MANDALI RANGANNA & ORS. ETC. v. T. RAMACHANDRA & ORS

Citation: [2008] 6 S.C.R. 264

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: S.B. SINHA, V.S. SIRPURKAR

Case summary

MANDALI RANGANNA & ORS. ETC. v. T. RAMACHANDRA & ORS.pdf

Judgment text

[2008] 6 S. C. R. 264 y~ MANDALI RANGANNA & ORS. ETC. V. T. RAMACHANDRA & ORS. (Civil Appeal Nos. 3128-29 of 2008) APRIL 30, 2008 [S. 8. SINHA AND V. S. SIRPURKAR, JJ. ] Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Or. 39 rr.

1and 2 - Temporary injunction/interim order - Suit for declaration and possession of suit properties - Applications for interim injunction and orders to restrain defendants from raising any construction on or creating any third party interests in suit property - Held: Grant of injunction is an equitable relief - Besides existence of basic elements in relation to granting injunction, conduct of parties must also be taken into consideration - On facts, prima facie, defendants had been in possession of suit properties for a long time and plaintiffs never exercised any act of possession - Constructions involving crores of rupees cannot be directed to be stopped - Therefore, in the interest ofjustice defendants are allowed to carry out the constructions which would be subject to the ultimate decision of the suit - Any third party interests, if created, would also be subject to the decision of . ,. the suit - Equity.

The appellants filed a suit for declaration that the suit properties were the joint family properties of the parties. It was stated that the partition which had taken place earlier between the parties was only a partial one. A preliminary decree for partition and possession of suit I' property according to the share of the parties was prayed for. A consequential decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendant-respondents from alienating the T. RAMACHANDRA & ORS. ~-) suit properties or raising any constructions thereon was also sought. The stand of the defendants was that the properties had already been partitioned as far back as the year 1924 and they were enjoying their rights over their respective shares uninterruptedly since then. During the ~· pendency of the suit the defendants-respondents executed a registered deed of lease on 15. 12. 2004 in favour of respondent no. 12.

The plaintiffs filed an application for interim injunction against the defendants and respondent no. 12 restraining them from digging pits, putting up construction etc. on the suit land. They filed another application restraining the defendants from changing the nature of the property or transferring or alienating any right therein in favour of third parties. The trial court granted the prayer in both the applications. However, the High Court allowing the appeal of the ~ · defendants, set aside the orders of the trial court and ordered that any construction put up in the suit properties and any alienation thereof and creation of any interests therein by the defendants would be subject to. the decision of the suit.

In the instant appeals filed by the plaintiffs, it was ,, contended for the appellants, inter alia, that the property having not been partitioned fully and possession of a co- ~ owner being possession of the other co-owners also, creation of third party interests in a situation of this nature or allowing parties to carry on constructions would cause irreparable loss to the appellants and the Court should direct stoppage of such construction. Dismissing the appeals, the Court / .. , HELD: 1. 1 It is true that grant or refusal of injunction has serious consequence depending upon the nature . thereof, and the courts dealing with such matters must y-, -, , make all endeavours to protect the interest of the parties; for the said purpose, application of mind on the part of the courts is imperative, and pleas raised by the parties must be determined objectively. However, grant of injunction is an equitable relief.

A person who had kept quiet for a long time and allowed another to deal with the properties exclusively, ordinarily, would not be entitled to an order of injunction. The court will not interfere only because the property is a very valuable one. [para 18) [275- C-E] 1. 2 While considering an application for grant of injunction, the court will not only take into consideration the basic elements in relation thereto, viz. , existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, it must also take into consideration the conduct of the parties. [para 18) [275-B-C] M. Gurudas and Others v. Rasaranjan and Others (2006) 8 SCC 367; Seema Arshad Zaheer and Others v. Municipal Corpn. Of Greater Mumbai and Others (2006) 5 SCC 282 and Transmission Corpn. of A. P Ltd. v. Lanco Kondapalli Power (P) Ltd. (2006) 1 sec 540 - relied on. 2.

1 In the instant case, prima facie it appears that the respondents had been in possession of the properties in suit for a long time and had admittedly been dealing with the properties exclusively. Appellants never exercised any act of possession. [Para 15] [273-H; 274-A] 2. 2 Rightly or wrongly constructions have come up. The same cannot be directed to be demolished, at least at this stage. Respondent No. 7 is said to have spent three 'r ' crores of rupees. If that be so, it would not be proper to stop further constructions. Therefore, interest of justice would be sub-served if, while allowing the respondents to carry out constructions of the buildings, the same is made subject to the ultimate decision of the suit. The trial court would dispose of the suit as early as possible.

If any third party interests are created upon completion of the constructions, the relevant deeds shall clearly stipulate that the matter is subjudice and all sales shall ~ be subject to the ultimate decision of the si. iit. [Para 23 and 24) [277-8-D] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 3128-3129 of 2008. From the Final Common Order dated 6. 3. 2007 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in M. F. A. Nos. 11783 and 11785 of 2006. Arun Jaitley, Mukul Rohatgi, K. K. Venugopal, Nalini Chidambraam, R. F. Nariman, M. Shanmukhappa, S. Balaji, S. R. ,,-i.. Sharma, Madhusmita Bora, S. Srinivasan, Solomon Francis, Sunieta Ojha, Shashi M. Kapila, Gopal Shan Karnarayanan, Kunal Tandon, D. S. Jayaraj, L. Prem Kumar, Vikas Mehta, Shri Narain, Sandeep Narain, Navkesh Batra (for Mis. S. Narain & Co. ) and K. V. Vijay Kumar for the appearing parties. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S. B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted. 2.

Appellants herein are aggrieved by and dissatisfied with a judgment and order dated 6. 3. 2007 passed by the High Court of Karnataka whereby and whereunder the private respondents herein were allowed to make constructions on the lands in suit, subject to the final decision therein. It was furthermore directed that any alienation or creation of an interest by the defendants -. 16. A large number of documents were produced by the respondents to substantiate that the property in question was in exclusive enjoyment ofT. M. Thimmaiah being the adopted father of T. Ramachandra from 1924 to 1936. The properties were in possession of T. Puttathaiamma, widow of Thimmaiah from 1937 to 1955 and thereafter the other respondents. 17. Respondents contend that the adoption deed must be read as a whole. The translation of the deed of adoption does not appear to be correct. The deed of adoption categorically establishes that the properties were to belong to T.

Puttathyamma during her life time, and thereafter the same was to vest in the adoptive son T. Ramachandra. Although no reference to the suit properties might have been made in the deed of adoption but they had all along been in possession of T. Puttathyamma. Apart therefrom evidently the deed of lease ~ was executed in the year 1963 in respect of 113rd of the suit schedule property. It was renewed in the year 1969. The property was developed and the nature and character thereof was changed from time to time. A registered deed of lease was executed in the year 1968 between Killik Nixon and T. ... Jy Ramachandra. A deed of partition was also executed on 20. 12. 1971. A deed of lease was executed in the year 1977 between Respondent No. 6 and Classic Automobiles. A public notice was also issued in the year 1985 whereafter a deed of sale was executed on 25. 07. 1989. 18.

While considering an application for grant of injunction, the court will not only take into consideration the basic elements in relation thereto, viz. , existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, it must also take into consideration the conduct of the parties. Grant of injunction is an equitable relief. A person who had kept quiet for a long time and allowed another to deal with the properties exclusively, ordinarily would not be entitled to an order of injunction. The court will not interfere only because the property is a very valuable one. We are not however, oblivious of the fact -A that grant or refusal of injunction has serious consequence depending upon the nature thereof. The courts dealing with such matters must make all endeavours to protect the interest of the parties. For the said purpose, application of mind on the part of the courts is imperative. Contentions raised by the parties must be determined objectively. 19. This Court in M.

Gurudas and Others v. Rasaranjan and Others [(2006) 8 SCC 367) noticed: "19. A finding on "prima facie case" would be a finding of . , fact. However, while arriving at such a finding of fact, the court not only must arrive at a conclusion that a case for trial has been made out but also other factors requisite for grant of injunction exist. There may be a debate as has been sought to be raised by Dr. Rajeev Dhavan that the decision of the House of Lords in American Cyanamid .... Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. would have no application in a case of ~ this nature as was opined by this Court in Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. and S. M. Dyechem Ltd. v. Cadbury (India) Ltd. but we are not persuaded to delve thereinto. " 20. Therein, however, the question in regard to valid adoption of a daughter was in issue. This Court held that Nirmala was not a validly adopted daughter. This Court wondered: "34.

The properties may be valuable but would it be proper to issue an order of injunction restraining the appellants herein from dealing with the properties in any manner whatsoever is the core question. They have not been able to enjoy the fruits of the development agreements. The properties have not been sold for a long time. The commercial property has not been put to any use. The condition of the properties remaining wholly unused could deteriorate. These issues are relevant. The courts below did not pose these questions unto themselves and, thus, misdirected themselves in law. " 21. Emphasis was also laid on the conduct of the parties 0 while granting an order of injunction. 22. In Seema Arshad Zaheer and Others v. Municipal Corpn. Of Greater Mumbai and Others [(2006) 5 SCC 282], this Court held: "30.

The discretion of the court is exercised to grant a temporary injunction only when the following requirements are made out by the plaintiff: (i) existence of a prima facie case as pleaded, necessitating protection of the plaintiff's rights by issue of a temporary injunction; (ii) when the need for protection of the plaintiffs rights is compared ' . with or weighed against the need for protection of the defendant's rights or likely infringement of the defendant's rights, the balance of convenience tilting in favour of the plaintiff; and (iii) clear possibility of irreparable injury being caused to the plaintiff if the temporary injunction is not granted. In addition, temporary injunction being an equitable relief, the discretion to grant such relief will be ·exercised only when the plaintiffs conduct is free from blame and he approaches the court with clean hands. " [See also Transmission Corpn. of A. P Ltd. v. Lanco Kondapalli Power (P) Ltd. (2006) 1 SCC 540] 23.

Rightly or wrongly constructions have come up. They cannot be directed to be demolished, at least at this stage. Respondent No. 7 is said to have spent three crores of rupees. 8 Ifthat be so, in our opinion, it would not be proper to stop further constructions. 24. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice would be subserved if while allowing the respondents to carry out constructions ofthe buildings, the same is made subject to the ultimate decision of the suit. The Trial Court is requested to hear out and dispose of the suit as early as possible. If any third party interest is created upon completion of the constructions, the deeds in question shall clearly stipulate that the matter is subjudice and all sales shall be subject to the ultimate decision of the suit. All parties must cooperate in the early hearing and disposal of the suit.

Respondents must also furnish sufficient security before the learned Trial Judge within four weeks from the date which, for the time being, is assessed at Rupees One Crore. 25. For the reasons aforementioned, the appeals are. ·· dismissed subject to the observations and directions made · hereinbefore. However, in the facts and Circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. R. P. Appeals dismissed.