MANU BHUSAN ROY PRADHAN v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL

Citation: [1973] 2 S.C.R. 842; 1972 INSC 270

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: J.M. SHELAT , I.D. DUA, Y.V. CHANDRACHUD

Judgment date: 1972-10-31

Case summary

1972 INSC 270. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1972-10-31. MANU BHUSAN ROY PRADHAN v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL. Read the judgment and case details on...

Judgment text

844 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1973] 2 s. c. R. MANU BHUSAN ROY PRADHAN v. STATE OF WEST BEN. GAL October 31, 1972 [J. M. SHELAT, Y. V. CHANDRACHUD AND l. D. lJuA, JJ. ] Mainte11ance oi Internal Security Act, 1971-S. 3(2)~P·1blic Order- What it amoUnts 10 • . The petitioner was arrested and detained under s. 9 read with section 3(2) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act of 1971 on the grounds:-(! ) that on 16-4-71 at about 8 p. m. the petition. er, a member of the aciion squad of C. P. I. (ML), along with others, committed a murderous assault on one Shri Bulo Das Gupta, who later died in hospital. As a result of this crime, people of the locality became highly terrorised and the public peac. e was greatly disturbed: and (2) on 19·7·71 at 7. 30 p. n\.

the petitioner, along with others forcibly entered a school and set fire to the school buildings, causing irreparable loss to the institution with the object of causing dislocation in the present system of education and compelling the school authorities. to close it down and as a result oi the lire the teachers and the local people became panicky and the public peace was greatly disturbed. In this Court it was submitted by the counsel appearing as amicus curiae that the petitioner had been arrested on August 5, 1971 in connec· tion with six cases. He was bailed out on November JO, 1971 but was re-arrested soon thereafter. It was further submitted that ground no. 1 stated in the order of detention, was vague and had no rel. evance to the maintenanc-e of public order with the result that the petitioner's deten-ti juries inflicted; it iilso does not disclose as to how long after the assault the injured 'person died: the motive or the purpse of the -assault is also not stated.

The difference between maintenance of law and order and its disturbance and maintenance of public order lies in the degree and extent of disturbance and its effect on the current life of the community, Public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the Country as a whole or even a specified locality. Dis~ turbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts direrted against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a .. _:,\ general disturbance of public tranquillity. Public order indeed embraces ; •' more of the community than does law and order. [846 Fl It is always a question of degree of the harm and its effect upon the community. The question to ask is : . "Does it lead to dtsturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of . t. he . public order. or does it effeC't merely an individual leaving the trnnqutlhty of the society undisturbed ? " This question is to be answered 1n every case on facts.

There is no rigid formula by V1hich one case can be distinguished from another. [847 HJ M. B. ROY V. WEST BENGAL 843 Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, [1966] 1 S. C. R. 709 and Arun Shah v. Slate of West Bengal, [ 1970] 3 S. C. R. 288, referred to. (ii) Jn the present case, the solitary incident of assault on one individual which may well be equated with an ordinary murder without any further details about the assault can hardly be said to disturb public peace or place public order in jeopardy so as to bring the case within the purview of the Act. It can only raise -a law and order problem and no more. (848 C-D] (iii) Ground no. 2, however, is quite germane to the problem . etween maintenance of law and order and its disturbance and the maintenance of public order and its disturbance. Public order was said to embrace more of the community than law and order. Public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the :. :ountry as a whole or even a specified locality.

Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts dir~cted against ]ndividuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquillity. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order. Take for instance, n man stabs another. People may be shocked and even disturbed, but the life of the commuuity keeps moving at an even tempo, however much one may di5like the act. Take another case of a town where there is com-munal tension. A man stabs a member of the other community. This is an act of a very different sort. Its implications are deeper and it affects the even tern po of life and public order is jeopardized because the reper-cussions of the act embrace large sections of th~ community and incite them to make further breaches of the law and order and to subver~ the public order.

An act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be very different. " The learned Chief Justice, after referring to the lines of demarca-tion drawn by Ramaswami J. , in W. P. 179 of 1968 between serious and aggravated forms of breaches of public order which affect the community or endanger the public interest at large and minor breaches of peace which do not affect the public at large, and after noting the analogy drawn by Ramaswami J. , between public and private crimes, cautioned against that analogy being pushed too far, observing, that a large number of acts directed against persons or individuals may total up into a breach of public order. After referring to Dr. Ram Manohar Loh ids case (supra) the learned Chief Justice observed : "It is always a question of degree of the harm and its effect upon the community.

The question to ask is : Does it lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed ? This qut"Stion has to be faced in every case on facts. There is no formula by which one case can be distinguished from another. " This view was reaffirmed in Nagendra Nath Mondal v. The State of West Bengal('), Sudhir Kumar Saha v. Commissioner of Police Calcutta('), Sk. Kader v. The State of West Bengal('), Kanu Bfawas v. State of West Bengal('), Kishori Mohan v. State of West Bengal(') and Amiya Kumar Karmakar v. State of West Bengal("). Ground no. 1 in the case before us merely mentions murderous assault by the petitioner on Bulo Das Gupta. It shows neither the nature of the weapon used nor the nature or extent of the injuries inflicted, nor does it disclose as to how long after the assault the injured person died.

The motive or the purpose of the assault is also not stated. This kind of a solitary assault on one individual, which may well be equated with an ordinary murder which is not an uncommon occurrence, can hardly be said to disturb public peace or place public order in jeopardy, so as to bring the case within the purview of the Act. It can only raise a law and order problem and no more; its impact on the society as a whole cannot be considered to be so extensive, widespread and forceful as to disturb the normal life of the community there-by rudely shaking the balanced tempo of the orderly life of the general public. This ground is, therefore, not at all relevant for •Ustaining the order of detention for preventing the petitioner from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public o:·der. Ground no. 2, however, is quite germane to the problem of maintenance of public order. But the question arises whether in the absence of ground no.

1 which, in our view, Ts wholly irrelevant, the detaining authority would have felt satisfied on the basis of the solitary ground nq. 2 alone to make the impugned order. Can it be said that ground no. 1 is of a comparatively unessential nature so as not to have meaningfully influenced the decision of the detaining authority. Similar problem has faced this Court on a number of occasions and the decision has p;enerally gone in favour of the detenu. This Court in Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj v. The State of Delhi('! laid down that the requirement that the grounds must not be vague must be satisfied with respect to each of ~he grounds. In Dwarka Das Bhatia v. The State of Jammu & 8 Kashmir( ) the principle deduced from the earlier decisions of this Court and also from the decision of the Federal Court in Keshav Talpade v. The King Emperor(") was stated thus : (1) A. T. R. 1972 S. C. 665. (2) [1970] 3 S. C. R. 360. (3) A. T. R. [1972] S. C. 1647. (4) A. T. R. [1972] S. C. 1656. (5) A. LR.

(1972) S. C. 1749. (6) W. P. 190/1972 dnted/31-7-1972. (7) [19531 S. C. R. 708. (8) [19561 S. C. R. 94P. (9) [19681 2 S. C. R. 505. M. B. l. OY V, WEST BENGAL (Dua,/. ) 849 "Where po'Ver is vested in a statutory authority to deprive the liberty of a subject on its subjective satisfaction· with reference to specified matters, if that satis· faction is stated to be based on a number of grounds or for a variety of reasons, all taken together, and if some out of them are found to be non-existent or irrelevant the very exercise of that power is bad. That is so because the matter being one for subjective satisfaction, it must be properly based on all the reasons on which ic purports to be based. If some out of them are found to be non-existent or irrelevant, the Court cannot predicate what the subjective satisfaction of the said authority would have been on the eXclusion of those grounds or reasons.

To uphold the validity of such an order in spite of the invalidity of some of the reasons or grounds would be to substitute the objective standards of the Court for the subjective satisfaction of the statutory authority. In applying these principles however the Court must be satisfied that the vague or irrelevant grounds are such as, if excluded, might reasonably have affected the· subjective satisfaction of the appropriate authority. It is not merely because some ground or reason of a comparatively unessential nature is defective that such an order based on subjective satisfaction can be held to be invalid. The Court while anxious to safeguard the . personal liberty of the individual will not lightly interfere with such orders. It is in the light of these principles that the validity of the impugned order has to be judged. " 1 In Rameshwar Lal v.

State of Bihar( ) it was observed : "Since the detenu is not placed before a Magistrate and has only a right of being supplied the grounds of detention with a view to his making a representation to the Advisory Board the grounds must not be vague or indefinite and must afford a real opportunity to make a representation against the detention. Similarly, if a vital ground is shown to be non-existing so that it could not have and ought not to have played a part in the material for consideration, the court may attach some importance to this fact. " In Motilal Jain v. State of Bihar( ), a decision by a Bench of six Judges, after reviewing the earlier decisions, this Court ex-pressed its view thus : (I) [1943] F. C. R. 88. (2) [1968] 3 S,C. R. 587. . .

"The defects noticed in the two grounds mentioned above are sufficient to vitiate the order of detention impugned in these proceedings as it not possible to hold that those grounds could not have influenced the decision of the detaining authority. Individual liberty is a cherished right, one of the most valuable fundamental rights guaranteed by our Constitution to the citizens of this country. If that right is invaded, excepting strictly in accordance with law, the aggrieved party is entitled to appeal to the judicial power of the State fonelief. We are not unaware of the fact that the interest of the society is no less important than that of the individual. Our Constitution has made provision for safeguarding the interests of the socie,iy. Its provisions harmoniSe the liberty of the individual}with social interest. The authorities have to act solely/on the basis of those provisions.

They cannot deal with/ the liberty of the individual in a casual manner, as has 'been done in this case. Such an approach does not advance the true social interest. Con-tinued indifference to individual liberty is bound to erode the structure of our democratic society. " In the case before us there are only two grounds on wtich the detention order is based. One of them which relates to an occurrence of April, 1971 has no relevance or relation to the disturbance of public order. The other ground re! ates to an occurrence of July, 1971. This ground is no doubt germane to the object of maintenance of public order; but we are satisfied that the first ground is not of an unessential nature and in our view its exclusion from consideration might reasonably have affected the sub-jectlve satisfaction of the authority making the impugned order of 0 detention. This was the test laid down in Bhatia's case (supra) and approved in Mori/a/ Jain (supra).

As has often been em· phasised by this Court the Act encroaches on the highly cherished right of personal liberty by conferring on the executive extraordinary power to detain persons without trial by coming to subjective decisions. The detaining authority in exercising this power must . ,act strictly within the limitations this Act places on its power so "'that the guarantee of personal liberty is not il}lperilled beyond what the Constitution and the Jaw strictly provide. The limited M. B. ROY V. WEST BENGAL (Dua,/. ) 851 right of redress conferred on the detenu under the law deserves to be construed with pennissible liberality consistently with the previsions of the Act and the constitutional guarantee. We find that the impugned order in this case has been made without paying due heed to the provisions of the Act and the ortler is clearly beyoud the statutory scope. The impugned order must, therefore, be struck down as outside the Act.

The petitioner was released by us by means of a short order on October 4, 1972.. We have now stated our reasons in support of that order. s. c. Petition allowed. 3-L521Sup. C. I. /73

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