MANAGER, R.B.I., BANGALORE v. S. MANI AND ORS

Citation: [2005] 2 S.C.R. 797

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: N. SANTOSH HEGDE, B.P. SINGH, S.B. SINHA

Case summary

MANAGER, R.B.I., BANGALORE v. S. MANI AND ORS.pdf

Judgment text

MANAGER, R. B. I. , BANGALORE v. S. MANI AND ORS. MARCH 14, 2005 {N. SANTOSH HEGDE, B. P. SINGH AND S. B. SINHA, JJ. ] Labour Laws : Industrial Disputes Act, I947 Sections 25F and25B-Reinstatement-Respondent-workmen appointed as "Ticca Mazdoors" (non-regular Mazdoors) in Reserve Bank ofIndia(RBI) not absorbed in regular service for alleged misconduct-Request for reemployment not granted-Industrial dispute-Tribunal directed re-instatement with full back wages on grounds that they had completed 240 days ofservice and their terminations were brought about without compliance ofS.

25F-On facts, held : The findings of Tribunal are wholly perverse-It wrongly placed the burden of proof on Appellant-employer for considering if Respondents completed240 days ofservice or not-Italso erredin drawing adverse inference against the Appellantfor non-production ofattendance registers alone though sufficient explanation therefor was given-Hence, case for judicial review made out-Directionfor re-instatementfor non-compliance with S. 25F would only restore to the workmen the same status as before termination-Respondents would continue to be "Ticca Mazdoors" and cannot have any right to get work-Moreover, direction ofcontinuity of services per se would not br~"lg them within purview ofthe settlement arrived at between RBI and the workers federation for absorption of "Ticca Mazdoors "-Constitution ofIndia, I950- Article I36.

Section 25B-Continuous service of240 days during periodof12 months preceding the order oftermination-Burden ofproof-Held: Initial burden is on the workmen--Tribunal wrongly placed the burden ofproofon the employer on the premise that it failed to prove its plea ofabandonment of service by the workmen. Misconduct-Effect ofjudgment of acquittal of accused-workmen in criminal proceedings vis-a-vis the alleged misconduct-Held : The acquittal passed in favour ofthe workman by giving benefit ofdoubt per se would not be binding upon the employer. Respondents, appointed as Ticca Mazdoors in Appellant-bank between March, 1980 and August, 1982, were not regularized in service as regular Mazdoors for the alleged misconduct of producing forged and fabricated certificates at the time of interview. Criminal prosecutions were launched against them for furnishing false certificates but they stood acquitted.

Subsequently, between 1987 and 1988, the Respondents submitted fresh certificates and requested Appellant to re-employ them. As the request was not accepted, an industrial dispute was raised. The Industrial Tribunal held that Respondents having completed 240 days of service, and their terminations having been brought about without complying wi~h the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, they were entitled to be reinstated·with full back wages. Writ petitions against the order were dismissed by Single Judge of High Court. Division Bench of the High Court modified the award of the Tribunal as also the Single Judge holding that the back wages be paid only from 23- 7-1993 and not from the date of retrenchment, but gave liberty to Appellant to hold domestic enquiry against Respondents for the alleged misconduct.

In appeal to this Court the Appellants contended that as the Respondents did not report for duty between December, 1982 and March, 1987, they must be held to have abandoned their services; that the Tribunal erred in failing to consider the fact that the Respondents failed to prove that they had completed 240 days of service during a period of 12 months preceding the order of termination, hence, the question of compliance of Section 25F of the Act did not arise at all and that in any event, only because the Respondents allegedly completed 240 days of work, the same by itself would not confer any right on them to be regularized in service; that no adverse inference could have been drawn against the Appellant for non-production of attendance register as sufficient explanation therefor had been furnished; that the burden of proof in that behalf lay upon the Respondents .

and that the action taken by the Appellant was not wholly arbitrary so as to justify a direction for reinstatement of the Respondents in service only on the ground that they stood acquitted in the criminal cases. Allowing the appeals, the Court MANAGER, R. B. l. , BANGALORE v. S. MANI 799 HELD : 1. Ticca Mazdoors are not regarded as regular Mazdoors. Their status is not higher than that of a temporary workman or probationer. The service of Ticca Mazdoors being not permanent in nature can be dispensed with subject to compliance of the statutory or contractual requirements, if any. [807-DI Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation andAnr. v. S. G. Kotturapp and Anr. , [200513 SCC 409, relied on. 2. 1. It is trite that a judgment of acquittal passed in favour of the employees by giving benefit of doubt per se would not he binding upon th6 employer. The employer had no occasion to initiate departmental proceeding against the Respondents, who were not regularly employed. [808-CJ .

Union of India and Anr. v. Bihari Lal Sidhana, [19971 4 SCC 385); Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh and Anr. , [2004) 8 SCC 200 and Cho/an Roadways Limited v. G. Thirugnanasambandam, [2004110 SCALE 578, relied on. 2. 2. From a perusal of a judgment passed in the criminal cases it would appear that the contention raised herein by the Respondents that they had never produced any transfer certificate at the time of interview was not raised. If the contention of the Appellant as regard production of transfer certificates by the Respondents at the time of their interview finds acceptance, then concededly the said certificates vis-a-vis the certificates produced by the Respondents in the year 1987 are different in several respects, including the name of the father and name of the school, date of birth, etc.

It is true that the certificates produced by them in 1987 were found to be genuine but the same by itself would not lead to a conclusion, that the Respondents themselves did not produce the said· certificates before the interview board or the same were manufactured by the officers of the Reserve Bank of India. (807-G-H; 808-A-BJ 3. 1. The initial burden of proof was on the workmen to show that they ha of continuity of service per se would not bring them within the purview of terms of- settlement. Even in the case of a statutory corporation in S. G. Kotturappa (supra), this Court observed : "It is not a case where the Respondent has completed 240 days ofservice during the period of 12 months preceding such termination as contemplated under Section 25-F read with Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Badli workers, thus, did not acquire any legal right to continue in service.

They were not even entitled to the protection under the Industrial Disputes Act nor the mandatory requirements of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes were required to be complied with before terminating his services, unless they complete 240 days service within a period oftwelve months preceding the date of termination. " It was further held : "The terms and conditions of employment of a Badli worker may have a statutory flavour but the same would not mean that it is not otherwise contractual. So long as a worker remains a Badli worker, he does not enjoy a status. His services are not protected by reason of any provisions of the statute. He does not hold a civil post. A dispute as regard purported wrongful tennination of services can be raised only if such termination takes. place in violation ofthe mandatory provisions ofthe statute governing the services.

Services ofa temporary employee or a badli worker can be terminated upon compliance of the contractual or statutory requirements. " Mr. Phadke, as noticed hereinbefore, has referred to a large number of decisions for demonstrating that this Court had directed reinstatement even ifthe workmen concerned were daily wagers or were employed intermittently. No proposition of law was laid down in the aforementioned judgments. The said judgments ofthis Court, moreover, do not lay down any principle having universal application so that the Tribunals, or for that matter the High Court, or this Court, may feel compelled to direct reinstatement with continuity of service and backwages. The Tribunal has some d·iscretion in this matter. Grant of relief must depend on the fact situation obtaining in a particular case. The industrial adjudicator cannot be held to be bound to grant some relief only because it will be lawful to do so. In Haryana State Coop. Land Dev. Bank v.

Nee/am, JT (2005) 2 SC 600, this Court observed : "It is trite that the courts and tribunals having plenary jurisdiction have discretionary power to grant an appropriate relief to the parties. The aim and object of the Industrial Disputes Act may be to impart social justice to the workman but the same by itself would not mean · that irrespective of his conduct a workman would automatically be entitled to relief. The procedural laws like estopp. el, waiver and acquiescence are equally applicable to the industrial proceedings. A person in certain situation may even be held to be bound by the doctrine of Acceptance Sub silentio. " OTHER CONTENTIONS. : We have noticed hereinbefore that the Appellant herein raised a specific plea denying or disputing the claim ofthe Respondents that they had completed 240 days of work. Such a plea having been raised both before the Industrial Tribunal as also before the High Court, we cannot accept that the Appellant \_ ·had abandoned such a plea.

Even in this Special Leave Petition, it is contended: - "(3) For that the High Court ought to have held t~at the disengagement of the Ticca Mazdoors (Respondents), ~o were daily wage casual workers, did not involve any retrenchment and as such there was no question of reinstatement of Respondents will full backwages from 23. 7. 1993. " The contention of Mr. Phadke that they have abandoned the said plea cannot be accepted. Similarly, the contention of Mr. Phadke raised before us that the order passed by the Division Bench was a consent order is unacceptable. The Division Bench does not say so. Such a contention has been raised only on the basis of a statement made by the Respondents in the Counter-affidavit wherein the reference had been made to one order of the Division Bench asking the parties to make endeavour for settlement. The Respondents contend that the order of the Division Bench is virtually consent order. No settlement admittedly had been arrived at.

A party to the lis, in absence of a statutory interdict, cannot be deprived of his right of appeal. The High Court has passed the judgment upon consideration of the rival contentions raised at the Bar. It arrived at specific findings on the issues framed by it. It has, for the reasons stated in the impugned judgment, affirmed the findings of the Industrial Tribunal as also the learned Single Judge. The impugned order of the Division Bench, in our opinion, by no stretch of imagination, can be said to have been passed with consent of the parties. However, we agree with the opinion of the Tribunal that the plea of abandonment of service by the Respondents in the facts and circumstances of the case was wholly misconceived. CONCLUSION : For the reasons, aforementioned, the impugned judgments cannot be sustained which are accordingly set aside. The appeals are allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. B. B. B. Appeals allowed.