MANUJENDRA DUIT v. PURENDU PROSAD ROY CHOWDHURY & ORS .
Citation: [1967] 1 S.C.R. 475; 1966 INSC 179
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: K. SUBBA RAO , J.M. SHELAT
Judgment date:
Case summary
1966 INSC 179. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1966-09-22. MANUJENDRA DUIT v. PURENDU PROSAD ROY CHOWDHURY & ORS . Read the judgment and case details...
Judgment text
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1967] 1 s. c. R. MANUJENDRA DUIT v. PURENDU PROSAD ROY CHOWDHURY & ORS . • September 22, 1966. [K. -SUBBA RAo, C. J. AND J. M. SHELAT, J:] Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949, ss. 3 and 29-S. 3 whether over-rides provision in lease agreement requiring landlord to give six months' notice ,to tenant for termination of lease-Suit for eviction of tenants transferred to Controller of Thika Tenancy under s. 29-Section repealed by Amending Act 6 of 1953-Controller's jurisdiction to try suit whether continues. The appellant was the tenant of the respondents on a piece of land. According to the lease agreement the period of lease was fixed at ten years but the lessee was entitled to renew the lease after that period under certain conditions. The lease agreement further provided that if the lessor required the lessee to vacate the premises whether at the time of the expiry of the lease or thereafter (in case tho !
ei;seo exercised his option to renew the lease), six months' notice to the lessee was necessary. Tho lessee exercised his option to continue the lease arid offered to fulfil the conditions therefor. The Court of Wards on behalf of the respondents, sought to impose further conditions for the renewal of the lease which the appellant did not accept. The Court 'of Wards thereUpon filed a suit in the Court of the First Subordinate Judge, Alipore for the eviction of the appellant on the ground that he was a trespasser. In the meanwhile the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 was passed by the West Bengal Legislature. As provided in s. 29 of the Act the suit was transferred to the Thika Controller. Thereafter Amendment Act 6 of 1963 was passed which deleted s. 29 and the appellant urged before the Controller that he no longer had jurisdiction to try the matter. This contention was reiected and on the merits the Controller decided against tho appellant holdmg that in view of s.
:) of the Act the six months' notice required by the lease agreetnent for the ,eviction of the appellant was not nOCOS$'11'Y1 The High Court also decided against the appellant who thereupon came to this Court with certificate. HELD: (i) Though s. 29 was deleted by the Amendment Act of 1953 the deletion could not affect pending proceedings and would not deprive the Controller of his jurisdiction to try such proceedings pending before him at the date when the Amendment Act came into force. Though the Amendment Act did not contain any saving clause, under s. 8 of the Bengal General Clauses Act, 1899 the transfer of the suit having been lawfully made under s. 29 of the Act its deletion would not have the effect of altering the law applicable to the claim in the litigation. There is nothing in s. 8 of the Amending Act, 1953 suggesting a different intention and therefore the deletion would not affect the previous operation of s.
5 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, or the transfer of the suit to the Controller or anything duly done under s. 29. That being the correct position in law the High Court was right in holding that in spite of the deletion of s. 29 the Controller still had the jurisdiction to proceed with the said suit transferred to him. (479 G] (ii) The Thika Tenancy Act does not confer any additional ri~t. t entitled to evict the appellant on the ground that they required the said land either for building on it or otherwise developing it but upheld their contention that they were entitled to an order of eviction under els. (v} and (vi) of s. 3. The appellant took the matter to the High Court under Art. 227 MANUJENDRA V. PURENDU PROSAD (She/at,/. ) 479 challenging the correctness of the said judgment and order which appli~tion was converted into Civil Revision No. 2612 of 1957. Before the High Court two questions were canvassed : (1) regarding the jurisdiction of the Controller after s.
29 of the Act was deleted and (2) regarding the notice which the appellant claimed he was entitled to under the said lease before the respondents could exercise any right of eviction. The High Court was of the view tliat in spite of the deletion of secti tice either under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act or under the lease was necessary in the present case as the lease expired by eftlux of time and no renewal was agreed upon by the parties. Therefore, since the lease expired the lessee in the absence of any such renewal was (I) (19541 A. C. 80 at p. 90. (2) A. LR. 1964 S. C. 1341. •. (3) A. 1. R. 1965 S. C. 101. (4) 53 C. W. N. &59. (5) 63 C. W. N. 824 at 831. (6) A. I. R. 1949 Mad. 180. • • bound to hand over vacant possession to the respondents as provided by clause 7 of the said lease. Mr.
Sarjooprasad argued that in the absence of any renewal of the lease if the appellant continued to be in possession of the property in suit his possession was that of a trespasser and therefore there was no question of any notice having to be given to him. The construction suggested by Mr. Sarjooprasad cannot be upheld as such a construction would be contrary to the express language of the proviso to clause 7 of the lease. As already stated clause 7 requires that on the determination of the lease by efflux of time or earlier termination the lessee has to hand over vacant possession of the land in its original position after removing the structures constructed there-on by him. ff the structures are not so removed the lessee has to sell them to the lesser at a valuation to be fixed by the lessor"s Engineer.
What would happen in a case where the tenant is not informed and does not know whether his lease which is for a fixed term would be extended by a renewal or otherwise 7 If there is no provision for an option to renew and the landlord does not extend the term, he has, of course, to vacate on the expiry of the term. But where the lease provides for an option and the tenant exercises the option it is but fair and equitable that he must know in good time whether the lessor agrees to the renewal or not. It is to provide against a contingency where the lessee would have to quit without a fair opportunity to dispose of the structures he has put up that the proviso was added in cl. 7 of the lease and that proviso must - be given effect to. The proviso lays down the condition of six -months' notice ending with the expiry of the term clearly to ·er. able the lessee to remove the structures, if need be, if the lease W•;S not renewed or extended.
The object of insert-ing such a condition being clear as aforesaid it would not be right to construe clause 7 and its proviso in the manner suggested by the respondents. To summarise the position : The Thika Tenancy Act does not confer any additional rights on a landlord but on the contrary imposes certain restrictions on his right to evict a tenant under the general law or under the contract of lease. The Thika Act like other Rent Acts enacted in various States imposes certain further restrictions on the right of the landlord to evict his tenant and lays down that the status of irremovability of a tenant cannot be got rid of except on specified grounds set out in section 3. The right of the appellant therefore to have a notice as provided for by the proviso to clause 7 of the Lease was not in any manner affected by section 3 of the Thika Act.
The effect of the non-obstante clause was that even where a landlord has duly terminated the contractual tenancy or i; otherwise entitled to evict his tenant he would still be entitled to a decree for eviction provided that his claim for possession falls under any one or more of or the grounds MANUJBNDRA v. PURBNDU PROSAD (She/at,/. ) 483 in section 3. Before therefore the respondents could be said to be entitled to a decree for eviction they had first to give six months notice as required by the proviso to clause 7 of the lease and such noti.. :e not having been admittedly given their suit for eviction could not succeed.
In our view the construction placed_ by the High Court on section ~ was not correct and the High Court was wrong in holding that the words "notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract" absolved the respondents from their obliga6on to give the six months notice to the appellant before claiming from him vacant possession of the land in question. In the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and order passed by the High Court and dismiss the respondent's suit. The respondents will •pay to the appellant his costs all throughout. G. C. Appeal allowed.
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