 2 cm.

abrasion on left side ofthe anterior ofthe middle of the head. 22. He deposed; "On dissection of injuries Nos. 1, 2 and 3, sub-coetaneous tissues of the neck shows extravagation of blood beneath the injured areas. On further dissection, fracture of projection in It \ KISHAN SINGH v. STATE [C. K. THAKKER, J. ] ~67 ,I laryngeal cartilage seen". 23. He proceeded to state: "The time between injuries and death was immediate and between death and postmortem within 24 hours. In our opinion, based on the report of the Chemical Examiner, which is Ex. PC, the cause ofdeath in this case was ante mortem throttling and . ,. , constunption ofaluminium phosphide, which is apesticide, Ex. PD is the correct copy ofthe postmortem report, the original ofwhich 'r I have brought today in the Court which is signed by me and Dr. H. S. Dhillon and Mrs. Raminder Kaler". 24.

In cross-examination, he stated that the injuries near the mouth were possible ifan attempt had been made by someone to prevent taking tablet or tlying to take it out. Similarly, injury on the neck could be possible in such a struggle. D. 25. Thus, from the evidence of Dr. Swinder Kumar-PW3, it was ,,.. proved that Reeta Kumari died unnatural death. As already noted earlier, Reeta Kumari married to Mann1ohan Singh on February 19, 1999 and / she died on June 20, 1999 i. e. within a period offour months. Tims, tbe death was caused "within seven years of her marriage". From the prosecution evidence, it was proved beyond reasonable doubt that deceased Reeta Kumari was subjected to cruelty and harassment by the accused in connection with demand ofdowry from day ofher marriage. The demand was repeated from time to time and it resulted in sad and untimely death ofa young bride. But for continuous demand ofdowry by ---; the accused and constant harassment, two lives would have been saved.

We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that both the Courts were "1 right in convicting the appellants for the offences with which they were charged. 26. In ourjudgment, both the Courts were right in rejecting defence version that since the accused possessed scooter as well as motorcycle, there was no necessity to make demand of scooter. The High Court I observed that it was a matter ofcommon knowledge that even ifin-laws had several things in the house, still they demand dowry. Even ifwe may not go to that extent, in our opinion, in the present case, there was sufficient evidence in the fonn ofsworn testimony ofPW2-Sudershana Rani, PW4- Gopal Singh and PW7-Dhanninder Singh that there was a demand of dowry by accused and deceased Reeta Kumari had made such complaint immediately after marriage which was repeated and reiterated. The deceased used to infonn about such demand by the accused to her parents.

It is, therefore, totally irrelevant whether accused possessed motorcycle or scooter. Demand of dowry in this case was clearly proved and conclusively established by the prosecution. 27. We also find no substance in the contention ofthe appellants that there was material contradiction in the deposition of prosecution witnesses as to the occasion of making demand, i. e. as shagun or as dowry. From the evidence, it is proved that accused persons insisted for scooter and golden bangle as they had 'obliged' parents ofReeta Kumari by allowing her to ma. 1-y to accused No. 1-Manmohan Singh. In our opinion, therefore, both the Courts were right in coming to the conclusion that there was demand of dowry by the accused. 28. The trial Court convicted accused No. 1-Manmohan Singh for an offence punishable under Section 498A, IPC.

The High Court, however, set aside the said conviction observing that he was not regularly staying with Reeta Kumari as he was serving in Army and used to come only for few days by taking leave. Prosecution witnesses have, no doubt, deposed that demand of dowry was also made by accused No. 1- Manmohan Singh-husband of Reeta Kumari and believing the said evidence, the trial Court convicted him. But the High Court was ofthe view that there wa. S no sufficient evidence to prove demand ofdowry by accused No. 1-Manmohan Singh and acquitted him. The said acquittal is not challenged by the State. That part ofthe order thus has become final. The matter, therefore, rests there. 29. For the foregoing reasons, in our opinion, both the Courts were wholly right and fully justified in recording an order ofconviction and in imposing sentence on appellants-accused Nos. 3 and 4. We see no infinnity therein and dismiss the appeal and confirm the order ofconviction and sentence.

Sin~e they are on bail, we direct them to surrender to undergo the remaining period ofsentence. KISHAN SINGH v. STATE [C. K. THAKKER, J. ] 169 I 30. Before parting with the matter, we may advert to one aspect. The trial Court, while not accepting the evidence ofPW4-Gopal Singh as to demand ofdowry by accused No. 1-Manmohan Singh-husband of Reeta Kumari, had observed that no such demand could have been made by him. It was because PW4-Gopal Singh had stated that accused Nq. 1- Manmohan Singh ill-treated deceased Reeta Kumari soon after her death. He further stated that 10/12 days prior to the incident, accused No. 1- Manmohan Singh reiterated the demand ofscooter and golden bangle. Now, accused No. 1-Manmohan Singh was on leave from February 15, 1999 to March 26, 1999. Thus, after marriage ceremony on February 19, 1999, accused No. 1-Manmohan Singh stayed with his wife for mqre than a month before reporting for duty. Thereafter, he again sought leave from June 14, 1999 to July 9, 1999.

According to the trial Court, he must have reached his village on or after June 16, 1999 from Goa aμd Reeta Kumari died on June 20, 1999. Thus, according to the trial Court, accused No. 1-Manmohan Singh could not have made demand ofscooter and golden bangle "10/12 days prior to the incident". The trial Court, therefore, did not believe that part ofthe statement ofGopal Singh. 31. The trial Court, however, proceeded to state; "But falsehood in this part of the statement of Gopal Singh, regarding the demand of scooter and golden kara made by accused Manmohan Singh, just I0112 days prior to the death of deceased is utterly glaring. As already said above the accused Manmohan Singh had taken leave from 15. 2. 1999 to 26. 3. 1999, for marriage and after that from 14. 6. 1999 to 9. 7. 1999. This leave record was produced by DW2. Ifaccused Manmohan Singh had taken leave from 14. 6. 1999, he must have reached his village from Goa on or after 16. 6. 1999. Therefore, the presence ofManmohan.

Singh in his house at village Kahnuwan,just 10/12 days prior to the alleged occurrence when Gopal Singh made visit does not crop up at all". 32. It is unfortunate that the trial Court has made a caustic remark that there was 'falsehood' on the part ofPW4-Gopal Singh as to demand ofdowzy by accused No. 1-Manmohan Singh. A Court oflaw may not accept a particular part ofthe evidence considering the other facts and circumstances on record. But that does not necessarily mean that what was stated by the witness was 'false'. In fact, PW4-Gopal Singh was believed by the trial Court as well as by the High Court. It may be that the witness had committed some mistake in giving the periodduring which dowry demand was made by accused No. 1-Manmohan Singh. Ifthat part ofthe evidence is not consistent with the facts on record, the Court may not accept it. But only for that reason, the Court should not make disparaging remarks as has been done by the Court. 33.

While dealing with a matter, ·the Presiding Officer ofa Court 1 may extend benefit ofdoubt to the accused in the light of omissions, contradictions or discrepancies in the deposition ofprosecution witnesses. He may also offer comment on the conduct ofparties or witnesses. He may as well make necessary observations keeping in view their demeanour. It has been rightly said that the Judges are flesh and blood mortals with likes and dislikes, preferences and prejudices and they are also normal human traits. " 34. Thomas Reed Powell once said; "Judges have preferences for social policies as you and I. They form theirjudgments after the varying fashions in which you and I form ours. They have hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions. They are warmed by the same winter and summer and by the same ideas as a layman is. " 35.

Justice John Clarke has also stated; "I have never known any judges, no difference how austere ofmanner, who discharged theirjudicial duties in ari atmosphere ofpure, unadulterated reason. Alas! we are 'all the common growth ofthe Mother Earth' - even those ofus who wear the long robe. "(emphasis supplied) 36. At the same time, however, it cannot be overlooked that judicial restraints and discipline are equally necessary to orderly administration ofjustice. One must always keep in view golden advice given by S. K. Das, J. in State ofUP. v. Mohd Nairn, (1964] 2 SCR 363 : AIR (1964) SC 703; "If there is one principle of cardinal importance in the administration of justice, it is this : the pr~per freedom and independence ofJudges and Magistrates must be maintained and I ~ KISHAN SINGH v. STATE [C. K. THAKKER, J. ] 171 they must be allowed to perform their functions freely and fearlessly ·A and without undue interference by anybody, even by this Court.

At the same time it is equally necessary that in expressing their opinions Judges and Magistrates must be guided by considerations ofjustice, fair-play and restraint. It is not infrequent that sweeping generalizations defeat the very purpose for which they are made. It has been judicially recognized that in the matter of making disparaging remarks against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before courts of law in cases to be decided by them, it is relevant to consider (a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the court or has an opp01tunity ofexplaining or defending himself; (b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks; and (c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. It has also been recognized that judicial pronouncements must be judicial in nature, and should not normally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve.

" (emphasis supplied) 37. In State ofMP. V. Nandlal, [1986] 4 sec 566, while disposing the writ petition, the High Court made certain sweeping observations attributing malajides, c01ruption and underhand dealings to the State Government. Holding the disparaging remarks as unjustified, hypothetical and unwarranted, Bhagwati, C. J. observed: "We may observe in conclusion that Judges should not use strong and carping language while criticising the conduct ofparties or their witnesses. They must act with sobriety, moderation and restraint. They must have the humility to recognise that they are not infallible and any harsh and disparaging strictures passed by them against any party may be mistaken and unjustified and ifso, they may do considerable harm and mischiefand result in injustice. Here, in the present case, the observations made and strictures passed by B. M. Lal, J. were totally unjustified and unwarranted and they ought not to have been made". 38.

We are reminded of the following observations of Shetty, J. in A. M Afathur V. Pramod Kumar, [1990] 2 sec 533: JT (1990) 1 SC 545; "The Judges Bench is a seat of power. Not only do judges have power to make binding decisions, their decisions legitimate the use ofpower by other officials. The Judges have the absolute and unchallenged control of the Court domain. But they cannot misuse their authority by intemperate comments, undignified banter or scathing criticism ofcounsel, parties or witnesses. We concede that the Court has the inherent power to act freely upon its own conviction on any matter coming before it for adjudication, but it is a general principle ofthe highest importance to the proper administration ofjustice that derogatory remarks ought not to be made against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration unless it is absolutely necessary for the decision of the case to animadvert on their conduct". (emphasis supplied) 39.

In the case on hand, in our judgment, there was no occasion for the trial Court to go to the extent ofdescribing the evidence of PW4- Gopal Singh to be 'false'. Even ifit is conceded that in the light ofother evidence on record, the Court was not convinced as to the demand of dowry by accused No. 1 Manmohan Singh, '10/12 days prior to the incident', the Court could have acquitted accused No. l on that ground. In our considered opinion, however, it was certainly not a case ofmaking scathing remarks against the witness. All those remarks are, therefore, ordered to be deleted from the record. 40. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. N. J. Appeal disposed of.