M-S MAHALAXMI MOTORS LTD. v. MANDAL REVENUE OFFICER AND ORS

Citation: [2007] 10 S.C.R. 964

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: S.B. SINHA, H.S. BEDI

Case summary

M-S MAHALAXMI MOTORS LTD. v. MANDAL REVENUE OFFICER AND ORS.pdf

Judgment text

MIS MAHALAXMI MOTORS LTD. v. MANDAL REVENUE OFFICER AND ORS. OCTOBER 10, 2007 [S. B. SINHA AND H. S. BEDI, JJ. ] Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982: ss.

2(e),4 and 8(1)-Landgrabbing-Suit lands vested in State Government-Application for occupancy certificate by a person claiming himselfas lnamdar ofsuit lands rejected-The said person sold the suit land-Vendee raised constructions thereon-His applicationfor regularization rejected-Meanwhile application u/s 8(1) filed by State Government, allowed by Special Court-Order affirmed by High Court-HELD: Definition of 'land grabber' is not restricted to party to proceedings but also includes his predecessor-in-interest- Only because a person has entered into possession ofland on the basis ofa purported sale deed, the same by itselfwould not be sufficient to hold that he did not enter over the land unauthorisedly, unfairly or greedily-Question whether the land grabber has grabbed the land or not, ordinarily is required to be determined as on the date offiling of the application-An averment in the application u/s 8 that the procedee had been in unlawful possession itselfis sufficient to invoke provisions ;:i of the Act-Pendency ofan application for regularization ofland would not stand in the way ofthe State to initiate proceedings under the Act-Thefacts ofthe matter squarely cover the ingredients ofs.

2(e) ofthe Act-Doctrine ofestoppel-Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition of1nams Act, 1955-Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905. Land grabbing-Jurisdiction ofSpecial Court. One'R' claiming ownership ofcertain lands as Inamdar, applied for occupancy certificate from the State Government. His application was rejected. 'R' then transferred the said lands by executing two I ~ MIS MAHALAXMI MOTORS LTD. v. MANDAL REVENUE OFFICER registered sale deeds in January 1985 in favour ofthe appellant, and thereafter filed a writ petition before the High Court, which by its orderdated 63. 1987 held that in view ofs. 3(1) ofthe A. P. (Telangana Area) Abolition oflnams Act, 1955 Act, the lands in question had vested in the State. The said judgment attained finality. Despite this, the appellant raised constructions on the suit lands. A notice under the A. P.

Land Encroachment Act, 1905 was issued to the appellant describing it as 'encroacher' of the suit land, which was unsuccessfully challenged by the appellant in a writ petition before ) the High Court. The appellant also filed an application before the State Government for regularization of the lands which was dismissed. The said order was challenged by the appellant in a writ petition before the High Court. Meanwhile an application against the appellant in terms of s. 8(1) of the A. P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 was filed praying, inter alia, for eviction of the appellant from the suit lands declaring it as land grabber and for punishing it u/s 4(3) ofthe Act. The Special Court allowed the said application. The writ petition of the appellant having been dismissed, it filed the instant appeal.

It was contended for the appellant, inter alia, that the Special Court as also the High Court erred in not considering that the respondent neither pleaded nor proved the ingredients ofthe terms 'land grabber' and 'land grabbing' as defined in the Act; that the appellant having entered into possession pursuant to registered sale deeds, it was not questionable under the Act; that during the pendency ofthe application ofthe appellant for regularization ofthe lands in question, the application u/s 8 of the Act was not maintainable. Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. The Special Court constituted under the A. P. Land -f Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 exercises jurisdiction ofthe Civil Court, provisions ofthe Code ofCivil Procedure being applicable; and, therefore, all questions relating to title and possession can be gone into by it.

The proceedings can be initiated in terms ofSection 4 ofthe said Act against a person who continues to be in occupation, othenvise than as a lawful tenant, ofa grabbed land belonging to the I __ \ Government, local authority, religious or charitable institution or endowment including a wakf, or any private person. Ifand when proceedings are initiated under the Act, the proceedee not only can raise a jurisdictional question but can also raise questions relating to his titie and possession. Lawful entitlement on the part ofa party to possess the land being the determinative factor, it is axiomatic that so long as the land grabber would not be able to show his legal entitlement to hold the land, the jurisdiction of the Special Court cannot be held to be ousted. [Paras 30 and 31] (988-D, E; 989-B] Konda Lakshmana Bapujiv. Government ofAndhra Pradesh and Ors. , (2002] 3 SCC 258; State ofA. P. v. Smt. Pramela Modi and Ors. , (2006) 11 SCALE 38; Union of India v.

Tata Teleservices (Maharashtra) Ltd. , JT (2007) 10 SC 356 and Gouni Satya Reddi v. Government ofAndhra Pradesh and Ors. , [2004] 7 SCC 398, relied on. A. P. Housing Boardv. Mohammad Sadatullah & Ors. , (2007) 5 SCALE 681, referred to. 2. 1. The definition of'land grabber' is not restricted to the party to the proceedings, but includes his predecessor-in-interest also. Once the land is held to be a Government land, the logical corollary thereto would be that subject to the law oflimitation and prescription, the State would not lose the said right to the opposite party. [Para 33] (989-D, E] 2. 2. What is necessary to be proved is the substance of the allegation. The proofofintention on the part ofa person being his state ofmind, the ingredients ofthe provisions must be considered keeping in view the materials on record as also circumstances attending thereto.

What would be germane for lawful entitlement to remain in possession would be that the proceedee proves that he had bonafide claim over the land. The question in regard to lawful entitlement ofthe proceedee, therefore, for invoking the charging section plays an important and significant role. [Paras 35 and 36] [989-G, H; 990-A, C] Konda La/r. shmana Bapuji v. Government ofAndhra Pradesh and 'j·· REVENUE OFFICER Ors. , [2002] 3 SCC 258, relied on. -i' 2. 3. The person's purported beliefthat he is legally entitled to hold the land and his possession is not otherwise illegal must also be judged not only from the point oftime when he entered into the possession orwhen he had acquired the purported title but also from the point ofview as to whether by reason ofdetermination ofsuch a question by a competent court oflaw, he has been found to have no title and consequently continuance ofhis possession becomes illegal.

1 The provisions of the Act must be construed so as to enable the tribunal to give effect thereto. It cannot be construed in a pedantic manner which if taken to its logical corollary would make the provisions wholly unworkable. [Para 37] [990-D, E, G] 3. 1. Only because a person has entered into possession of land on the basis of a purported registered sale deed, the same by itself, would not be sufficient to come to the conclusion thathe had --( not entered over the land unauthorisedly, unfairly, or greedily. For determination ofsuch an issue, the Special Court will be entitled to take into consideration not only the rival claims ofthe parties, but also the earlier round oflitigation, ifany, and subsequent conduct of the proceedee himself. The question as to whether the land grabber had grabbed the land or not ordinarily is required to be determined as on the date offiling ofthe. application. [Paras 30, 37 and 38] [990-G, H; 991-A, B; 988-F] )- 3. 2.

'R', the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant, was claiming the suit lands as ifit were a grant by way oflnam. The High Court categorically came to the finding that the land in question had vested in the State Government and 'R' was not entitled even to grant ofan occupancy certificate. 'R' had, therefore, no title over the land. It was obligatory on the part of the appellant keeping in view the doctrine ofcaveat emptor to examine the title ofthe vendor 1 over the land, it purchased. Within a period oftwo years from the date ofpurchase, the appellant became aware that it had acquired no title thereto and it had illegally been occupying the land, as the same belonged to the Government and, thus, the latter was entitled to possess the same. Apart therefrom, the appellant was put to notice that it was an encroacher. [Para 39) [991-C, DJ 4. 1. An averment that the appellant had been in unlawful possession itself is sufficient to invoke the proyisions of the Act.

So far as the pleadings in the application under Section 8 ofthe Act are concerned, suffice it to say that the same was filed in a prescribed form. There does not exist any column where the requisite pleadings by way of fulfilling the second part of the ingredients of land grabbing could be pleaded. With the said application, a concise statement was annexed. The said concise statement, therefore, became a part of the application. It has categorically been stated therein that the appellant without having any right or title illegally encroached upon the Government land. The history oflitigation and the area ofencroachment had also been specifically stated therein. A sketch map showing the same was annexed the1·eto. The fact that the appellant had made constructions illegally and had been running a workshop was specifically pleaded. One ofthe reliefs prayed for therein, inter alia, was to declare that the appellant was a land grabber. It is, therefore, not.

a case where it can be said that the respondent failed to plead the requisite ingredients of the definition of the term·'Jand grabbing'. It was, therefore, not necessary for respondent no. 1 to make averments that the appellant illegally, forcibly, unscrupulously orwith criminal intention of grabbing the Government land entered upon the Government land. Besides, pleadings of the parties, it is now well settled, are not to be construed in a pedantic manner. The Special Court took note of the c somebody then we will not have our access to our workshop. - If the land is not allotted to us the entire business of the company will be greatly affected and many families, depended will be put to great loss and hardship. In this connection we also wish to bring to your kind attention that the land was initially inhabitable and unusable being full of boulders and rocks and after spending huge sums we had made it suitable for construction purpose.

This aspects may kindly be kept in view while fixing the reasonable compensation payable by us for the said land. " \' 9'. In response thereto, the appellant was asked to withdraw his writ petition, being Writ Petition No. 5954 of 1987, so as to enable the Government to examine the issue ofregularization of the possession, subject of course, to the payment of the market value of the land. Appellant, however, did not withdraw the said vmt application. Despite the same,·the Collector allegedly made recommendations for regularization ofthe land in favour ofthe appellant, stating: "The Petitioner informed that the matter has been brought to the Supreme Court and is pending. This Office has no information with regard to the filing ofcase in the Supreme Court. However, the land is Inam land which is already vested with the Government and possession has been assumed during the year 1987.

Since the Petitioner is a purchaser of the said land (partly) and has filed undertaking to pay the prevailing Market value regularization ofthe land in Sy. No. 82 Bowenpally village can be considered subject to outcome ofthe decision ofthe Supreme court, ifany. According to basic valuation register in the above vicinity the Market value is @ Rs. 500/- to Rs. 850/- per sq. yard for the years 1991-92 and between Rs. 780/- to Rs. 1240/-per sq. yard in the year 1993. Therefore the lands in Sy. No. 15711 to an extent of2763 sq. yards and land in Sy. No. 82 of Bowenpally village to an extent of 7728 sq. yards i. e. total 10491 sq. yards or 8772 sq. mtrs. is recommended for regularization on payment of Market value@ Rs. 1240/- per sq. yard in favour of the Mis Mahalaxmi Motor Private Limited in relaxation ofban orders issued in G. O. Ms. No. 634 Revenue (Ann-III) Department dt. 2. 7. 1990. " 10. The said writ petition was disf!. 1issed by the High Court by a judgment and order dated 04. 06.

1996, holding : "As the vendor of the Petitioner have (sic) failed to get occupancy certificate in their favour, the Petitioner who is clainllng . under its vendor cannot obtain any relief in this writ petition. The writ petition therefore fails, and is accordingly dismissed. 'f REVENUE 0 FFICER (SINHA, J. ] However, the Petitioner is granted six weeks time for obtaining appropriate orders from the concerned authorities. " 11. Prayer ofthe appellant for regularization ofthe land was rejected by the State by an order dated 06. 12. 1999. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith, the appell~t filed another writ application before the Andhra Pradesh High Court, which was marked as Writ Petition No. 15 of2000. 12. During the pendency of the said proceedings, the First Respondent herein initiated a proceeding in terms of Section 8(1) ofthe Act before the Special Court, praying, inter alia, for the foflowing reliefs: "(i) Declare that the respondent is land grabber.

(ii) Evict the respondent from the application scheduled land. (iii) Award compensation ofRs. 20/- per sq. meters per month from 1985 for the wrongful possession ofthe land in question. (iv) Award cost ofthis petition. (v) Punish the respondent under sub-section (3) uf Section 4 oftct. (vi) Pass any other relief or reliefs as the Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances ofthe case. " 13. Appellant filed its written statement in the said proceeding, contending that the provisions ofthe said Act were not applicable. 14. On or about 30. 07. 2001, inter alia, on the premise that the aforementioned order dated 06. 12. 1999 was not a speaking one, while allowing the writ petition No. 15 of2000, the High Court remitted the matter to the State Government for consideration ofthe appellant's prayer for regularization afresh having regard to the recommendations ofthe Collector dated 22. 10. 1994 and that of the Commissioner dated 30. 09. 1997 within a period oftwo months.

"'> ) 15. It is not in dispute that only recently, namely, on 03. 08. 2007, the said prayer of the appellant for regularization of the land has been rejected. 16. Before the Special Court, the appellant, inter alia, raised the following contentions : "(i) The petitioner did not enter upon the land suddenly or unscrupulously but through registered sale deeds and it was not a "land grabber" as defined in Section 2(d), (e) and (i) of the Act. (ri) The sale deed clearly showed that the Petitioners were in uninterrupted possession of the land since 1985, whi. le its predecessors-in-title were in possession since 1960s. The predecessors-in-title had not been impleaded in LGC No. 7 of2000. (rii) The Petitioner's application for regularization was pending before the Government and the definitional requirement ofa "Land Grabber" had not been fulfilled.

(iv) The initial burden ofproving that the Petitioner was a Land Grabber as mandated by Section 10 ofthe Act had not been fulfilled (v) The Petitioner was a bona fide purchaser ofthe property for valuable consideration and huge amount of money has been spent to develop the land for an automobile workshop. (vi) The Respondents had not initiated proceedings against the Petitioner for over 12 years. " 17. In view ofthe pleadings ofthe parties, the Special Court framed the following issues : "(i) Whether the Applicant has title to the application schedule land? (li) Whether the rival title set up by the Respondent is true, valid and binding? (rii) Whether the Respondent is a land grabber within the meaning of the Act XII of 1982? (iv) In the event of success, whether the Applicant is entitled to the compensation as claimed? 1 MIS MAHALAXMI MOTORS LTD. v. MANDAL 975 (v) Whether any direction can be given by this Court for -i regulariz. ation in terms of G. O. Ms. No. 508 and 972?

(vi) To what relief? 18. By a judgment and order dated 11. 08. 2004, the Special Court allowed the said application ofthe First Respondent, holding : "... Thus, it is clear that the vendor ofthe respondent failed to get Occupancy Certificate ofthe application schedule property and he has no title to sell the same.. . ln Ex. B. 4 in para 7 ofthe Hon'ble High Court categorically held stating "it is not in dispute that the petitioner has purchased the land in 1985, but it was finally declared that the land belonged to the Government. " Thus, the very document relied by the respondent herein under Ex. B. 4 clearly indicates that the application schedule land is a Government land.... The very fact that he applied for regulariz. ation of the application schedule land clearly indicates that the respondent having recogniz. ed the Government as titleholder ofthe application schedule land applied for regulariz.

ation ofthe same as he occupied the land since more than 14 years and running garage... Thus, the very testimony ofPW 1clubbed with the documentary evidence Exs. Al, A2 Pahanies, A3 village Map ofBowenpally and Thokatta Villages, A. 4 rough sketch showing the application schedule land clearly establishes that the application schedule land is a Government land... But this petition is filed in the year 2000 and as his possession ofthe application schedule land is for 14 years, he is not entitled to raise the plea ofadverse possession. " The Special Court further held : "In view of our discussion on issues 1 and 2 as it was established that respondent is in possession of the application schedule land without any legal entitlement, he can be ranked as '( land grabber within the meaning ofthe Act. .. The applicant did not adduce any evidence for grant ofcompensation. There is no iota ofevidence in this regard.. . In view ofthe provisions ofthe A. P.

Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, the Special Court has no jurisdiction to give any direction to the Government, who is the -~ owner and who got title over the property for regularization ofthe land... But the learned counsel for the respondent contended that above said proceeding for regularization is pending before the Government. It is a matter between the Government and the respondent. .. As the respondent is in possession ofthe application schedule land without any legal entitlement it can be dubbed as land grabber within the meaning ofthe Act and liable for eviction and ordered accordingly. " 19. A writ petition filed thereagainst by the appellant before the Andhra Pradesh High Court, which was marked as Writ Petition No. 15920 of2004, has been dismissed by reason ofthe impugned judgment. Submissions : · 20. Mr.

Shyarn Divan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf ofthe appellant, raised the following contentions in support ofthe appeal: _ ' 1 (i) The learned Special Court as also the High Court committed a manifest error in passing the impugned judgment insofar as they failed to take into consideration that the first respondent neither pl. eaded nor proved the ingredients ofthe terms 'land grabber' and 'land grabbing' as defined in the said Act. (ii) The averment to the effect that the appellant had allegedly ~ncroached the Government Jand was not sufficient to establish the existence ofthe essential ingredients ofthe provisions of the said Act that the appellant had any intention or knowledge to take possession ofthe land in question illegally.

(iii) Appellant herein, having entered into the possession pursuant to two registered deeds of sale and having been allowed to take possession and raise constructions upon expending a large swn ofmoney, must be held to be acted bonafide being under the impression that he had a right to do so. It was, therefore, not a case where the appellant had taken possession of the land belonging to the Government, unauthorizedly, unfairly and greedily or snatched. forcibly, violently or unscrupulously the subject land or that it was a successor in interest ofany such f---- person. (iv) Factual possession alone being not only the ingredient ofthe provisions ofthe said A:ct, but intention ofthe person who is alleged to have ·grabbed the land being imperative, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.

(v) The Special Court having not determined the second ingredient of'Land Grabbing', namely, the intention ofthe person who is alleged to have grabbed the land, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. (vi) The application for regularization ofthe land in question having been pending before the State Government, no application under Section 8 ofthe Act was maintainable. (vii) Only because the appellant had filed an application for regulariz. ation ofthe said land, the same by itselfcould not be a ground to arrive at a finding that it had an intention to grab J::) the said land as far back as in the year 1985. (viii)Despite the order dated 30. 07. 2001, passed by a learned Single Judge ofthe Andhra Pradesh High Court in W. P (Civil) No. 15 of 2000 directing the State Government to pass a speaking order on the appellant's application for regulariz.

ation in the light ofthe recommendations made by the Collector as also the Commissioner, the State Government having failed to do so, the learned Special Judge should not have adjudicated upon the issue of 'land grabbing' in the said proceeding. 21. Mr. Gopal Subramanium, learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing on behalfofthe respondents, on the other hand, submitted : 0) The provisions of the Act must be read harmoniously and so read, it would be evident that the purported second element ( of the definition would only mean that a person had taken possession ofthe land without any lawful entitlement. (ii) Intention to illegally occupy the land in question cannot be the sine qua non for determining the meaning ofthe term "land grabbing" under the Act, as has been contended on behalfof I /~\ the appellant in this case, inasmuch once a person comes to know that his predecessor in interest had no title to the land in question, his possession would become illegal.

(iii) The contention ofthe appellant that during the pendency of regulariz. ation proceeding, the State should not have initiated the proceeding before the Special Court, cannot be accepted as: (a) Firstly, the responsibility to check its vendor's title was on the Petitioner. The doctrine of constructive notice would also operate against the Petitioner. If it failed to discharge its responsibility, the Petitioner cannot claim to have acted without an intention to illegally occupy State property. (b) Any other interpretation would comple~ely frustrate the Act itself It would effectively mean that as long as the land grabber is able to sell the larid to a third party, no one can be proceeded against under the Act. Such an interpretation must be avoided. (c) In any event, the fact is that Petitioner was aware in 1987 that it was illegally occupying State property. From that time onwards, its intention to continue to occupy the property is clear.

And the Respondents only commenced these proceedings in 2000, when it was clear that the Petitioner had no intention of vacating the land and handing over the same to its rightful owner, the State. This is precisely the evil the Act aims to tackle. (d) There is no provision in the Act that enables the Special Court to direct the State to regularize an illegal occupancy. That is not the function of the Special Court. As the Special Court pointed out, ifthe Petitioner has a grievance in that regard, he should approach the appropriate forum. This cannot be used as a defence in land grabbing proceedings. Statutory provisions : 22. The said Act was enacted to prohibit the activity ofland grabbing M/S MAHALAXMI MOTORS LTD. v. MANDAL 979 in the State of Andhra Pradesh and to provide for matters incidental thereto and connected therewith. 23.

Clauses (c), (d) and (e) of Section 2 ofthe Act define "land", "land grabber" and "land grabbing" respectively in the following terms : "(c) "land" includes rights in or over land, benefits to arise out of land and buildings, structures and other things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth;" "(d) "land grabber" means a person or a group of persons who commits land grabbing and includes any person who gives financial aid to any person for taking illegal possession oflands or for construction ofunauthorized structures thereon, or who collects or attempts to collect from any occupiers ofsuch lands rent, compensation and other charges by criminal intimidation, or abets the doing of any of the above mentioned acts; and also includes the successors in interest.

" "(e) "land grabbing" means every activity ofgrabbing ofany land (whether belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment, including a wakf, or any other private person) by a person or group of persons, without any lawful entitlement and with a view to illegally taking possession ofsuch lands, or enter into or create illegal tenancies or lease and licences agreement or any other illegal agreements in respect of such lands, or to construct unauthorized structures thereon for sale or hire, or give such lands to any person on rental or lease and licence basis for construction, or use and occupation, ofunauthorized structures; and the term "to grab land" shall be construed accordingly. " Section 3 of the Act provides for land grabbing to be unlawful in the following terms : "3.

Land Grabbing to be unlawful:- Land grabbing in any form is hereby declared unlawful; and any activity connected with or arising ~\ out oflandgrabbing shall be an offence punishable under this Act. " Section 4 ofthe Act provides for prohibition ofland grabbing in the following terms : "4. Prohibition ofland grabbing:- (1)_No person shall commit or cause to be committed land grabbing. (2) Any person who, on or after the commencement of this Act, continues to be in occupation, other\vise than as a lawful tenant, of a grabbed land belonging to the Government, local authority, religious or charitable institution or endowment including a wakf, or other private person, shall be guilty ofan offence under this Act. (3) Whoever contravenes the provisions ofsub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to five years, and with fine :which may extend to five thousand rupees.

" Section 7 provides for constitution ofspecial courts, relevant portion whereof, insofar as the same is relevant for the present discussions, is reproduced as under : "7. Constitution ofSpecial Courts . -(1) The Government may, for the purpose ofproviding speedy enquiry into any alleged act ofland grabbing, and trial ofcases in respect ofthe ownership and title to, or lawful possession of, the land grabbed, by notificati. on, constitute a Special Court. - *** *** *** (5-D)( i) Notwithstanding anything in the Code ofCivil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) the Special Court may follow its own procedure which shall not be inconsistent with the principles ofnatural justice and fair play and subject to the other provisions ofthis Act and of any rules made thereunder while deciding the civil liability. " Section 8 of the Act provides for procedures and powers of the I 1- ( M/SMAHALAXMIMOTORSLTD. v.

MANDAL 981 --i Special Courts, relevant portion whereof, insofar as the same is relevant for the purpose of the present case, reads as under : "8. Procedure and powers of the Special Courts. -(1) The Special Court may, either suo motu or on application made by any person, officer or authority take cogniz. ance ofand try every case arising out ofany alleged act of land grabbing or with respect to the ownership and title to, or lawful possession of, the land grabbed, whether before or after the commencement ofthis Act, and pass such orders (including orders by way ofinterim directions) as it deems fit; (1-A) The Special Court shall, for the purpose of taking cogniz. ance ofthe case, consider the location, or extent or value of the land alleged to have been grabbed or of the substantial nature ofthe evil involved or in the interest ofjustice required or any other relevant matter: Provided that the Special Court shall not take cogniz.

ance of any such case without hearing the petitioner; (2) Notwithstanding anything in the Code ofCivil Procedure, 1908 the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or in the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972, any case in respect ofan alleged act of land grabbing or the determination ofquestion oftitle and ownership to, or lawful possession ofany land grabbed under this ~- Act, shall be triable only in a Special Court constituted for the area in which the land grabbed is situated; and the decision of the Special Court shall be final. *** *** *** (2-C) The Special Court shall determine the order in which the civil and criminal liability against a land grabber be initiated. It shall be within the discretion of the Special Court whether or not to deliver its decision or order until both civil and criminal proceedings are completed. The evidence admitted during the criminal proceeding may be made use ofwhile trying the civil liability.

But additional evidence, ifany, adduced in the civil proceedings shall .. ~· \ not be considered by the Special Court while determining the criminal liability. Any person accused of land grabbing or the abetment thereofbefore the Special Court shall be a competent witness for the defence and may give evidence on oath in disproof ofthe charge made against him or any person charged together with him in the criminal proceeding: Provided that he shall not be called as a witness except on his own request in writing or his failure to give evidence shall be made the subject of any comment by any of the parties or the Special Court or give rise to any presumption against himselfor any person charged together with him at the same proceeding.

*** *** *** (6) Every finding of the Special Court with regard to any alleged act of land grabbing shall be conclusive proofofthe fact of land grabbing and of the persons who committed such land grabbing, and every judgment of the Special Court with regard to the determination oftitle and ownership to, or lawful possession of, any land grabbed shall be binding on all pers0ns having interest in such land. " Section 15 provides for Act's overriding effect over other laws. Section 17-B ofthe Act provides for the guidelines for interpretation· ofthe Act in the following terms : . -J "17-B. Guidelines for interpretation ofAct:- The Schedule shall constitute the guidelines for the interpretation and implementation ofthis Act. " Precedents : 24. Interpretation ofthe provisions ofthe said Act and in particular the definitions of "land grabber" and "land grabbing" came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Konda Lakshmana Bapuji v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.

, (2002] 3 sec 258]. I f f We would examine the said decision in a bit detail. In that case the Special Court opined that the occupation ofthe land in dispute claimed by the appellant therein was without any lawful entitlement. It also decided the question of ownership and title to lawful possession of the land in dispute on appreciating the evidence on record. It was held that the land in dispute is not a part oflnam. A finding offact was recorded in regard to absence oflawful entitlement ofthe appellant to the land and upholding the title of the respondent that the land in question was a Government land. A writ petition was filed thereagainst which was dismissed.

This Court while considering the appeal preferred by the land grabber, inter alia, held: (i) The Special Tribunal has only civil jurisdiction and the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the proceedings before it, whereas the Special Court has both the Civil as well as criminal jurisdiction to which the provisions ofboth the Code ofCivil Procedure and Code ofCriminal Procedure would apply. (ii) The Special Court exercises both the original and appellate jurisdictions as well as court of sessions for all practical purposes. (iii) A mere allegation ofland grabbing is sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction ofthe Special Court. (iv) The Civil Court's jurisdil:tion is ousted and the Act, which is a special law, would prevail and as such the Special Court has jurisdiction in respect ofthe matter dealt with thereunder.

(v) In terms of Section 10 of the Act, the burden of proof is on the person who alleges tl1at the land has not been grabbed by him (vi) The provisions of the Act not only deals with an action of . _, wrong but also an offence. The definitions contained in Section 2(d) and 2(e) are required to be construed strictly. 25. In Kanda Lakshmana Bapuji (supra), this Court interpreting the expression "land grabbing" observed : "31.

Clause (e) ofSection 2, quoted above, defines the expression \ "land grabbing" to mean: (1) every activity ofgrabbing ofany land (whether belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment, including a wakf, or any other private person) by a person or group ofpersons; (2) such grabbing must be: (i) without any lawful entitlement, and (ii) with a view to: (a) illegally taking possession ofsuch lands; or (b) to enter into or create illegal tenancies, lease and licence agreements or any other illegal agreements in respect ofsuch lands; or (c) to construct unauthorised structures thereon for sale or hire; or (d) to give such lands to any person on (i) rental, or (ii) lease and licence basis for construction, or (iii) use and occupation ofunauthorised structures. " It was observed : "37. The various meanings noted above, disclose that the term "grab" has a broad meaning- to take unauthorisedly, greedily or unfa.

lrly - and a narrow meaningufsnatching forcibly or violently or by unscrupulous means. Having regard to the object ofthe Act and the various provisions employing that term we are ofthe view that the term "grab" is used in the Act in both its narrow as well as broad meanings. Thus understood, the ingredients of the expression "land grabbing" would comprise (i) the factum ofan activity of taking possession of any land forcibly, violently, unscrupulously, unfairly or greedily without any lawful entitlement, and (ii) the mens rea/intention - "with the intention of7with a view to" (a) illegally taking possession ofsuch lands, or (b) enter into . -i, or create illegal tenancies, lease and licence agreements or any other illegal agreements in respect ofsuch lands, or (c) to construct unauthorised structures thereon for sale or hire, or (d) to give such lands to any person on (i) rental, or (ii) lease and licence basis for construction, or (iii) use and occupation ofunauthorised structures.

38. A combined reading ofclauses ( d) and ( e) would suggest that to bring a person within the meaning ofthe expression "land grabber" it must be shown that: ( i )( a) he has taken unauthorisedly, unfairly, greedily, snatched forcibly, violently or unscrupulously any land belonging to the Government or a local authority, a religious I-I or charitable institution or endowment, including a wakf, or any other private person; (b) without any lawful entitlement; and (c) 1 with a view to illegally taking possession of such lands?

or enter or create illegal tenancies or lease and licence agreements or any other illegal agreements in respect of such lands or to construct unauthorised structures thereon for sale or hire, or give such lands to any person on rental or lease and licence basis for construction, or use and occupation of unauthorised structures; or (ii) he has given financial aid to any person for taking illegal possession of lands or for construction ofunauthorised structures thereon; or (iii) he is collecting or attempting to collect from any occupiers ofsuch lands rent, compensation and other charges by criminal intimidation; or (iv) he is abetting the doing ofany ofthe abovementioned acts; or (v) that he is the successor-in-interest ofany such persons. " It was further observed : "... A mere prima facie bonafide claim to the land alleged to be grabbed by such a person, cannot avert being roped in within the ambit ofthe expression "land grabber".

What is germane is lawful entitlement to and not a mere prima facie bonafide claim to the 1 and alleged to be grabbed... xxx xxx xxx 70. The requisite intention which is an important ingredient ofthe land grabber, though not stated specifically, can be inferred by necessary implication from the averments in the petition and the plaint and the deposition ofwitness like any other fact. Ifa person comes into occupation ofany government land under the guise of a perpetual lease executed by an unauthorised person having no title to or interest in the land it cannot but be with aview to illegally taking possession of such land. We make it clearthat we are expressing no opinion on the point whether those averments would constitute "mens rea" for purposes ofoffence under the Act. " 26.

We would consider the application ofthe aforementioned JegaJ · principles enumerated by this Court to the fact ofthe present case, little later; but before doing so, we may notice some other decisions, which have been cited at the Bar. 27. In Gouni Satya Reddi v. Government ofAndhra Pradesh and Ors. , [2004] 7 SCC 398, a two-Judge Bench of this Court held: "10. From a reading ofthe definitions ofthe phrases "land grabber" and "land grabbing" it is clear that the grabbing ofany land must be without any lawful entitlement and with a view to take possession ofsuch lands illegally. That is to say, the land grabber must be aware of the fact that he is entering into the possession illegally and without any lawful entitlement. Ifsuch elements as indicated above are missing in our view, it would not be a case of land grabbing. " It was further held : "13.

The first thing to be noted is that the case ofRespondent 3 as sought to be made out in the petition as quoted in the earlier part of this judgment was that the appellant had created false documents by creating the false power of attorney in favour of Prabhakara Rao and got the sale deed registered in his favour and that the sale deed was also false. But we don't find any such finding having been recorded by the Special Court saying that the appellant had created the false document by creating the false power of attorney. In absence ofany such finding it may be examined as to what extent taking over of possession by the appellant without lawful entitlement was " with a view to take possession illegally ". Mere fact ofnot being lawfully entitled to enter into possession by itself would not lead to the inference of land grabbing unless possession is illegally taken with that view in mind. It is a necessary ingredient of land grabbing i. e.

the person taking possession must know it that he is acting illegally while taking possession. " It was observed : "... The provisions ofthe Act would not cover such cases, unless coupled with the fact ofnot being entitled to possession the person enters into possession with a view to obtain illegal possession . I Where such view oftaking illegal possession is missing or lacking, a person would not be covered under the definition ofthe phrase , or expression "land grabber". The facts, to indicate such intention, though have been pleaded, as indicated earlier, but no such finding has been recorded. The mere fact of legally not entitled to the possession would not fulfil the ingredients ofthe definitions of"land · grabber" and "land grabbing"... " 28. However, recently in A. P. Housing Board v. Mohammad Sadatullah & Ors. , (2007) 5 SCALE 681, a Division Bench of this Court opined that the plea ofadverse possession cannot be gone into in a proceeding under the said Act, stating : "41.

In this connection, reference was made to a recent decision ofthis Court in N Srinivasa Rao v. Special Court under the A. P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act and Ors. , [2006] 4 SCC 214. A two Judge Bench of this Court in the above case held that the Special Court constituted under the Act has no jurisdiction to decide question as to acquisition oftitle by adverse possession in a proceeding under the Act as the same would fall within the domain ofCivil Court. " 29. In State ofA. P. v. Smt. Pramela Modi and Ors. , (2006) 11 SCALE 38, a Division Bench ofthis Court held: "28. It is thus seen that the Special Court can play the role of a Civil Court and decide the disputed question of title and possession. The extent ofjurisdiction as is permitted by the statute, therefore, is rather wide in its application.

Three specific situations have been noted namely, (i) Jurisdiction can be had in regard to a case in respect of an alleged act of land grabbing (ii) Jurisdiction can be had in a case where determination of question oftitle and ownership are involved and (iii) Jurisdiction can be had where lawful possession ofany land grabbed under the Act is involved. All these three specific situations as envisaged by and under the Statute would be triable in the Special Court. The condition precedent for assuming jurisdiction by the Special Court is that the case must have arisen out ofany alleged act ofland grabbing and a District Judge while acting as a Special Court merely acts as a Presiding Officer ofthe Court. Having regard to the provisions of Section 8(2) read with Section 15 ofthe Act, no suit for title in respect ofthe disputed land which was alleged to be grabbed by the party could be entertained by the Civil Court.

In other words, the Civil Court is barred from trying the matters which fall within the exclusivejurisdiction ofthe Special Court constituted under the Act. " Application oflaw : 30. We are bound by the decision ofthe larger Bench in this case. The Special Court exercises a jurisdiction ofthe Civil Court, provisions ofthe Code ofCivil Procedure being applicable. Ifit is a Civil Court, all questions relating to title and possession can be gone into. The proceeding can be initiated in terms of Section 4 ofthe said Act against a person who continues to be in occupation, otherwise than as a lawful tenant, of grabbed land belonging to the Government, local authority, religious or charitable institution or endowment including a wakf, or any private person. Ifand when a proceeding is initiated under the said Act, the proceedee not only can raise a jurisdictional questions but can also raise questions relating to his title and possession.

It is, therefore, difficult to comprehend as to how the Special Court would be debarred from determining the questions raised by the parties thereto. The question as to whether the land grabber had grabbed the land which is a Government land or not ordinarily is required to be determined as on the date of filing of the application. Pendency ofan application for regularization ofthe land, therefore, y· in our opinion, would not stand in the way of the State to initiate a proceeding under the Act. It is one thing to say that the question in regard to regularization ofa portion of t11e land in question was pending before the Government in terms ofthe directions issued by the learned Single Judge ofthe Andhra Pradesh High Court, but it is another thing to say , REVENUE 0 FFICER [SINHA, J. ] that the Special Court had no jurisdiction to continue the proceeding, which is otherwise validly initiated only because pendency of such an application.

Ifand when the prayer ofthe land grabber for regularization of the land is allowed, he would become entitled thereto. We may, however, hasten to add that we are assuming that the State had the requisite jurisdiction to direct such regularization. 31. Lawful entitlement on the part of a party to possess the land being the determinative factor, it is axiomatic that so long as the land grabber would not be able to show his legal entitlement to hold the land, the jurisdiction of the Special Court cannot be held to be ousted. 32. The Act is a self-contained Code. In view ofits power as also applicability ofthe provisions ofthe Civil Procedure Code, the tribunal can in a given case even entertain counter claims [See Union ofIndia v. Tata Teleservices (Maharashtra) Ltd. , JT (2007) 10 SC 356]. 33. The Tribunal being possessed ofextensive jurisdiction, subject ofcourse to fulfillment of the conditions precedent, for initiation of the proceeding, was entitled to go into all issues.

We have furthermore to bear in mind that the definition of 'land grabber' is not only restricted to the party to the proceeding, but also includes his predecessor in interest. Once the land is held to be a Government land, the logical corollary thereto . would be that subject to the law oflimitation and prescription, the State would not lose the said right to the opposite party. >· 34. It may be true that absence oflawful entitlement by itselfmay not be sufficient to pass a judgment and decree in favour of the State · and against the land grabber, but also it must be shown that he had taken illegal possession thereof 35. The Bench in Konda Lakshmana Bapuji (supra) has applied both the broader and narrow meanings ofthe said expression. It would 1 not, however, mean that all the tests laid down therein are required to be satisfied to their letter and spirit. What is necessary to be proved is the substance ofthe allegation.

The proofofintention on the part ofa persons being his state ofmind, the ingredients ofthe provisions must be considered keeping in view the materials on records as also circumstances attending thereto. What would be germane for lawful entitlement to remain in ·,. _ possession would be that if the proceedee proves that he had bona fide claim over the land, in which event, it would be for him to establish the same. 36. In Konda Lakshmana Bapuji (supra), this Court has categorically held that the requisite intension can be inferred by necessary implication from the averments made in the petition, the written statement and the depositions ofwitnesses, like any other fact. The question which '( must, therefore, have to be posed and answered having regard to the claim of the land grabber would be that, if on the face of his claim it would appear'that he not only had no title, but claimed his possession only on the basis thereof, the same must be held to be illegal.

The question in regard to lawful entitlement ofthe proceedee, therefore, for invoking the charging section plays an important and significant role. 37. We would like to add that the person's purported belief that he is legally entitled to hold the land and his possession is not otherwise illegal must also be judged not only from the point oftime when he entered into the possession or when he had acquired the purported title but also from the point of view as to whether by reason of determination of such a question by a competent court oflaw, he has been found to have no title and consequently continuance of his possession becomes illegal.

Ifthe proceedee against whom a proceeding has been initiated under the provisions of the said Act is entitled to raise the question of adverse possession, which being based on knowledge of a lawful title and declaration ofthe hostile title on the part ofthe person in possession, there does not appear to be any reason as to why knowledge ofdefect in his title and consequently his possession becoming unlawful to his own knowledge would not come within the purview ofthe term 'land grabbing' as contained in Section 2(e) ofthe Act. The provisions ofthe Act must be construed so as to enable the tribunal to give effect thereto. It cannot be construed in a pedantic manner which iftaken to its logical corollary would make the provisions wholly unworkable.

Only because a person has entered into possession ofa land on the basis ofa purported registered sale deed, the same by itself, in our considered opinion, would not be sufficient to come to the conclusion that he had not entered over the land REVENUE 0 FFICER [SINHA, J. ] unauthorisedly, unfairly, or greedily. A' 38. For determination of such an issue, the Special Court will be entitled to take into consideration not only the rival claims ofthe parties, but also the earlier round of litigation, ifany, and subsequent conduct of the proceedee himself. Determination : 39. The predecessor in interest ofthe appellant, Ramender Reddy, was claiming the said land as ifit was a grant by way oflnam. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in W. P. No. 8734of1983 categorically came to the finding that the land in question had vested in the State ofAndhra Pradesh and Ramender Reddy was not entitled even to grant of an occupancy certificate. Ra. mender Reddy had, therefore, no title over the land.

It was · obligatory on the part of the appellant keeping in view the doctrine of caveat emptor to examine the title ofthe vendor over the land, it purchased. Within a period of two years from the date of purchase, the appellant D became aware that it had acquired no title thereto and it had illegally been occupying the land, as the same belonged to the Governinent and, thus, the latter was entitled to possess the same. Apart therefrom, the appellant was put to notice that it was an encroacher. Admittedly, it had been served with a notice under the Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act. The writ petition filed by it again was dismissed. Observations made therein by the learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh that its application for regularization may be disposed ofin the manner specified therein did not and could not have clothed the appellant with a legal entitlement thereto. 40.

It is one thing to say that by reason of the direction by the High Court, its application for regularization of the land was liable to be considered but it is another thing to say that its possession thereto became , lawful or otherwise it became legally entitled to possess the land. Right to possess the land must be referable to the title of the land not to mere entitlement ofits application for regularization to be considered. 41. So far as the pleadings in the application under Section 8 ofthe , Act is concerned, suffice it to say that the same was filed in a prescribed form. There does not exist any column where the requisite pleadings by }-way offulfilling the second part ofthe ingredients ofland grabbing could be pleaded. With the said application, a concise statement was annexed. The said concise statement, therefore, became a part ofthe application.

It has categorically been stated therein that the appellant without having any right or title illegally encroached upon the Government land. The history of litigation had also been specifically stated therein, which is to the following effect : (- "4. It is submitted that the Respondent Company previously known as M/s Mahalaxmi Motors Pvt. Limited changed its name as Jublee Honda Motors. The land encroached by the respondent is surveyed by the Mandal Revenue Officer through Mandal Surveyor and found that the respondent not only encroached 6946 sq. mtrs. (Amended as per orders passed in I. A. No. 94of2003 dated 13. 06. 2003) of Government land in Sy. No. 82 of Bowenpally, but also encroached an extent of 842 sq. mtrs. + (Amended as per orders passed in I. A. No. 94 of 2003 dated 13. 06. 2003) Government lands in Sy. No. 157/1 of Thokatta . Village as shown in the sketch.

The Respondent illegally encroached the application scheduled property and 'construed sheds and running Mechanical workshop for vehicles. The company constructed workshop and compound wall of an extent of 6946 Sq. Mts. (Amended as per orders passed in I. A. No. 94 of. 2003 dated 13. 06. 2003) in Sy. No. 82/p ofBowenpally and an extent of842 Sq. Mtrs. (Amended as per orders passed in I. A. No. 94 of2003 dated 13. 06. ,2003) in Sy. No. 157/lP ofThokatta Village. The 'application schedule land is valuable land abutting Highway and it is required for public purpose. The cause ofaction arose when the Manda! Revenue Officer has issued notice on 27. /4. 87 to the Respondent under Andhra y Pradesh Land Encroachment Act and noticed that the Respondent illegally encroached the Government land.

It is submitted that the Application Scheduled land situated abutting to the Hashamathpet Road which is a link road between two National High Ways running from Hyderabad to Karimnagar M/S MAHALAXMIMOTORS LTD. v. MANDAL 993 and Nizamabad, and it is very valuable property and is required A for public purpose. Tue market value ofthe land is Rs. 5000/- per Sq. Mts. Tue Respondent wrongfully using the Government land for Commercial purpose from 1985 and the Respondent is liable to pay a sum of Rs. 20/- Sq. Mts. Per month from 1985 till the date ofdisposal ofthe LGC as means profits/compensation to the Govememnt. " 42. Thus, not only the history of litigation but also area of encroachment was stated. A sketch map showing the same was annexed thereto. The fact that the appellant had made constructions illegally and had been running a workshop was specifically pleaded. One ofthe reliefs prayed for therein, inter alia, was to declare that the appellant was a land grabber.

It is, therefore, not a case where it can be said that the respondent failed to plead the requisite ingredients ofthe definition ofthe term 'land grabbing'. 43. We have noticed hereinbefore the findings ofthe learned Special Court. The Special Court took note ofthe aforementioned contentions ofthe parties hereto and arrived at a definite finding, having regard to the history ofthe litigation between the parties, that the appellant was a land grabber. 44. The application filed by the appellant before the State Government for regularization of the land although may not be determinative ofthe issue as to whether it is a land grabber or not could be taken into consideration for a limited purpose, namely, admission or acknowledgement on its part in regard to the title of the State.

It was possible for the appellant to file an application for regularization ofland without prejudice to its rights and contentions in the pending proceedings, but having regard to the decisions rendered by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in two writ petitions, it would be fair to presume that the appellant filed the said application knowing fully well as to where it stood. Once it had taken a specified stand knowing fully well that it had no right, title and interest in or over the land in question, it cannot in law turn round and contend that the same was not binding on it. Doctrine ofestoppel in a situation ofthis nature, in our opinion, would squarely apply. An abstract beliefon the part of the appellant that its vendor had a marketable title • -~ and it was getting a good title to the land is not decisive.

Whether any }-action was taken by the authorities ofthe State in regard to the possession ofRamender Reddy or the appellant, in our opinion, is wholly irrelevant inasmuch Ramender Reddy and consequently the appellant had no title over the property nor acquired any title by prescription. Law does not contemplate any vacuum in the title. Either the State had the title or the appellant and its predecessor. 45. Submission ofMr. Dewan that it was obligatory on the part of '(the First Respondent to make averments that the appellant illegally, forcibly, unscrupulously or with criminal intention ofgrabbing the Government land entered upon the Government land, in our opinion, in the fact situation obtaining herein, was not necessary. Pleadings of the parties, it is now well-settled are not to be construed in a pedantic manner. [See Des Raj and Ors. v. Bhagat Ram (Dead) by Lrs. & Ors. , (2007) 3 SCALE 371] 46.

An averment that the appellant had been in unlawful possession itselfis sufficient to invoke the provisions ofthe said Act in view ofthe + decision ofthis Court in Konda Lakshmana Bapuji (supra). Keeping in view the fact that the appellant or the Ra. mender Reddy had no title and consequently he could not acquire any title, all other contentions raised on its behalf, in our opinion, pales into insignificance. The fact ofthe matter squarely covers the ingredients of Section 2(e) ofthe Act as interpreted by this Court in Kondo Lakshniana Bapuji (supra). 47. Submission of the learned counsel that even an order dated ~ 03. 08. 2007 is not a speaking order cannot be considered in this application. However, from a perusal ofthe said order, it is evident that therein all relevant circumstances have been taken into consideration. Recommendations made by the Collector or the Commissioner for regularization ofthe land are not binding on the State. 48.

We, therefore, are of the opinion that no case has been made y out for interference with the impugned judgment. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand only). RP. Appeal dismissed.