M. RAMAKRISHNAN v. STATE OF MADRAS (2)

Citation: [1980] 1 S.C.R. 396

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: A.C. GUPTA, E.S. VENKATARAMIAH

Case summary

The High Court' further held that the la,nd acquired by Devita: was governed by seetion 21 (1) read with section 10(2)(b) of the Act.

Judgment text

M. RAMAKRISHNAN v. STATE OF MADRAS August 28, 1979 [A. C. GUPTA AND E. S. VENKATARAM! AH, J}. ] Tamilnadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceilings on Land) Act 1961-Ss. 3 (42), 5 (4)(a)-Scope oi-"Stridhana land"-Whether includes land inherited by female or acquired by her as bequest after the date of commencement of the Act. The Tamilnadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 by S. 3 (42) defined '~tridhana land'' as any land held on the date of tho commencement of the Act (April 6, 1960) by any female member of a family in her own name, and S. 5 (4)(a) of the Act enabled such a female meniber to bold, in addition to the extent of land whic! -, the family is entitled to bold, stridhana land not exceeding 10 standard acres. The mother of the appellant had bequeathed to the appellant and his wife certain agricultural lands by a will. The appellant being married 9n June 29, 1960 and his mother having died on April 20, 1962 i. e. after the Act ca.

me into force, the Authorised Officer passed orders treating the lands bequeatl:i acre in the case of dry land shall, irrespective of the assess- ·~ ment of such land, be excluded. " Section 21 of the Act read as follows :- "21. Ceiling on future acquisition by inheritance, bequest or by sale in execution of decrees, etc. - (1) If, on or after the date of the commencement of this Act- (a,) any person acquires by inheritance or bequest from any person; . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. any land, which, together with ·the fand, if any, already held by him, exceeds in the aggregate the ceiling area, then he shall, within ninety days from the notified date or from the date of such acqui- . sition, whichever is later, furnish to the authorised officer within whose jurisdiction his holding or the major part thereof is situated, a return containing the following particulars, namely .............. ·..... •..... •....

" The lands which were bequeathed by Sivagami Achi, the mother of the appellant under a will were held by her on the date of tl! e commencement of the Act. i. e. April 6, 1960. The appellant married Devika on June 29, 1960. Sivagami Achi died on April 20, 1962 and on her death, the appellant and Devika became entitled· to the land bequeathed iii their favour by her. The draft statement rel. ilting to the holding of the appellant was published on May, 30, 1965 and the Authorised Officer passed his order on March 14, 1966 treating the lands bequeathed by Sivagami Achi in favour of the appellant and his Y· wife as part of the holding of the family consisting of the appellant and his wife. The case of the appellant before the Authorised Officer, the Subordinate Judge and the High Court was that in view of section 5 (4)(a) of the Act, the ceiling area should have been fixed in his case at 30 standard acres plus the extent of land bequeathed in favour of his wife i. e. 8. 81 standard acres.

In this Court also, the very same contention is urged. We are of the view that there is no substance • in this contention. The expression "stridhana land" used in sect~on 5(4) (a) has been given a restricted meaning by section 3(42) of the Act which defines it as any land held on the date of the co=encement of the Act by any female member of a family in her own name. Admittedly on the date of the co=encement of the Act i. e. April 6, 1960, Devika was not the owner of the land in question. She acquired title to it only on April 20, 1962 on the death of the testatrix. The appellant cannot, therefore, claim any benefit under section 5 (4) (a) of the Act.

Section 21 of the Act under which the land in question becomes liable to be included in the holding of the appellant for purposes of determination of the surplus land does not make any difference between stridhana property of a female acquired after the conunencement of the Act by inheritance or bequest from any person and any other property held by her familyc From a reading of the definition of the expression "stridbana land" in section 3 (42) of the Act and the provisions of section 5 (4) of the Act, we are of opinion that the State Legislature intended to extend the concession available under section 5 (4) ·of the Act only to the stridhana property held by a female on the date of the commencement of the Act and not to property acquired by her thereafter. I It was urged by Mr. K. Jayaram, learned connsel for the appel13nt • that the Act was an expropriatory one and therefore, we should construe section 5(4) (a) of the Act as being applicable to agricultural land acquired.

by a female even after the co=encemeut of the Act. We do not think that there is any room for construing the said provision in that way. The object of the 1egislatiou as mentioned earlier was to • acquire agricultural land in excess of the ceiling area from the holders thereof and to distribute the same amongst the landless among the rural population. If the construction urged by the appellant is placed on section 21 of the Act, the very object of the statute would be defeated. If really the Legislature intended that lands acquired by way of inheritance or bequest by a female on or after the commencement of the Act should also be dealt with in accordance with section 5 (4) , . it would have defined the expression "stridhana land" without the words "on the date of the commencement of this Act. " It has also to be i borne in_ mind that the expression 'stridhana' is no( used in the Aci in the sense in which it is used in Hindu Law.

The Act is applicable to Hindus as well as others governed by other personal lawi. It is, therefore, reasonable to construe the expression 'stridhana land' at referring ' only tb the land held by a female on the date of the commencement of the Act and not to lands inherited· by her . or acquired by her as a "-"" quest at any subsequent point of time. • The learned counsel for the appellant relied on the decision of the High Court of Madras in Valliammal v. The Authorised Officer, Land Reforms, Coimbatpre(') in which a contention 5imilar to the one urged before us on behalf of the appellant in this case had been accepted. ·The facts of that case were more or less similar to the facts in the case before us. The petitioner in that case was the wife of one Palanisami Gounder who was in po6Session of an extent ·of 44. 061 atandard acres, after excluding the exempted lands, on the commencement of the Act. She inherited 11. 075 standard acres on the death of her IOU on March 25, 1962.

In the return filed by him, the husband of the petitioner claimed that he was entitled to retain 30 atandard acres as holding of the family and that his wife, the petitioner in that case, wa& entitled to hold 10 smndard acres as stridhana property. The Land Tribunal, Coimbatore held that since the Act defined "1tridhana land" as meaning any land held on the date of the commencement of the Act-by any female member of the family in her own name and since • the petitioner therein had inherited the land on the death of her son only on March 25, 1962 i. e. subsequen~ to the commencement of the Act, she was not entitled to retain any land as stridhana property in addition to the extent of land which the family could retain under section 5(1) . The petitioner questioned the correctness of the order of f .. the Tribunal before the High Court of Madras in C. R. P. No. 916 of 1971. That petition was dismissed by Ganesan, J.

on the ground tha~ in view of the definition of stridhana land in section 3(42) of the Act, the petitioner therein was not entitled to hold 10 standard acres as stridhana property, in addition to the 30 standard acree allowed to • the family consisting of herself 11nd her husband. Thereafter a petition was filed before the High Court by the petitioner therein t'o review the order passed by Ganesan, J. The review petition came up for decision before another learned Judge who allowed the laDle by his order dated November 2, 1972. It is on the decision rendered on the review petition the reliance is placed by the appellant before us. IJ:r paragi:aph 6 of that decision, it is observed as follows • (1) A. l. R. 1973. Mad. 321. M. RAMAKRISHNAN v. MADRAS (Venkataramiah, J.

) 403 "The learned· Judge, who heard the civil revision petition, mainly relied on the definition of 'stridhana property' for holding that no woman is entitled to hold any stridhana property if the same was acquired or inherited subsequent to the co=encement of the Act. Of course, section 3(42) defines stridhana land as meaning any land held on the date of commencement of the Act by any female mem· ber of a family in her o\Vn name. But that me-aning is to be adopted 'unless the context otherwise requires'. It has been repeatedly held that the word in the section will have to be interpreted and understood in the context in which it is used in the section and the definition given for that word in the definition section of the Act could not always govern the interpretation withont reference to the context. In the context of sections 5, 7 and 21 and with reference to the ..

scope and object of the Act, I am of opinion, that the properties inherited by females as stridhana property subsequent to the commencement of the Act are also entitled to the benefit of sub-section (4) of section 5 of the Act. " It is true that the above passage supports the case of the appelloant but we are of the view that in the context of section 21 of the Act it is not neccisary to give a meaning to the expression 'stridhani land' different from what is stated in section 3(42) of the Act. For the reasons already stated by us we hold that the aforesaid decision does not lay down the law correctly. It is also to be observed that the earlier decision of the High Court of Madras which is now under appeal does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the learned Judge who decided the above case. ' • We, therefore, hold that the High Court was right in this case in holding that section 5(4) of the Act was not applicable to the land in question. It was lastly urged by Mr. K.

Jayaram that in view of certain sub-· sequent amendments made to the Act, the case has to be examined • afresh by us in the light of the amended law. We do not think that it is advisable to do so at this stage. It is open to the appellant if he is so advised to resort to appropriate proceedings in order to claim the benefit that he may be entitled to under the amended law. Liberty is also reserved to the State Government to take whatever action it may take under the subsequent amendments to the Act. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. N. V. K. Appeal dismissed.