M-S. GIRNAR TRADERS v. ST ATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS

Citation: [2007] 9 S.C.R. 383

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: B.N. AGRAWAL, P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, P.P. NAOLEKAR

Case summary

M-S. GIRNAR TRADERS v. ST ATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.pdf

Judgment text

MIS. GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS. AUGUST 27, 2007 [B. N. AGRAWAL, P. K. BALASUBRAMANYAN AND P. P. NAOLEKAR, JJ. ) Land Acquisition Act, 1894/Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966: Section I IA/Sections 126, 127 Interpretation and applicability of newly inserted S. 11A of the Land Acquisition Act to the MRTP Act-Referred to larger Bench-There is no application under clause (s) of S. 126(/) moved by the officer authorized by the Municipal Corporation i. e. the Municipal Commissioner to the State Government for acquisition of the land-Thus, it cannot be said that steps as contemplated were taken for the commencement of acquisition proceedings-Hence, appellants are entitled to deemed dereservation and permitted to utilize the land as permissible under S. 127 of the MRTP Act- Constitution of India, 1950, Article 246.

Interpretation ofStatutes-When language ofthe Legislature admits of two constructions, Court should not adopt the construction which would lead to absurdity or obvious injustice-The construction which would be consistent with the smooth working ofthe system which the statute proposed to be regulating should be chosen-The alternative is to be rejected which will introduce uncertainly, friction or confusion with the working of the system. Words and Phrases: 'Steps'-Meaning of in the context of S. 127 of Maharshtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966. C. A. No. 3922 of 2007 has been filed against the dismissal of Writ Petition by the Bombay High Court holding that Section llA of the Land Acquisition Act as amended is not applicable to the proceedings for acquisition initiated under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, relying on State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Sant Joginder Singh Kishan Singh and Ors. , (1995] Supp. 2 sec 475. Civil Appeal No.

3703 of 2003 has been referred to the present 3 Judge Bench after a 2 Judge Bench of this Court doubted the correctness of the decisio~ rendered in Sant Joginder Singh 's case. On behalfofMunicipal Corporation ofGreater Mumbai, it was contended that the Chief Engineer (Development Plan) sent a letter to the State of Maharashtra enclosing therewith a copy of Resolution No. 956 dated 16. 9. 2002, requesting that steps be taken for acquisition of the land and this step taken by the respondents would constitute 'steps' for the acquisition of the land under clause (c) ofSection 126(1) ofthe MRTP Act, the same having been taken on 17. 9. 2002 when the period of six months had not expired, the provision ofde-reservation under Section 127 would not apply.

On behalfofthe appellants, it was contended that the intent and purpose ofSection 127 of the MRTP Act is the acquisition of land within six months or the steps are taken for acquisition of the land within six months, which could only be when a declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act is published in the Official Gazette; that the words "ifwithin six months from the date of the service ofsuch notice, the land is not acquired or no steps as aforesaid are commenced for its acquisition" are not susceptible ofa literal construction and the words have to be given a meaning which safeguards a citizen against arbitrary and irrational executive action which, in fact, may not result in acquisition ofthe land for a long period to come; and that it cannot be doubted that the period of 10 years is a long period where the land of the owner is kept in reservation.

Section 127 gives an opportunity to the owner for dereservation of the land if no steps are taken for acquisition by the authorities within a period of six months inspite of service of notice for de-reservation after the period of 10 years has expired. It was also contended for the appellants that the decision in Municipal GIRNARTRADERSv. STATE 385 Corporation ofGreater Bombay v. Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants' Association and. ,A Ors. , (1988) Supp. SCC 55 squarely covers the proposition oflaw wherein it has been held that the development or the planning authority must take recourse to acquisition with some amount of promptitude in order that the compensation paid to the expropriated owner bears a just relation to the real value of the land; and that the period ofsix months provided by Section 127 upon the expiry ofwhich the reservation of the land under a development plan lapses, is a valuable safeguard to the citizens against the arbitrary and irrational executive action.

Section 127 ofthe Act is a fetter upon the power ofeminent domain. On behalf of the State it was submitted that in para 11 of the said judgment, it is clearly held that the steps for commencement of the acquisition obviously refer to the steps contemplated by Section 126(1) which means the step taken of making an application under clause (c) ofSection 126(1) of the MRTP Act and that this Court had already observed that after the service of notice from the owner or any person interested in the land as provided under Section 127 of the MRTP Act, the steps taken within six months of such -{ service, included any step taken by the appropriate authority for the acquisition ofland as contemplated under the provisions ofSection 126 (1) of the MRTP Act It has been further contended that such observation of this Court is binding as precedent Allowing Civil Appeal No. 3922 of 2007 and as regards Civil Appeal No.

3703 of 2003 referring the question regarding interpretation and applicability of Seetion l lA introduced into the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by Amendment Act 68 of 1984 to the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 for consideration by a larger Bench, the Court HELD: (Per Naolekar, J. for himself and Agrawal, J. ): 1. 1. Giving a plain meaning to the words used in the statute would not be resorted to when there is a sense of possible injustice. In such a case, the simple application of the words in their primary and unqualified sense is not always sufficient and will sometimes fail to carry out the manifest intention oflaw-giver as collected from the statute itselfand the nature ofsubject-matter and the mischiefs to be remedied.

Ifthe plain words lead apparently to do some ' -t injustice or absurdity and at variance with, or not required by, the scope and object of the legislation, it would be necessary to examine further and to test, by certain settled rules ofinterpretation, what was the real and true intention of the legislature and thereafter apply the words if they are capable of being so applied so as to give effect to that intention. Where the plain literal interpretation of statutory provision were to manifestly result . in injustice never intended by the legislature, the court is entitled to modify the language used by the legislature so as to achieve the intention ofthe legislature and to produce a rational construction. (Para 21) (412-A-C] Municipal Coproration ofGreater Bombay v. Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants' Association & Ors. , (1988] Suppl. SCC 55, referred to. 1. 2.

Where the legislature has used words in an Act which if generally construed, must lead to palpable injustice and consequences revolting to the mind ofany reasonable man, the court will always endeavour to place on such words a reasonable limitation, on the ground that the legislature could not have intended such consequence to ensue, unless the express language in the Act or binding authority prevents such limitation being interpolated into the Act. In construing an Act, a construction ought not be put that would work injustice, or even hardship or inconvenience, unless it is clear that such was the intention of the legislature. It is also settled that where the language of the legislature admits of two constructions and if construction in one way would lead to obvious injustice, the courts act upon the view that such a result could not have been intended, unless the intention had been manifested in express words. (Para 22) [412-D-F) Collector ofCustoms v.

Digvijaysinhji Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. , (1962) 1 SCR 896 and His Holiness Kesvananda Bharati v. State ofKera/a, AIR (1973) SC 1461, relied on. 1. 3. The court must always lean to the interpretation which is a reasonable one, and discard the literal interpretation which does not fit in with the scheme of the Actunder consideration. [Para 23] [413-A) Narashimaha Murthy v. Susheelabai, (1996) 3 SCC 644 and American Home Products Corporation v. Mac Laboratories Pvt. Ltd and Anr. , AIR GIRNARTRADERSv. STATE 387 (1986) SC 137, relied on. State ofPunjab v. Sat Ram Das, AIR (1959) Punj. 497, referred to. 1. 4. Many a times, it becomes necessary to look into the true intention of the legislature in order to give a proper effect to the statutory provisions and in order to achieve the actual intended goal behind the legislation. (Para 25) (413-F) Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh and Ors. , AIR (1955) SC 830; Commissioner ofIncome Tax, Bangalore v. J. H.

Got/a, AIR (1985) SC 1698 and State ofRajasthan v. Leela Jain andOrs. , AIR (1965) SC 1296, relied on. Andhra Cotton Mills Ltd v. Lakshmi Ganesh Cotton Mill, (1996) l ALT 537 AP, referred to. 2. 1. The question for consideration before the Court in the Municipal Corporation ofGreater Bombay Case has reference to first step required to be taken by the owner after lapse of 10 years' period without any step taken by the authority for acquisition ofland, whereby the owners ofthe land served the notice for dereservation of the land. The Court was not called upon to decide the case on the substantial step, namely, the step taken by the authority within six months ofservice of notice by the owners for dereservation of their land which is second step required to be taken by the authority after service of notice.

The observations of this Court regarding the linking of word 'aforesaid' from the wordings 'no steps as aforesaid are commenced for its -r· acquisition' ofSection 127 with the steps taken by the competent authority for acquisition of land as provided under Section 126(1) of the MRTP Act, had no direct or substantial nexus either with the factual matrix or any ofthe legal issues raised before it. It is apparent that no legal issues, either with respect to interpretation of words 'no steps as aforesaid are commencedfor its acquisition' as stipulated under the provisions of Section 127 or any link of these words with steps to be taken on service of notice, were contended before the Court. Thus, observations of the Court did not relate to any ofthe legal questions arising in the case and, accordingly, cannot be considered as the part of ratio decidendi. Hence, the reliance placed on mere general observations or casual expressions of the Court, is not of much avail to the respondents.

(Para 30) (419-A-E) Union ofIndia and Ors. v. Dhanwanti Devi and Ors. , (1996) 6 SCC 44; Director ofSettlements, A. P. andOrs. v. MR. Apparao andAnr. , (2002) 4 SCC 638 and Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. ltd v. Aksh Optifibre Ltd and Anr. , (2005) 7 sec 234, relied on. Municipal Coproration ofGreater Bombay v. Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants' Asscciation & Ors. , (1988) Suppl. SCC 55, referred to. 2. 2. On a conjoint reaaing of Sections 126 and 127 ofthe MRTP Act, it is appar. ent that the legislative intent is to expeditiously a_cquire the land reserved under the Town Planning Scheme and, therefore, various periods have been prescribed for acquisition of the owner's property. The intent and purpose ofthe provisions ofSections 126 and 127 has been well explained in Municipal Corporation ofGreater Bombay Case.

Ifthe acquisition is left for a time immemorial in the hands of the concerned authority by simply making an application to the State Government for acquiring such land under the LA Act, 1894, then the authority will simply move such an application and if no such notification is issued by the State Government ! or one year of the publication of the draft regional plan under Section 126(2) read with Section 6 ofthe LA Act, wait for the notification to be issued by the State Government by exercising suo motu power under sub-section (4) of Section 126; and till then no declaration could be made under Section 127 as regards lapsing of reservation and contemplated declaration ofland being released and available for the land owner for his utilization as permitted under Section 127. Section 127 permitted inaction on the part ofthe acquisition authorities for a period of 10 years for de-reservation of the land.

Not only t~at, it gives a further time for either to acquire the land or to take steps for acquisition of the land within a period of six months from the date ofservice of notice by the land owner for de-reservation. The steps towards commencement ofthe acquisition in such a situation would necessarily be the steps for acquisition and not a step which may not result into acquisition and ~erely for the purpose of seeking time so that Section 127 does not come into operation. Providing the period ofsix months after the service of notice clearly indicates the intention of the legislature of an urgency where nothing has been done in regard to the land reserved under the plan for a period of 10 years and the owner is GIRNARTRADERSv. STATE 389 deprived of the utilization of his land as per the user permissible under the plan. (Para 31) (419-F-H; 420-A-C) Municipal Coproration ofGreater Bombay v. Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants' Association & Ors. , (1988) Suppl. SCC SS, referred to. 2. 3.

The underlying principle envisaged in Section 127 of the MRTP Act is either to utilize the land for the purpose it is reserved in the plan in given time or let the owner utilize the land for the purpose it is permissible under the Town Planning Scheme. The step taken under the Section within the time stipulated should be towards acquisition of land. It is a step of acquisition ofland and not step for acquisition ofland.. It is trite that failure ofauthorities to take steps which result in actual commencement ofacquisition ofland cannot be permitted to defeat the purpose and object of the scheme of acquisition under the MRTP Act by merely moving an application requesting the Government to acquire the land, which Government may or may not accept Any step which may or may not culminate in the step for acquisition cannot be said to be a step towards acquisition. (Para 31) (420-E-G) 3. 1. The MRTP Act does not contain any reference to Section 4 or Section SA ofthe LA Act.

The MRTP Act contains the provisions relating to preparation of regional plan, the development plan, plans for comprehensive developments, town planning schemes and in such plans and in the schemes, the land is reserved for public purpose. The reservation ofland for a particular purpose under the MRTP Act is done through a complex exercise which begins with land use map, survey, population studies and several other complex factors. This process replaces the provisions of Section 4 of the LA Act and the inquiry contemplated under Section SA of the LA Act. These provisions are purposely excluded for the purposes ofacquisition under the MRTP Act. The acquisition commences with the publication ofdeclaration under Section 6 of the LA Act. The publication of the declaration under sub-sections (2) and (4) of Section 126 read with Section 6 of the LA Act is a sine qua non for the commencement ofany proceedings for acquisition under the MRTP Act.

It is Section 6 declaration which would commence the acquisition proceedings under the MRTP Act and would culminate into passing of an award as provided in sub-section (3) of Section 126 of the MRTP Act. Thus, unless and until Section 6declaration is issued, it cannot be said that the steps for acquisition are commenced. [Para 33] (421-C-F] 3. 2. If one reads Section 126 of the MRTP Act and the words used therein are given the verbatim meaning, then the steps commenced for acquisition of the land would not include making ofan application under Section 126(1)(c) or the declaration which is to be made by the State Government under sub-section (2) of Section 126 of the MRTP Act. On a conjoint reading ofsub-sections (I), (2) and (4) of Section 126, it is seen that Section 126 provides for different steps which are to be taken by the authorities for acquisition of the land in different eventualities and within a· -i particular time span.

Steps taken for acquisition ofthe land by the authorities under clause (c) of Section 126(1) have to be culminated into Section 6 declaration under the LA Act for acquisition ofthe land in the Official Guette, within a period of one year under the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 126. Ifno such declaration is made within the time prescribed, no declaration under Section 6 ofthe LA Act could be issued under the proviso to sub-section (2) and no further steps for acquisition ofthe land could be taken in pursuance ofthe application moved to the State Government by the planning authority or other authority. Proviso to sub-section (2) ofSection 126 prohibits publication ofthe declaration after the expiry ofone year from the date ofpublication of draft regional plan, development plan or any other plan or scheme.

Thus, from the date ofpublication ofthe draft regional plan, within one year an application has to be moved under clause (c) of Section 126(1) which should culminate into a dech. 1ration under Section 6 of the LA Act. In other words, during one year of the publication of the draft regional plan, two steps need to be completed, namely, (i) application by the appropriate authority to the State Governm~nt under Section 126(1)(c); and (ii) declaration by the State ~ Government on receipt of the application mentioned in clause (c) ofSection 126(1) on satisfaction of the conditions specified under Section 126(2). The only exception to this provision has been given under Section 126(4). (Para, 34 35] [421-G, H; 422-A-E] 3. 3. In the present case, the amended regional plan was published in the year 1991.

Thereafter, the steps by making an application under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 126 for issuance of the declaration of acquisition and the declaration itself has to be made within the period ofone GIRNARTRADERSv. STATE 391 year from the date ofthe publication ofregional plan, that is, within the period ofone year from 1991. The application under Section 126{l)(c) could be sai~ to be a step taken for acquisition ofthe land ifsuch application is moved withi" the period of one year from the date of publication of regional plan. Th~ application moved after the expiry of one year could not result in the publication ofdeclaration in the manner provided under Section 6 ofthe LA Act, under sub-section (2) of Section 126 of the MRTP Act, there being a prohibition under the proviso to issue such declaration after one year. (Para 35) (422-E-G] 3. 4. The High Court has committed an apparent error when it held that the steps taken by the respondent-Corporation on 9. 9. 2002 and 13. 9.

2002 would constitute steps as required under Section 126(l){c) ofthe MRTP Act. What is required under Section 126(l)(c) is that the application is to be moved to the State Government for acquiring the land under the LA Act by the planning/local authority. Passing of a resolution by the Improvement Committee recommending that the steps be taken under Section 126(l)(c) or making an application by the Chief Engineer without there being any authority or resolution passed by the Municipal Corporation, could not be taken to be · steps taken of moving an application before the State Government for acquiring · the land under the LA Act. The High Court has committed an apparent error , in relying on these two documents for reaching the conclusion that the steps for acquisition had been commenced by the Municipal Corporation before the expiry ofperiod ofsix months which was to expire on 18. 9. 2002. Further, the letter dated 17. 9.

2002 shows that the resolution was passed by the Municipal Corporation on 16. 9. 2002 whereby it was informed that the sanction had been p accorded to initiate the acquisition proceedings for the land in question. The letter also mentioned that the authorization had been given to the Municipal Commissioner to make an application to the State Government as per the provisions ofSection 126(1) of the MRTP Act. Under Section 2(19) read with Section 2(15) with Section 126(1) of the MRTP Act, the application to the State Government under clause (c) of Section 126(1) has to be made by the planning/local authority, i. e. the Municipal Corporation ofGreater Mumbai constituted under the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. The Municipal Corporation had passed a resolution delegating authority to Municipal Commissioner for making an application to the State Government, but the application/letter either dated 13. 9. 2002or17. 9.

2002 were made to the State Government by the Chief Engineer (Development Plan). The authority was given by the Municipal Corporation to the Municipal Commissioner to make an application to the State Government No such application or letter moved by the Municipal Commissioner has been produced before this Court. (Para 36( (433-8-H) State of Maharashtra and Anr. v. Sant Joginder Singh Kishan Singh and Ors. , [1995) Supp. 2 SCC 475, dissented from. Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vasantrao and Ors. , (2002) 7 SCC 657 and UP. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Jainul Islam and Anr. , (1998( . 2 SCC 467, referred to. 4. 1. In view of the decision on the interpretation and applicability of Section 127 of the MRTP Act to the facts of the present case, the appellants are entitled to the relief claimed, and the other question argued on the applicability ofthe newly inserted Section 11A ofthe LA Act to the acquisition of land made under the MRTP Act need not require to be considered in this case.

[Para 37) (424-CJ 4. 2. The impugned judgment and order dated 18. 3. 2005 passed by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court is set aside. As no steps have been taken by the Municipal Corporation for acquisition ofthe land within the time period, there is deemed de-reservation of the land in question and the appellants are permitted to utilise the land as permissible under Section 127 of the MRTP Act. (Para 38] (424-D-EI Per P. K. Balasubramanyan, J. : I. I.

On an analysis of the provisions in the context of the questions that are before this Court, what emerges is that the publication of the ptan with the reservation therein itself operates as a notification like the one under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, that a declaration has to be made akin to a declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, the compensation has to be paid not with reference to the date of the notification under Section 125 of the Act but with reference to the date of declaration GIRNARTRADERSv. STATE 393 .. under Section 126 ofthe MRTP Act and that a declaration under Section 126 A ofthe Act had to be made within one year of the application for acquisition made by the authority under the MRTP Act.

But in case the declaration was not so made, a fresh declaration has to be issued and compensation has to be paid with reference to the date ofthe fresh declaration and the authority had also the power to take prior possession in case of urgency on the conditions stipulated under Section 129 of the MRTP Act. The MRTP Act provides for lapsing of reservations but does not provide for lapsing of the acquisition. The reservation lapses on the expiry of ten years and on the expiry of six >-months after a purchase notice is issued by the owner ofthe land unless steps are taken in the meanwhile to proceed with the acquisition. If there is no agreement regarding compensation and acquisition then the State Government has to be approached "for acquiring such land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. " (Para 12) (431-G-H; 432-A-C) 1. 2. Under the Land Acquisition Act, a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act is followed by a declaration under Section 6 of the Act.

The amendment introduced by Act 68of1984 provides that no declaration under 'I' Section 6 shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of publication ofthe notification under Section 4(1) ofthe Act. It further provides that the Collector, after the declaration is made, has to take an order for acquisition, mark out the land available, issue notice to persons interested in the land to be acquired and for, passing an award containing the true area of the land acquired, the compensation that should be allowed for the land and the apportionment ofthe compensation among the claimants, if there are more than one. Section l IA introduced by Act 68of1984 provides that the Collector ,... shall make an award within a period of two years from the date of publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period the entire proceedings for the acquisition ofthe land shall stand lapsed.

Thus, the Land Acquisition Act, as amended in the year 1984 provides for two lapses of the acquisition; one, in a case where a declaration under Section 6 is not made G within one year ofthe publication ofthe notification under Section 4(1) ofthe Act and; two, the award itself not being made within a period of two years from the publication of the declaration. (Para 13) (432-D, GI -{ 2. It is clear that when the MRTP Act was enacted, the Land Acquisition Act that was referred was the unamended Act of1894. That Act did not contain A either a provision for lapsing of the acquisition on the non issue of a __). declaration under Section 6 of the Act within one year ofa notification under Section 4(1) of the Act or by the award not being rendered within two years of a declaration under Section 6 of the Act. These two time limits were prescribed by Act 68of1984.

Thereafter, the State Legislature amended the B MRTP Act by substituting the proviso to sub-Section (2) of Section 126 providing that a declaration shall not be made after the expiry ofone year from the date of notification under Section 125 of the MRTP Act. Simultaneously, sub-Section (4) was amended providing that notwithstanding --( the fact that a declaration had not been made within one year, the Government C could make another declaration under Section 126 ofthe MRTP Act in terms of the Land Acquisition Act in the manner provided by sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 126 with the only consequence that the compensation payable shall be the compensation as on the date ofthe fresh declaration.

Significantly, the State Legislature did not introduce any provision either for the lapse of D an acquisition or for lapsing of the proceedings for acquisition ifan award is not made within two years of the declaration under Section 126 ofthe MRTP Act read with Section 6 ofthe Land Acquisition Act. (Para 15) {433-B, El Chairman ofthe Municipal Commissioners ofHowrah v. Shalimar Wood E Products & Anr. , (1963) 1S. C. R. 47; UP. Awas Evam· Vikas Parishadv. Jainu/ Islam & Ors:, (1998} 2 SCC 467 and Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vasantrao & Ors. , [2002) 7 S. C. C. 657, relied on. Secretary of State v. Hindustan Cooperative Insurance Societies Ltd. , AIR (1931) P. C. 149; Rangoon Botatoung Company v. Collector ofRangoon, F 39 Indian Appeals 197; Ujagar Prints & Ors. v. Union ofIndia & Ors. , (1989) ~ 3 S. C. C. 488; Nagpur Improvement Trust andAnr. v. Vithal Rao & Ors. , (1973) 1 SCC 500; State ofKera/a & Ors. v. T.

M P --' rejected which will introduce uncertainty, friction or con(usion with the working ofthe system. [See Collector ofCustoms v. Digvijaysinhji Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. , [1962] l SCR 896, at page 899 and His Holiness Kesvananda Bharati v. State ofKera/a, AIR (1973) SC 1461]. 23. The court must always lean to the interpretation which is a reasonable one, and discard the literal interpretation which does not fit in with the scheme of the Act under consideration. 24. [n series of judgments of this Court, these exceptional situations have been provided for. In Narashimaha Murthy v. Susheelabai, [1996] 3 SCC 644 (at page 647), it was held that: "... The purpose of law is to prevent brooding sense of injustice. It is not the words ofthe law but the spirit and eternal sense of it that makes the law meaningful.... " In the case of American Home Products Corporation v. Mac Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. , AIR (1986) SC 137 (at page 166, para 66), it was held that: " ..

It is a well-known principle of interpretation of statutes that a construction should not be put upon a statutory provision which would lead to manifest absurdity or futility, palpable injustice, or + absurd inconvenience or anomaly.... " Further, in the case ofState ofPunjab v. Sat Ram Das, AIR (1959) Punj. 497, the Punjab High Court held that: "To avoid absurdity or incongruity, grammatical and ordinary sense of the words can, in certain circumstances, be avoided. " 25. Many a times, it becomes necessary to look into the true intention ,. of the legislature in order to give a proper effect to the statutory provisions and in order to achieve the actual intended goal behind the legislation. In the case of Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh and Ors. , AIR (1955) SC 830 (at page 833, para 7), it was held by the Court that: "...

Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or. to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, -( construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence". The same has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Commissioner ofIncome ---t- ' Tax, Bangalore v. J. H. Got/a, AIR (1985) SC 1698 and inAndhra Cotton Mills Ltd v. Lakshm(Ganesh Cotton Mill, (1996) 1ALT537 (AP). Similarly, in the case ofState ofRajasthan ':'·Leela Jain and Ors. , AIR{l965) SC 1296 (at page 1299, para 11), it was held that: "...

Unless the words are unmeaning or absurd, it would not be in accord with any sound principle of construction to refuse to give effect to the provisions of a statute on the very elusive ground that to give them their ordinary meaning leads to consequences which are not in accord with the notions of propriety or justice... " 26. Learned senior counsel appearing on both sides have strongly relied on the decision of this Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bqmbay v. Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants' Association and Ors. , (1988] Supp. SCC 55.

It is contended by the learned senior counsel for the appellants that the decision squarely covers the proposition of law wherein it has been held that the development or the planning authority must take recourse to acquisition with some amount of promptitude in order that the compensation paid to the expropriated owner bears a just relation to the real value of the land; and that the period of six months provided by Section 127 upon the expiry of which the reservation of the land under a development plan lapses, is a valuable safeguard to the citizens against the arbitrary and irrational executive action. Section 127 of the Act is a fetter upon the power ofeminent domain.

On the other hand, the learned senior counsel for the State submits that if we read para 11 ofthe above judgment, it is clearly held that the steps for commencement ofthe acquisition obviously refer to the steps contemplated by Section 126(1) which means the step taken of making an application under clause (c) of Section 126(1) of the MRTP Act and has contended that this Court had already observed that after the service of notice from the owner or any person -interested in the land as provided under Section 127 of the MRTP Act, the steps taken within six months of such service, included any step taken by the appropriate authority for the acquisition of land as contemplated under the provisions of Section 126 (I) ofthe MRTP Act. It has been further contended that such observation of this Court is binding as precedent. 27. At this juncture, it will be appropriate for us to refer some of the judicial pronouncements to illustrate what constitutes the binding precedent.

This Court in Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla, [1976] 2 sec 521 has observed: + "394.... The Earl ofHalsbury, L. C. said in Quinn v. Leathern, (1901) AC 495, 506 that the generality of the expressions which may be found in a judgment are not intended to be expositions ofthe whole law but are governed and qualified by the particular facts ofthe case in which such expressions are to be found. This Court in the State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, [1968] 2 SCR 154, 163, uttered the caution that it is not a profitable task to extract a sentence here and there from a judgment and to build upon it because the essence of the decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein... " 474....

when we are considering the observations of a high judicial authority like this Court, the greatest possible care must be taken to relate the observations of a judge to the precise issues before him and to confine such observations, even though expressed in broad terms, in the general compass of the question before him, unless he makes it clear that he intended his remarks to have a wider ambit. It is not possible for judges always to express their judgments so as to exclude entirely the risk that in some subsequent case their language may be misapplied and any attempt at such perfection of expression can only lead to the opposite result of uncertainty and even obscurity as regards the case in hand... " In Union ofIndia and Ors. v. Dhanwanti Devi and Ors. , [1996] 6 SCC 44, a three-Judge Bench of this Court has observed as follows: "9.... It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent.

The only thing in a judges' decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents; every decision contains three basic postulates - (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment_ based on the combined effect ofthe above. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment.

Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there is not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. It would, therefore, be not profitable to extract a sentence here and there from the judgment and to build upon it because the essence of the decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. The concrete decision alone is binding between the parties to it, but it is the abstract ratio decidendi, ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which, when it is clear what it was, is binding.

It is only the principle laid down in the judgment that is binding law under Article 141 ofthe Constitution. A deliberate judicial decision arrived at after hearing an argument on a question which arises in the case or is put in issue may constitute a precedent, no matter for what reason, and the precedent by long recognition may mature into rule ofstare decisis. It is the rule deductible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of the case which constitutes its ratio decidendi. 10. Therefore, in order to understand and appreciate the binding force of a decision it is always necessary to see what were the facts in the case in which the decision was given and what was the point which had to be decided. No judgment can be read as if it is a statute. A word or a clause or a sentence in the judgment cannot be regarded as a full exposition of law. Law cannot afford to be static and therefore, Judges are to employ an intelligent technique in the use of precedents...

" Similarly, in Director ofSettlements, A. P. and Ors. v. MR. Apparao andAnr. , [2002] 4 SCC 638, a Bench comprising of three Judges, has observed: "7.... But what is binding is the ratio of the decision and not any finding of facts. It is the principle found out upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence... A judgment of the Court has to be read in the context of questions which arose for consideration in the case in which the judgment was . ,_ delivered. An "obiter dictum" as distinguished from a ratio decidendi is an observation by the Court on a legal question suggested in a case . before it but not arising in such manner as to require a decision... " This Court in Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd v. Aksh Optifibre Ltd and Anr. , [2005] 7 sec 234 has observed: "69. ...

if the court thinks that an issue does not arise, then any observation made with regard to such an issue would be parely obiter dictum. It is a well-settled proposition that the ratio decidendi of case is the principle of law that decided the dispute in the facts of the case and, therefore, a decision cannot be relied upon in support of proposition that it did not decide. [See also: Mittal Engg. Works (P) Ltd. v. CCE, [1997] 1 SCC 203 at p. 207 (para. 8); Jagdish Lal v. State ofHaryana, [1997] 6 SCC 538 at p. 560 (para. 17); Divisional Controller, KSRTC v. Mahadeva Shetty, [2003] 7 SCC 197 at p. 206 (para. 23). ]... " 28. We will now analyse that whether the observations of the Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Case (supra) as extracted from paragraph 11 of that Judgment (supra) constituted binding or authoritative precedent with respect to the question of law arising in the present case.

In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Case (supra), the planning authority had published a draft Development Plan in which land of a trust property was reserved for a recreation ground. The Development Plan was finalised and sanctioned by the State Government on 6. 1. 1967. The final development scheme came into effect from 7. 2. 1967. Since no action had been taken for acquisition of the land until 1. 1. 1977, the owners thereof, i. e. , the trustees, served a purchase notice dated I. 7. 1977 on Corporation either to acquire the same or release it from acquisition,,and the same was received on 4. 7. 1977. On 28. 7. 1977 the Corporation's Executive Engineer wrote a letter to the trustees asking information regarding the ownership of the land and the particulars of the tenants thereof. It was also stated that the relevant date . ,.. under Section 127 of the MRTP Act would be the date upon which such information was received. The trustees, by their lawyer's letter dated 3. 8.

1977, conveyed that the date of six months stipulated by Section 127 had to be computed from the date of the receipt from them of the information required and that Corporation could not make an inquiry at that stage without taking a decision on the material question. The Executive Engineer once again wrote to trustees stating that the period ofsix months allowed by Section 127 would commence on 4. 8. 1977, i. e. , the date when the requisite information was furnished. The Corporation passed a resolution dated 10. 1. 1978 for the acquisition of the land and made an application to the State Government which ori being satisfied that the land was required for a public purpose issued the requisite notification dated 7. 4. 1978 under Section 6 ofthe LA Act for acquisition of the land. A petition was filed before the High Court to quash the aforementioned notification, which was allowed by the Single Judge and subsequently maintained by the Division Bench.

The contention of the appellant Corporation before this Court was that the period of six months after the notice by the owner or any person interested in the land as specified under section 127, would start from date when such person had provided the requisite information to the Corporation. 29. In light of the above-mentioned factual matrix, the question of law involved in the Municipal Corporation ofGreater Bombay Case (supra) was as follows: "2. The short point involved in this appeal by special leave from a judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dated June 18, I986, is whether the period ofsix months specified in Section 127 of the Act is to be reckoned from the date of service of the purchase notice dated July 1, 1977 by the owner on the Planning Authority i. e. the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay here, or the date on which the requisite information of particulars is furnished by the owner. " The Court has answered the above question as follows: "7.

According to the plain reading of Section 127 of the Act, it is manifest that the question whether the reservation has lapsed due to the failure of the Planning Authority to take any steps within a period of six months of the date of service of the notice of purchase as stipulated by Section 127, is a mixed question offact and law. It would therefore be difficult, if not well nigh impossible, to lay down a rule of universal application. It cannot be posited that the period of six months would necessarily begin to run from the date of service of a purchase notice under Section 127 of the Act. The condition prerequisite for the running of time under Section 127 is the service of a valid purchase notice. It is needless to stress that the Corporation must primafacie be satisfied that the notice served was by the owner of the affected land or any person interested in the land.

But, at the same time, Section 127 ofthe Act does not co~template an investigation into title by the officers ofthe Planning Authority, nor can the officers prevent the running of time if there is a valid notice... " 30. Thus, after perusing the judgment in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Case (supra), we have found that the question for consideration before the Court in the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Case (supra) has reference to first· step required to be taken by the owner after lapse of I0 years' period without any step taken by the authority for acquisition of land, whereby the owners of the land served the notice for dereservation of the land. The Court was not called upon to decide the case on the substantial step, namely, the step taken by the authority within six months of service of notice by the owners for dereservation of their land which is second step required to be taken by the authority after service of notice.

The observations ofthis Court regarding the linking ofword 'aforesaid' from the wordings 'no steps as aforesaid are commencedfor its acquisition' of Section 127 with the steps taken by the competent authority for acquisition of land as provided under Section 126(1) of the MRTP Act, had rio direct or substantial nexus either with the factual matrix or any of the legal issues raised before it. It is apparent that no legal issues, either with respect to interpretation of words 'no steps as aforesaid are commenced for its acquisition' as stipulated under the provisions of Section 127 or any link of these words with steps to be taken on service of notice, were contended before the Court. Thus, observations of the Court did not relate to any of the legal questions arising in the case and, accordingly, cannot be considered as the part of ratio decidendi.

Hence, in light of the aforementioned judicial pronouncements, which have well settled the proposition that only the ratio decidendi can act as the binding or authoritative precedent, it is clear that the reliance placed on mere general observations or casual expressions of the Court, is not of much avail to the respondents. 31. When we conjointly read Sections 126 and 127 of the MRTP Act, it is apparent that the legislative intent is to expeditiously acquire the land reserved under the Town Planning Scheme and, therefore, various periods have been prescribed for acquisition of the owner's property. The intent and purpose of the provisions of Sections 126 and 127 has been well explained in Municipal Corporation ofGreater Bombay Case (supra).

Iftlie acquisition is left for a time immemorial in the hands ofthe concerned authority by simply making an application to the State Government for acquiring such land under the LA Act, 1894, then the authority will simply move such an application and if no such notification is issued by the State Government for one year of the publication of the draft regional plan under Section 126(2) read with Section 6 ofthe LA Act, wait for the notification to be issued by the State Government by exercising suo motu power under sub-section (4) of Section 126; and till then no declaration could be made under Section 127 as regards lapsing of -+ reservation and contemplated declaration of land being released and available for the land owner for his utilization as permitted under Section 127. Section 127 permitted inaction on the part of the acquisition authorities for a period of l0 years for de-reservation ofthe land.

Not only that, it gives a further time for either to acquire the land or to take steps for acquisition of the land within a period of six months from the date of service of notice by the land owner for de-reservation. The steps towards commencement of the acquisition in such a situation would necessarily be the steps for acquisition and not a step which may not result into acquisition and merely for the purpose of seeking time so that Section 127 does not come into operation. Providing the period of six months after the service of notice clearly indicates the intention of the legislature of an urgency where nothing has been done in regard to the land reserved under the plan for a period of 10 years and the owner is deprived of the utilization of his land as per the user permissible unde_r the plan.

When mandate is given in a Section requiring compliance within a particular period, the strict compliance is required thereof as introduction ofthis Section is with legislative intent to balance the power of the State of"eminent domain". The State possessed the power to take or control the property of the owner for the benefit of public cause, but when the State so acted, it was obliged to compensate the injured upon making just compensation. Compensation provided to the owner is the release of the land for keeping the land under reservation for 10 years without taking any steps for acquisition of the same. The underlying principle envisaged in Section 127 of the MRTP Act is e. ither to utilize the land for the purpose it is reserved in the plan in a given time or let the owner utilize the land for the purpose it is permissible under the Town Planning Scheme.

The step taken under the Section within the time stipulated should be towards acquisition of land; It is a step of acquisition of land and not step for acquisition of land. It is trite that failure ofauthorities to take steps which result in actual commencement of acquisition of land cannot be permitted to defeat the purpose and object of the scheme of acquisition under the MRTPAct by merely moving an application requesting the Government to acquire the land, which Government may or may not accept. Any step which may or may not culminate in the step for acquisition cannot be said to be a step towards acquisition. 32. It may also be noted that the legislature while enacting Section 127 has deliberately used the word 'steps' (in plural and not in singular) which are required to be taken for acquisition ofthe land.

On construction of Section 126 which provides for acquisition of the land under the MRTP Act, it is apparent that the steps for acquisition of the land would be issuance of the declaration under Section 6 ofthe LA Act. Clause (c) ofSection 126(1) merely provides for a mode by which the State Government can be requested for the acquisition of the land under Section 6 of the LA Act. The making of an application to the State Government for acquisition of the land would not be a step for acquisition ofthe land under reservation. Sub-section (2) of Section 126 leaves it open to the State Government either to permit the acquisition or not to permit, considering the public purpose for which the acquisition is sought for by the authorities. Thus, the steps towards acquisition would really commence when the State Government permits the acquisition and as a result thereof publishes the declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act. 33.

The MRTP Act does not contain any reference to Sectidn 4 or Section SA of the LA Act. The MRTP Act contains the provisions relating to preparation ofregional plan, the development plan, plans·for comprehensive developments, town planning schemes and in such plans and in the schemes, the land is reserved for public purpose. The reservation of land for a particular purpose under the MRTP Act is done through a complex exercise which begins with land use map, survey, population studies and several other complex factors. This process replaces the provisions of Section 4 of the LA Act and the inquiry contemplated under Section SA of the LA Act. These provisions are purposely excluded for the purposes of acquisition under the MRTP Act. The acquisition commences with the publication of declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act.

The publication of the declaration under subsections (2) and (4) ofSection 126 read with Section 6 ofthe LA Act is a sine qua non for the commencement of any proceedings for acquisition under the MRTP Act. It is Section 6 declaration which would commence the acquisition proceedings under the MRTP Act and would culminate into passing of an award as provided in sub-section (3) of Section 126 of the MRTP Act. Thus, unless and until Section 6 declaration is issued, it cannot be said that the steps for acquisition are commenced. 34. There is another aspect of the matter. Ifwe read Section 126 of the MRTP Act and the words11sed therein are given the verbatim meaning, then the steps commenced for acquisition of the land would not include making of an application under Section 126(1)(c) or the declaration which is to be made by the State Government under sub-section (2) of Section 126 -0f the MRTPAct. 3S.

On a conjoint reading ofsub-sections (I), (2) and (4) of Section 126, we notice that Section 126 provides for different steps which are to be taken + by the authorities for acquisition of the land in different eventualities and within a particular time span. Steps taken for acquisition of the land by the authorities under clause (c) of Section 126(1) have to . be culminated into Section 6 declaration under the LA Act for acquisition of the land in the Official Gazette, within a period ofone year under the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 126. If no such declaration is made within the time prescribed, no declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act could be issued under the proviso to sub-section (2) and no further steps for acquisition of the land could be taken in pursuance of the application moved to the State Government by the planning authority or other authority.

Proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 126 prohibits publication of the declaration after the expiry of one year from the date of publication of draft regional plan, development plan or any· other plan or scheme. Thus, from the date of publication of the· draft · regional plan, within one year an application has to be moved under clause (c) of Section 126(1) which should culminate into a declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act. As per the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 126, the maximum period permitted between the publication ofa draft regional plan and declaration by the Government in the Official Gazette under Section 126(2) is one year. In other words, during one year of the publication of the draft regional plan, two steps need to be completed, namely, (i) application by the appropriate authority to the State Government under Section 126(1)(c); an.

d (ii) deelaration by the State Government on receipt ofthe application mentioned in clause (c) of Section 126(1) on satisfaction of the conditions specified under Section 126(2). The only exception to this provision has been given under Section 126(4). In the present case, the amended regional plan was published in the year 1991. Thereafter, the steps by making an application under clause (c) ofsub-sectfon (l) ofSection 126 for issuance ofthe declaration of acquisition and the declaration itself has to be made within the period of one year from the date of the publication of regional plan, that. is, within the period ofone year from 1991. The application under Section l26(1)(c) could be said to be a step taken for acquisition of the land if such application is moved within the period of one year from the date of publication of regional plan.

The application moved after the expiry of one year could not result in the publication of declaration in the manner provided under Section 6 of the LA Act, under sub-section (2) of Section 126 of the MRTP Act, there being a prohibition under the proviso to issue such declaration after one year. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination, the step taken by the Municipal Corporation under Section 126(l)(c) of making an application could be said to be a step for the commencement ofacquisition ofthe land. After the expiry of one year, it is left to the Government concerned under sub-section (4) of +/ Section 126 to issue declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act for the purposes of acquisition for which no application is required under Section 126(l)(c). Sub-section (4) of Section 126 of the MRTP Act would come into operation if the State Government is of the view that the land is required to be acquired for any public purpose. 36.

The High Court has committed an apparent error when it held that the steps taken by the respondent-Corporation on 9. 9. 2002 and 13. 9. 2002 would constitute steps as required under Section 126(I)(c) of the MRTP Act. What is required under Section 126(l)(c) is that the application is to be moved to the State Government for acquiring the land under the LA Act by the planning/local authority. Passing ofa resolution by the Improvement Committee recommending that the steps be taken under Section 126(l)(c) or making an application by the Chief Engineer without there being any authority or resolution passed by the Municipal Corporation, could not be taken to be steps taken of moving an application before the State Government for acquiring the land under the LA Act. The High Court has committed an apparent error in relying on these two documents for reaching the conclusion that the steps for acquisition had bee!

) commenced by the Municipal Corporation before the expiry ofperiod ofsix months which was to expire on 18. 9. 2002. Further, ifwe look at the letter dated 17. 9. 2002 which, as per the counsel for the respondent- Corporation, is a request made by the Municipal Corporation to the State Government under clause (c) of Section 126(1), we cannot agree with the submissions of the respondents. The letter itself shows that the resolution was passed by the Municipal Corporation on 16. 9. 2002 whereby it was informed that the sanction had been accorded to initiate the acquisition proceedings for the land in question. The letter also mentioned that the authorization had been given to the Municipal Commissioner to make an application to the State Government as per the provisions of Section 126(1) ofthe MRTP Act.

Under Section 2(19) read with Section 2(15) with Section 126(1) of the MRTP Act, the application to the State Government under clause (c) of Section 126(1) has to be made by the planning/local authority, i. e. the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai constituted under the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. The Municipal Corporation had passed a resolution delegating authority to Municipal Commissioner for making an application to the State Government, but the application/letter either dated 13. 9. 2002 or 17. 9. 2002 were made to the State Government by the Chief Engineer (Development Plan). The authority was given by the Municipal Corporation to the Municipal Commissioner to make an application to the State Government. No such application or Jetter moved by the Municipal Commissioner has been produced before us.

On + being asked by this Court, as many as six documents have been produced before us by the counsel for the Municipal Corporation who has stated before us that these documents were also placed before the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. Therefore, we have permitted production of these documents before u_s. On a minute and careful scrutiny of the documents produced before us, we do not find that the application under clause (c) of Section 126(1) was moved by the officer authorized by the Municipal Corporation, i. e. the Municipal Commissioner, to the State Government for acquisition of the land, so that it could be said that steps as contemplated were taken for the commencement of acquisition proceedings. 37.

In view of our decision on the interpretation and applicability of Section 127 of the MRTP Act to the facts of the present case, the appellants are entitled to the relief claimed, and the other question argued on the applicability ofthe newly inserted Section l lA of the LA Act to the acquisition of land made under the MRTP Act need not require to be considered by us in this case. 38. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned judgment and order dated 18. 3. 2005 passed by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court is set aside and this appeal is allowed. As no steps have been taken by the M! -lnicipal Corporation for acquisition ofthe land within the time period, there is deemed de-reservation of the land in question and the appellants are E. permitted to utilise the land as permissible under Section 127 of the MRTP -. Act. P. K. ~ALASUBRAMANYAN, J. l. Leave granted in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 11446 of2005. 2. Civil Appeal No.

3703 of 2003 is before us on the basis of an order of reference dated 14. 10. 2004 reported as Gimar Traders v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. , [2004] 8 S. C. C. 505. Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 11446 of 2005 is before us by virtue of an order dated 11. 7. 2005 tagging the same along with the Civil No. No. 3703 of2003. The question in Civil Appeal No. 3703 of 2003 and one of the questions in the Civil Appeal arising out ofSpecial Leave Petition (Civil) No. 11446 of2005 as posed by the order of reference is whether all the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by the Central Act 68 of 1984, can be read into the provisions under Chapter VII of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (for short, 'the MRTP Act') for an acquisition un~er that Act. According to the order of reference, the decision in State ofMaharashtra GIRNARlRADERSv. STATE[BALASUBRAMANYAN,J. ] 425 & Anr. v. Sant Joginder Singh Kishan Singh & Ors. , [1995] 2 S.

C. R. 242 requires reconsideration. In the second of the appeals, this question arises along with· a subsidiary question on the interpretation of Section 127 of the MRTP Act. 3. _The MRTP Act· as its preamble shows, is an act to make provision for planning the development and use of land in Regions established for that purpose and for the constitution of Regional Planning Boards therefor; to make better provisions for the preparation of Development plans with a view to ensuring that. town planning schemes are made in. a proper manner and their execution is made effective; to provide for the creation ofnew towns by means of Development Authorities; to make provisions for the compulsory acquisition of land required for public purposes in respect of the plans; and for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid.

This legislation is a State enactment and according to the learned counsel for the State of Maharashtra, is covered by the Entries 5, 6, 10, 13, 14, 17, 18, 23, 24, 28, 33, 35 of List II and also by Entries 17A, 20, 31 and 42 of List III of the Constitution. In other words, the attempt is to show that the MRTP Act is a legislation concerned with planning, local development and regulation in various fields. As is seen from the preamble, the compulsory acquisitions of land provided for by the -f Act are acquisitions of land required for public purposes in respect of plans under the Town Planning Scheme and not for acquisitions of lands for other purposes or for public purpose as envisaged by the Land Acquisition Act. 4. In Civil Appeal No. 3703 of 2003, revised Draft Development Plan under the MRTP Act was prepared on 22. 11. 1983. The revised Draft Development Plan was published on 6. 3. 1987. The land in question was reserved for the purpose of education.

The land was agricultural land. The appellant purchased the land only on 24. 2. 1984, after the preparation of the revised draft plan. The appellant attempted to get permission to develop the land but without success. 5. On 19. 1. 1989, the appellant issued a purchase notice to the Government under Section 49 of the MRTP Act. Steps for acquisition of land were taken for the purpose as envisaged by the Plan and a declaration under Section 126 of the MRTP Act published on 15. 10. 1991. A draft award was also allegedly prepared. At this stage, the appellant issued another purchase notice under Section 49 ofthe MRTP Act on 22. 3. 1994. The purchase notice was rejected. That rejection was challenged in the High Court by the appellant and the High Court on 3 l. 3. 1997, directed the authorities to initiate acquisition proceedings within one year failing which the land should be deemed to be released. Based on the earlier initiation of acquisition proceedings, a final award was passed on 10.

2. 1999 and the local authority deposited the award amount on 15. 2. 1999. Notice was issued under Section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act to the appellant. Then. the appellant filed another Writ Petition, No. 822 of 2000 praying for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings on the ground that Section l lA of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended, had been violated by the award not being passed within two years ofthe declaration under Section 6 of the Act, and for a writ of mandamus directing the respondents in the Writ Petition to permit the appellant to develop the reserved land for residential purposes. The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition by the impugned judgment.

It held, on a perusal of the documents, that it was satisfied that the requisite steps have been taken by the Special Land Acquisition Officer after the earlier Writ Petition was disposed of and there was no necessity to initiate fresh action by the Planning Authority as contemplated under Section 126{l)(c) of the MRTP Act and hence the relief sought could not be granted. It is this decision that was challenged before this Court by way of a Petition for Special Leave to Appeal and leave having been granted the matter is before us as detailed earlier. 6. In the second ofthe appeals, the land involved is situate in Carmichael Road, Malabar Hill Division, Mumbai. The declaration under Section 4(1) of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 was made on 7. 7. 1958. A development plan in accordance with the provisions of Section 3(1) of that Act was published on 9. 1. 1964. On 8. 7.

1964, a modified development plan was submitted to the Bombay Municipal Corporation to the Government of Maharashtra for sanction. On 6. 1. 1967, the Government of Maharashtra sanctioned the development plan. The property in question was notified for development as open space and children's park. On l l. l. 1967, the MRTP Act came into force. The Bombay Town Planning Act stood repealed. But proceedings initiated or taken . under that Act were saved by Section 165 of the MRTP Act. It was notified that 7. 2. 1967 would be the date on which the final development plan shall come into force. 7. On 6. l. 1979, a declaration under Sections 126 (2) and 126(4) of the MRTP Act was made in respect ofan extent of2593. 36 square meters of land. On 24. 9. 1984, the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 68 of 1984 came into force. On 16. 9. )991, the revised development plan sanctioned by the State Government on 6. 7. 1991 came into effect. On 2. 8.

1993, ·the Municipal Commissioner, Greater Bombay wrote to the Special Land Acquisition Officer GIRNARlRADERSv. STATE[BALASUBRAMANYAN,J. ] 427 stating that the Bombay Municipal Corporation has decided to give priority for acquiring the property in question. The letter also requested Land Acquisition Officer to move the State Government for acquisition of the property forthe purposes envisaged by the MRTP Act. The Land Acquisition Officer asked for submission of fresh proposals by taking a stand that an earlier notification for acquisition of the property issued had lapsed on 23. 9. 1986. On 3. 2. 1998, the appellant issued a purchase notice, inter alia, asking. for re-notifying the property and to pay compensation as per the prevailing market rate or otherwise to release the property from reservation and accord sanction for development of the property.

The Municipal Commissioner thereupon wrote to the State Government indicating that purchase notice issued was invalid as IO years have not expired since the sanction of the revised development plan which came into effect only on 16. 9. 1991. On 18. 10. 2000, the appellant again issued a purchase notice under Section 127 of the MRTP Act to the Municipal Commissioner. Again, the appellant was informed that since 10 years have not expired, the notice was invalid. On 15. 3. 2002, the appellant issued yet another purchase notice under Section 127 of the Act calling upon the authority either to acquire the land or to permit the appellant to develop the same. According to the Municipal Corporation, on 9. 9. 2002, it passed a resolution deciding to request the State Government to acquire the land. On 13. 9. 2002, the request was sent to the State Government. On 20. 11.

2002, a notification under Section 126(4) of the MRTP Act read with Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued declaring that the property in question was needed for the purpose for which it has been reserved. The appellant filed a Writ Petition on 19. 9. 2003 seeking to have the notification dated 6. 1. 1967 and the declaration dated 6. 1. 1979 quashed and for a mandamus directing the respondents to accord sanction to the appellant for developing the property or in the alternative to re-notify ~- the land and pay the market value as compensation. On 24. 6. 2004, the High Court disposed of the Writ Petition leaving the appellant to pursue the remedies that may be available in accordance with Jaw. The appellant thereupon submitted a revised plan for development of the property purporting to be in the light of the direction of the High Court in the Writ Petition. The proposal was rejected.

Another Writ Petition was filed by the appellant seeking permission to develop the land and for payment of enhanced compensation and for quashing the notification dated 20. 11. 2002 issued under Section 126(4) of the MRTP Act. After the pleadings were completed and the appellant sought and obtained an amendment of the Writ Petition, ultimately the High Court dismissed the Writ Petition relying on the decision in State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Sant Joginder Singh Kishan Singh & Ors. [supra]. The appellant thereupon approached this Court and got its Petition for Special Leave to Appeal tagged to Civil Appeal No. 3703 of 2003. 8. The main contention urged on behalf of 'the appellant~ ~n the first aspect is that the MRTP Act has adopted the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by reference and consequently, any amendment in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 would automatically be attracted in any proceedings for acquisition under the MRTP Act.

Since Section l lA introduced into the Land Acquisition Act by Act 68 of 1984 provided that acquisition wo~ld lapse if an award is not passed within two years of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act, the entire proceedings for acquisition in both these cases have lapsed since awards were not rendered within two years of the declaration. On the second aspect arising in the latter appeal, the contention is that on receipt of the purchase notice, the proceeding for acquisition itself was not started within six months of the receipt of the notice and consequently the acquisition and the reservations have lapsed under Section 127 of the MRTP Act. The further submission is that taking of some step like writing to the Government for acquiring the land, is not a step as contemplated by Section 127 of the MRTP Act and the step must be a step under the Land Acquisition Act, namely, issuance of a declaration under Section 6. of that Act so as to enable the )-.

authority to acquire the land in term-s of the MRTP Act. These contentions· are met by learned counsel for the State of Maharashtra and the authorities by contending that there was no incorporation by reference of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 in the MRTP Act; that the MRTP Act had adopted the Land Acquisition Act only for limited purposes and since there was no provision in the MRTP Act for lapsing of an acquisition as distinct from the lapsing of the scheme itself, Section I IA of the Land Acquisition Act had no application. It is also contended that in any event the amendment brought in by introduction of Section 11A into the Land Acquisition Act by the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 cannot be read into the MRTP Act which adopted the Land Acquisition Act as it then stood in the year 1966, on which date Section 11 A was_ not in the statute book and hence there was no question of the acquisition lapsing in terms ·of Section I IA of the Land Acquisition Act.

It is submitte~ that the decision of this Court in State of Maharashtra & Anr_ v. Sant Joginder Singh Kishan Singh & Ors. [supra] covers this question. On the latter question, it is submitted that what Section 127 of the Act contemplates is only a step under the MRTP Act as distinct from the Land Acquisition Act and the writing of the concerned authority to the Government to acquire the land for the purpose for which it has been reserved under the revised plan within time would be a step in terms of Section 127 GIRNARTRADERSv. STATE[BALASUBRAMANYAN,J. ] 429 of the Act. It is submitted that the High Court has rightly relied upon the decision in Municipal Coproration of Greater Bombay v. Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants' Association & Ors. , (1988) Suppl. SCC 55) to negative the plea. 9. We may first notice the scheme of the MRTP Act.

We have already referred to the preamble of the MRTP Act which indicates that the main object of the Act is to make provisions for planning the development and use of land in regions established for the purpose. Different purposes are contemplated. Provision is also made for acquisition of land but as the preamble suggests it is for compulsory acquisition of land required for the purposes in respect of the plans and not merely a public purpose as understood under the Land Acquisition Act. Thus, it is clear that the acquisition of land under the MRTP Act is incidental to the main objective ofbringing about a planned development of the different regions and areas in the State of Maharashtra and the use of various lands reserved in the development plan for the purpose for which it is reserved. Chapter VII deals with land acquisition.

Section l'25 provides for any land required, reserved or designated in a Regional plan, Development plan or town planning scheme for a public purpose or purposes including plans for any areas of comprehensive development or for any new town shall be deemed to be land needed for a public purpose within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act. In other words, the moment a Regional development plan or town planning had been ·notified, Section 125 would operate as a notification corresponding to a notification under Section 4( I) of the Land Acquisition Act. Section 126 provi~es for acquisition of land so required in terms of the plan and three modes are prescribed for such acquisition. One is by agreement by parties by paying an amount agreed to, or by paying the compensation as provided in clause (b) or by making an application to the State Government for acquiring the land under the Land Acquisition Act.

The acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act is contemplated by the authority making an application to the State Government for that purpose. In other words, it is not the authority that has to take steps for the acquiring of the land under the Land Acquisition Act but it is to apply to the State Government to make an acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act. On receipt of such an application if the State Government is satisfied that the land specified in the application is needed for the specified public purpose or that land is included in the plan and it is needed for any public purpose indicated, it may make a declaration, in the manner provided under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. The declaration so published is deemed to be a declaration duly made under Section 126 of the MRTP Act. The proviso indicates that declaration shall be made before the expiry of one year from the date of the draft regional plan, development plan or any other plan or the scheme.

On publication of the declaration under Section 126, the Collector shall proceed to make an order for acquisition of the land under the Land Acquisition Act and the provisions of the Land Acquisition shall apply to the acquisition of the said land subject to the modification that the relevant date for determining the market value to be paid as compensation shall be the date of declaration under Section 126 of the MRTP Act. The section also provides that if a declaration is not made within one year, the State Government may make a fresh declaration for acquiring the land subject to the modification that the market value of the land is to be paid with reference to the date of the subsequent declaration. In other words, on a declaration under·Section 126 being made, the authority under the MRTP Act has to apply to the government to acquire the land. The Government has to issue a declaration as -contemplated by Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act.

The compensation is to be paid with reference to the date of such declaration. A declaration has to be made within one year of the request for acquisition. But in case it is not so made, a fresh declaration would be made in which case the compensation has to be adjudged with reference to the market value on the date of the second declaration. Section 126 of the MRTP Act does not provide for the lapsing of the acquisition. On the other hand, the acquisition, notwithstanding the default to act in terms of sub-section (2) of that Section can be proceeded with by issuing a fresh declaration and the compensation has to be determined with reference to the date of that fresh declaration. Section 127 provides for lapsing of reservations. Since interpretation of Section 127 is also involved we think it proper to extract the said,provision. "127.

If any land reserved, allotted or designated for any purpose specified in any plan under this Act is not acquired by agreement within ten years from the date on which a final Regional plan, or final Development plan comes into force or ifproceedings for the acquisition of such land under this Act or under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894; are not commenced within such period, the owner or any person interested in the land may serve notice on the Planning Authority, Development Authority or as the case may be, Appropriate Authority to that effect; and if within six months from the date of the service of notice of such notice, the land is not acquired or no steps as aforesaid are commenced for its acquisition, the reservation, allotment' or designation shall be deemed to be released from such reservation, \ allotment or designation and shall become available to the owner for the purpose of development as 'otherwise, permissible in the case of GIRNARTRADERSv. STATE[BALASUBRAMANYAN,J.

] 431 adjacent land under the relevant plan. " I0. The reservations are provided by the Act for a period of ten years. Ifthe land is not acquired within a period of ten years by agreement of parties or if proceedings for acquisition of the land are not commenced within ten years, the owner could serve a notice on the planning authority or the development authority and if within six months from the date of the service of such notice the land is not acquired or no steps are commenced for its acquisition, the reservation, allotment or designation shall be deemed to have lapsed and the land shall be deemed to be released from such purpose, allotment or designation and shall become available to the owner for the purpose of development as pennissible in the case of lands lying adjacent to the land in question under the relevant plan.

In other words, ifthe reservation lapses, the land owner could use the land for the purposes for which the adjacent lands are permitted to be used under the development plan or revised plan. 11. This section also does not appear to deal with lapsing of any acquisition for which steps have been taken in tenns of Section 126 of the MRTP Act by applying to the State Government for acquiring the land for the purpose for which it is reserved in the plan. But this Section contemplates the lapsing ofreservation itself if the conditions laid down thereunder are not complied with. If no acquisition is made within 10 years of the notification under Section 125 of the Act, the land owner is given the right to issue a notice calling upon the authority to acquire the land for the purpose for which it is eannarked in the plan. If on service of such a notice no steps for acquisition are taken within six months, the reservation would lapse.

This section also does not contemplate a lapse of the acquisition as such. Section 128 confers power on the State Government to acquire land for a purpose other than the one for which it is designated in any plan or scheme. Section 129 confers power to take possession of the land in case of urgency at any time after the declaration under Section 126(2) of the Act is notified, on condition that before taking possession, the Collector has to offer to the person interested, compensation as provided in that section. 12.

On an analysis of the provisions in the context of the questions that are before us, what emerges is that the publication of the plan with the reservation therein itself operates as a notification like the one under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, that a declaration has to be made akin to a declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, the compensation has to be paid not with reference to the date of the notification under Section I25 of the Act but with reference to the date of declaration under Section 126 of the MRTP Act and that a declaration under Section 126 of the Act had to be made within one year of the application for acquisition made by the authority under the MRTP Act.

But in case the declaration was not so made, a fresh declaration has to be issued and compensation has to be· paid with reference to the date of the fresh declaration and the authority had also the power to take prior possession in case of urgency on the conditions stipulated under Section 129 of the MRTP Act. The MRTP Act provides f