LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER-CUM-DSWO, A.P. v. B.V. REDDY AND SONS

Citation: [2002] 1 S.C.R. 1041

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: G.B. PATTANAIK, S.N. PHUKAN, S.N. VARIAVA

Judgment text

LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER-CUM-DSWO, A. P. v. B. V. REDDY AND SONS FEBRUARY 14, 2002 [G. B. PATTANAIK, S. N. PHUKAN AND S. N. VARIAVA, JJ. ] land Acquisition Act, 1894: Section 25 (as it stoodprior lo its amendment by Act 68 of I984). Land Acquisition-Amount ofcompensation-Maximum limit-Held, The compensation cannot be in excess ofthe amount claimed by the claimant but in no case would it be less than that awarded by the Collector under S. 9. Section 25-Nature of-Procedural or substantive-Held, ls substantive in nature. Interpretation ofStatutes: Substantive provision -Prospective or retrospective-Held, A substantive provision cannot be retrospective in nature unless the provision itself so indicates. The land belonging to the respondents was acquired and compensation paid at a certain amount per acre, which was less than that claimed by the respondents-daimants.

The Reference Court determined the market value of the acquired land at much higher amount but restricted the quantum of compensation to the extent claimed by the respondents in view of Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as it stood prior to its amendment by Act 68 of 1984. A Single Judge of the High Court upheld the decision of the • Reference Court But the Division Bench enhanced the compensation to the market value on the ground that Section 25 of the Act being procedural in nature there was no bar for awarding compensation more than the amount claimed by the respondent-claimant. Hence this appeal. On behalf of the appellant it was contended that Section 25 of the Act was substantive in nature and not procedural and that the High Court erred in applying the amended provision of Section 25 of the Act in awarding compensation more than the amount claimed.

On behalf of the respondents it was contended that this Court while 1042 SUPREME COliRT REPORTS (2001] I I regard to the measurements made as well as inquiry to the valuation of the land on the date of Notification under Section 4(1) and thereafter it shall make an Award under his hand. Such Award of the Collector is required to be filed in the Collector's Office and under law is held to be final and conclusive evidence, as between the Collector and the persons interested on 1048 SUPREME COURT RHORTS [2002] I S. C. R. the question of true area and value of the land and apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. We are not concerned with other provisions except Section 18 and Section 25. Section 18 entitles the person interested who has not accepted the award to make a written application to the Collector, requiring that the matter of determination of compensation be referred to a competent Court.

Section 25 however, as it stood prior to its amendment by Act 68 of 1984, puts an embargo to the effect that if an applicant has made a claim to compensation, pursuant to any notice given under Section 9, then the amount awarded to him by the Court shall not exceed the amount so claimed and shall not be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11. The aforesaid provision contained in subsection (I) of Section 25, thus limits the power of the reference Court on a reference being made under Section 18 to the quantum of compensation which could be awarded. When these appeals had been listed before a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court, the decision of this Court in Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, (2000) 7 SCC 756, had been placed before the Bench and it was contended that since the award in the case in hand is between 30th of • September, 1982 and 24th of September, 1984, the compensation could be awarded under the amended provisions of Section 25.

Since that decision prima facie supported the contention of the claimants-respondents and the Bench was of the view that the said decision requires re-consideration, the matter had been referred to a Bench of three learned Judges and that is how the matter has been placed before us. On the rival submissions made by the counsel for the parties, the following questions arise for our consideration: (I) Can the provision of Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act be construed to be procedural in nature or is substantive? (2) If it is held to be substantive in nature, then can the amended provisions of Section 25 of the Act would apply to a case where the award of the Land Acquisition Collector had been made much prior to the amendment in question? (3) Whether the Judgment of this Court in Krishi Utpadan Mandi ' - Sam1ti's case can be held to be correctly decided? .

,, (4) Whether at all it would be appropriate for this Court to lay down the law and yet not to interfere with the judgment ofthe Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court with regard to the quantum of compensation awarded? LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER-CUM-DSWO, A. P. v. B. V. REDDY [PATTANAIK, J. ] }049 (5) Whether the petition under Article 32 can be entertained for deciding the validity of un-amended provisions of Section 25? So far as the first question is concerned, on a plain reading of the same, it is difficult for us to hold that it is procedural in nature. On the other hand, it unequivocally limits the power of the Court on a reference being made to award compensation, more than the amount claimed by the claimants and ll less than the amount awarded by the Collector.

In other words, the substantive right of a claimant who has made a claim to the compensation, pursuant to a notice under Section 9, cannot be more than the amount claimed and under any circumstances, would not be less than the amount which the Land Acquisition Collector has awarded under Section 11, since that award of the Collector is the offer that is made to the claimant. In course of the arguments, Mr. Rao, the learned counsel for the claimants submitted before us that subsection (5) of Section 25, as it stood prior to its amendment gives sufficient power to the reference Court to entertain a claim if the claimant had omitted to make such claim pursuant to notice issued under Section 9 and determine the compensation on that. Consequently, Mr. Rao contends that there should not be any embargo on the power of the Court even if the claimant makes a claim pursuant to the notice issued under Section 9.

We are unable to accept this submission inasmuch as sub-section (5) of Section 25 contemplates a situation where the claimant for sufficient reason had omitted to make a claim and the reference Court on being satisfied about the same may permit the claimant to make a claim. But the unambiguous and clear language of sub-section (I) of Section 25, as it stood prior to the amendment, makes it explicitly clear that if the claimant has made a claim pursuant to a notice under Section 9, then the Court would be incompetent to award any amount exceeding the said claim. In our considered opinion, sub-section (5) of Section 25 will be of no assistance to the claimants-respondents in the present case. lncidently, we may deal with the submission of Mr. Rao that the amount claimed was by the lawyer and not by the claimant himself and therefore, cannot be held to be claim by the claimants, pursuant to notice under Section 9 of the Act.

On examining the records of the case, we do not find any justification to entertain this submission, inasmuch even in the application made for reforence under Section 18, the claimant had not taken such a stand. It would, therefore, be futile for us to entertain this contention and hold that the claim made by the claimants through his lawyer cannot be held to be a claim by the claimants. This Court in the very case of Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, [2000] 7 SCC 756, on which the learned counsel for the respondents had placed reliance, considered the provisions of Section 25 and held that the said provision can never be held to be procedural and it is substantive in nature. We approve of the said conclusion and hold that the provision of Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act is substantive in nature. Coming to the second question, it is a well settled principle of construction that a substantive provision cannot be retrospective in nature unless the provision itself indicates the same.

The amended provision of Section 25 nowhere indicates that the same would have any retrospective effect. Consequently, therefore, it would apply to all acquisitions made subsequent to 24. 9. 84, the date on whii:h Act 68/1984 came into force. The Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill of 1982 was introduced in Parliament on 30th of April, 1982 and came into operation with effect from 24th of September, 1984. Under the amendment in question, the provisions of Section 23(2) dealing with solatium was amended and Section 30(2) of the amended Act provided that the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Principal Act as amended by clause (b) of Section 15 shall apply and shall be deemed to have applied, also to and in relation to any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the principal Act, after the 30th April, 1982 and before the commencement of the Act.

It is because of the aforesaid provision, the question cropped up as to whether in respect of an award passed by the Collector between the two dates, the amended provision will have an application or not and that question has been answered by this Court in the Constitution Bench decision in Union ofIndia and Anr. v Raghubir Singh, [1989] 2 S. C. C. 754. Sub-section (2) of Section 30 has at all no reference to the provisions of Section 25 of the Act. In that view of the matter, question of applicability of the amended provisions of Section 25 of the Act to an award of the Collector made earlier to the amendment and the matter was pending in appeal, does not arise. In our considered opinion, the amended provisions of Section 25 of the Act, not being retrospective in nature, the case in hand would be governed by the unamended provisions of Section 25 of the Act.

Coming to the third question, we find that on a review application being filed, this court relying upon the case of Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, [1989] 2 SCC 754, held that the amended provisions would be applicable under which there is no restriction that the award would only be upto the amount claimed by the claimant. In Raghubir Singh's case, the Constitution Bench was dealing with sub-section (2) of Section 30 which had got absolutely no relevance or connection with the provisions of Section 25 LAND ACQUISITlON OFFICER-CUM-DSWO, A. P. v. B. V. REDDY [PATTANAIK. l. j I05 J of the Land Acquisition Act. For the reasons aln:ady indicatt:d, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the enunciation of law made by this Court in 11. rishi Utpadan Mandi Sam1ti 's case, in para (17) of the Judgment relying upon the case of Union ofIndia v. Raghubir Singh, is not correct and to that extent the aforesaid case must be held not to have been correctly decided.

Coming to the next question as to whether this Court would interfere with the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the Anahra Pradesh High Court or not, the answer would depend on the provision of law which was under consideration and whether there was any ambiguity in the law which is being decided for the first time. It is no doubt true that in Teherakhatuun V. Salambin Mohammad, [1999] 2 sec 635, this Court has held that even if the special leave has been granted under Article 136, unless and until, it is shown that a substantial and grave injustice will be caused if no interference is made out, the Court may refuse to interfere with the judgment under challenge. This principle would mainly depend upon the facts of each case which comes up for decision before the Court. To the case iii hand, it is difficult for us to apply the aforesaid principle.

On the date the land was notified for acquisition under Section 4( I) of the Act, the un-amended provision of Section 25 was in force and it was made known to all concerned that the reference Court will have no power to award the amount in excess· of the amount claimed by the claimants. Not only the language of the Statute was clear and unambiguous, but also the question was not res- integra, in view of the decision of this Court in Dadoo Yugendrenath Singh v. The Cu//er;tur, AIR (1977) SC 1128. Until the statutory rigour contained in subsection (I) of Section 25 stood obliterated by the amended provisions of Section 25 and until all restraints and embargoes placed for the Court stood totally liberated, the reference Court had no jurisdiction to award the amount in excess of the amount claimed by the claimant. Such being the position of law. we are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the submission of Mr.

Rao to hold that it would not be in the interest ofjustice to interfere with the judgment of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. In our considered opinion, the High Court had no jurisdiction on the law as it stood, to award any amount in excess of the amount claimed and in the case in hand in excess of Rs. 30,000 per acre and, therefore, the principles enunciated in the decision of this l'ourt in Teheru!.. hatoon v. Salambin Mohammad, (1999) 2 sec 63'i, cannot be applied to the case in hand. So far as the last submission is concerned, we are afraid that the validity 1052 SCPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] I S. C. R. A of unamended provision of Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act which was there on the statute book since inception can at all be examined at a point of time when that provision no longer subsists since, 24. 9. 84, the date on which Act 68/1984 came into force. We, therefore, decline to entertain the petition under Article 32 at the behest of the claimants.

In the net result, B therefore, these civil appeals are allowed. The Judgment of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court is set aside and it is held that the claimants-respondents would be entitled to compensation for the acquired land @Rs. 30,000 per acre, which they claimed pursuant to service of notice under Section 9. The writ petition filed by the claimants stands dismissed. v. s. s. Appeals allowed and Petition dismissed. •