M-S. STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. v. S.U.T.N.I. SANGAM & ORS

Citation: [2009] 12 S.C.R. 929

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: S.B. SINHA, CYRIAC JOSEPH

Case summary

M-S. STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. v. S.U.T.N.I. SANGAM & ORS.pdf

Judgment text

·. [2009] 12 S. C. R. 929 MIS. STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. -\ v. S. U. T. N. I. SANGAM & ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 3874 of 2006 etc. ) JULY 29, 2009 [S. B. SINHA AND CYRIAC JOSEPH, JJ. ] Land Acquisition Act, 1894: ss. 18, 31 second proviso and 50 (2) - Acquisition ofland - Compensation - Acceptance of, with and without protest by different awardees - Reference for enhancement . of compensation amount - Reference courl allowing the case of the awardees who received the amount under protest - "' Rejection of reference of the awardees who accepted the . amount without protest and of those whose reference was filed -I beyond statutory period - Writ petition by the Association of land-holders - High Court directing the authorities to complete process of reference - On appeal, held: The awardees, who received compensation without any protest not entitled to referencf! - An objection in response to a notice u/s. 9, cannot have the same effect as if an application has been filed u/s.

18 - When statute provides for limitation, compliance thereof is mandatory - It was not permissible to direct reference to the awardees whose applications were belated - Limitation Act, 1963 - s. 5. Acquisition of land - Reference made on the direction of High Courl - State and the parly for whom land was acquired, not raising any objection in the reference proceedings - Held: Are estopped from challenging the reference. Interpretation of Statutes - As statute must be read as a whole - If the principles of interpretation of statutes resorled to by the court leads to a fair reading of the provision, it would fulfill the conditions of applying the principles of purposive construction. Doctrines/Principles: Principles of purposive construction - Applicability of. Statute prescribing a thing to b°e done in a particular manner - Is applicable to the statutory authority alone. ,.

Land acquisition proceedings were initiated on the requisitions of appellant-Authority and appellant-Housing Board. In respect of land acquisition for the Auth,ority, some of the land-holders had accepted the compensation amount without protest and some accepted it with protest. Applications u/s. 18 of Land 0 Acquisition Act were filed for reference to Land - Acquisition Court. Reference court granted enhanced compensation for the awardees who had accepted the same under protest. Reference court rejected the reference applications of those, who had accepted the amount without protest. Some awardees filed reference application after the expiry of limitation period prescribed therefor. Their applications were also dismissed by reference court. Some land-owners formed an Association for protection of their legal rights. Association filed writ petition and the same was allowed by High Court directing the authorities concerned to complete the process of reference.

Intra-court appeals were also dismissed. Hence the present appeals. In respect of the case of acquisition for Housing Board, the land owner, at the time of fixation of market value of the acquired land made a statement expressing his dissatisfaction over the quantum of compensation. He also stated that he would receive the amount under protest. No reference was made by the Collector suo- SANGAM & ORS. motu. Representations were made for reference. Pursuant to filing of writ petition seeking reference, State made reference of some-cases which was not questioned by the appellant-Board. Representations for making reference for rest of the cases was rejected on the ground ( of limitation. Another writ petition seeking direction for s reference was allowed by High Court. State did not raise any objection with regard to the maintainability of order of reference. Reference court enhanced the amount of compensation. Appeals by the appellant-Board were dismissed.

The judgment was further upheld in intracourt appeal. Hence the present appeals. Allowing the appeals filed by appellant-Authority and dismissing the appeals filed by appellant-Board, this Court, HELD: 1. 1. The provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 must be read in their entirety. A holistic approach is required to be made for the purpose of interpretation of application of the provisions of the Act and so given, the provisions thereof meet the tests of Article 300A of the Constitution of India. The Act provides for a fair · procedure. The Parliament in its wisdom is entitled to lay down conditions for application of other or further relief. While it does so, it is entitled to lay down a procedure therefor in its respect. Such a procedure although meets the tests of fairness and reasonableness for the purpose of determining the constitutionality thereof, ordinarily, the mode and manner in which the provisions are required to be applied should be adhered to. The same shall, .

however, be subject to the interpretation of the statute as to whether the procedures laid down therein would be treated to be mandatory or directory. From the scheme of the Act, the mode and manner in which the amount of compensation is required to be determined is in several phases, i. e. , notice to the persons interested, making of an award, the period for doing so and publication of the award itself. [Para 40] [954-D-H; 955-A-C] 1. 2. Section 18 of the Act is required to be read with the provisos appended to Section 31 of the Act. The person interested may question the correctness or legality of the award on one or the other grounds specified in Section 18 of the Act. He, even, for the purpose of payment of the amount of compensation and/ or acceptance thereto, would be governed by the provisos appended to Section 31 of the Act. Section 31 of the Act, however, enables the person interested to accept the award under protest.

Acceptance of such an award under protest, however, is circumscribed by the· conditions laid down in the provisos appended both to ... Sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Act as also Subsection (2) of Section 31 thereof. The said provisos, . , therefore, circumscribe the rights of the persons interested. The right to receive compensation, thus, having been circumscribed by the conditions attached, ordinarily, they should be held to be imperative in character. [Paras 45 and 46] 1. 3. The law does not contemplate that even before an award is made, a general or vague objection can be entertained by the Collector. Objection to the award, therefore, must be specific. When a reference is made, the court shall ordinarily be bound by the terms of the reference. The Reference Court does not have a plenary jurisdiction. It does not have any original jurisdiction to entertain an application directly from the Collector or from the land holders. [Para 44] [955-H; 956-A-B] J. 1. 4.

When the statute provides for a law of limitation, compliance thereof is mandatory. For the purpose of applying the statute of limitation, the courts should, however, be liberal in their approach. Section 18 (2) (b) of the Act provides for the maximum period of six months SANGAM & ORS. from the date of the Collector's award. It was, therefore, impermissible to direct references to be made after a long period particularly when the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be said to have any application. [Paras 4. 7 and 48] [956-G-H; 957-A-B] Officer on Special Duty (La~d Acquisition) 'and Anr. v. Shah Manila/Chandulal and Ors. 1996 (9) SCC 414; State of Kamataka v. Laxuman 2005 (8) SCC 709, relied on. Mirza Majid Hussain v. State of M. P. and Anr. (1995) 2 sec 422, referred to. · 1. 5. The expression "person interested" for the purpose of Section 18 of the Act may be given a restricted meaning. A State is not a person interested.

A company or a local authority for whose ,benefit the lands are [) ~ acquired, having regard to the provisions,of S~~-section (2) of Section 50 of the Act, is not entitled to file any application for reference. [Para 55] [961-A-B] ' 1. 6. The Association, tl)erefore, could file a writ application representing its members but, stricto sensu, it ·could not have filed any application for reference in terms of Section 18 of the Act. For the purpose of making such an application, indisputably, the period of limitation provided for therein must be resorted to. However, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that a statute of limitation should receive strict construction. [Para 57] [961-D-E] Kamataka State Road Transport Corporation v. KSRTC Staff andWorkers' Federation and Anr. (1999) 2 SCC 687, relied on. J 1. 7. In a land acquisition matter, the question of body of the persons being represented by Association does not arise.

The statute provides for filing of claim applications as also filing of objections by the land holders and not by and/or on behalf of the Association and that too an independent body corporate. [Para 59) [962-G] 1. 8. An owner of a land has a right to receive just compensation. He, having regard to his human right of access to justice as has been declared by the ICESCR on December 10, 2008 should be given an opportunity to make a reference. A person may get an opportunity to get a reference only when he is informed about the making of an award. [Para 60) [962-H; 963-A] 1. 9. Constructive knowledge would also subserve the purpose of the Act. Whether a person had the actual or constructive knowledge of the contents of a document is essentially a question of fact. The onus would be on .. the landholder to show that he did not have any knowledge of the contents of the award. In a case where communication gives rise to a cause of action, the same must be held to be mandatory in nature.

[Para 66 and 67) [964-G-H; 965-A] Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land AcquisitionOfficer and Anr. (1962) 1 SCR 676; State of Punjab v. Mst. QaisarJehan Begum and Anr. (1964) 1 SCR 971, relied on. State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika AIR 1966 SC 1313; State ofPunjab v. Khemi Ram (1969) 3 SCC 28; Land Acquisition officer v. Shivabai and Ors. (1997) 9 SCC 710; Parsottambhai MaganbhaiPatel and Ors. v. State of Gujarat Through Dy. Collector Modasaand Anr. (2005) 7 SCC 431, referred to. 1. 10. The State issued a notification directing the Collector to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 18 of the Act. Such a notification, therefore, would amount to SANGAM & ORS. a constructive knowledge. It was obligatory on the part of the land owners to file an appropriate application within the prescribed period. [Para 71] [966-D-E] 1. 11.

The State, however, clarified the said notification stating that its earlier notification would not mean that the statutory period of limitation provided for under the Act should be given a complete go-by. [Para 72] [966-E-F] 1. 12. Pursuant to or in furtherance of the notification of the State of Tamil Nadu issued in the year 1981, no reference was made as the awards were made principally during the period 1972 to 1974. [Para 73] [966-F-G] 1. 13. Those who received compensation without any protest keeping in view the second proviso appended to 0 Section 31, it must be held that they have expressed no reservation in regard thereto whatsoever. [Para 76] [967- D-E] 1. 14. 0bjections, however, appeared to have been filed in printed forms contending that all awards should be subject to objections and payments would be received on protest. Raising of such an objection in response to a notice u/s.

9 of the Act, cannot have the same effect as if an application has been filed for reference u/s. 18 of the Act. [Para 77] [967-E-F] 1. 15. A statute must be read as a whole and then chapter by chapter, Section by Section, and then word by word. For the said purpose, the Scheme of the Act must be noticed. If the principle of interpretation of statutes resorted to by the court leads to a fair reading J of the provision, the same would fulfil the conditions of applying the principles of purposive construction. [Para 79] [968-A-B] New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia (2008) 3 SCC279; Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Cokeand Chemicals Ltd. (2007) 8 SCC 705, referred to. 1. 16. The Court does not intend to lay down a law that 8 the protest in regard to making of an award must be done in a manner specified expressly. When an application for reference is filed, protest to the award is implicit. [Para 82] [969-E] Ajit Singh and Ors. v.

State of Punjab and Ors. (1994) 4 sec 67, relied on. R. v. Medical Appeal Tribunal (1957) 1 QB 574, 583, referred to. 1. 17. No case for exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India has been made out. [Para 86] [971-D] H. M. Kelogirao and Ors. v. Govt. of A. P. and Ors. (1997) 7 SCC 722;0rissa Industrial Infrastructure Development Corpn. v. Supai Mundaand Ors. (2004) 12 SCC 306, distinguished. Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India and Anr. (1998) 4SCC 409; Vinay Chandra Mishra, Re (1995) 2 SCC 584; JayaChandra Mohapatra v. Land Acquisition - Officer, Rayagada(2005) 9 SCC 123; Union of India vs. Pramod Gupta (Dead) by Lrs. and Ors. (2005) 12 SCC 1; Union of India v. Pramod Gupta(Dead) by LRs. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. Status Spinning Millsltd. (2008) 7 SCC 353, referred to. 2. 1. The appeals preferred by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, however, stand on a different footing.

Therein, the writ petition was allowed by a Single Judge of the High Court. Pursuant thereto or in furtherance thereof, SANGAM & ORS. reference was made. A finding of fact had been arrived at. A prayer was also made for reference to the Civil Court The Land Acquisition Officer assured them that reference shall be made. The promise, however, was not kept.. In the aforementioned situation, the writ petition was filed. [Para 92) [975-B-C] 2. 2. The judgment of the Single Judge having been actE! d upon and the Housing Board, having participated in the proceedings without any demur whatsoever, --; cannot be permitted to turn round and contend that the pro1. :eeding was illegal. They not only participated in . the . Prciceedings but. allso questioned. the adduction of evidence in regard to the quantum of compensation and prnferred appeals against the judgment and award of the Reference Judge. The said proceedings hav'ing attained firnality, the writ appeals preferred by them should not -.

/ h;ave been entertained. [Para 93) (975-D-E] 2. 3. In a case of this nature, in the absence of any material brought or11 rncord by the State and/or the appellant, it is assum . 55. The expression "person interested" for the purpose of Section 18 of the Act may be given a restricted meaning. State is not a person interested. A company or a local authority for whose benefit the lands are acquired, having regard to the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 50 of the Act, is not entitled to file any application for reference. 56. The Collector is a statutory authority. He, therefore, ordinarily must exercise its statutory jurisdiction within the four- ~ corners of the statute, although this would not mean that a superior court in exercise of its power of judicial review would be denuded of its power to interfere with an order of reference or issue a directi.

on when the same has unjustly been withheld in appropriate cases, but, such a power as is well known should -be exercised only in exceptional situations and subject to the . / condition that adequate grounds exist therefor. ' } 57. The Association, therefore, could file a writ application representing its members but, stricto sensu, it could not have filed any application for reference in terms of Section 18 of the Act. For the purpose of making such an application, indisputably, the period of limitation provided for therein must be resorted to. However, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever • that a statute of limitation should receive strict construction . 58. Reference has been made to Kamataka State Road Transport Corporation v. KSRTC Staff & Workers' Federation & Anr.

[(1999) 2 SCC 687], wherein in regard to a matter relating to conditions of employment of the workers of the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, the Association was held to have a locus standi to challenge the Government Order and consequent notification issued by the corporation, ,. . stating: "9. So far as the locus standi of the Union in the present proceedings is concerned, it must be kept in view that the Corporation itself by its order dated 24-12-1987 granted recognition to the Union as the sole bargaining agent for its members. It was noted by the office memorandum of the Corporation dated 24-12-1987 that the Federation having secured 53. 04% of the votes polled at the Corporation level in the referendum held on 11-12-1987, the Corporation was pleased to accord recognition to the respondent-Federation as the sole bargaining agent at the Corporation level.

However, this was subject to the conditions stipulated under the notification dated 30-4- 1987 which prescribed four years' period from the date of such conferment of the right of collective bargaining with the employer by the Union concerned. It is also not in dispute between the parties that even in the subsequent referendum, the respondent-Federation/Union secured 61. 07% of the votes polled at the Corporation level and the Corporation, by its office memorandum dated 16-7- 1992, continued recognition to the Union as the sole bargaining agent subject to the conditions stipulated in the earlier notification dated 3-12-1991. It is, therefore, not in dispute between the parties that till 16-7-1996, the respondent-Federation/Union remained a recognised Union. We fail to appreciate how the said Union cannot challenge the government order dated 10-9-1993 and the consequent notification issued by the Corporation on 21- ... 9-1993.

On both these occasions, the respondent-Union was admittedly a recognised Union of the employee·s and had got the benefit of the payroll check-off facility under the settlement of 28-7-1988.... " 59. In a land acquisition matter, the question of a body of the persons being represented by Association does not arise. The statute provides for filing of claim applications as also filing of objections by the land holders and not by and/or on behalf of the Association and that too an independent body corporate. 60. An owner of a land has a right to receive just compensation. He, having regard to his human right of access to justice as has been declared by the ICESCR on December 10, 2008 should be given an opportunity to make a reference. A person may get an opportunity to get a reference only when """ he is informed about the making of an award. 61.

We may notice that before the High Court it was conceded that in the cases where the award of the Collector was served on the claimant and yet reference was not made within time, prayer for reference was not maintainable. 62. The High Court in its judgment had divided the II>. claimants in four categories. So far as the first category of claimants is concerned, there cannot be any doubt that their applications for reference would be maintainable. So far as the second category of claimants is concerned, their applications being barred by limitation, the same could not have been entertained by the Collector, being beyond his jurisdiction. So far as the third category of claimants is concerned, the time for making application would indisputably run from the date. of J communication thereof. As far as the land holders belonging to the fourth category of claimants are concerned, the question being of some importance would be discussed a little later. 63.

We may notice a few precedents operating in the field. 64. In Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and Another[(1962) 1 SCR 676], this Court referring to Section 12 of the Act held: "It is significant that the section requires the Collector to give notice of the award immediately after making it. This provision lends support to the view which we have taken about the construction of the expression "from the date of the Collector's award" in the proviso to Section 18. It is because communication of the order is regarded by Jo. the legislature as necessary that Section 12(2) has imposed an obligation on the Collector and if the relevant clause in the proviso is read in the light of this statutory requirement it tends to show that the literal and mechanical construction of the said clause would be wholly inappropriate.

It would indeed be a very curious result that the failure of the Collector to discharge his obligation under Section 12 (2) should directly tend to make ineffective the right of the party to make an application under Section 18, and this result could not possibly have been intended by the legislature. " 65. Similar observations have been made in State of Punjab v. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum & Anr. ((1964) 1 SCR 971, thus: "... Now knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. These contents may be known either actually or constructively. If the award is communicated to a party . under Section 12(2) of the Act, the party must be obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the award whether he reads it or not.

Similarly when a party is present in court either personally or through his representative when the award is made by the Collector, it must be presumed that he knows the contents of the award. Having regard to the scheme of the Act we think that knowledge of the award must mean knowledge of the essential contents of the award. Looked at from that point of view, we do not think that it can be inferred from the petition dated December 24, 1954 that the respondents had knowledge of the award. " 66. The said decision, therefore, itself is an authority for the proposition that constructive knowledge would also subserve the purpose of the Act. Whether a person had the actual or constructive knowledge of the contents of a document is essentially a question of fact. The onus would be on the landholder to show that he did not have any knowledge of the contents of the award. 67. We may furthermore notice that in a case where ..

, communication gives rise to a cause of action, the same must be held to be mandatory in nature. {See State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika [AIR 1966 SC 1313)} 68. But in State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram [(1969) 3 SCC 28: AIR 1970 SC 214), it was stated : J. :.. "16. The last decision cited before us was that of State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika where one of the questions canvassed was whether an order of dismissal can be said to be effective only from the date when it is made known or communicated to the concerned public servant. The facts of the case show that though the order of dismissal was passed on June 3, 1949, and a copy thereof was sent to other 6 persons noted thereunder, no ~· copy was sent to the concerned public servant who came to know of it only on May 28, 1951, and that too only through another officer. On these facts, the Court held, rejecting the contention that the order became effective as soon as it was issued, that the mere.

passing of the order of dismissal would not make it effective unless it was \< published and communicated to the concerned officer. " 69. In Land Acquisition officer v. Shivabai and Others [(1997) 9 SCC 710), this Court held : "... The limitation begins to run from the date of the notice as per the proviso to Section 18(2). The date of the award and the date of the receipt of the compensation were incidentally the same. Under these circumstances, it must be presumed that they were present on the date when the • award was made and the compensation was received without any protest. Under these circumstances, they are not entitled to seek any reference. " 70. In Parsottambhai Maganbhai Patel and Others v. State of Gujarat Through Dy. Collector Modasa and Another ((2005) 7 sec 431], it was observed : .... "7.

This Court, therefore, held that the limitation under the latter part of Section 18(2)(b) of the Act has to be computed having regard to the date on which the claimants got knowledge of the declaration of the award either actual or constructive. This principle, however, will apply only to cases where the applicant was not present or represented when the award was made, or where no notice under Section 12(2) was served upon him. It will also apply to a case where the date for the pronouncement of the award is communicated to the parties and it is accordingly pronounced on the date previously announced by the Court, even if, the parties are not actually present on the date of its pronouncement. " 71. The State issued a notification directing the Collector to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 18 of the Act. Such a notification, therefore, would amount to a constructive knowledge.

It was obligatory on the part of the land owners to file an appropriate application within the prescribed period. 72. The State, however, clarified the said notification on or about 25. 01. 1983 stating that its earlier notification of the • year 1981 would not mean that the statutory period of limitation provided for under the Act should be given a complete go-by. It is only on or about 2. 12. 1983 that the writ petition was filed. 73. Indisputably, pursuant to or in furtherance of the notification of the State of Tamil Nadu issued in the year 1981, no reference was made as the awards were made principally during the period 1972 to 1974. 74. The writ petition, therefore, was also filed after inordinate delay. 75. In Mirza Majid Hussain v. State of M. P. and Another ((1995) 2 SCC 422], this Court held: SANGAM & ORS. [S. S. SINHA, J. ] "4.

Then we have to see whether the appellant was justified in approaching the High Court after an inordinate delay of more than 10 years from the date of the order of the Collector or at any rate from the date of the order passed by the District Judge. The High Court exercised its jurisdiction under Article 226 but not under Section 115 CPC. Even if it is to be converted as a revision under Section 115 CPC, the order of the High Court is not vitiated by any error of jurisdiction or material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The High Court has rightly ~refused to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction after an inordinate delay of more than 5 years from the date of the order of District Judge and more than 10 years from the date of the order of the Land Acquisition Collector. Under these circumstances, we do not think that it is a case warranting interference by this Court under Article 136. " J. 76.

Indisputably, those who received compensation without any protest keeping in view the second proviso appended to Section 31 ·must be held to have expressed no reservation in regard thereto whatsoever. 77. Objections, however, appeared to have been filed in printed forms contending that all awards should be subject to • objections and payments would be received on protest. Raising of such an objection in response to a notice under Section 9 of the Act, in our opinion, cannot have the same effect as if an application has been filed for reference under Section 18 of the Act. 78. We may, however, notice that in terms of the proviso . ,Y.. -. (b) appended to sub-Section (2) of Section 18, the maximum period fixed for filing of an objection is six months from the date ).. of the Collector's award. The statute, therefore, imposed a duty on the owner of land to keep track as to what has happened to his objection. 79. The learned counsel, however, invited our attention to [2009] 12 S. C. R.

take recourse to the purposive interpretation doctrine in preference to the literal interpretation. It is a well settled principle of law that a statute must be read as a whole and then chapter by chapter, section by section, and then word by word. For the said purpose, the Scheme of the Act must be noticed. If the principle of interpretation of statutes resorted to by the court leads to a fair reading of the provision, the same would fulfil the conditions of applying the principles of purposive construction. 80. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia [(2008) 3 SCC 279], this Court held: "49. Section 5 of the Act, on a plain reading, would place the entire onus upon a noticee. It, in no uncertain terms, states that once a notice under Section 4 is issued by the Estate Officer on formation of his opinion as envisaged therein it is for the noticee not only to show cause in 1 respect thereof but also adduce evidence and make oral submissions in support of his case.

Literal meaning in a situation of this nature would lead to a conclusion that the landlord is not required to adduce any evidence at all nor is it required even to make any oral submissi0ns. Such a literal construction would lead to an anomalous situation because the landlord may not be heard at all. It may not even be permitted to adduce any evidence in rebuttal to the one adduced by the noticee nor it would be permitted to advance any argument. Is this contemplated in law? The answer must be rendered in the negative. When a landlord files an application, it in a given situation must be able to lead evidence either at the first instance or after the ' ... ,.. _,_ evidence is led by the noticee to establish its case and/or in rebuttal to the evidence led by the noticee. " I 81. In Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd. [(2007) 8 SCC 705], this Court held: "57.

The Act being regulatory in nature as by reason -\ thereof the right of an owner of property to use and develop stands restricted, requires strict construction. An owner of land ordinarily would be entitled to use or develop the same for any purpose unless there exists certain regulation in statute or a statutory rules. Regulations contained in such statute must be interpreted in such a manner so as to least interfere with the right to property of the owner of such land. Restrictions are made in larger public interest. Such restrictions, indisputably must be reasonable ones. (See ""- Bairam Kumawat v. Union of India; Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Pilibhit Pantnagar Beej Ltd. and Union of India v. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd. ) The statutory scheme contemplates that a person and owner of land should not ordinarily be deprived from the user thereof by way of reservation or designation. ~- 58. Expropriatory legislation, as is well-known, must be given a strict construction. ..... 82.

We may, however, hasten to add that we do not intend to lay down a law that the protest in regard to making of an award must be done in a manner specified expressly. When an application for reference is filed, protest to the award is • implicit as has been held by this Court in Ajit Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & ors. [(1994) 4 SCC 67]: "5. Having regard to the contiguity of these lands the High Court is correct in its valuation. Besides, the date of notification, issued under Section 4 of the Act, is October 4, 1978 while Exh. R-6 is nearer to it, namely, August 16, ----- 1978, in comparison to Exh. A-6 dated January 14, 1977. Inasmuch as the appellants have filed an application for ... reference under Section 18 of the Act that will manifest their intention. Therefore, the protest against the award of the Collector is implied notwithstanding the acceptance of compensation.

The District Judge and the High Court; therefore, fell into patent error in denying the enhanced compensation to·the appellants. " ,.. _ 83. The learned counsel for the respondents would, however, make an appeal that in a situation of this nature we should exercise our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel for the said purpose refers to a large number of cases. We may notice some of them. 84. ·in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr. [(1998) 4 SCC 409], a Constitution Bench of this Court . 4 was dealing with a decision rendered in Vinay Chandra Mishra, Re [(1995) 2 SCC 584], wherein the statutory provisions dealing expressly with the subject were said to have been ignored by this Court while exercising power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. In that case itself, it was held: "47.

The plenary powers of this court under Article 142 of ~ the Constitution are inherent in the court and are complementary to those powers which are specifically conferred on the court by various statutes though are not limited by those statutes. These powers also exist independent of the statutes with a view to do complete justice between the parties. These powers are of very wide amplitude and are in the nature of supplementary powers. .. This power, exists as a separate and independent basis of jurisdiction, apart from the statutes. It stands upon the foundation, and the basis for its exercise may be put on a different and perhaps even wider footing, to prevent injustice in the process of litigation and to do complete justice between the parties. This plenary jurisdiction is, thus, the residual source of power which this Court may draw .

-· upon as necessary whenever it is just and equitable to do so and in particular to ensure the observance of the due ~ process of law, to do complete justice between the parties, while administering justice according to law. There is no doubt that it is an indispensable adjunct to all other powers and is free from the restraint of jurisdiction and operates -', as a valuable weapon in the hands of the court to prevent "clogging or obstruction of the stream of justice"..... " 85. In H. M. Kelogirao & Ors. v. Govt. ofA. P. & ors. [(1997) 7 sec 722], this Court was dealing with a case where the appellants had not accepted the award which was put in issue by them in the Writ Petition. It was in the aforementioned extraordinary situation and particularly having regard to the fact that they had filed writ petitions, this Court granted time to them ~to seek reference under Section 18 of the Act in exercise of its equitable jurisdiction as also in the interests of justice. 86.

A foundational fact, therefore, in that case for reference has been made out. Such is not the position here. As indicated hereinbefore, no application for reference has been made in these cases either by the land holders or by the Association for a long time. Therefore, in our opinion, no case for exercising i. our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the . ,, Constitution of India has been made out. 87. Reliance has also been placed on Orissa Industrial Infrastructure Development Corpn. v. Supai Munda & ors. [(2004) 12 SCC 306] wherein this Court was dealing with a case where State Authorities awarded compensation which was supported by convincing evidence. It was also furthermore found that the claimant made oral protest as regards the sufficiency of the amount of compensation which had been cowed down by resorting to coercive methods.

It is in the aforementioned situation, it was held that the benefit of the proviso appended to sub-Section (2) of Section 31 of the Act ....... - was not available to the State as the claimants had received compensation under duress. The direction to proceed with the reference by this Court in the aforementioned situation was not made in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India but on the principle that a decision obtained under coercion ·is no decision in the eye of law and was liabie to be ignored. 88. Land Acquisition Collector is a statutory authority. The ,~ proceeding before the Land Acquisition Collector is a quasijudicial Proceeding. A party before it may waive its right. 89. In Jaya Chandra Mahapatra v. Land Acquisition Officer, Rayagada [(2005) 9 SCC 123], this Court held: "8. In law, there is no bar in filing applications for review successively if the same are otherwise maintainable in law.

The Civil Court herein admittedly had not granted to the . ~ Appellant the benefit of solatium at the rate of 30% of the amount of enhanced compensation as also the addi(ional amount and interest as contemplated under the Amending Act of 1984. To the said benefits, the Appellant was entitled to in terms of Section 23(1A), Section 23(2) as also Section 28 of the Act. It is one thing to say that the omission to award additional amount under Section ~ 23(1A), enhanced interest under Section 28 and solatium under Section 23(2) may not amount to clerical or arithmetical mistake in relation whereto an executing court will not be entitled to grant relief but it is another thing to say that the grant thereof would be impressible in law even if the Reference Court on an- appropriate application made in this behalf and upon application of its mind holds that .

, the statutory benefits available to the claimant had not been granted to him and pass an order in that behalf by directing amendment of decree. In a case of former nature, an executing court may not have any jurisdiction to pass such an order on the ground that it cannot go behind the decree, but in law there does not exist any bar on a Reference Court to review its earlier order if there exists - " an error apparent on the face of the record in terms of Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such a ' jurisdiction cannot be denied to the Reference Court. The Act 68of1984 is a beneficial statute and, thus, the benefits arising thereunder cannot ordinarily be denied to a claimant except on strong and cogent reasons. " SANGAM & ORS. [S. 8. SINHA, J. ] 90. In Union of India v. Pramod Gupta (Dead) by LRs. & • ' ors. [(2005) 12 sec 1): "104. It ma/ not, thus, be correct to contend that the said.

provisions are so imperative in character that waiver thereof is impermissible in law or would be against public 8 interest. Grant of interest in terms of Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act is discretionary. Only rate of interest specified therein is mandatory. Section 34 of the Act ex facie, however, appears to be imperative in character as the word 'shall' has been used. A discretion vested in the court, it is trite, may not be exercised where the right to claim interest has been waived. expressly by the parties and/or their counsel. Even a mandatory provision of statute can be waived. xxx xxx xxx 108. It is not in dispute that if a person alters its position pursuant to the representation made by the other side, the principles of ~stoppel would be applicable and by reason thereof, the person making the representation would not be allowed to raise a plea contra thereto. In Kris. hna Bahadur v. Puma Theatre and Ors. (2004) 8 SCC 229, this Court held: (SCC p. 233, paras 9-10) "9.

The principle of waiver although is akin to the principle of estoppel; the difference between the two, however, is that whereas estoppel is not a cause of action; it is a rule of evidence; waiver is contractual and may constitute a cause of action; it is an agreement between the parties and a party fully knowing of its rights has agreed not to assert a right for a consideration. 10. A right can be waived by the party for whose benefit certain requirements or conditions had been provided for by a statute subject to the condition that no public interest is involved therein. Whenever • ' waiver is pleaded it is for the party pleading the same to show that an agreement waiving the right in consideration of some compromise came into being. Statutory right, however, may also be waived by his conduct. " [See also Vijay Cotton & Oil Mills Ltd. v. The State of Gujarat (1969) 2 SCR 60, SCR at p. 63]. ~ 109. Yet again recently in State of Kamataka and Anr. v. Sangappa Dyavappa Biradar and Ors.

(2005) 4 SCC 264, the principles of estoppel was applied in relation to a consent award holding that once a consent award had been passed, the claimants were precluded from applying for a reference under Section 18 of the Act. " 91. In Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. Status Spinning Mills Ltd. [(2008) 7 SCC 353], this Court held: "34. Validity of the notifications on the ground that they are unreasonable has not been raised before the High Court. We, therefore, cannot go into the issue. If that be so, it is difficult to agree ·with Mr Parasaran that we should + undertake an exercise to interpret the notifications in a manner which would not lead to unreasonableness. For the purpose of declaring a statute unconstitutional, foundational facts have to be laid therefor. (See Seema Silk & Sarees v. Directorate of Enforcement11. ) Grounds are required to be raised therefor. In absence thereof it would not be possible for us to enter into the debate of ..

constitutionality of the said provisions. The Division Bench of the High Court had rightly or wrongly opined that the doctrine of promissory estoppel has no application. The fact that the said doctrine may apply even in relation to a statute is beyond any dispute as has been held by this Court in Mahabir Vegetable Oils (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana12, A. P. Steel Re-Rolling Mill Ltd. 9, Pawan Alloys and Casting (P) Ltd. v. U. P. SEB13 and Southern \ Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v. Electricity Inspector & ET/014. " 92. The appeals preferred by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, however, stand on a different footing. Therein, the writ petition was allowed by a learned single judge of the High Court. Pursuant thereto or in furtherance thereof, reference was made. A finding of fact had been arrived at. A prayer was also made y. _ for reference to the Civil Court. The Land Acquisition Officer assured them that a reference shall be made. The promise, however, was not kept.

In the aforementioned situation, the writ petition was filed. 93. The judgment of the Single Judge having been acted upon and Tamil Nadu Housing Board, having participated in the proceedings without any demur whatsoever, cannot be -f. permitted to turn round and contend that the proceeding was illegal. They not only participated in the proceedings but also questioned the adduction of evidence in regard to the quantum of compensation and preferred appeals against the judgment and award of the Reference Judge. The said proceedings having attained finality, the writ appeals preferred by them should not have been entertained. °t' 94. In a case of this nature, in the absence of any material brought on record by the State and/or the appellant, we may assume that the Land Acquisition Officer is a Collector within the meaning of Section 3(c) of the Act. He was, therefore, bound by his promise. 95.

In the aforementioned situation, it would not be a case where a statutory authority has been asked by a higher - \authority to perform his jurisdiction in a particular manner. No form of protest, as indicated hereinbefore, is prescribed under the Act. No form of application in writing has also been prescribed. In a given case, keeping in view the object and purport the statute seeks to achieve, a Collector being a statutory authority and having the jurisdiction to make a reference can waive the same. We may consider it from another angle. Had a reference been made pursuant to the request made by the awardees, could it be held to be wholly illegal or without jurisdiction only because the protest made in regard to the quantum of compensation under the award is oral and not in writing? The answer to the said question must be rendered in the negative. The form, mode and manner of protest are procedural in nature. The statute does not provide for a thing to be done in a particular manner.

96. Submission of Mr. Krishnamurthy that the doctrine that where a statute prescribes a thing to be done in a manner as prescribed or not at all is applicable where statutory authority is to perform his function in terms of the provisions of the statute. It is not meant to be applied to a litigant. A procedure, as is well known, is hand maid of justice. A substantive provision providing for substantive right or a statutory provision providing for a substantive right shall prevail over the procedural aspect of the matter. In a situation of this nature, therefore, the Land Acquisition Collector could have been, having regard to the principles of promissory estoppel, held bound to fulfil his promise. 97. ln Nagar Palika Nigam v. Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti & Ors. (2008 AIR SCW 7114], this Court held: "8. The normal function of a proviso is to except something out of the enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for the proviso would be within the purview of the enactment.

As was stated in Mullins v. Treasurer of Survey 1880 (5) QBD 170, (referred to in Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory v. I Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha (AIR 1961 SC 1596) and Calcutta Tramways Co. Ltd. v. Corporation of Calcutta (AIR 1965 SC 1728); when one finds a proviso to a section the natural presumption is that, but for the proviso, the enacting part of the section would have included the subject matter of the proviso. The proper function of proviso is to except and to deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment and its effect is confined to that case. It is qualification of the Page 4544 preceding enactment which is expressed in terms too general to be quite accurate. As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an exception to what is in the enactment and ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule.

"If the language of the enacting part of the statute does not contain the provisions which are said to occur in it you cannot derive these provisions by implication from a proviso. " Said Lord Watson in West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Co. 1897 AC 647 (HL). Normally, a proviso does not travel beyond the provision to which it is a proviso. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted as a proviso and to no other. (See A. N. Sehgal and Ors. v. Raje Ram Sheoram and Ors. (AIR 1991 SC 1406), Tribhovandas Haribhai Tamboli v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and Ors. (AIR 1991 SC 1538) and Kera/a State Housing Board and Ors. v. Ramapriya Hotels (P) Ltd. af)d Ors. (1994 (5) sec 672). " 98. For the reasons aforementioned, the appeal preferred by M/s Steel Authority of India Ltd. is allowed with no order as to costs and the appeals filed by the Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Housing Board are dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs.

25,000/- each. K. K. T. Appeal disposed of.