M-S A.P. ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT CORPORATION v. THE TAHSILDAR & ORS. ETC

Citation: [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1625, 2025 INSC 274

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Judgment text

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA M/s A. P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc. Writ petition by appellant against illegal attempts of dispossession [2025] 2 S. C. R. 1625 : 2025 INSC 274 M/s A. P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc. (Civil Appeal No(s). 4526-4527 of 2024) 27 February 2025 [J. B. Pardiwala* and R. Mahadevan, JJ. ] Issue for Consideration Whether in the instant case, single Judge of the High Court was right in holding that the appellant herein is entitled to get the benefit of s. 3 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999. Whether the Division Bench of the High Court committed any error in upsetting the findings recorded by the Single Judge. Headnotes† Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 - Sub-section (5) of section 10 and sub-section (6) of s. 10 - Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 - s. 3 - The Competent Authority issued notice u/s.

10(5) of the ULC Act directing the appellant to surrender the excess vacant land within 30 days - According to respondents, the appellant's factory was closed and the said notice was fixed on the main door of factory premises - Due to non-compliance of the aforementioned notice, order u/s. 10(6) of the ULC Act was issued on 05. 02. 2008 authorising the enquiry officer to take over the possession of the surplus land - Accordingly, the Enquiry Officer took over the possession of the surplus land on 08. 02. 2008 by way of a panchnama - However, it is the case of appellant that the respondents allegedly took only symbolic possession of the subject land - Thereafter, the State brought into force the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 with effect from 27. 03. 2008 - Writ petition by appellant against illegal attempts of dispossession - The Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petitions filed by the appellant and held that order u/s.

10(6) was void, illegal and bad in law - However, the Division Bench of the High Court allowed both the appeals filed by the State and thereby set aside the judgment and order passed by the Single Judge - Correctness: * Author 1626 Held: The issue as to whether actual possession of land declared excess under the Act has been taken over or not assumes great significance after the coming into force of the Repeal Act, 1999 inasmuch as if possession has not been taken over, the proceedings would abate u/s. 4 of the Repeal Act, 1999 and the ownership of the land, if vested in the State Government u/s.

10(3) of the Act, 1976 would be required to be restored to the original land-holder subject to repayment of any amount that has been paid by the State Government with respect to such land - The "vesting" in sub-section (3) of section 10 means vesting of title absolutely and not possession though nothing stands in the way of a person voluntarily surrendering or delivering possession - Surrendering or transfer of possession under sub-section (3) to Section 10 can be voluntary so that the person may get the compensation as provided under Section 11 of the Act, 1976 early - Once there is no voluntary surrender or delivery of possession, necessarily the State Government has to issue notice in writing under sub-section (5) to Section 10 to surrender or deliver possession - Sub-section (5) of Section 10 visualizes a situation of surrendering and delivering possession, peacefully while sub-section (6) of Section 10 contemplates a situation of forceful dispossession - The State has to establish that there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land or surrender and delivery of peaceful possession under sub-section (5) of Section 10 or forceful dispossession under sub-section (6) of Section 10 - On failure to establish any of those situations, the landowner or holder can claim the benefit of Section 3 of the Repeal Act, 1999 - In the case on hand, the State Government has not been able to establish any of those situations - The mere paper possession would not save the situation for the State Government unless the State is able to establish by cogent evidence that actual physical possession of the entire land was taken over by evicting each and every person from the land - The onus is on the State to establish that actual physical possession of the excess vacant land was taken over before the repeal - Hence, the Single Judge was right in holding that the appellant herein is entitled to get the benefit of Section 3 of the Repeal Act, 1999.

[Paras 20, 29, 36, 38, 39] Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 - Sub-section (5) of section 10 and sub-section (6) of section 10 - Statute contemplates: M/s A. P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.

Held: On a plain reading of the sub-section (5) of section 10 and sub-section (6) of section 10, it is apparent that the statute contemplates giving an opportunity to the landholder or any person in possession of excess vacant land to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government and for this purpose provides for giving notice in writing, ordering such person to surrender or deliver possession of such land - It is only when pursuant to such notice, such person refuses or fails to comply with an order under sub-section (5) within a period of thirty days of the service of notice, that the competent authority is required to take over possession of the vacant land and for that purpose may use force, if necessary - Therefore, the provisions of sub-section (6) are to be resorted to only when there is refusal or non-compliance of an order under sub-section (5) of Section 10 of the Act, 1976 within the prescribed period.

[Para 22] Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 - Possession of subject land - Paper possession: Held: The dictum, as laid in Hari Ram case, is that where the possession of the subject land has not been taken over by the State Government or by any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority, the proceedings under the Act would not survive and mere vesting of the vacant land with the State Government by operation of law, without actual possession, is not sufficient - To put it in other words, the mere paper possession would not save the situation for the State Government unless the State is able to establish by cogent evidence that actual physical possession of the entire land was taken over by evicting each and every person from the land - The onus is on the State to establish that actual physical possession of the excess vacant land was taken over before the repeal.

[Para 29] Precedent - Two inconsistent decision of Supreme Court - The High Court to reconcile and respect both: Held: If two decisions of this Court appear inconsistent with each other, the High Courts are not to follow one and overlook the other, but should try to reconcile and respect them both.

[Para 35] Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 - Effect of: 1628 Held: The effect of Repeal Act, 1999 is clear - If the landowner remains in physical possession, then irrespective of his land being declared surplus and/or entry being made in favour of the State in revenue records, he will not be divested of his rights - Even if compensation is received that also will not dis-entitle him to claim the benefit if compensation is refunded, provided he is in actual physical possession - Payment of compensation has no co-relation with the taking of actual physical possession as with the vesting land compensation becomes payable which can be paid without taking actual physical possession. [Para 40] Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 - Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 - The propositions of law governing the issue of possession in context with ss. 10(5) and 10(6) respectively of the Act, 1976 r/w. s.

3 of the Repeal Act - Summed up: Held: (1) The Repeal Act, 1999 clearly talks about the possession being taken u/s. 10(5) or s. 10(6) of the Act, 1976, as the case may be; (2) It is a statutory obligation on the part of the competent authority or the State to take possession strictly as permitted in law; (3) In case the possession is purported to have been taken u/s. 10(6) of the Act, 1976 the Court is still obliged to look into whether "taking of such possession" is valid or invalidated on any of the considerations in law; (4) The possession envisaged u/s. 3 of the Repeal Act, 1999 is de facto and not de jure only; (5) The mere vesting of "land declared surplus" under the Act without resuming "de facto possession" is of no consequence and the land holder is entitled to the benefit of the Repeal Act, 1999; (6) The requirement of giving notice under sub-sections (5) and (6) of s.

10 respectively is mandatory - Although the word "may" has been used therein, yet the word "may" in both the sub-sections should be understood as "shall" because a Court is obliged to decide the consequences that the legislature intended to follow from the failure to implement the requirement; (7) The mere vesting of the land under sub-section (3) of s. 10 would not confer any right on the State Government to have de facto possession of the vacant land unless there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land before 18. 03. 1999; (8) The State has to establish by cogent evidence on record that there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land or surrender and delivery of peaceful possession under sub-section (6) of s. 10 or forceful dispossession under sub-section (6) of s. 10. [Para 41] M/s A. P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.

Appeal - Intra-Court Appeal - Scope of: Held: An intra-court appeal is really not a statutory appeal preferred against the judgment and order of an inferior to the superior Court - The appeal inter se in a High Court from one court to another is really an appeal from one coordinate bench to another coordinate bench and it is for this reason that a writ cannot be issued by one Bench of the High Court to another Bench of the High Court nor can even the High Court issue writ to a High Court - Thus, unlikely an appeal, in general, an intra court appeal is an appeal on principle and that is why, unlike an appeal, in an ordinary sense, such as a criminal appeal, where the whole evidence on record is examined afresh by the appellate court, what is really examined, in an intra court appeal, is the legality and validity of a judgment and/or order of the Single Judge and it can be set aside or should be set aside only when there is a patent error on the face of the record or the judgment is against the established or settled principles of law - If two views are possible and a view, which is reasonable and logical has been adopted by a Single Judge, the other view howsoever appealing may be to the Division Bench, it is the view adopted by the Single Judge, which should, normally, by allowed to prevail.

[Para 42] Jurisdiction - Writ Jurisdiction - Power of writ Court to determine disputed question of fact: Held: The disputed questions of fact are not investigated or adjudicated by a writ court while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India - But the mere existence of the disputed question of fact, by itself, does not take away the jurisdiction of this writ court in granting appropriate relief to the petitioner - In a case where the Court is satisfied, like the one on hand, that the facts are disputed by the State merely to create a ground for the rejection of the writ petition on the ground of disputed questions of fact, it is the duty of the writ court to reject such contention and to investigate the disputed facts and record its finding if the particular facts of the case, like the one at hand, was required in the interest of justice - There is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to indicate that the High Court in the proceedings, like the one on hand, is debarred from holding such an inquiry - The proposition that a petition under Article 226 must be rejected simply on the ground that it cannot be decided without determining the disputed question of fact is not warranted by any provisions of law nor by 1630 any decision of this Court - A rigid application of such proposition or to treat such proposition as an inflexible rule of law or of discretion will necessarily make the provisions of Article 226 wholly illusory and ineffective.

[Paras 48, 49] Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 - Sub-section (5) of s. 10 and sub-section (6) of s. 10 - Whether actual physical possession of excess land is a mixed question of law and fact: Held: The issue as regards taking over of the actual physical possession of the excess land in accordance with the provisions of sub-sections (5) and (6) of s. 10 of the Act, 1976 could be said to be a mixed question of law and fact and not just a question of fact - Mixed question of law and fact refers to a question which depends on both law and fact for its solution - In resolving a mixed question of law and fact, a reviewing court must adjudicate the facts of the case and decide relevant legal issues at the same time. [Para 54] Case Law Cited Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. [2002] Supp. 4 SCR 517 : (2003) 2 SCC 111; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Hari Ram [2013] 2 SCR 301 : (2013) 4 SCC 280; Vipin Chandra Vadilal Bavishi v.

State of Gujarat [2016] 1 SCR 283 : (2016) 4 SCC 531; Rajendra Kumar v. Kalyan (Dead) by L. Rs. [2000] Supp. 2 SCR 114 : (2000) 8 SCC 99; State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei [1967] 2 SCR 625 : AIR 1967 SC 1269; Gunwant Kaur v. Bhatinda Municipality (1969) 3 SCC 769 : AIR 1970 SC 602; State of U. P. & Anr. v. Ehsan & Anr. , 2023 INSC 906 : [2023] 13 SCR 905; Kolkata Municipal Corporation and Another v. Bimal Kumar Shah and Others [2024] 5 SCR 831: (2024) 10 SCC 533 - relied on. Gajanan Kamlya Patil v. Additional Collector and Competent Authority (ULC) and Ors. [2014] 1 SCR 1032 : (2014) 12 SCC 523; State of Assam v. Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma [2014] 14 SCR 1451 : (2015) 5 SCC 321; Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar v. Deputy Collector and Competent Authority and Ors. [2012] 2 SCR 219 : (2012) 4 SCC 718; State of Gujarat v. Kamuben, 2019 SCC OnLine Guj 4941; Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab [1962] Supp. 3 SCR 713 : AIR 1963 SC 395; Sethi Auto Service Station and Another v.

Delhi Development Authority and Others [2008] 14 SCR 598 : (2009) 1 SCC 180; Jasbir Singh Chhabara and Others v. State of Punjab and Others (2010) 4 SCC 192; State of Uttaranchal and Another v. M/s A. P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc. Sunil Kumar Vaish and Others [2011] 13 SCR 754 : (2011) 8 SCC 670; Pimpri Chinchwad New Township Development Authority v. Vishnudev Cooperative Housing Society and Others [2018] 11 SCR 310 : (2018) 8 SCC 215; Sita Ram Bhandari Society, New Delhi v. Lieutenant Governor of NCT of Delhi [2009] 14 SCR 507 : (2009) 10 SCC 501; Omprakash Verma v. State of A. P. [2010] 15 SCR 302 : (2010) 13 SCC 158; Balmokand Khati Educational and Industrial Trust v. State of Punjab [1996] 2 SCR 643 : (1996) 4 SCC 212; Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. A. Viswan [1996] 2 SCR 402 : (1996) 8 SCC 259; State of Assam v. Bhaskar Jyoti Sharma [2014] 14 SCR 1451 : (2015) 5 SCC 321; State of Maharashtra v. B. E. Billimoria [2003] Supp.

2 SCR 603 : (2003) 7 SCC 336; Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana, 2012 AIR SCW 240; Maharaj Singh v. State of UP [1977] 1 SCR 1072 - referred to. State of Telangana v. Southern Steels Limited, W. A. 1975 of 2017; The Principal Commissioner v. M. Venkataraman, 2014 SCC OnLine Mad 4505; P. Laxmi Kantha Rao and Others v. Government Of Andhra Pradesh, 2014 SCC OnLine Hyd 1348; J Sarada Govardhini v. Special Officer and Competent Authority, Writ Petition No. 9680 of 2006; Gonguluri Srinivasa Sharma and Anr. v. Government of AP and Ors. , Writ Petition No. 28883 of 2011; Dip Co. Op. Hsg. Society Ltd. through Purshottam S. Patel v. State of Gujarat and Others, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 693; Dip Co. Op. Hsg. Society Ltd. through Purshottam S. Patel v. State of Gujarat and Others, 2024 SCC OnLine Guj 3034; Privy Council in Punjab Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Commr. of Income Tax, Lahore, AIR 1940 PC 230 - referred to. Quinn v. Leathern, 1901 AC 495 at p.

506; Privy Council in Alexander Rodger Charles Carnie v. Comproir D'Escompte De Paris, 1871 Law Reports 3 Privy Council 475 - referred to. List of Acts Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976; Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999; U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. List of Keywords Section 3 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999; sub-sections (5) and (6) of s. 10 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976; Excess vacant land; Possession; Actual 1632 possession; Paper possession; de facto possession; Vesting of the vacant land; Writ Jurisdiction; Disputed question of fact; Mixed question of law and fact; Intra-Court Appeal; Two inconsistent decision of Supreme Court; Article 226 of Constitution. Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No(s). 4526-4527 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 14. 02. 2023 of the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in WA Nos.

665 and 670 of 2022 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant: N. K. Kaul, Mukul Rohatgi, V. Ramesh, Sr. Advs. , M/s. Khaitan & Co. , Sanjeev K Kapoor, Aakash Bajaj, Dhritiman Roy, Ms. Sania Abbasi, R Ashwanth. Advs. for the Respondents: Raju Ramachandran, Sr. Adv. , Somanadri Goud Katam, Ms. Neha Agarwal, Vikram, Sirajuddin. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment J. B. Pardiwala, J. 1. Since the issues raised in both the captioned appeals are same, the parties are also same and the challenge is also to the self-same judgment and order passed by the High Court, those were taken up for hearing analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. 2. ".....

One of the first and highest duties of all courts is to take care that the act of the Court does no injury to any of the Suitors, and when the expression 'the act of the Court' is used, it does not mean merely the act of the Primary Court, or of any intermediate Court of appeal, but the act of the Court as a whole, from the lowest Court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter up to the highest Court which finally disposes of the case. " [Privy Council in Alexander M/s A. P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc. Rodger Charles Carnie v. Comproir D'Escompte De Paris, 1871 Law Reports 3 Privy Council 475] 3. These appeals arise from a common judgment and order passed by the High Court for the State of Telangana and Hyderabad dated 03. 01. 2022 in Writ Appeal No. 665 of 2022 and Writ Appeal No.

670 of 2022 respectively by which both the writ appeals filed by the State came to be allowed thereby setting aside the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court allowing the writ petitions filed by the appellants-herein. 4. The facts giving rise to these appeals may be summarized as under:i) M/S A. P. Electrical Equipment Corporation (Now known as 'ECE INDUSTRIES LIMITED'), hereinafter the appellant is a company engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of power transformers and other electrical equipment. For the purpose of establishing its manufacturing unit, the appellant company had purchased land measuring 1,63,764 (Sq. yards in Survey Nos 74,75,76, 78, 79) ('Subject Land') and the same is the subject matter of the present appeals. ii) The subject land is situated in Fatehnagar Village Balanagar Mandal, Rangareddy District.

iii) Following the enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short, 'the Act, 1976'), the appellant filed a declaration in Form I under Section 6(1) of the Act, 1976 whose declaration was taken up as C. C. No. 10571 of 1976 by the special officer and competent authority of urban land ceiling department for utilization of excess land. The declaration, which covered the appellant's holdings in Hyderabad and Visakhapatnam, was duly processed by the authorities. iv) Lands held by the appellant at Hyderabad are as under: S. Properties Area No (in Sq. Mtrs) 1. Total extent in Sy. Nos- 74/P, 75/P, 163679 76/P, 78 & 79 in Fathenagar (Vg) 2. Extent covered by GVM road in Sy. 163679-5088 = No. 78 & 79 in T. S. No. 3 & 6 of 158591 Block A = 5088 Sq Meters 1634 3. Extent exempted by the Government 158591-51580 = u/s 20(1)(a) vide G. O. Ms No. 1729 dt 107011 23. 11. 82 = 51580. 00 Sq meters 4. Extent Exempted u/s 21 under 107001- Housing Scheme in Sy. Nos . 74/P, 56730.

57 = 75/P = 56730. 57 Sq Mtrs 50280. 43 5. Total Extent exempted i. e. (108310. 57 Sq Mtrs) 6. Extent Effected by Roads in Sy. 50280. 43-3742 = No. 74/P, 75, 76 as per MCH Plan, 46538. 43 3742. 00 Sq Mtrs out of 50283. 00 Sq Mtrs 7. Surplus extent in Sy. No. 74/P, 75/P & 46538. 43 76/P (Fatehnagar) v) In respect of the Hyderabad holdings, the appellant's submission led to the issuance of Government Orders, notably GO Ms. No. 1729 (dated 27 November 1982), whereby the exemptions were granted under Section 20(1)(a):a. The entire land in Surveys 78 and 79 was exempted on the ground that a factory had been constructed there; b. A portion of the land in Surveys 74, 75 and 76 measuring approximately 48,859. 50 square metres was exempted subject to the condition that separate industrial structures be constructed within a prescribed period; c.

The appellant had also filed a declaration under Section 21(1) of the ULC Act and the same declaration was taken up as for accommodation of weaker sections to an extent of 56,730. 57 square meters out of the aforesaid land. Accordingly, permission was accorded by the Special Officer and Competent Authority under Section 21(1) of the ULC Act on 04. 02. 2001. While granting the permission, a condition was imposed on the appellant that the construction of the dwelling units shall be for the weaker sections of the society and the same should be completed within 5 years. It was alleged that the appellant had failed to construct the dwelling units within the specified period M/s A. P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc. thereby violating the condition while granting permission under Section 21(1) of the ULC Act. vi) In respect of the land in Survey Nos. 74, 75 and 76 respectively, the Government had issued G. O. Ms No. 303 dated 07. 04.

1990 withdrawing the exemption granted earlier under G. O. Ms. No. 1729. vii) The stance of the Respondents is that the failure on the part of the appellant to utilize the 48,859. 50 sq. m. portion in the prescribed manner led to the withdrawal of the exemption for that land, as affected by GO Ms. No. 303. On April 7, 1992, the Special Officer and the Competent Authority for Urban Land Ceiling, Hyderabad, issued a draft statement under Sections 8(1) and 8(3) of the Act, 1976 respectively, provisionally categorizing the appellant as holding surplus land amounting to 1,01,645 sq. m. viii) Later, on 03. 04. 2005, the Special Officer issued an order under Section 8(4) determining that the excess vacant land in the Hyderabad Urban Agglomeration measured 46,538. 53 sq. m. of this total, the appellant was entitled to retain 1,000 sq. m. under Section 4(1)(b) of the ULC Act, leaving a balance of 45,538. 43 sq. m. as vacant hand. ix) Aggrieved by the order dated 03. 04.

2005, the appellant approached the Appellate authority by way of an appeal under Section 33 bearing no. Hyd/11/2005. The Appellate authority vide order dated 28. 07. 2005, set aside the order appealed against and remanded the matter to the special officer and competent authority for fresh computation. After due enquiry, a revised order under Section 8(4) of the ULC Act and final Statement under Section 9 of the ULC Act were issued on 20. 03. 2007 which determined the surplus at 46,538. 43 sq. mts. which was separate from the land exempted under Section 21 of the ULC Act. x) It is the case of the Respondents that the Government of Andhra Pradesh issued a notification under Section 10(1) of the ULC Act, in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette inviting claims from persons interested in the Subject land measuring 46,538. 43 sq. mts. It is also the stance of the Respondents that the said gazette notification was never challenged by the appellant.

1636 xi) After completion of such computation, notification under Section 10(3) of the ULC Act was published in the Andhra Pradesh State Gazette dated 03. 10. 2007, wherein an extent of 46,538. 43 square meters in survey nos. 74/P, 75/P and 76/P of the Fatehnagar Village in Balanagar mandal was declared to have been acquired by the State Government, with effect from 12. 07. 2007. It is the case of the appellant-herein that the aforesaid notification failed to note that the surplus land was only to the extent of 45,538. 43 sq. mts. and not 46,538. 43 sq. mts. xii) It is the case of the appellant that the Competent Authority purportedly issued a notice under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act dated 05. 01. 2008 directing the appellant-herein to surrender the excess vacant land within thirty days. Further, according to the Respondents since the appellant's factory was closed due to lockout on 05. 01. 2008 the said notice was affixed on the main door of the factory premises on 08. 01. 2008.

The operative portion of the notice is reproduced herein below:- "Whereas the lands in sy. Nos. 75/p, 75/p, 76/p to an extent of£ 46538. 43 Sq/Mtrs. Fatehnagar vg. , Balanagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, Marripalen vg. Visakhapatnam District in Sy. No. 59/3, 8437. 48 Sq. Mtrs. (B Category) equivalent to 12,656. 22 Sq. Mtrs. (C- Category) and which are in your possession are deemed to have vested absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrance with effect from the 12. 07. 2007 under Sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Urban land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 (Central Act 33 of 1976) vide Notification No. G 1/10571/76, published at pages 1 of part-II Extraordinary of the Andhra Pradesh Gazette No. 288 dated 3. 10. 2007. Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (5) of section 10 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (Central Act, 33 of 1976), I hereby order you to surrender/deliver possession of the said land to Sri S. A.

Khader, Deputy Tahsildar of this office within thirty days of the service of this Notice. " M/s A. P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc. xiii) According to the Respondents due to non-compliance of the aforementioned notice, order under Section 10(6) of the ULC Act was issued on 05. 02. 2008 authorising the enquiry officer to take over the possession of the Surplus Land. Accordingly, the Enquiry Officer took over the possession of the surplus land on 08. 02. 2008 to the extent of 46,538. 43 Square Meters in Survey Nos. 74/P, 75P and 76P in Fatehnagar Village, Balanagarmandal, Ranga Reddy District. 5. The operative part of the order is reproduced hereinbelow:- "Notice U/s 10(5) of the Act was issued to the M/s A. P. E. E. C Fathenagar Balangar Mandal, RR Dist. asking them to deliver the possession of the following surplus land withing 30 days from the date of the service of notice u/s 10(5) of the Act. Sl. Description of Location Extent in Sq. Mtrs No.

the Property 1 Sy. Nos. 74/P, Fathenagar 46538. 43 Sq Mtrs 75/P, 76/P vg. Balanagar, Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. 8437. 48 Sq Mts (B-Category) equivalent to Marriapalem vg. 12656. 22 Sq Mtrs Visakhapatnam (C Category) District The 30-days time given in the notice U/s 10(5) of the Act expired on 01-10-2008 buy they failed to deliver possession before the expiry date. Hence Sri SA Khader Enquiry officer of this office is authorized to take over the possession of land in question U/s 10(6) of the Act and hand over the same to the Mandal Revenue Officer concerned and report compliance within one week positively. " xiv) According to the Respondents, the enquiry officer in pursuance of the order dated 05. 02. 2008 took over the actual physical possession of the surplus Subject Vacant Land on 08. 02. 2008 by way of a panchnama.

It is the case of the Respondents that 1638 the panchnama was prepared by the Deputy Tahsildar and enquiry officer in the presence of three panchas and the said possession was taken over by drawing a valid panchnama. The relevant extracts of the panchnama is reproduced herein below:- Sl. Panchas Name Aged Occupation Residence No. 1 Ramaiah 50 Business Fathenagar 2 Yashwanadham 45 Coolie Fathenagar 3 Jagadeesh 25 Carpenter Fathenagar We three panchas under the call from Deputy Tahsildar and Inquiry Officer, Urban Land Ceiling, Hyderabad present at site at Rangareddy District, Balanagar Mandai, Fathonagm: village limits sy. nos. 74/8, 75/8and 76/f3. There the Deputy Tahsildar over the said survey nos. land holding the ownership rights their land under Urban land ceiling act 1976 (46538. 435 mtrs. ) is identified as excess land vide Special Officer, Urban Land Ceiling Hyderabad orders No. F1/G1/10571/71/76 dated : 5. 2.

08 through the said land owners are excess land owners as confirmed said. Such excess land ext. 46538. 42 sq. mtrs. handover to government, the said ceiling act sec. 1 0(5) the file no. F1/G1/10571/76/76 dated : 5-1-08 through to the land owners issued the notice. But according to that notice the said land though the stipulated is completed, the said excess land not handed over to the government Hence in the said ceiling act sec. 1 0(6) tl1e said excess land to take possession by the government the Deputy Tahsildar permitting to the Inquiry Officer file no. F1/ G1/10571/76 dated : 9-2-08 through the Special Officer issued the orders. Hence the inquiry officer according to the orders, today i. e. on 8-2-08 in the said survey nos. 46538. 43 sq. mts. excess land according to sub division sketch after fixing the boundaries by the surveyor, he himself personally to take into M/s A. P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc. govt.

possession in our panchas presence taken into possession. Hence this excess land from today onwards is in the govt. possession as confirmed. This excess land vacant/making plots /made the constructions/structures. This panchnama took place in our presence is true. Read over in Telugu, as all the above contents are true believing we signed below. " 6. It is the case of the appellant-herein that the purported "panchnama" dated 08. 02. 2008 was prepared in a printed form, and the Respondents allegedly took symbolic possession of the Subject Land. Admittedly, the actual physical possession of the Subject Land is with the appellant till date. A copy of the purported panchnama, a printed Form with gaps filled in, was handed over to the appellant for the first time on 14. 09. 2010, when the writ petition was filed before the High Court. 7. On 22. 04.

2008 the State of Andhra Pradesh brought into force the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (for short, "the Repeal Act, 1999") with effect from 27. 03. 2008. 8. According to the appellant in or around 2009, the Respondents attempted to take action under the purported acquisition proceedings in respect of the Subject Land. The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court being Writ Petition No. 11293 of 2009, against illegal attempts of dispossession by the Tahsildar. The High Court issued notice in the said Writ Petition and granted interim injunction in favour of the appellant. 9. According to the appellant the copies of the purported Section 10(5) Notice, Section 10(6) Order and the panchnama (collectively, "Section 10 Notices") were handed over to the appellant for the first time on 14. 09. 2010. 10. On 20. 09. 2010 the appellant preferred another writ petition being Writ Petition No. 23477 of 2010, inter alia assailing the purported panchnama.

In Writ Petition No. 23477 of 2010, the High Court directed that pending further orders, the appellant shall not be dispossessed from the Subject Land. 10. The learned Single Judge adjudicated both the writ petitions filed by the appellants and allowed those vide common judgment and order dated 03. 01. 2022. The learned Single Judge held as under:- 1640 "From the sum and substance of the above said judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and various other Courts, it is clear that the official respondents after issuing notices under Section 10(1) and 10(3) have to issue notice under Section 10(5) directing the party to surrender the possession of the land, within a period of thirty days, and if voluntary possession of the same is not given, then the official respondents are obligated to issue notice under Section 10(6) to the petitioner and then take possession.

The above judgments also make it abundantly clear that mere issuance of the notice under Section 10(3) does not automatically entitle the official respondents to take possession of the notified lands, but the authorities have to necessarily issue notice under Section 10(5) to the land owner or any other interested person. The Courts have also held that the taking over of the possession has to be actual physical possession and not mere de jure possession. Having regard to the above laid proposition of law, the question now before this Court is to see as to whether the notifications issued under Section 10(5) and 10(6) by the authorities and the panchnama stand to the legal scrutiny of this Court? 31. The documents filed, more particularly, the notice issued under Section 10(6) of the Act reveals that in the said notice, two dates are mentioned i. e. 05. 02. 2008 and 08. 02. 2008. 32. Even if the contention of the official respondents that the 10(5) notice dated 05. 01.

2008 is sent through registered post is taken to be true, it will take minimum two or three days time for the said notice to reach the office of the petitioner. As per the requirement of ULC Act, the time period of thirty days is prescribed for issuance of 10(6) notice after issuance of 10(5) notice. If that be so, the 10(6) notice should be dated 08. 02. 2008. But a perusal of the 10(6) notice shows that two dates are written on the said notice i. e. the dates of 05. 02. 2008 and 08. 02. 2008, which clearly shows that the date 10(6) notice has been prepared even before the expiry of 30 days. Moreover, in the said notice it is mentioned as under: M/s A. P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc. "The 30-days time given in the notice U/s 10(5) of the act expired on 01-10-2008 but they failed to deliver possession before the expiry date. Hence Sri. S. A.

Khader, Enquiry Officer of this office is authorized to take over possession of land in question U/s 10(6) of the Act and hand over the same to the Mandal Revenue Officer concerned and report compliance within one week positively. " (Emphasis Added) 33. The above extracted portion of the 10(6) notice clearly reveals that the notices are back-dated for the purpose of preparing the said notice and panchanama. It is beyond comprehension and not understandable as to how the date of 01. 10. 2008 can be mentioned while calculating the expiry date of thirty days from either 05. 01. 2008 or 08. 01. 2008, as the case may be. Evidently the person who was preparing the 10(6) notice did so after the Repeal Act was enacted and adopted by the then Government of Andhra Pradesh. Even in the counter filed by the Special Officer & Competent Authority, it is stated as under: "18............ A notice U/s.

10(5) of the Act was issued on 5-1-08 asking the declarant to surrender the excess vacant, land within (30) days from the date of its receipts. The company was under lockout, hence the notice issued U/s 10(5) of the Act was affixed on the main door on 8-1-08. The time stipulated in the notice expired but the declarant failed to surrender the land. Hence order U/s 10(6) of the Act was issued on 5-2-08, authorizing the Enquiry Officer of this office to take over possession of the surplus land and hand it over to the MRO, concerned. The Enquiry Officer of this office took over possession of the surplus land on 8-2-2008 to an extent of 46538. 43 sq. mtrs. in Sy. Nos. 74/p, 75/p and 76/p, in Fathenagar Village, Balanagar Mandal and Special Officer, ULC, Visakhapatnam accordingly took over possession of the surplus land to an extent of 8437. 48 sq. mtrs. 1642 in Sy. No. 59/3, Marripalem village, Visakhapatnam on 12-3-2008. " (Emphasis Added) 34.

Even if the above averments made in the counter are taken to be true and correct, the very admission on the part of the official respondents that the notice was served on 08. 01. 2008 and Section 10(6) notice is issued on 05. 02. 2008 confirms that the mandatory period of 30 days between Sections 10(5) and 10(6) notices is not met and the same has to be held void, illegal and bad. Besides, when pointed out by this Court about the discrepancies with regard to the dates mentioned in the 10(6) notice and also the non-service of the notice under Section 10(5) to the petitioner in-person, the learned Special Government Pleader tried to brush out the same as some clerical errors and argued that the same has to be ignored as a minor procedural lapse. The two dates mentioned in 10(6) notice belie the claim of the official respondents that they have taken over the physical possession of the subject land on 08. 02. 2008.

There is no whisper or explanation forthcoming from the authorities as to how the date of 01. 10. 2008 is mentioned in the 10(6) notice while calculating the expiry of 30 days period from either 05. 01. 2008 or 08. 01. 2008. Even a perusal of the 10(5) notice shows that the same has not been served on the petitioner, but was affixed on the gate of the factory only on 08. 01. 2008. There is no signature on the said notice as to who has received the same except a name has been scribbled (which is not legible). Having regard to the overwhelming evidence to show that the physical possession of the land is still with the petitioner, this Court is of the considered view that the valuable rights of the parties cannot be allowed to be defeated on the basis of the documents prepared after the Repeal Act has come into force and the stand of the Government that the dates shown in the documents are only clerical errors, cannot be accepted and is hereby rejected.

In the absence of any cogent and convincing evidence or document to show M/s A. P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc. that the Government has taken physical possession of the subject land as contended or any other material to show that the notices under Sections 10(3), 10(5) and 10(6) were validly prepared and served on the petitioner, both the Section 10(6) notice and panchanama dated 08. 02. 2008 have to be taken as a bogus and fabricated one, prepared after the Repeal Act come into force. The material placed before this Court clinchingly establishes that the physical possession of the subject premises has not been taken over by the official respondents as claimed and absolutely there is no material to show that the subject land is in their physical possession even as on date. The panchanama dated 08. 02.

2008, on which the independent witnesses are stated to have affixed their signatures, relied by the official respondents to substantiate that the officials went to the site and taken physical possession, do not contain either the addresses of the panchas or their description and do not instill any confidence in the Court that they are genuine. The official respondents did not even bother to file affidavits of the so-called panchas to show that they were present at the site and the panchanama was prepared in their presence. Admittedly, there is no signature of the land owner on the alleged panchanama dated 08. 02. 2008 or the site map annexed thereto. Even the description of the panchas or their addresses or even their temporary addresses are not shown therein. In the Absence of the signatures of the land owner on the panchanama, the panchanama and the site map will have to be considered as having been prepared behind the back of the petitioner and in the office of the authorities.

The documents filed by the petitioner establish beyond any doubt that the factory is still running, number of apartments are constructed in part of the land and that the physical possession has not been taken over by the Government, as contended, but the same is still with the petitioner Company. No affidavit of any of the panchas has been filed to show that the authorities have physically gone to the subject land and taken over the possession in the presence of the owner. 1644 The entire exercise of affixing signatures and taking over the possession of the land appears to have been done sitting in the office of the authorities and only on paper. 35. It is apt to note that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Barangore Jute Factory (referred supra) has held that where the Statute requires a particular act to be done in a particular manner, the same has to be done in that manner alone.

It is obvious from the record that the official respondents did not follow the procedure contemplated under the ULC Act, but acted contrary to it. Once the ULC Act was repealed by the Central Government and the same has been adopted by the State Government and physical possession of the land is still with the petitioners, the preparation of notices under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) and the panchanama of taking possession is void ab initio and non est in the eye of law. The bare perusal of the panchanama, notices under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the ULC Act, do not inspire any confidence in the Court, which warrants any indulgence of this Court in favour of the official respondents. x x x x 38. The documents filed by the petitioner clearly establish the fact that the physical possession of the land has not been taken over by the respondents.

The photographs filed by the petitioner show that there is a factory in existence, beside number of multi storied residential buildings have already been constructed in a part of the said land, entire land is encompassed with compound wall and gate manned by security guards. In the absence of any material to show that the procedure as contemplated under the ULC Act, more particularly sections 10(1), 10(5) and 10(6) thereof, has been followed in its true letter and spirit, the irresistible conclusion that can be drawn from the record filed by the petitioner is that the 10(5) and 10(6) notices are backdated and panchanama has been prepared in the office of the authorities after the Repeal Act has come into force and the physical possession of the subject land is still with the land owner only. It is also pertinent to mention that G. O. Ms. M/s A. P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc. No. 1534 dated 20. 12.

2008 wherein the Government sought to resume the surplus land has been set aside by a learned Single Judge of this Court vide order dated 26. 10. 2009 in W. P. No. 3140 of 2009. Relevant portion of the said order reads as under: "... it is clear that possession was not taken under the Act and proceedings under Section 10(5) and 10(6) have not been initiated insofar as the subject land is concerned. Therefore, the impugned order passed by first respondent in directing the Special Officer and Competent Authority to take possession from the first petitioner though the petitioners 2 and 3 are in possession of the subject land is arbitrary and illegal, particularly when the 1976 Act has no application by virtue of Repeal Act, 1999, which was adopted by the State of Andhra Pradesh with effect from 27. 03. 2008 i. e. much prior to issuance of the impugned G. O. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that the impugned G. O. is liable to be set aside and accordingly set aside.

The writ petition is accordingly allowed. No order as to costs. " (Emphasis supplied) 11. Thus, what is discernible from the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge referred to above is as under:- i. Under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act, 1976 the State is required to take over physical possession of vacant land in a cogent and convincing manner. As per the decisions of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Hari Ram, (2013) 4 SCC 280, and Gajanan Kamlya Patil v. Additional Collector and Competent Authority (ULC) and Ors. , (2014) 12 SCC 523 respectively, unless actual physical possession of the Subject Land is taken over prior to the Repeal Act, 1999 all proceedings shall stand abated upon its enactment. ii. Mere issuance of a notice under Section 10(3) of the Act, 1976 does not automatically entitle the officials of the Respondents to take possession. The requirement of giving notice under 1646 Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act, 1976 respectively is mandatory. iii.

The documents on record establish beyond any doubt that the factory is still running, number of apartments are constructed in part of the Subject Land and that the physical possession has not been taken over by the Government, as contended, but the same is still with the Appellant. iv. In the absence of any cogent and convincing evidence or document to show that the Government has taken actual physical possession of the Subject Land as contended or any other material to show that the notices under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) respectively were validly prepared and served on the Appellant, both the order under Section 10(6) and the panchnama have to be treated as bogus and fabricated. In other words, prepared after the Repeal Act, 1999 came into force. v.

Even taking the Respondents' case at the highest, the mandatory 30-day period provided to the landholders between a notice under Section 10(5) and a notice under Section 10(6) was not complied with, making the order under Section 10(6) void, illegal and bad in law. vi. Even a bare perusal of the Section 10(5) Notice shows that the same has not been served on the Appellant but was affixed on the gate of the factory only on 08. 01. 2008. There is no signature on the said notice as to who had received the same except some name has been scribbled (which is not legible). vii. The valuable rights of the parties cannot be allowed to be defeated on the basis of documents prepared after the Repeal Act, 1999 has come into force. The stand of the Respondents that the dates shown in the documents are only clerical errors, was rejected. viii. The inconsistencies and lacunae in the panchnama do not instil any confidence that the same is genuine. ix.

There is no signature of the landowner or any responsible officer or person on the panchnama dated 08. 02. 2008. 12. The respondents being dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge preferred two writ appeals M/s A. P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc. i. e. Writ Appeal No. 665 of 2022 and Writ Appeal No. 670 of 2022 respectively. 13. The Division Bench of the High Court allowed both the appeals filed by the State and thereby set aside the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge allowing the two writ petitions filed by the appellant herein. The Division Bench held as under:- "17. 2. Claim of the appellants that notice under Section 10(5) was issued on 05. 01. 2008 was denied by the respondent. 05. 01. 2008 was a Saturday. It was the duty of the appellants to establish that 05. 01. 2008 was a working day and that notice dated 05. 01. 2008 was despatched from the office on a working day.

It is also the duty of the competent authority to establish the exact date of service of notice under Section 10(5) and service on the noticee were conspicuously absent in the counter affidavit. Appellants merely stated that notice under Section 10(5) was issued on 05. 01. 2008. Since the respondent was under lockout, the notice was affixed on the main door on 08. 01. 2008. In the absence of dispatch of notice by registered post with acknowledgement due, the service would be deemed to be in violation in terms of Rule 5 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Rules, 1976 (briefly, 'the ULC Rules' hereinafter). That apart, it was reiterated that there was no lockout in the establishment of the respondent at the relevant point of time; rather it was fully operational for which respondent relied upon various documentary evidence including returns filed before the Employees' State Insurance Corporation for the period from 01. 10. 2007 to 31. 03. 2008. 17. 3.

While denying that notice under Section 10(5) was served on 08. 01. 2008 as claimed by the appellants, it was averred that the thirty days period mentioned in the said notice to surrender possession voluntarily would have expired only on 07. 02. 2008. Right of the competent authority to take further action under Section 10(6) would accrue only after 08. 02. 2008. Therefore, no reliance could be placed on the alleged order dated 05. 02. 2008 passed under Section 10(6) of the ULC Act. That apart, order 1648 dated 05. 02. 2008 containing more than one date with overwriting did not inspire any confidence at all. 17. 4. Further attempt by the appellants to show that they had taken over possession of the excess vacant land on 08. 02. 2008 by relying on the purported panchanama does not inspire any confidence. It is contended that when the order under Section 10(6) of the ULC Act dated 05. 02. 2008 was of no legal consequence, the alleged taking over of possession on 08. 02.

2008 on the strength of the order dated 05. 02. 2008 would also be of no consequence. Besides, a bare perusal of the panchanama would reveal that it was prepared in a printed format to suit the case of the appellants. A careful reading of the panchanama itself would indicate that it was a fabricated document without furnishing details of the three panchas, as a result of which the panchas were not identifiable. 17. 5. Appellants claimed to have taken over possession of 46,538. 43 square meters on 08. 02. 2008 which included 1000 square meters of land conferred on the respondent under Section 4(1) of the ULC Act. This only goes to show that appellants had not applied their mind and had just produced some documents to show that they had taken over possession. 17. 6.

Respondent's name was shown as owner in possession and enjoyment of the lands including the excess vacant land in the revenue record which only goes to show possession of the respondent, besides pahanis stand in the name of the respondent in respect of the subject land. Therefore, the theory of possession put forth by the appellants is contrary to the record. 18. Learned Single Judge after narrating the relevant facts and after adverting to the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties had examined various provisions of the ULC Act, more particularly Sections 10(1), 10(3), 10(5) and 10(6) of the ULC Act as well as the Repeal Act which was adopted by the Government of undivided Andhra Pradesh on 27. 03. 2008 vide G. O. Ms. No. 603 dated 22. 04. 2008. Learned Single Judge examined the M/s A. P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc.

claim of the appellants of having taken over possession of the subject land under Section 10(6) of the ULC Act as well as the contents of the panchanama observed that whenever a panchanama is prepared, the same has to be done duly putting the actual owner/interested person on notice; panchas should be reputed and respectable persons of the locality; date and time on which the panchanama was prepared as well as the name, age and address of the panchas should be mentioned in the panchanama. Thereafter, learned Single Judge held that unless and until actual physical possession of the subject land was taken over, the taking over proceedings under the ULC Act would stand abated on coming into force of the Repeal Act.

After referring to various decisions, learned Single Judge held that after issuing notice under Sections 10(1) and 10(3) of the ULC Act, competent authority under the said Act would have to issue notice under Section 10(5) directing the party to surrender possession of the excess land within a period of thirty days. If voluntary possession of the same is not given, then the authorities are under obligation to issue notice under Section 10(6) and thereafter take possession. Mere issuance of notice under Section 10(3) would not automatically entitle the authorities to take over possession of the notified lands; the authorities would have to necessarily issue notice under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act to the land owner or any other interested person. Taking over of possession has to be actual physical possession and not mere de jure possession. 18. 1.

After referring to the alleged anomalies noticeable in Section 10(6) notice, learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that very admission on the part of the appellants that the notice was served on 08. 01. 2008, whereafter Section 10(6) order was passed on 05. 02. 2008 would clearly show that the mandatory period of thirty days between the two provisions was not met. Learned Single Judge further noted that there was no explanation forthcoming as to how the date "01. 10. 2008" appeared in the Section 10(6) notice. Thus, learned Single Judge vide the judgment and order dated 03. 01. 2022 came to the 1650 conclusion that physical possession of the subject land was still with the respondent. There was no cogent and convincing evidence to show that State Government had taken over physical possession of the subject land. That apart, learned Single Judge found that the panchanama dated 08. 02. 2008 did not inspire the confidence of the Court.

Further, from the documentary evidence, it was proved beyond any doubt that the factory of the respondent was still functional, a number of apartments had been constructed. Therefore, physical possession of the subject land had not been taken over by the government but was still with the respondent. Learned Single Judge also referred to an order of this Court dated 26. 10. 2009 in writ petition No. 3140 of 2009, whereby government sought to resume the surplus land of the respondent by issuing G. O. Ms. No. 1534 dated 20. 12. 2008. In the said order, this Court had set aside G. O. Ms. No. 1534 holding that possession of the subject land was not taken over by the government. Accordingly, both the writ petitions were allowed and the panchanama dated 08. 02. 2008 was set aside. 19. Mr. Raju Ramachandran, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submits that learned Single Judge was not at all justified in setting aside the panchanama proceedings dated 08. 02.

2008 and interfering with the action of the State in taking over possession of the surplus land of the respondent under the ULC Act. In the course of his arguments, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants has placed before the Court a flow chart of land belonging to the respondent covered by the final statement made under Section 8(4) of the ULC Act. He submits that respondent had declared under Section 6(1) of the ULC Act a total of 1,63,679 square meters of land in Survey Nos. 74/P, 75/P, 76, 78 and 79. Out of the aforesaid land, 5,088 square meters was covered by GVM Road leaving land to the extent of 1,58,591 square meters. By G. O. Ms. No. 1729, an extent of land measuring 51,580 square meters in Survey Nos. 78 and 79 was allowed to be retained by the respondent to run the industry for manufacturing electrical meters. Though an extent of land admeasuring M/s A. P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc. 48,859.

90 square meters was allowed to be retained by the respondent for establishing fan factory, later on the exemption was withdrawn vide G. O. Ms. No. 303. Excluding 51,580 square meters from the total extent of 1,58,591 square meters surplus excess land with the respondent was quantified at 1,07,011 square meters. Out of this extent, 56,730. 57 square meters in Survey Nos. 74, 75 and 76 was exempted under Section 21 of the ULC Act leaving balance extent of 50,280. 43 square meters for computation under Section 8(4) of the ULC Act. After excluding an extent of 3,742 square meters, which was affected by road, the extent of surplus land quantified by the competent authority under the ULC Act was estimated at 46,538. 43 square meters as per revised order of the competent authority dated 20. 03. 2007. 19. 1.

Because of clerical mistakes, learned Single Judge ought not to have disbelieved the notice issued under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act as well as the order passed under Section 10(6) of the ULC Act, more so when learned Single Judge did not requisition the record. While admitting that appearance of the date "01. 10. 2008" in the order dated 05. 02. 2008 is inexplicable, Mr. Raju Ramachandran, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submits that that by itself would not justify the conclusion reached by the learned Single Judge that the aforesaid notice and order were antedated and thus discarded. He submits that learned Single Judge was also not justified in disbelieving the panchanama dated 08. 02. 2008 and thereafter declaring the notices under Section 10(5) and 10(6) as well as the panchanama as void ab initio.

He further submits that learned Single Judge committed a manifest error in holding that physical possession of the surplus vacant land had not been taken over by the appellants. x x x x 29. 2. We have already extracted the provisions of subsections (5) and (6) of Section 10 of the ULC Act and made an analysis of the same. Section 10(5) contemplates service of notice calling upon the person in possession of 1652 the excess vacant land to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government within thirty days of service of notice. If he fails to do so then under sub- section (6) of Section 10, the competent authority may take over possession of the excess vacant land for which purpose such force as may be necessary may be used.

Though issuance and service of notice on the person in possession of the excess vacant land under sub-section (5) of Section 10 is mandatory as held by the Supreme Court in Hari Ram (supra) however, sub-section (6) of Section 10 nowhere says that after the period of thirty days of service of notice under Section 10(5), another order has to be passed or another notice has to be given. Question of once again putting the parties on notice at the stage of subsection (6) of Section 10 is not statutorily provided. Therefore, learned Single Judge fell in error in taking the view that at the stage of Section 10(6), the owner or person in possession of the excess vacant land has to be again put on notice. There is no such legal requirement. 29. 3. Insofar preparation of panchanama is concerned, the same is not statutorily provided either in the ULC Act or in the ULC Rules.

Therefore, we fail to understand as to how learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that while preparing the panchanama the site map also needs to be prepared and both would have to be attested not only by the panchas and the person preparing the same but also by the land owner. We are afraid learned Single Judge fell in complete error in coming to the aforesaid conclusion as there is no such statutory prescription. The panchanama comes into the picture at the stage of Section 10(6) when the owner or person in possession of the excess vacant land fails to comply with the notice under Section 10(5). Therefore, to expect such a person to put his signature on the panchanama is wholly unrealistic. 29. 4. In fact, in Sita Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi (supra) Supreme Court in the context of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, after referring to previous judgments held that one of the accepted modes of taking over possession of the acquired land is recording of a memorandum M/s A. P.

Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc. or panchanama by the land acquisition officer in the presence of witnesses signed by them and that would constitute taking possession of the land. It is difficult to take physical possession of the land under compulsory acquisition. The normal mode of taking possession is drafting the panchanama in the presence of panchas, taking possession and giving delivery to the beneficiaries which is the accepted mode of taking possession of the land. While taking possession of a large area of land, a pragmatic and realistic approach has to be taken. One of the methods of taking possession and handing it over to the beneficiary department is the recording of a panchanama which can in itself constitute evidence of the fact that possession had been taken and that the land had vested absolutely in the government. 29. 5. This position has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Omprakash Verma (supra). This was a case under the ULC Act.

In the facts of that case, Supreme Court reiterated that it is settled law that where possession is to be taken of a large tract of land then it is permissible to take possession by a properly executed panchanama. 30. Proceeding further, we find that in paragraph 30 of the judgment and order, learned Single Judge once again reiterated that after expiry of the period of thirty days as contemplated under sub-section (5) of Section 10, if voluntary possession of excess vacant land is not handed over then the authorities are obligated to issue notice under Section 10(6) to the land owner and then take possession. Having held so, learned Single Judge proceeded to frame the question as to whether notifications issued under Section 10(5) and 10(6) by the authorities and the panchanama would stand to legal scrutiny. 30. 1.

As already discussed above, there is no statutory requirement under sub-section (6) of Section 10 to once again put the defaulting owner or the person in possession on notice. After the thirty days period following service of notice under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act is over, it is open to the authority to take over possession of the 1654 excess vacant land forcibly, if necessary even by using force. Therefore, the very basis of the learned Single Judge framing the above question does not stand to legal scrutiny, the same being contrary to the legal requirement which has vitiated the impugned judgment and order. 31. In paragraph 31 of the judgment under appeal, learned Single Judge has mentioned that the notice issued under Section 10(6) of the ULC Act has two dates in it i. e. , 05. 02. 2008 and 08. 02. 2008. As already mentioned above, there is no legal requirement for passing any order or issuing further notice under Section 10(6) of the ULC Act. Therefore, the order dated 05. 02.

2008 at page 234 of the paper book (W. A. No. 670 of 2022) is really not material; in fact the same is of no legal consequence. Though below the date 05. 02. 2008, '08' is written, who has written it is not known. There is also no initial by the side of the figure '08'. But one thing is certain; there is no date '08. 02. 2008', therebeing only one date i. e. , 05. 02. 2008. However, what is evident therefrom is that notice under Section 10(5) is dated 05. 01. 2008. If we contrast this notice at page 234 of the paper book with the order (notice) dated 05. 02. 2008 at page 334 of the paper book (W. A. No. 670 of 2022), there is no figure '08' below 05. 02. 2008. This is a signed order of the special officer and competent authority which is missing at page 234. Besides, this document is attested by the Special Tahsildar, Urban Land Ceiling (Wing), Medchal Malkajgiri District. Be that as it may, there is one date which has remained unexplained. As a matter of fact, Mr.

Raju Ramachandran, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants frankly told the Court that it is inexplicable as to how the date '01. 10. 2008' appears in the last paragraph of the order (notice) dated 05. 02. 2008. Appearance of this date cannot be explained. The last paragraph of the order (notice) dated 05. 02. 2008 says that thirty days time given in the notice under Section 10(5) expired on '01. 10. 2008'. As seen from the aforesaid order (notice) itself, notice under Section 10(5) is dated 05. 01. 2008. As such, there is no question of expiry of thirty days period on '01. 10. 2008'. In any case, the order or notice dated 05. 02. 2008 does M/s A. P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc. not have any legal sanction or even necessity as Section 10(6) does not require issuance of a fresh order or a notice before taking forcible possession. Therefore, either the order dated 05. 02.

2008 can be ignored or if taken at its face value, it does not convey an irregularity or illegality of a magnitude which may render taking over of forcible possession invalid. X x x 35. This brings us as to how learned Single Judge dealt with the panchanama dated 08. 02. 2008. Learned Single Judge held as under: "34. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx The panchanama dated 08. 02. 2008, on which the independent witnesses are stated to have affixed their signatures, relied by the official respondents to substantiate that the officials went to the site and taken physical possession, do not contain either the addresses of the panchas or their description and do not instill any confidence in the Court that they are genuine. The official respondents did not even bother to file affidavits of the so-called panchas to show that they were present at the site and the panchanama was prepared in their presence. Admittedly, there is no signature of the land owner on the alleged panchanama dated 08. 02.

2008 or the site map annexed thereto. Even the description of the panchas or their addresses or even their temporary addresses are not shown therein. In the absence of the signatures of the land owner on the panchanama, the panchanama and the site map will have to be considered as having been prepared behind the back of the petitioner and in the office of the authorities. The documents filed by the petitioner establish beyond any doubt that the factory is still running, number of apartments are constructed in part of the land and that the physical possession has not been taken over by the Government, as contended, but the same is still with the petitioner Company. No affidavit of any of the panchas has been filed to show that the 1656 authorities have physically gone to the subject land and taken over the possession in the presence of the owner.

The entire exercise of affixing signatures and taking over the possession of the land appears to have been done sitting in the office of the authorities and only on paper. 35. 1. According to the learned Single Judge, the panchanama does not contain the addresses of the panchas or their description. Affidavits of the panchas were not filed, describing the panchas as so called panchas. Further, according to the learned Single Judge, there was no signature of the land owner in the panchanama. Therefore, such a panchanama would have to be considered having been prepared behind the back of the respondent and in the office of the authorities. 35. 2. We have already held that neither the ULC Act nor the ULC Rules provide for the procedure for service of notice under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act. However, as discussed above, it is judicially recognised that taking over of possession of large tracts of land by way of panchanama is an acceptable mode.

There is no requirement under the statute for obtaining the signature of the land owner in the panchanama or filing of affidavits by the panchas. Such finding of the learned Single Judge in our considered opinion is not based on any materials on record. 36. Having said so, we may examine the panchanama which is at pages 89 to 91 of the paper book (W. A. No. 670 of 2022). While page 89 is the Telugu and original version of the panchanama, the translation copy thereof is at page 90 and page 91 contains the site plan. A reading of the panchanama would go to show that the same was prepared by the Deputy Tahsildar and Enquiry Officer in presence of three panchas viz. , 1) Ramayya, 2) Viswanadham and 3) Jagdish, whose addresses were mentioned in the panchanama. Two persons by name Venkateshwar Rao and Mallayya stood as witnesses. As per the panchanama, notice under Section 10(5) dated 05. 01. 2008 was served upon the land owner. When possession was not handed M/s A. P.

Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc. over to the Government even after expiry of the time limit, order was passed by the competent authority on 05. 02. 2008 directing the Deputy Tahsildar and Enquiry Officer to take over possession. Pursuant to such order, the Enquiry Officer had taken over possession of the land to the extent of 46,538. 43 square meters on 08. 02. 2008 after identification and fixation of boundary by the surveyor in presence of the panchas, who certified that the panchanama was prepared in their presence. 37. As already discussed above, there was no requirement of passing an order or issuing further notice under Section 10(6) of the ULC Act. Therefore, the order or notice dated 05. 02. 2008 is of no legal consequence. But the fact remains that according to the version of the appellants, Section 10(5) notice is dated 05. 01. 2008 which was affixed at a conspicuous place of the premises on 08. 01.

2008, whereafter possession was taken over on 08. 02. 2008 as per the panchanama dated 08. 02. 2008. Therefore, there was no breach of the thirty days period. To our mind, learned Single Judge committed a manifest error in declaring the notice under Section 10(5) as well as the panchanama as void ab initio and non est in the eye of law. If the correctness or genuineness of the same were disputed by the respondent, then it would be a case of disputed and contentious facts. A proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not the proper forum to adjudicate such disputed and contentious facts. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma (supra), such seriously disputed questions of fact would not be amenable to a satisfactory determination by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. 38. That being the position, we have no hesitation in our mind that learned Single Judge had erred on facts as well as in law in declaring the notice dated 05. 01.

2008 under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act as well as the panchanama dated 08. 02. 2008 being void ab initio and non est in the eye of law and thereafter in setting aside the panchanama. " (Emphasis supplied) 1658 14. Thus, what is discernable from the aforesaid discussion in the impugned judgment is as under:- i. Taking over of possession of land by way of panchnama under the Act is an acceptable mode. Consequently, the impugned judgment does not in any manner consider the effect of Section 3(2) of the Repeal Act, 1999. The impugned judgment does not in any manner deal with the judgments in Hari Ram (supra) and Gajanan Kamlya Patil (supra); and ii. The Division Bench further said that there is no legal requirement under Section 10(6) of the Act, 1976 for passing any order or issuing any further notice to the affected parties under Section 10(6) of the Act, 1976. Therefore, in the present case, the Section 10(6) Order is of no legal consequence.

On this basis, the Division Bench en bloc rejected the issues regarding the legality /validity of the Section 10(6) Order and the panchnama thereafter. It is relevant to note at this stage that the impugned judgment does not in any way disturb the factual findings recorded in the judgment of the learned Single Judge as regards the factory very much in operation and also that the physical possession of the land remains with the appellant. 15. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant is here before this Court with the present two appeals. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT 16. The written submissions of the appellant read as under:- "I. It is a statutory mandate to issue an order under Section 10(6) after proper and effective service of notice under Section 10(5) of the Act. 17.

The Impugned Judgment suffers from a patent error insofar as it holds that there is no statutory requirement under Sections 10(5) and 10 (6) of the Act to issue or serve a notice to the affected/concerned parties. 18. On this erroneous premise, the impugned judgment has brushed aside all the illegalities and/or statutory lacunae in the Section 10(5) Notice and the Section 10(6) Order. M/s A. P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc. 19. It is trite law that the requirement of issuance of notice under Section 10(5) and order under Section 10(6) of the Act is mandatory under law. Refer to : Hari Ram (supra) and State of Telangana v. Southern Steels Limited, W. A. 1975 of 2017. 20. Significantly, the judgments in Hari Ram (supra) as well as Southern Steel Limited (supra) were relied upon by the Appellants before the Hon'ble Division Bench.

However, the impugned judgment while coming at a diametrically opposite finding, fails to deal with the judgments in Hari Ram (supra) and Southern Steel Limited (supra) in any manner whatsoever. 21. Before this Hon'ble Court, the Respondent had sought to contend that this settled legal position has been disturbed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Assam v. Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma, (2015) 5 SCC 321. The same is not correct. The facts in Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma were completely different and the same are not in any manner applicable in the case at hand. In Bhaskar Jyoti Sharma, this Hon'ble Court held that where possession is stated to have been taken long ago and there is undue delay on the part of the landholder in approaching the writ court, in such a case attraction of the prescribed procedure for taking possession would not be a determining factor, inasmuch as it can be taken that the persons for whose benefit the procedure existed have waived his right thereunder.

In that case, the original landowner sold the excess vacant land to six people after a notification under Section 10(1) of the Act had been published. In the first round of litigation, the purchasers questioned the acquisition, and this came up to this Hon'ble Court, wherein such challenge was dismissed in 2002. Thereafter, in 2003, the excess vacant land was allotted to Guwahati Metropolitan Development Authority and mutated accordingly. After coming into effect of the Repeal Act in Gujarat in 2003, a writ was again filed by the legal heirs of the original landowner. This was the second round of litigation. Such challenge was also dismissed by this Hon'ble Court, holding that the original 1660 landowner had waived his right by not questioning the aspect of possession under Section 10(5) of the Act, despite possession having been taken as early as on 07. 12. 1991. 22.

In the present case, it is not even Respondents' case nor is there any finding to this effect in the impugned judgment that the Appellants have waived their right in any manner whatsoever or have delayed in approaching the writ court. In fact, in 2009, as soon as the attempts were made by the Respondents to dispossess the Appellant from the Subject Land, the Appellant immediately approached the writ court. 23. Hence, the said finding in the impugned judgment regarding Sections 10(5) and 10 (6) of the Act is ex facie unsustainable in law. II. The acquisition proceedings are de hors the Act, more particularly Section 10 of the Act. 24. The purported Section 10 Notices suffer from glaring illegalities. This clearly reflects that the said purported Section 10 Notices are de hors the Act, fictitious and non est in law. 25. The purported Section 10 Notices were never contemporaneously served nor received by the Appellant.

The Appellant was made aware of the Section 10 Notices for the first time only on 14. 09. 2010. A bare perusal of the same would demonstrate that the Section 10 Notices are not prepared contemporaneously. 26. Such glaring illegalities at each stage of the said acquisition proceedings are evident from the statements that follow:- STAGE ILLEGALITIES / LACUNAE Purported a. The Appellant never received the Section Notice 10(5) Notice contemporaneously. The Appellant under was made aware of this notice for the first time Section on 14. 09. 2010. 10(5) of the Act M/s A. P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc. b. In any event, the Section 10(5) Notice is dated 05. 01. 2008. As per the Respondents, it was affixed on the main gate on 08. 01. 2008 on the false pretext that there was a lockout in the factory. c. The Respondent has miserably failed to establish that on the said date, there was a lockout in the factory.

Even from a bare perusal of the purported Section 10(5) Notice, it is clear that the same has not been served on the Appellant in any manner whatsoever. There is no signature on the said notice as to who has affixed the same, except a name has been scribbled, which is not legible. The Respondents have also failed to show that any attempt was made by them to carry out service of the Section 10(5) Notice by any other means in any manner whatsoever. d. Even in the situation of lockout, it is implausible that the Respondent authorities were not able to locate any personnel or individual for the purported service of the Section 10(5) Notice. e. It is well settled that affixing of notices, as the Respondents suggest having done, should only be a last resort. The Government of Tamil Nadu v. Nandagopal, 2011 (3) CTC 843 f.

Therefore, it is clear that the so-called stand regarding affixing of the Section 10(5) Notice on the main door of the factory is concocted and nothing but a cock and bull story. g. Moreover, such stand of the Respondents themselves runs counter to their core contention that the factory was not on the Subject Land. Purported a. The Appellant never received the Section Order under 10(6) Order contemporaneously. The Appellant Section was made aware of this order for the first time 10(6) of the on 14. 09. 2010. Act b. There is no reasonable or justifiable explanation for the two dates which are "05. 02. 2008" and "08. 02. 2008". 1662 c. Pertinently, the Respondents were unable to explain the date of "01. 10. 2008" which was also mentioned in the Section 10(6) Order. Admittedly, there is no explanation for the same. d. Further, the Section 10(6) Order states that the 30-day time given in the Section 10(5) Notice expired on 01. 10. 2008, after the enforcement of the Repeal Act.

This is completely incomprehensible. e. Moreover, the copy of the Section 10(6) Order provided to the Appellant on 14. 09. 2010 and the copy filed by the Respondents as part of the Compilation of Copies of Original Record dated 23. 02. 2024, reveal further discrepancies in relation to execution of the said order. For instance, the date of "08. 02. 2008" is missing from the said copy supplied to the Appellant as part of the Compilation of Copies of Original Record and it only mentions the date [or date of purported issuance] of "05. 02. 2008". These discrepancies clearly demonstrate that the record of proceedings is tampered with and cannot be relied upon in any manner whatsoever. f. In any event, even as per the Respondents, the Section 10(6) Order was issued on 05. 02. 2008 and the Section 10(5) Notice was affixed on the wall on 08. 01. 2008. g. Therefore, even as per the Respondents, 30 days had not lapsed between the purported service of the Section 10(5) Notice, i. e. , 08. 01.

2008 and alleged issuance of the Section 10(6) Order, i. e. , 05. 02. 2008. It is mandatory to have a gap of 30 days between a notice under Section 10(5) of the Act and an order under Section 10(6) of the Act. ¾ The Principal Commissioner v. M. Venkataraman, 2014 SCC OnLine Mad 4505; ¾ P. Laxmi Kantha Rao and Others v. Government Of Andhra Pradesh, 2014 SCC OnLine Hyd 1348 h. The Ld. Single Judge rightly held that the Section 10(6) Order is bad in law. M/s A. P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. Etc. Panchnama a. The Appellant never received this anchnama contemporaneously. The Appellant was made aware of this purported Panchnama for the first time on 14. 09. 2010. b. It is a printed form where gaps have been filled up. c. The purported Panchnama lacks fundamental particulars of a Panchnama such as: - The purported Panchnama did no