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MAHARANI KUSUMKUMARI AND ANR. v. SMT. KUSUMKUMARI JADEJA AND ANR

Citation: [1991] 1 S.C.R. 193

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: L.M. SHARMA, M.M. PUNCHHI

Case summary

The marital status of a 'person stands on a much higher footing than other positions one may hold in the society or may have in relation to a property; and cannot be allowed to be challenged lightly. 103, it was held that the decree could not be confirmed.

Judgment text

MAHARANI KUSUMKUMARI AND ANR. V. SMT. KUSUMKUMARI JADEJA AND ANR. FEBRUARY 1, 1991 [LAUT MOHAN SHARMA AND M. M. PUNCHHI; JJ. ] Hindu Marriage Act; 1955: Section 11-Petition to declare , marriage a nullity-Whether maintainable after death of petitioner's .. _____,,. , spouse. · · · Practice and Procedure: Proceedings involving issues relating to marital status-Question dependent upon nature of action and the law governing the same-Provisions ofthe relevant statute very material. The appellant No. 1-Maharani was married to a Maharaja in 1960 and the daughter-appellant No. 2 was born of the wedlock in 1964. The relationship between the husband and the wife thereafter ceased to be cordial and the appellantstarted living in Bombay and the Maharaja within his estate in Madhya Pradesh. It is the case of the respondent No. 1 that the Maharaja decided to remarry without legally separating from the appellant. The respondent who is a relation of the Maharaja's mother, respondent No.

2, was misled both by the Maharaja and his mother in believing that the first marriage of the Maharaja had been dissolved and under that belief she married the Maharaja and several issue~ were born of this wedlock. In 1974 when the Maharaja died, on application tor grant of p Letters of Administration was filed by the appellant-Maharani> and the respondent No. 1 applied for probate on the basis of an alleged will. 'r- This will was denied by the appellants. These proceedings are still pending. Respondent No. 1 filed an application under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for declaring her marriage as nullity, and the Maharaja's mother was impleaded as the sole respondent. The appellants intervened and were impleaded as parties. The maintainability of the aforesaid application was challenged by the appellants on the ground that the marriage could not be declared 194 SUPREME COURT REPOJUS [199l] l S. C. R.

a nullity after thedeatJt of the Maharaja but both the trial court and the High Court have rejected thJs p•ea, Ip the ~PPeal t9 this Court, it w@s c,;@ntended on behalf of the appell@pts th~t having regRrd to tile veq speci11. I reliltlonshlp between husbagd and wife, a marriage cannot be dissolved or declared to be a 11,uJlity QPless b9tfl 9f them are parties thereto. The martml ~totwl Qf Q p. erl! i9D stands on a mJicb higtier footmg th! lD. other positiQ11,s een tlntithid to tile beP. filnt gf the t1edion In absence of a [) de~ree dech,trin~ tbe m1t. rriage Pf their 1nmmts Jis nullity, and this was preciseJy the rea~on thpt the·respqnde. ut had tt> immm. ence the present iiti~*1tion. · · Qp th@ gμ"~tfpm whether a petition under Section 11 of the Hindu M,:~rriQge . t\~t, 1955 fQr ·declaring the marriage of the petitioner RS. a ~ nullity ! ~ mP. lntaiQ3ble atler tbe deatJt Qf the petitioiie. r's spouse. JlismJ~~ms th~ 3P. Ve""I' tJti~ CPm1,, HELD: 1.

An appli~atioP Qpder Section U oftbe Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 before its amendrnent in 1976, was maintainable at the instanc~ of ~ PRI1Y to tJte nutrrbtge even idler the death of the other ( §pQlJ§e. l20Ulf. . ~ ~' IP t~e insumt case, tbe proceeding was started in 1974 that is, befgre the amemhnent wa& madv 1n tbe llindu Marriage A. ct, 1955. Section 11 did not ~onW. in the WfU'il! i "against the other party". At that time all that wa$ required w11s On•t the application bad to be filed by a 1n•rty tp tbe marrt11ge under challenge. On the plain language of the ~e~tf9P. Ii)§ it §tggd tbeQ, it 4,! 0Uld not be claimed that in absence of the r otller §pgp~ as a party h> the proceedings, the same would not be matptafuable, [l9,7F) 3. Under the generQI h•w a child for being legitimate bas to be M. KUSUMKUMARI v. K. JADEJA 19$ born in lawful wedlock and if the rm1rringe i~ void or decll,ll'ed to ~ ~ . ~· by the Court, Jt will necessarily have the effect of ba!!

tardising tbe chUJI born of the parties to such a marriage. [199F] 4. By enacting Section S(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 the legislature abolished polygamy, Which bRd ftJWays remafne4 pel'IJlJ!! ~ ' sible and prevalent among the Hindu!! iD tbe p~t. Tbe Act w~ briPP'JB IJ about a very significant departtm! mthli!! r~gar4; ~d ~~ mm . _....... account the possibility of violatbm. Pf tbe law ffl. IJμDJerQ~ ~ses at least for sometime to come spedal pmvfsion!! were Jn. cllJded mul@r Section 16 of the Act with the object of protecting the legitimacy of the 1 children. [199G] .... 5. The benefit of Section 16 was c0Qf:U1ed to ttlJIY SYcb c11ses wbere Q a decree of nullity was granted undQr Se~tion 11 or Section 12. It did not extend to other cases. In 1976 section U wits ! Wended by inserting the .. ,. ,. ,,.. words "against the other party" ond alPPgwith the same secti9D lfi w~ amended. '{200DJ ~ 6.

By the amendment in ~digp U, in so far the cases where marriage can be declared QS nulllty, the llppUC1Jtion of the rule protecting the legitimacy was widened. Iftb1t bad ngt ~n done, the children born of such marriages would b1tve ~n demiv~ of the advantage on the death of either of the p1trents. Ry th@ l!! bnllJtap. ~μs ! lmen®Ien~ gf the two sections it can safely be decl1u1ted tJlpt tbe PMU~ent did •mi ij hold identical ~fews as e~reHed by tbe l@w C:9PP. Disfil~m in Us ~~h , Report. [200F·G] • 7. The intention of tbe legi~lature bi enacting section 16 was to . protect the leptlmacy of the children wbg wool.. have been legitimate if ~· · the Act bad not been passed m19SS. [iOOR) · ~ 8. There is no re8$0n to fpterprtit Sllction 11 ma manner which would narrow down its ffeld, With rilspet;t to tJ1e n@tm-e of tbe pr~eed lngs, what the court bas to do in oo appUcatJon under section 1! is not to bring about any change hi the morital stat~ of the parties.

The effect of granting a decree of nullity is to disconr tbe f11nv in the m! ll'riage at the time ofits performan~e and accordil)gly tf) gr~t a ! Jecree dectaring it to . be void. [201A·BJ . , Butterfield v. /Jμ. ttf! rfi , tro, ~d Law Commission of India, S9tb Report Chapter 6, pRra 6. 11\ referred to. 9. It is. not correct to suggest that one uniform rule shall·apply for deciding the maintainability of all proceedings involving issues relating ~ .. te mmitBI st8tuS~ The--question will bedependent QR9D the nature ofthe action and law governing the same. The provisions of the relevant statute relating to a proceeding in question will be very material. [198H-199A] Rayden and Jackson's Law and Practice in Divorce and Family Ma. tters, (15th Edn. ) p. 650, referred to. ',,,_... - CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2215 of 1977. From the Judgment and Order dated 23. 7. 1976 of the Madhya ·c Pradesh High Court ii1 Misc. Appeal No. 23 of 1976. - T. U. Mehta, S. K.

Gambhir, Vivek Gambhir and Surinder Karnail for the Appellants. ""( Uday'. U. Lalit and A. G. Ratnaparkhi for the Respondents: The Jud~mentof thi Court was delivered by SHARMA, J. The question for decision in this appeal by special leave is whether a petition under s. 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, . >-- ·E 1955, for declaring the marriage of the petitioner as nullity is maintainable after the death of the petitioner's spouse. 2. The appellant no. 1, hereinafter referred to as the Maharani, was married to Maharaja Rameshwarsillghji in 1960 and a· daughter, the appellant no. 2, was born of the wedlock in 1964. The relationship between the husband and the wife thereafter ceased to be cordial and '-f the appellants started living in Bombay and the Maharaja within his~ estate in Madhya Pradesh. According to the case of the respondent no: 1, the Mafiaraja decided to remarry without legally . separating :from the appellant Maharani.

The respondent who is a relation of the Mah,araja's mother, respondent no. 2, was misled both by the ·'G -Mah~raja and his mother in believing that the first marriage . of the Maharaja had been dissolved and under the belief she married the Maharaja and the -couple got several issues. In 1974 when the r Maharaja died, an application for grant of Letters. of Administration was ·filed by the appellant Maharani; and the respondent applied for 1probate on. the basis '? fan alleged will which is denied by. the appellant. The •proceec:Ungs . are still e_endin~ ~n this ba~kgr~und the respondent no. 1 filed the present application under s. 11 of the Hindu Marriage ~·. _ Act for declaring her. marriage as nullity. The Maharaja's mother was impleaded as the sole respondent. When the appellants learnt about the case, they intervened and were joined as parties. 3.

The appellants challenged the maintainability of the application on the ground that the marriage could not be declared nulllty after the death of the Maharaja. Both the trial court and the High Court have rejected the appellants' plea. 4. Mr. Mehta, the learned counsel for the appellants, has con- .... \ tended that having regard to the very special relationship between husband and wife, a marriage cannot be dissolved or decJared to be a nullity unless both of them are parties thereto. The marital status of a 'person stands on a much higher footing than other positions one may hold in the society or may have in relation to a property; and cannot be allowed to be challenged lightly. The marriage of a person, therefore, cannot be declared as a nullity after his death when he does not have an opportunity to contest. He relied upon the language of s. U. After its amendment in 1976 the sectioo reads thus: "11.

Void marriages:-Any marriage ·solemnized after the commencement of this Act shall be null and void and may, on a petition presented by either party thereto against the other party, be so declared by a decree of nullity if it_ contravenes any one of the conditions specified in clauses (i), (iv) and (v) ofSection5. " (emphasis added) 5. The present proceeding was started in 1974, that is, before the amendment,· and the . section did not contain the words which have J1 been underlined by us above. At :that time all that was required was ' that the application had to be filed by a party to the marriage under challenge. On the plain language of tll. e section as it stood then, it · could ilot be elaimed that in absence of the other spouse as a party to the proceeding, the same would not be maintainable. The argument of Mr.

Mehta is that'the section had the same meaning before and after the amendment and the addition of the words in 1976 was merely --- --respect of that marriage under this Act and whether or not' ·E the marriage is held to be void otherwise than on a petition under this Act. " .. erilarged the applicability of the beneficial provisions, so as not to deny the same to children who are pfaced in circumstances similar to those of the present respondent. By the amendment in s. 11, in so far the -..... ( cases where marriage can be declared as nullity, the application of the ~, rule protecting the legitimacy was widened. If that had not been done, the children borri of such marriages would have been deprived of the advantage,on the death of either ofthe parents. By the 'simultaneous amendment of the two sections it can safely be deduced that the Parlia- ·G ment did not hold identical views· as expressed by the Law Commission's Report. · 10.

Even if it be assumed that the meaning of the section was not free from ambiguity, the rule of beneficial construction is called for in ascertaining its meanin_g. T! 1e jntention of_ the l~Jature in enacting s. 16 was to protect the le-8. itimacy of the children who would have been legitimate if the Act had not been passed in i955. There is no reason to A interprets. 11 in a manner which would narrow down its field. With respect to the nature of the proceeding, what the court has to do in an application under s. 11 is not to bring about any change in the marital status of the parties. The effect of granting a decree of nullity is to discover the flaw in the marriage at the time of its performance and accordingly to grant a decree declaring it to be void. We, therefore,. B hold that an application under s. 11 before its amendment in 1976, was maintainable at the instance of a party to the marriage even after the death of the other spouse.

Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed with costs. N. V. K. Appeal dismissed. -