MOHAN KUMAR SINGHANIA AND ORS. ETC. ETC v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. ETC. ETC

Citation: [1991] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 46

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: S. RATNAVEL PANDIAN, M. FATHIMA BEEVI, K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY

Case summary

challenge travels beyond the intent of the main rule namely, Rule 4 of the CSE Rules? ppear in the Civil Services (Main) Examination in 1988 he would not be allowed to join the Probationary Training along with the candidates of 1987 group but would only be allowed to join the...

Judgment text

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S. RATNAVEL PANDIAN, J. The above batch of Civil Appeals in which common questions of law arise, is preferred by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution of India against the judgments dated +- 20. 8. 1990, 4. 10. 1990 and 5. 10. 1990 of the Central Administrative Tribun~ Principal Bench, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to asTribunal) rendered in various affiliated groupc; of original applications (O. As) upholding the validity of the second proviso to Rule 4 of the Civil Services Examination Rules (hereinafter referred to as 'C. S. E. Rules') introduced by Notification No. 13016/4/86-AIS(l) dated 13. 12. 1986 (Published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary, Part I Section 1). Be it noted that similar notification has been/is being issued each year for the general· information of the candidates setting down the terms and conditions, eligibility etc~ to sit for the Civil Service Examination of tlie concerned year.

· While a substantial. number. of O. As filed before the Tribunal . at Delhi were pending, a similar number of analogous O. As filed before the · · Benches of Administrative Tribunals at Patna, Allahabad, Chandigarh, Jabalpur, Hyderabad, Jodhpur and Eranakulam were transferred to the Tribunal at Delhi since common questions of law arose for determination in all the OAs. . ··.. The Tribunal rendered its main judgnlent in 0. A. No. 206/89 Alok -·-"'-' Kμmar v.. Union of India & Ors. and 61 other 0. As in which the facts appear to be common. The otherjudgments were passed on the basis of -the conclusiOns arrived in O. A. No. 206/89 and the connected batch of OAs. Since the Tribunal has set out ·only the facts in the case of Alok Kumar (O. A. No. 206/89) treating it as a main application and illustrative of the questions raised, we would like to briefly indicate the facts.

ofAlok Kumar's case so that the impelling circumstances which led to the filing of · these appeals and the cominon questions of law involved may be under- . stood . in the proper: perspective in the light of the judgnient of ~e Tribunal. - ~ . In this oontext>if may be noted that though no appeal has been fded against the Order in O. A. No. 206/89, we are giveμ to understand that Alok · Kumar who agitated bis similar claim along with two others who were all allocated to Group 'A' Services (tR. P. S. ) in O. A. No. 1071/1990 has : ... ; -~~ preferred Civil Appeal No. 5469 of 1990 against the judgment in the said OA. No. 1071of1990. Shri Alok Kumar filed his application in December 1986 to sit for the preliminary examination in 1987. The preliminary examination was held by the Union Public Service Commission ('UPSC for short') in June 1987 and the result was declared in July 1987. The C. S. E. (Main) Examination was held by the UPSC in November 1987. The interviews took place in.

April 1988 and the final results were declared by the UPSC in June, 1988. The applicant, Aiok Kumar was selected for appointment to Central Service Group 'A' post. A communication to this effect was sent to him on 30. 8. 88 in which Alok Kumar's attention was drawn to Rule 4 of the C. S. E. Rules 1987 pointing out that if he intended to a. ppear in the Civil Services (Main) Examination in 1988 he would not be allowed to join the Probationary Training along with the candidates of 1987 group but would only be allowed to join the Probationary Training along with the candidates who would be appointed on the basis of the CSE 1988. The said letter also indicated that in the matter of seniority, he would be placed below all the candidates who would join training without postponement. Therefore, he was. required to furnish the information about his appearing in the CSE (Main) 1988 to the c. oncerned cadre controlling authorities.

He was further informed that only on receipt of the above information, the concerned cadre controlling authority would permit him to abstrain from the Proba~ · tionary Training. The Joint Director, Estt. G (R), Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) informed Alok Kumar about his selection for appointment to the Indian Railway Personnel Service and that the training would commence from 6. 3. 1989 and that he should report for training at the· -,,/ Railway Staff College, Vadodara. Further he was informed that ·he once joined the Probationary Training along \\ith 1987 batch , he would not be eligible for consideration of appointment on the basis of subsequent CSE conducted by the UPSC. . The case of Alok Kumar was that he. did not intend to appear in the next CSE and he had already appeared for the CSE 1988 even before he received the offer of appointment dated 2. 1. 1989. He was then intimated that if_he had already joined the Probationary Training along with 1987 bateh, he would .

not be eligible for consideration for appointment on the basis of subsequent CSE conducted by the UPSC. Besides the main reliefs, Alok Kumar had prayed . for an interim order to join and complete the current Probationary Training without being compelled to sign the wtJcrf\~king sought to be obtained from him subject to final orders in the OA. The Division Bench of the Tribunal issued an interim order, as prayed for by Alok Kumar, allowing him to join the requisite training for the service to which he had been allocated and allowed him to appear in the interview as and when he was called by the UPSC on the basis of 1988 ~-· ' Examination. The respondents filed their reply explaining the circumstances under which the second proviso was introduced to rule 4 of CSE Rules, its scope and ambit and refuted all the intentions raised by Alok Kumar challenging the legality and constitutionality of the impugned proviso.

The Tribunal by its detailed and considered judgment has rendered its conclusions thus: ~ "Having considered the matter in the above bunch of cases, we have come to the following conclusions: - 1. The 2nd proviso to Rule 4 of the Civil Services Examination Rules is valid. 2. The provisions of Rule 17 of the above Rules are also valid. 3. The above provisions are not hit by the provisions of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 4. The restrictions imposed by the 2nd proviso to Rule 4 of the Civil Services Examination Rules are not bad in law. 5. (i) The letter issued by the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions dated 30th August, 1988 and in particular, paragraph 3 thereof and paragraph 4 of the letter dated 2. 1. 1989, issued by the Cadre Controlling Authority, Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) are held to be bad in law and unenforceable. Similar letters issued on different dates by other Cadre controlling Authorities are also unenforceable.

(ii) A candidate who has been allocated to the I. P. S. or to a Central Services, Group 'A' may be allowed to sit at the next 1 Civil Services Examination, provided he is within the permissible age limit, without having to resign from the service to which he has been allocated, nor would he lose his original seniority in the service to which he is allocated if he is unable to take training with his own Batch. 6. Those applicants who have been allcoated to the I. P. S. or any Central Services, Group 'A', can have one rnore attempt in the subsequent Civil Services Examination, for the Services in- dicated in rule 17 of the C. S. E. Rules. The Cadre Controlling Authorities can grant one opportunity to such candidates. 7. All those candidates who have been allocated to any of the Central Services, Group 'A', or I. P. S. and who have appeared in Civil Services Main Examination of a subsequent year under the interim orders of the Tribunal for the Civil Services Ex- .

aminations 1988 or 1989 and have succeeded, are to be given benefit of their success subject to the provisions of Rule 17 of the C. S. E. Rules. But this examination will not be available for any subsequent Civil Services Examination. In the result, therefore, the Applications succeed only in part-viz. , quashing of the 3rd paragraph of the letter dated 30. 8. 1988 and 4th paragraph of the letter dated 2nd January, 1989 and similar paragraphs in the letters issued to the applicants by other cadre controlling authorities. Further, a direction is given to the respondents that all those candidates who have been allocated to any of the Central Services, Group 'A' or l. P. S. and who have appeared in Civil Services Main Examination, 1988 or 1989 under the interim orders of the Tribunal and are within the permissible age limit and have succeeded are to be given benefit of their success subject to the provisions of Rule 17 of the C. S. E. Rules. The O. As are dis- missed on all other counts.

" On the basis of the above directions given in paragraphs 5(ii), 6 and 7, we gave some interim directions on 7. 12. 1990 which are annexed to this judgment as Annexure 'A'. Several learned counsel appeared for the respective parties and advanced their submissions interpreting the rules and cited a plethora of decisions in support of their respective cases. Whilst Mr. P. P. Rao, senior counsel assisted by Mr. C. N. Sreekumar and others, Mr. Gopal Subramaniam, Mrs. C. M. Chopra, Mr. Gopal Singh and Mr. A. M. Khanwilkar appeared for the appellants in the various batches of cases, th ~ Rao, senior counsel appearing for the appellants forcibly and fervehtW oontended that the second proviso to rule 4 of the impugned notification is ultra-vires clause (iii-a) of Regulation 4 of the Regulations, 1955 inasmuch as the power to notify exceptions does not include the power to make ineligible the candidates who are "otherwise eligible" in terms of Clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of Regulation 4.

In other words, all '""' candidates, who satisfy the requirements of nationality, age and educational qualifications prescribed in clauses (i) to (iii) of Regulation 4, are entitled to the maximum nl! mber of attempts prescribed in clause (iii-a) which initially was three attempts, since raised tQ four attempts w. e. f. 1. 2. 90.

He further submits that the expression 'in this behalr appearing in the said clause (iii-a) refers only to the number of attempts of candidates otherwise eligible in terms of clauses (i) to (iii) of Regulation 4 and that the obvious intention in conferring the power on the Central Government ~-i; to "notify exceptions 'in his behair of candidates 'otherwise eligible' was to enable the Government to increase th"e number of attempts in deserving cases, such as - candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes· and· other weaker sections including physically handicapped category and that consequently the Central Government has no power to add more conditions of eligibility to those stipulated in Regulation 4 itself. MOHAN KUMAR v. U. O. I. fl'ANDIAN, J. ] 79 ·According to him, the second part of the ~pugned proviso to Rule 4.

of CSE Rules which insists that a candidate who was permitted to abstain from probationary traiDing in order to appear at the next Civil Services 1 (Main) Examination and who accepted the allocation to a service subsequently and is appointed to the service "shall not be eligible to appear· again in the CSE (Main) unless he first resigns from the Service and in other words it declares a candidate, who is o_therwise eligible in terms of Regulation 4 as ineligible unless he first res~gns from the service. This additional condition of eligibility, according to him, is clearly beyond the scope of the limited power to notify exceptioqs to the number of attempts prescribed and, therefore ultra-vires Regulation 4 (iii-a). Mr. Kapil Sibal, the Learned Additional: Solicitor General presented a plausible argument countering the pleadings of Mr. P. P.

Rao and drew our attention to Rule 7 of IAS (Recruitment) Rules of 1954 which deals with the recruitment by competitive examination, and sub-rule (2) which states that an examination, namely, the competitive examination for recruitment to the service shall be conducted by the Commission in accor? ance wit~ such regul~tion~ as the Centr~l povernment may from time to ttme make m consultation with the Comm1Ssion and State Governments.

~ ·· According to him, the permissible number of attempts that a candidate can avail is also a condition of eligibility because the object is for a dual purpose, namely, 'to get the best and to retain the best', and that Regulation 4 (iii-a) should be read with Rule 4 of CSE as its part: He continues to state that under Article 73 of the Constitution, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the Central Government in exert:ise of its executive power can regulate the manner in which the right of a candidate in appearing for the competitive examination is to be exercised ~d, therefore, the restric- . ;;,,/ tion imposed in the second proviso to Rule 4 of CSE Rules is in no way u/tra-vires clause (iii-a) of Regulation 4 of Regul~tions, 1955.

I The source of power for the Central Government fot making rules and regulations for 'Recruitment and the Conditions of Services of Persons appointed to All India Services' in consultations with the Government of States concerned as well making regulation under or in pursuance of any such right is derived from Section 3 of the All India Services Act, 1951. I The Regulations, 1955 were made by Central Government in pur- 7"'" suance of rule 7 of IAS (Recruitment) Rules of 1954 in consultation with 1 the State Governments and the Union Public Service Commission. Clause (iii-a) of Regulation 4 was substituted vide Department of Personnel A & R Notification No. 11028/1/78/AIS dated 13. 12. 1978 and the latter part of which by another notification dated 23. 11. 1988.

· We are concerned only with the earlier part of the said clause as per which unless covered by any of the exceptions that may from time to t~me be notified by the Central Government, in this behalf, every candidate appearing for the examination after 1st January 1979, who is otherwise eligible, shall be permitted three attempts at the examination. If Rule 4 of CSE Rules is examined in juxtaposition of clause (iii-a) of Regulation 4, it is clear that both rule 4 of CSE Rules anQ Clause (iii-a) of the Regulation 4 show that every eligible candidate appearing at the CSE should be permitted three attempts at the examination. As we have pointed out in the earlier part of this judgment, the attempts are now increased to 4 under Rule 4 of the CSE Rules. This increase of attempts by the Government is by virtue of its power which flows under Article 73 of the Constitution of India.

The eligibility of a candidate to appear in the CSE with regard to nationality, age and educational qualifications'is given under clauses (i) to (iii) of Regulation 4 but the Government by exercise of its executive power has imposed certain restrictions under some specified circumstances. Even today, in the nor-· mat course, every eligible candidate can appear in the examination for all the permissible attempts and the restriction of attempts is not applicable in the case of SC/ST who are otherwise eligible but subject to their upper age limit. A plain and grammatical reading of clause (iii-a) of Regulation 4 shows that if the number of attempts are covered by any of the exceptions + that may from time to time be notified by the Central Government in this behalf, then the notification will become enforceable and only in the absence of such notification, every candiqate normally can appear for all the permitted attempts at the examination whether three or four.

The impugned second proviso does not restrict or put an embargo on the number of attempts in the normal course. But the restriction is only when the conditions enumerated in the impugned proviso are satisfied. In order to appreciate and understand the restr}ction imposed, in its proper perspective, we shall refer to certain decisions of this Court cited by both the parties, firstly with reference to the interpretation of statutes and secondly with regard to the construction of a proviso in relation to the subject matter covered by the section/rule to which the proviso is appended. Before we cogitate and analyse this bone of contention in some detail, it will be convenient at this stage to pore over some of the well established rules of construction which would assist us to steer clear of the impasse entertained by the learned counsel, according to whom some complications are created by the impugned notification being 11/tra-vires·clause ~ (iii-a) of Regulation 4 of Regulations, 1955.

Maxwell on the "Intel]Jretation of Statutes" 10th Edition page 7 says thus: "........... if the choice is between two interpretations, the nar- rower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of _J.. the legislation, we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. " · venience and hardships should be avoided and that when the language is clear and explicit and the words used are plain and unambiguous, we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense with reference to other clauses of the Act or Rules as the case may be, so far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes/Rules/ Regulations relating to the subject matter.

Added to this, in construing a statute, the Court has to ascertain the intention of the law making authority in the backdrop of the dominant purpose and the underlying intendment of the said statute and that every statute is to be interpreted without any violence to its language and applied as far as its explicit language admits consistent with the established rule of interpretation. A proViso to a Section/ Rule is expected to except or qualify something in \he enacting part and presumed to be necessary. Coming to the · broad general rule of construction of the proviso Maxwell on "The Inter- ~ pretation Qf statute" in the 11th edition at page 155 has quoted a passage from Kent's Commemary on American Law, 12th &in. Vol. 1, 463n, reading thus: "The true principle undoubtedly is, that the sound interpreta- 1tion and meaning of the statute, on a view of the enacting <clause, saving clause and proviso, taken and construed together is to prevail.

n Maxwell in his 12th Edition has quoted a passage from Att. Gen. v. Chelsea Waterworks Co. , [1731] Fitzg. 195 which reads that if a proviso cannot reasonably be construed otherwise than as contradicting the main enactment, then the proviso will prevail on the principle that "it speaks that last intention of the makers". • It is pointed out in Piper v. Harvey, [1958} 1 Q. B.. 439 that if, however, the language of the proviso makes it plain that it was intended to have an operation more extensive than that of the provision which it immediately follows, it must be given such wider effect. + In R. v. Leeds Prison (Govemor), Exp. Stafford [1964} 2 Q. B. 625 it is pointed out thus: "The main part of a section must not be construed in such a way as to render a proviso to the section redundant. " A Constitution Bench of this Court in Ram Narain Sons Ltd. and Ors. y. Asstt. Commissioner of Sales tax and Ors.

, [1955] 2 SCR 483 has made the following observations: "It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that a proviso to a particular provision of a statute only embraces the field which is covered by the main provision. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted as proviso and to no other. " Another Constitution Bench inAbdullobar Butt & Another v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, [1957] SC:R 51 held that it is a fundamental rule of --tconstruction that a proviso must be considered with relation to the prin· cipal matter to which it stands as a proviso. See also Commissioner of Income Tax v. S. Teja Singh, [1959) 1 Suppl. SCR 394. MOHANKUMAR v. U. 0. I. [PANDIAN, J. ) 85 Kapur, J speaking for the bench of this Court in The Commissioner _,;J.. of Income Tax, Mysore, Travancore Cochin and Coorg, Bangalore v. The Indo Mercantile Bank Limited, [1959] 2 Suppl. SCR 256 reiterated the view expressed by Bhagwati, J as he then was in Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v.

Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, [1955] 2 SCR 483 at 493 and the observations by Lord Macmillan in Madras & Southern Maliratta Railway Co. v. Bezwada Municipality, 1944 L. R. 71 I. A. 113, 122 and laid down the sphere of a proviso thus: "The territory of a proviso therefore is to carve out an exception to the mai11 enactment and exclude something which otherwise would have been within the section. It has to operate in the same field and if the language of the i:nain enactment is clear it cannot be used for the purpose of interpreting the main enactment or to exclude by implication what the enactment clearly says unless the words of the proviso are such that that is its necessary effect. (Vide also Corporatio11 ofthe City ofToro11to v. Attomey-Generalfor Canada, [1946] A. C. 32,37. " Mis Macki1111011 Macki11zie & Co. Ltd. v. AudreyD'Cost a11d A11other, [1987] 2 sec 469 may also be referred to.

When the impugned second proviso to Rule 4 of the CSE Rules is interpreted in its grammatical meaning and cognate expressions and construed harmoniously with. the substantive rule in the light of the above decisions of this Court as well as the views expressed by various authors in their Text Books on this subject, it is pellucid that the said proviso only carves out an exception to Rule 4 of the CSE Rules in given circumstances and under specified conditions and, therefore, the second proviso cannot be read in isolation and interpreted literally. On the other hand the substantive Rule 4 is to be read in conjunction with the two provisos appended thereto so as to have a correct interpretation. '"" In the proviso, in dispute, there are no positive words or indications which would completely exclude the operation of the substantive rule the spirit of Y•hich is reflected in Regulation 4 of the Regulations, 1955.

In fact, Rule 4 as stood till 1986, in its normal course; allowed a candidate to appear for three attempts, since increased to 4 for 1990 and 1991 Examinations. But the restriction is imposed by the seoond proviso only under certain circumstances as repeatedly indicated above. Although the notification of 1986 introducing the impugned proviso, no doubt, has to be strictly construed, the Court cannot overlook the very aim and object of the proviso thereby either defeating its purpose or rendering it redund~nt or inane or making it'otiose. Judged from any angle, we are not impressed by the contention of Mr. P. P. Rao that there is a violent breach of the provisions of the substantive Rule 4 of CSE Rules and Regulation 4 (iii-a) -and we are not able to persuade ourselves to hold that the impugned second proviso either subverts or destroys the basic objectives of Rule 4 and that it is u/tra-vires.

In this connection, it may be noted that the restriction or embargo, as the one under consideration is not only placed on the candidates who on the basis of the result of the previous CSE had been allocated and appointed to IPS or Central Service Group 'A' but also on the candidates appointed in the higher echelon of Civil Service, which we will presently deal with. There is a far more restrictive rule in existence, namely Rule 8 of the CSE Rules according to which a candidate who is appointed to the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) or the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) on the result of an earlier examination before the commencement of the ensuing examination and continues to be a member of that service will not be eligible to compete at the subsequent examination,. even if he/she is disillusioned and wants to switch over. In other words, this rule precludes the candidates who have been appointed to the IAS or IFS, from sitting in the ensuing examination while in _service.

Further, this rule states that in case, a candidate has been appointed to the IAS or IFS on the basis of the earlier examination and after the subsequent preliminary examination, but before the Main examination, that candidate, if continues to be a member of that service, shall not be eligible to appear in the ensuing main examination notwithstanding that· the said candidate has qualified himself in the preliminary examination. Similarly· if a candidate is appointed to the IAS or-IFS after the commencement of the Main Examination but before the announcement of the result _and continues to be a member of that service, the said candidate shall not be considered for appointments to any service/post on the basis of. the result of this examination.

The purpose for inco~rating this uncompromising and stringent provision is that the candidates appointed to the IAS and IFS are required to man the key positions -both in the Central and State Services wherein the appointees have to combine their intellectual capacity and the requisite traits of personality and also to exhibit higher intellectual profidency and leadership. Thus Rule 8 keeps up and,ritaintains the phe11omenon of the upper civil service,_ run under our constitution wi~all enduring features J and facets of the said se_rVice on All India-basis. --But there is_ no bar for \ a candidate who is appointed to the IAS/IFS tesigning from that service, -and sitting in the examination for IPS or any Central Service Group 'A'. Under Rule 4 of CSE Rules notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 8, a candidate who a~pts allocation_ to a service and appointed to that MOHAN KUMAR v. U. O. I. (PANDIAN, J.

} · 'ir1 service shall not be eligible to appear again in the CSE· unless he first resigns from that service. In other words, a candidate who is allocated and appointed to a service can sit in the ensuing examination provided he first resigns from that service. This restriction, in our view, is a reasonable one in order to achieve the desired result in the background of the situation and circumstances about which we have elaborately discussed albeit. In conclusion, we hold that the second provi~o to Rule 4 of CSE Rules does not travel beyond the intent of the main rule putting any unjustifiable embargo and that the proviso is not ultra-vires Regulation 4 (iii-a) of Regulations 1955 on the ground it makes the candidates ineligiole who are otherwise eligible in terms of clauses (i) to (iii) of the said Regulation and that the proviso to Rule 17 is not invalid. .

~ enactment is never to be held invalid unless it be, beyond question, plainly and palpably in excess of legislative power or it is ultra-vires or inconsistent with the statutory or constitutional provisions or it does not conform to the statutory or constitutional requirements or is made arbitrarily with bad faith or oblique motives or opposed to public policy. In our considered opinion, the second proviso to Rule 4 of CSE Rules cannot be held to be invalid. on any of the grounds mentioned above. The next question that has arisen for consideration is, how far the principle of reasonable restriction can be applied in· the formulation of the rules, keeping the relevance of the recruitment scheme to the civil service.

Neither an omnibus answer or a simplistic solution would carry us far to faee the public service reality in the modern state, the governing consideration of which is the context of actual situation, circumstances, resources and the societal goals ofthe particular State/country. . The further argument advanced in Civil Appeal Nos. 5506-5525 of 1990 (as appears from the written submission made by Mr. C. N. Sreekumar) is that on a correct interpretation of the impugned second proviso, the last clause of which reads. "such candidate who accepts the service shall not be eligible to appear again in the Civil Services Examination.

unless he first resigns from the service" refers to only candidates, who on the basis of the result of the previous CSE had been allocated to the Central Services Group 'A' but who expressed their intention to appear in then~ CSE (Main) for competing for IAS, IFS, IPS or Central Services Group 'A' and who are permitted to abstain from the probationary training in order to so appear and who joined Group 'A' service subsequently on allocation either on the basis of the previous . examination or the subsequent examination. According to him, in other words, the candidates who did not avail the benefit of abstaining from the probationary training ~with the permission of the Government in order to appear at the next Civil Services (Main) Examination do not fall within the scope of the impugned -;l_. restriction and they cannot be asked to resign as a condition precedent to their appearing again in the CSE. This tenuous argument does not appeal to us.

Firstly the expression "such candidate", is not used in the proviso, ori the other hand, the words used are "a candidate" (vide publication of Gazette of India dated 13-12-86). Secondly the last part of the· proviso, as it stands, reads "a candidate who accepts allocation to a service and is appointed to a service shall not be eligible to appear again in the Civil Services Examination unless he has first resigned from the service. " Thirdly ~a correct and proper reading of the last limb of the proviso clearly · demonstrates that the expression "a candidate" refers only to the. candidate, mentioned in the earlier part of the proviso. Lastly, if such an interpretation is to be giveri on the wrong reading of the proviso, then the whole object of the proviso will be defeated. Reg. Question No. 7 Mrs. C. M.

Chopra scathingly attacks the judgment of the Tribunal inter-alia contending that the protection guaranteed to the candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes under the Constitution - more particularly under Article 335 of the Constitution of Indiacannot be taken away by an arbitrary executive action by introducing the second proviso, thereby reducing the number. of permissible attempts for appearing in the CSE hitherto enjoyed by such candidates; that the right statutorily and constitutionally vested on the SC/ST candidates, permitting them to make unlimited attempts, of course, subject to the upper age limit cannot be easily whittled down and that the second proviso is an independent proviso, having no relation to the first proviso and apriori it cannot control·and prevail upon the first proviso which declares "that this restriction on the number of attempts will not apply in the case of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes who are otherwise eligible.

" According to her, the reservation policy guaranteed to the SC/ST candidates cannot be ,;: obliterated by an unreasonable and arbitrary executive action. No doubt, it is true that while the substantive Rule 4 of the CSE Rules permits every candidate to appear for three attempts at the examination - which . is now increased to four 7' the first proviso to this rule states ~ that this restriction on the number of attempts at. the examination is not applicable in the case of SC/ST candidates who ~re otherwise eligible. However, even in the case of SC/ST candidates, there is a specific restriction so far as the upper age limit is concerned as envisaged under Rule 6 (b) of the CSE Rules.

Regulation 7(2) of Regulation, 1955 states that the candidates belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes may, to the extent of the number of vacancies reserved for the · Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes cannot be filled on the basis of the standard determined by the Commission under sub-regulation (1) be recommended by the Commission by a relaxed standard to make up the deficiency in the reserved quota, subject to the fitness of these candidates for selection to the Service, irrespe~tive of their ranks in_. order to merit at the examination. Sub-Regulation (1) of Regulation 7 reads that subject to the provision of Sub-Regulation (2) the Commission (U. P. S. C. ) shall for-. ward to the Central Government a list arranged in order of merit of the candidates who have qualified by such standard as the Commission may determine. In the normal course, a candidate belonging to SC/ST category can enjoy all the benefits under the rules and regulations.

But the restriction imposed under the second proviso is only for a specified category of candidates by treating all such candidates at par and. without making any exception to the candidates belonging to SC/ST. The submission made by Mrs. Chopra that the second proviso is an independent one does not merit consideration because the second proviso to Rule 4 begins with the words "proi. •ided further.... " which expression would mean that a strict compliance of the second proviso is an additional requirement to that of the substantive rule 4 and the first proviso. The expression "provided further" spells out that the first proviso cannot be read in isolation or independent of the second proviso but it must be read in conjunction with the second proviso.

To put in other words, once the candidates belonging to SC or ST get through one common examination and interview test and are allocated and appointed to a service based on their ranks and performance and brought under the one and the same stream of category, then they too have to be treated among all other regularly and lawfully selected candidates and there cannot be any preferential treatment at that stage on the ground that they belong to SC or ST, though they may be entitled for all other statutory benefits such as to the relax_ation of age, the reservation etc. The unrestricted number of attempts, subject to the upper age limit, is available to the SC/ST candidates in the normal course but that is subject to the second proviso because when once they are allocated and appointed along with other candidates to a category/post, they are treated alike. . Ramaswami, J speaking for the Constitution Bench in CA. Rajendra11 v. Union of India & Ors.

, (1%8] 1 SCR 721 at page 733 while interpreting Article 16(4) of the Constitution of India observed thus: "Our conclilsion therefore is that Art. 16(4) does not confer any right on the petitioner and there is no constitutional duty imposed on the Government to make a reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, either at the initial stage of recruitment or at the stage of promotion. In other: words, Art. 16(4) is an enabling provision and confers a discretionary power on the state to make a reservation of appointments in favour of backward class of citizens which, in its opinion, is not adequately represented in the Services of the · ·State. We are accordingly of the opinion that th~ petitioner is unable to make good his submission on this aspect of the case. " A seven-Judges Bench in State of Kera/a v, N. M.

Thomas, (1976] 2 SCC 310 before which some important questions arose with regard to the intent of Article 16 of the Constitution, referred to and relied upon the observation in Rajendran's case holding that reservation is not a constitutional compulsion, but is a discretionary one. In that case. Krishna Iyer, J agreeing with the majority view expressed flis opinion thus: 'The State has been obligated to promote the economic interests of harijans and like backward classes, Articles 46 and 335 being a testament and Articles 14 to 16 being the tool-kit, if one may put it thatway. To blink at this panchsheel is to be unjust to the Constitution. " Further, the learned Judge held: ' ' · . ·"Indeed; Article J35 is more specific and cannot be brushed · aside or truncated iri the operational ambit vis-a-vis Article 16(1~ and (2) without hubristic aberration. " . .. . . . . . In Akliil Bllaratiya Soshit Kamraclrari Sangh (Railway) v: Union of India & Other!

, [1981]1 SCC 246, Krishna Iyer, J observed that Article 16(4) is not a. jarring note but auxiliary to fair fulfilment of Article 16(1) . and further said, "Article 16(4) is notin the 'nature of an exception to Article 16(1)~ It is afacet of Article 16(1)which fosters and furthers the . idea of equality of opportunity with special reference to an underprivileged and deprived class of citizens to whom egalite de droit (formal or legal equality) is not egalite de fait (practical or~facttial equality). See also M. R. Ba/aji ~. State of Mysore, [1963]' Supp. 1 SCR 439, Tri/oki Nath v. State ofJ&K, [1969] 1 SCR 103 and T. Devadasan v. Union of11idia, [1964] 4 SCR 680 and Comptroller and Auditor-Genera/ ofIndia v. KS. ! Q,gannathan, [1986] 2 SCC 679 at 684 (para 6).

The Constitution, no doubt, has laid aspecial responsibility on the Govtjrnment to protect the claims of SC/ST in the matter of public appointments under various Constitutional provisions of which we shall presently,refer to a few. Artide 16(4), as manifested from the various decisions of this court referred to hereinbefore, is an enabling provision conferring a discretionary power on the State for making any provision or reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens, which in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the service under the State. The. expression 'backward class' obviously takes within its fold people belonging to SC and ST (vide Janki Prasad v. State ofJ&K, AIR 1973 S. C. 930). Clause 4 of Article 16 has to be interpreted in the background of Article 335 as ruled by this Court in General Manager v. Rangachari, AIR 1962 S. C. 36 and in Rajendran's case referred to above.

Article 335 enjoins that the claims of the members of the SC and ST shall be taken into consideration, consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of administration, in the making of appointments to services or posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State. Article 320(4) makes it clear that the Public Service Cominissiori is not required to ·be consulted as respects the manner in which any provision referred to in Art. 16(4) may be made or as respects the manner in which effect may be given to Article 335. · The query before us is not in respect of the reservation of backward dasses or in respect of the claims of SC and ST services/posts, but it is whether the C<}ndidates belonging to SC and ST are entitled to any exception from the operation of the proviso. The answer to the above query would ~~ negative as we have aforesaid. . It may be true, as fervently submitted by Mrs.

Chopra there may be some hard cases, but the hard cases cannot be allowed to make bad law. Therefore, in the case on hand, as long as the second proviso does not suffer from any vice, it has to be construed, uniformly giving effect to all those falling under one category in the absence of any specific provision exempting any particular class or· classes of candidates from the operation of the impugned proviso and no one can steal march over others falling under the same category. Hence, the right of candidates belonging to SC and ST competing further to improve their career opportunities is limited · to the extent permissible under the second proviso to Rule 4 read with Rule 17 of the C. S. E. Rules. For the aforementioned reasons, we find no merits in the submission of Mrs. Chopra that the second proviso is not applicable to the candidates belonging to SC or ST. Mr.

Gopal Subramanian appearing on behalf of some of the appellants supplemented by the arguments of other counsel, stating that the very structure of the recruitment policy is itself disturbed to the great disadvantage of the candidates who since then have been enjoying the right to appear for 3 attempts as conferred by the substantive Rule 4 and that one of the present restrictions that the candidates should severe from the service, if intends to appear for the third time, after he has been allocated and - ,_appointed to a service is unjust, unreasonable and it seriously transgresses on the main provision and virtually interdicts the candidates from availing their statutorily conferred and protected right. Therefore, such a serveran~ of status from the service is ex-facie wrong, even if one can understand losing of seniority. We have already discussed this.

interpellation in extenso while dealing with similar contentions and our considered view expressed albeit will clearly answer this contention. Hence, we hold that there is no question of severance of status as we have come to the conclusion that the restriction imposed by the impugned proviso cannot be said to be unjust, unreasonable or arbitrary or change of any policy and moreover, the spirit of the main rule is not in any way disturbed. In the result, we conclude that there is neither any tenable reason nor any logic in the above submission. Reg. Question No.

8 Then a mordacious criticism was unleashed by all the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants inter-a/ia contending that the second proviso which is an administrative instruction is highly arbitrary and irrational having no nexus to the object of the scheme of recruitment to the post of civil services and that there was inadequate attention paid to the Pexus between the intent of the proviso and the object to be achieved. The learned Additional Solicitor General controverted the above argument stating that the working system of the civil service in relation to its logical relationship of recruitment rules on different aspects has been exclusively investigated bearing in _mind the process of rapid economic development with a democratic framework of Government on Indian scenario and the present proviso is having a dynamic, . reasonable and relative nexus with the objed to be achieved in. the present system of the civil services within its administrative framework.

No denying the fact that the civii service being the top most service in MOHANKUMAR v. U. 0. I. [PANDIAN. J. ] 93 the country has got to be kept at height, distinct from other services since .. -':- these top echelons have to govern a wide variety of departments. Therefore, the persons joining this higher service should have breadth of interest and ability to acquire new knowledge and skill since those joining the service have to be engaged in multiple and multifarious activities as pointed out supra. Jn order to achieve this object, the selectees of this higher civil services have to undergo. training in the National Academy/ Training institutes wherein they have to undergo careful programme of specialized training as probationers. The various schemes of training are based on the conviction that splendid active experience is the real training and the selectees are to be trained in the academies in all kinds of work they have to handle afterwards with a band of senior chosen officers.

Training at the academy comprises a foundation course followed by another course of practical training. The rationale underlying the course at the training centres is that the officers of civil services must acquire an under· standing· of the constitutional, social, economic and administrative framework within which they have to function and also must have a com· plete sense of involvement in the training and thereafter in the service to which/she is appointed. It is apparent that initial training is in the nature of providing young probationers an opportunity to counter-act their weak points and at the same time develop their social abilities and as such the aspect of training is the most important of all. It was brought to the hOtice of the Government that the probationers who have been allocated to the JPS and Group 'A' service were more often than not completely neglecting their training in the academies!

Training Institutes and also have gone on enmass leave thereby creating a complete vacuum in the academy and the Training Institutes for the purpose of . _). preparing for the next CSE (Main) in the hope of getting a better position and a more preferred service like IAS, IFS etc. without having a sense of involvement with the service to which they have been allocated and appointed on the basis of the earlier examination. It seems that the Government had been facing this disturbed problem of indiscipline and inattentiveness among the probationers undergoing training who were busy themselves with the preparation for the ensuing CSE. As a result of this, bent on preparation for the CSE the training imparted was not seriously taken and the concentration of the proJ? ationers was only in the preparat-· tion of the next CSE. Consequently, the. standard ofofffcers turneaounrl' the academy on completion of their training declined very much.

Therefore, in order to overcome this problem it was suggested and considered :. that the probationers selected and allocated to a service and sent for train- ... , ing should bedebarred from appearing in the ensuing CSE so that they can ~ fully devote themselves to the training and take it more seriously. Resultantly, the matter was considered in consultation with the Department of - ~- Personnel and Training and it was agreed that the relevant rules should be amended so as to prevent the IPS and Group 'A' probationers from joining training at the academy in case they intend to take another CSE. These measures are taken for making· probationers training more effective and meaningful. Hence for the aforementioned reasons, we hold that there is a dynamic nexus between the impugned second proviso and the object to be achieved. Reg. Question No.

9 We shall now pass on to the real and pivotal point in issue which has been hotly debated and eloquently articulated by all the learned counsel contending that the impugned proviso is discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution resulting in a disastrous effect.

All the learned counsel appearing in all the batches of the appeals amplified the above contention stating thus: - ln all, there are 46 Group 'A' Central Services listed in the CCS Rules of which only for 16 Group 'A' Services, recruitment is made through the Civil Services Examination conducted by UPSC annually and it is only in respect of the candidates already allocated and appointed to the IPS or to one or other of these 16 Group 'A' services, the impugned proviso imposes an onerous restriction that they should first resign in order to appear at the next Civil Service Examination whereas there is no --{_ such restriction so far as candidates recruited through the same open competition to the remaining Group 'B' services are concerned despite the fact that the level of responsibility is the same and the qualifications prescribed are comparable: This kind of classification between these two groups has no rational nexus with the object of selection.

The reasons attributed for such a classification on the ground of neglect of training, financial loss, unemployment situation, loss to service are all common to all the Central Service Group '. A' listed in the CCS Rules, and therefore, the impugned second proviso is held to be discriminatory against the candidates ap- -\ ·pointed to the IPS and 16 Group 'A' services and as such it is violative of . Artricle 14. The impugned proviso makes a further discrimination vis-a-vis candidates appointed to Group 'B' services, in that the said proviso by placing the onerous condition of resignation from service of candidates appointed to the IPS and Group 'A' service in substance and effect and it MOHANKUMAR v. U. 0. I. [PANDIAN, J. ) • 95 precludes them from competing for higher civil service with the candidates appointed to Group 'B' service and thereby facilitates the selection of candidates with relatively inferior merit to posts of superior Group 'A' services.

In other words, the impugned proviso excludes the candidates appointed to group 'A' services from competition on the one hand and on the other facilitates selection from amongst less meritorious candidates appointed to Group 'B'. services to the highest and prestigious All India Services. This defeats the very object of securing the services of most meritorious candidates to the most important All India Services and it is arbitrary for want of rational nexus between the classification of candidates with the proven superior merit and those of inferior merit and consequent· ly the object of recruiting the most meritorious candidates to the top-most All India Services is frustrated. · In addition to the above submission, reliance was placed on the dictum laid down in R. K. Dalmia v.

Justice Te11dolkar, [1959] SCR 279 at pages 296-297 holding, "In order to pass the test of permissible classifications two conditions must be fulfilled, namely '(i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible__dj. fferentia With,4,istinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others le'ft out of the group and, (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation· to the object, sought to be achieved by the statute in question. " According to Mr. P. P. Rao, the recommendations of the Kothari Committee and the Estimates Committee are not enforceable proprio vigore and the executive authorities who are expected to act justly and reasonably, cannot usurp the functions of the Parliament and arbitrarily put a restriction through the. impugned proviso which restriction is highly -tainted with hostility and discrimination subjecting the candidates allocated and appointed to the IPS and Group 'A' services to a harassing and oppressive treatment. Mr.

Gopal Singh appearing for some of the appellants besides stating that he is adopting the submissions made by other learned counsel cited some decisions in support of his arguments that the discrimination now existing consequent upon the introduction of the second proviso offends Article 14 of the Constitution. At the risk of repetition, it may . be stated that under the present system of civil services, all candidates are selected through one common examination - preliminary and main and interview test. A list of se~ected candidates in the order of merit is published and thereafter the successful candidates are· allocated to different services. namely IAS, IFS, IPS, Group 'A' and Group 'B' services based on their ranks and preferences. Of the candidates, IAS and IFS are top rankers in the merit list. In the notification dated 13. 12.

1986 issued by the Ministry of Personnel, there were only 28 services/posts of which the first three were IAS, IFS and IPS and of the remaining (iv) to (xviii) were Group 'A' services and (xix) to (xxviii) were Group 'B' services. In the list of Group 'A' services, items (xvii) and (xviii) were Grade II and III respectively. In notification dated 19. 12. 1987, there were in total 27 services/posts of which the first three were the same and the services under (iv) to (xix) were Group 'A' services and (xx) to (xxvii) were Group 'B' services. In the nomenclature of Group 'A' and Group 'B' services, there was slight variation. In the subsequent notification issued on 17. 12. 1988, besides the first three services being the same, the total number of services in group 'A' was 16 and in Group 'B' the number of services was reduced to 7.

In 1989, the first three services remaining the same, there were 16 services under items (iv) to '(xix) in Group 'A' services and 8 services/posts in Group 'B' Services under . item (xx) to (xxvii). In the notification issued on 5th January 1991, the total services were reduced from 27 to 26 and items (i) to (iii) remaining the same, there were 16 Group 'A' services (iv to xix) and 7 services in Group 'B' (xx to xxvi). Thus, it is seen that there was inclusion or exclusion of one service or other besides the change of nomenclature in one or two services in the notifications for the CSE every year. As envisaged in Rule 17, due consideration is given at the time of making appointments and on the results of the examination to the preferences expressed by a candidate for various services at the time of his application and the said appointments will be governed by the rules/regulations in force as applicable to the respective Services at the time of appointment.

As pointed out in detail in the preceding part of this judgment, under the first proviso to Rule 17, a candidate who has been approved and appointed to IPS or Central Services Group 'A' will be eligible to compete for appointment in services mentioned against that service in column no. 3 of the table given in the said rule. As per the second proviso appended to the said rule, a candidate who is appointed to a Central Service Group 'B' on the results of an earlier examination will be eligible to compete for IAS, IFS, IPS and Central Services Group 'A' and considered only for those appointments.

The intent of the above proviso proceeds on the footing that -~ all Central Services of Group 'A' stand on equal footing and likewise all Group 'B' services also stand on equal footing within their respective group of services/posts and that there is no point in competing for any one of the services by a candidate within the same Group 'A' or Group 'B' services as the • case may be when he has already been allocated and appointed to one of those services in either of the groups to which he has been selected on his ~- merit. It cannot be disputed that the candidates allocated to Group 'A' services are more meritorious compared to candidates allocated to Group 'B' services. Consequently, those allocated to Group 'B' services get lower position compared to those allocated to Group 'A' services. The pay scales in Group 'B' services are comparatively less than those meant for IAS, IFS and IPS and Central Services Group 'A'.

There is a clear cut separation on the basis of ranking and merit a11d, therefore, it cannot be said by any ')--· stretch of imagination that both Group 'A' and Group 'B' services fall under one and the same category but on the other, these services are two distinct and separate categories falling under two different classifications. The Additional Solicitor General refuting the arguments of Mr. P. P. Rao that there is a discrimination between Group 'A' and Group 'B' services, in that whilst an Under Secretary, selected in Group 'A' services, is not allowed to sit for examination by availing his third chance, a Section Officer coming under Group 'B' services is permitted to sit for examination availing his chance without resigning from service, emphatically stated that t- this argument has no merit since in Group 'A' services, there is a vertical movement.

The learned ASG further clarified that Group 'A' and Group 'B' services are two separate services, having different status, prospects, conditions of services and pay scales and both the services under the two groups are not similarly situated, besides the candidates in Group 'A' services standing in higher rank and merit. The Tribunal after deeply considering the similar contention raised before it has concluded as follows: 1~ "........ We do not see any reasonable basis to urge that Group 'A' and Group 'B' Services should be treated at par. Even their pay scales and conditions of service not the same as in the Group 'A' Services. It is, therefore, not a question of comparing these two Services and placing them at par. In our opinion, there is no discrimination. It will be noticed that the alleged discrimination is not on the basis of religion, race, caste, sex, ... _ descent, place of birth, residence or any of them.

The discrimination, if any, has a reasonable nexus with the objective for which it has been made. The objective is to create five categories of Services consisting of IAS, IFS, IPS, Central Services Group 'A' and Central Services Group 'B'. We are fur- ther of the opinion that the Government having come ·across certain difficulties and problems in the matter of probationary training and the filling up of the vacancies in various Services ~. made these rules. We do not find the argument of discrimination between Group 'A' and Group 'B' Services to be valid. · We, therefore, reject these arguments".

One other argument advanced on behalf of the appellants was that the candidates who have been allocated in Group 'A' services and whose training is postponed at their request have to loose their seniority whereas the candidates who have been appointed to Group 'B' services do not suffer such kind of disability and that they can even after their training retain their original seniority which they had at the time of initial selection. This serious setback suffered by a candidate selected in Group 'A' services, according to the counsel for the appellants, indicates that there is an apparent discrimination between the two sets of candidates.

This contention of the appellants, according to ASG, cannot be countenanced because the services under Group 'A' and Group 'B' are different services and, therefore, the conditions of service of a p\lrticular service cannot be compared with other service especially when the services are not at par and more so when the other service, namely, Group 'B' service is less in rank and merit to that of Group 'A' Service.

In passing, all the learned counsel in assailing the validity of the impugned second proviso drew our attention to various Service Rules, such as Central Secretariat Service Rules, Indian Revenue Service Rules, 1988, Indian Customs and Central Excise Service Group 'A' Rules, 1987, Department of Revenue (Customs Appraiser) Recruitment Rules, 1988, Indian Railway Personnel Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1975 and Delhi and Andaman and Nicobar Islands Civil Service Rules, 1971 - all made under Article 309 of the Constitution of India - and attempted to show that various provisions of those rules relating to the recruitment and service conditions go in support of their submissions that there is a hostile discrimination between the candidates of Group 'A' services and Group 'B' services. In our considered opinion,.

this abortive attempt made by the learned counsel does not loom large and assume any significance in examining the broad aspect of the main issues involved and in testing the constitutionality of the said proviso. Now, it necessarily follows whether the Classification of these two services, one falling under Group 'A' and another falling under Group 'B' are based on intelligible differentia. The Constitution Bench of this Court in R. K. Dalmia's case (supra) after reiterating the legal principle enunciated by a Constitution Bench of Seven Judges of this Court in Budhan Choudluy v. State ofBihar, (1955} 1 SCR 1045, has ruled thus: "It is now well established that while Article 14 forbids class legislation, . it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation.

" · y- Having regard to the objective in that case, it has been held: "In determining whether there is any intelligible differentia on the basis of which the petitioners and their companies have been grouped together it is permissible to look not only at the facts appearing in the notification but also the facts brought to the notice of the Court upon affidavits. The facts in the present case afford sufficient support to the presumption of cons~itutionality of the notification and the petitions have failed to discharge the onus which was on them to prove that other ~· people or companies similarly situated have been left out and that the petitioners and their companies have been singled out for discriminatory and hostile treatment. " In Kumari Chitra Ghosh and Another v.

Union of India and Others, (1969] 2 sec 228, the facts were thus: The appellants filed a Writ Petition in the High Court challenging the authority of the Central Government to select candidates for certain --f"" reserved seats on the ground that they having secured 62. 5 per cent marks would have got admission but for the reservation of seats which were filled by nominations by the Central Government. The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition as well as the Review Petition. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the appellants appealed to this Court. Grover, J speaking for the Constitution Bench approved the dictum in R. K Da/mia's case (cited above) laying down the fulfilment of the two conditions as the test of permissible classification and held that the classification in that case was based on intelligible differentia, observing thus:· -r-- "It is lhe Central Go. vernment which bears the financial burden of running the medical college.

It is for it to lay down the ·criteria for eligibility. From the very nature of things it is not possible to throw the admission open to students from all over the country. The Government cannot be denied the right to decide from what sources the admission will be made. That essentially is a question of policy and depends inter alia on an overall assessment and survey of the requirements of residents of particular territories and other categories of persons for whom it is necessary to provide facilities for medical education. If the sources are properly classified whether on territorial, geographical or other reasonable basis it is not for the Courts to interfere with the manner and method of making the classification. " ---< In the above case, the Court has distinguished the decision in Rajendran's case (referred to above). Y. V. Chandrachud, J as he then was speaking for the Constitution Bench in State ofJammu & Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa & Ors.

, (1974] 1 SCR 771 in which it was contended on behalf of the State that is always open to the Government to classify its employees so long as the classification is reasonable and has nexus with the object thereto, stated as follows: "Thus, it is no part of the appellants' burden to justify the classification or to establish its constitutionality.

Formal educa~ tion may not always produce excellence but a classification founded on variant educational qualifications is for purposes of promotion to the post of an Executive Engineer, to say the least, not unjust on the fact of it and the onus therefore cannot shift from where it originally lay Classification is primarily for the legislature or for the statutory authority charged with the duty of framing the terms and conditions of service, and if, looked at from the standpoint of the authority making it, the classification is found to rest on a reasonable basis, it has to be upheld Discrimination is the essence of classification and does violence to the constitutional guarantee of equality only it rests on an unreasonable basis ············································································································· - _. _ Equality is for equals.

That is to say that those who are similar- ' ly circumstanced are entitled to an equal treatment Judicial scrutiny can therefore extend only to the consideration whether the classification rests on a reasonabl~ basis whether it bears nexus \Vith the object in view. It cannot extend to em- barking upon a nice or mathematical evaluation of the basis· of . classification, for were such an inquiry permissible it would be open to the courts to substitute their own judgment for that of the legislature or the rule-making authority on the need to classify or the desirability of achieving a particular object. " P. N. Bhagwati, J and Krishna Iyer, J have concurred with the view . expressed by chandrachud, J though they have added some more concurring observations of their own. It will be apposite to recall an observation of this Court in A. S. --y- Sangwan v. Union ofIndia, [1980) Supp.

SCC 559 at 561 reading as follows: "A policy once formulated is not good for ever; it is perfectly within the competence of the Union of India to change it, rechange it, adjust it and readjust it according to the compulsions of circumstances and the imperatives of national considerations. We cannot, as Court, give directives as to how the Defence Ministry should function except to State that the .. obligation not to act arbitrarily and to treat employees equally is binding on the Union of India because iffunctions under the Constitution and not ove. r it -~ ············································································································· It is entirely within the reasonable discretion of the Union of India. It may stick to the earlier policy or give it up.

But one imperative of the Constitution implicit in Article 14 is that if it does change its policy, it must do so fairly and should not give the impression that it is acting by any ulterior criteria or arbitrarily. " See also Aklzil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway)'s case --.. <' (already referred to). In Deepak Sibal v. Punjab University, [1989) 2 SCC 145 M. M. Dutt, J speaking for the Court has held thus: "In order to consider the question as to the reasonableness of the classification, it is necessary to take into account the objective for such classification. If the objective be illogical, unfair and unjust, necessarily the classification will have to be held as ~ unreasonable. Surrounding ('. ircumstances may be taken into ~ consideration in support of the constitutionality of a law which is otherwise hostile or discriminatory in nature.

But the circumstances must be such as to justify the discriminatory treatment or the classification subserving the object sought to be ' achieved. A classification by the identification of a source must ... ;. ~ not be arbitrary, but should be on a reasonable basis having a nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the rules for such admission. A classification need not be made with mathematical precision but, if there be little or no difference between the person or things which have been grouped together and those left out of the group, the classification cannot be said to be a reasonable one It is true that a classification need not be made with mathematical precision but, if there be little or no difference between the persons or things which have been grouped together and those left out of the group, in that case, the classification cannot be said to be a reasonable one :......

It is submitted that in making the classification the surrounding circumstances may be taken into account ......................................................................................................... It ( follows from the observation that surrounding circumstances may be taken into consideration in support of the constitutionality of a law which is otherwise hostile or discriminatory in nature. But the circumstances must be such as + to justify the discriminatory treatment or the classification subserving the object sought to be achieved. In the instant case, the circumstances which have been relied on by the respondents, namely, the possibility of production by them of bogus certificates and insecurity of their services are not, in our opinion, such circumstances as will justify the exclusion of the employees of private establishments from the evening classes. " What falls instantly for determination is whether.

the differentia on which the classification is sought to be made has a rational relation with the object to be achieved. We have already discussed this question in detail when we have separately examined the question as to whether the second proviso is related to the purposes stated therein. Whereas Mr. Kapil Sibal has urged that it is always open to the ..... Government to classify its employees as long as the classification is reasonable and has nexus to the object thereto, the rival contention is that there is no nexus between the classification and the object to be achieved thereby, that in fact the classification defeated that object, that if chances of sitting for examination are denied to a few with equals; there is inherent vice attached to such classification and that in such circumstances, the unreasonableness of the classification becomes patent. It is further urged MOHAN KUMAR v. U. O. I. [PMTIIAN, J.

) 103 J-- on behalf of the appellants that this classification foments frustration amongst the selectees of group 'A' services and produces inefficiency by placing men of lower efficiency in a very advantageous position. Mr. P. P. Rao would urge that if there is a vertical movement in group 'A' services as stated by Mr. Kapil Sibal, how can candidates in group 'B' services be permitted to sit for examination of IAS, IFS and IPS by passing the meritorious candidates under group ~A' and therefore the classification is perse irrational, unjust and discriminatory and as such ultra-vires Article 14. -'y We shall now bestow out judicious thought over this matter and carefully examine the rival contentions of the rival parties in the light of the guiding principles, lucidly laid down by this Court in a series of decisions, a few of which we have already referred to hereinbefore. The selections for IAS, IFS and !

PS group 'A' services and group 'B' service are made by combined competitive examination and viva voce test. There cannot be any dispute that each service is a distinct and separate cadre, having its separate field of operation, with different status, prospects, pay scales, the nature of duties, the responsibilities to the post and conditions of service 't etc. Therefore, once a candidate is selected and appointed to a particular cadre, he cannot be allowed to say that he is at par with the others on the ground that ail of them appeared and were selected by a combined competitive examination and viva voce test and that the qualifications prescribed are comparable. In our considered view, the classification of the present case is not based on artificial inequalities but is hedged within the salient features and truly founded on substantial differences.

Judged from this point of view, it seems to us impossible to accept the submission that -< the classification rests on an unreal and unreasonable basis and that it is arbitrary or absurd. In this connection, it may be noted that in fact the civil services in foreign countries too, such as United States of America, Great Britain, France and Canada grew up by degrees from time to time in tune with the concept of new ideas under the pressure of some necessity or influence of particular theories linked with the changing political ideology and social conditions and with a view to trimming the civil service scheme and this -j:-~ process of development is by way of evolution rather than revolution. We may again hark-pack to the case of the appellants and examine whether this classification offends Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

Article 14 declares that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the law within the ter- -,l, ritory of India. The cherished principle underlying the above Article is that there should be no discrimination between one person and another if as regards the subject matter of the legislation, their position is the same. Vide Chiranjit Lal v. Union ofIndia, [1950] 1 SCR 869 or in other words its action must not be arbitrary, but must be based on some valid principle, which in itself must not be irrational or discriminatory (Vide Kasturi v. State ofJ & K (albeit). As ruled by this Court inAmeeroonissa v. Mahboob, [1953] SCR 405 and Gopi Chand v. Delhi Administratio11, AIR 1959 SC 609 -~ that differential treatment does not per se constitute violation of Article 14 and it denies equal protection only when there is no rational or reasonable basis for the differentiation.

Thus Article 14 condemns discrimination and forbids class legislation but permits classification founded on intelligible differentia having a rational relationship with the object sought to be achieved by the Act/Rule/Regulation in question. The Government is legitimately empowered to frame rules of classification for securing the requisite standard of efficiency in services and the classification need not scientifically be perfect or logically complete. As observed by this Court + more than once, every classification is likely in some degree to produce some inequality. The provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution have come up for discussion before this Court in a number of cases but we feel that in the present case, it is not necessary to go in for any lengthy discussion as to the origin, meaning and the gradual development of the concept of principles· and enlargement of the scope and effect of this Article.

Suffice to mention a few decisions of this court relating to the issue under consideration, namely- Chiranjit Lal Clwwdlmry v. The Unio11 of India; Budhan Clwudluy and Others v. The State of Bihar; R. K Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar (all cited above); E. P. Royappe v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1974] 2 SCR r 348; Ma11eka Ga11dhi v. U11ion of India, [1978] 1 SCC 248; Ramona v. International Airport Authority of I11dia, AIR 1979 SC 1928; Union ofIndia v. Tulsiram Patel, [1985] 3 SCC 398; Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. U11ion of India, [1981] 2 SCR 533; and Ce11tral Inland Water Transport C01poration v. Brojo Nath, AIR 1986 SC 1971. In Devadasan v. Union of India, [1964] 4 SCR 680 wherein Subba Rao, J as he then was, has dissented from the majority an. d pointed out that the expression "equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws" means equality among equals and that Article 14 does not provide for an absolute equality of treatment to all persons in utter disregard in every.

conceivable circumstance of the differences. . , MOHANKUMAR v. U. 0. I. (PANDIAN, J. ) 105 _J_ In Birendra Kumar Nigam and Others v. Union oflndia,Writ Petition Nos. 220-222 of 1963 decided on 13. 3. 1964, three writ petitions were filed under Article 32 of the Constitution raising a common question regarding the constitutional validity of certain rules framed by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs and certain directions issued by it relative to the appearance of Assistants employed in the Central Secretariat Service in the competitive examination held by the Union Public Service Commission for recruitment to certain All India Services. In each of the above three petitions, ~ grounds of challenge was same viz. , that the impugned rules and directions were violative of Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution. The facts in relation to the three petitions were slightly different. Therefore, by way of illustration we will tersely state the facts in Writ Petiti~n No. 220 of 1963.

The petitioner in that case was appointed to the post of an Assistant in the Central Secretariat Service from 1956 and he joined the same on 29. 8. 56. But in March of that year, he had already submitted his application to be included as a candidate for competing in the combined examination for the several All India Services - IAS, IFS, IPS and the several categories of the All India Central Services, the Examination for which was held in September 1956 but before that date he received an informa- \ tion from the Home Ministry that he could not appear for that examination because he was still on probation. prior to the date on which he completed his probation and was confirmed as an Assistant, the Ministry of Home Affairs issued the impugned notification on 14. 3.

1957 pointing out that there was an acute shortage of Grade IV Assistants in the Secretariat -~ Service and that the Assistants would not be permitted to compete at the examination to be held in 1957 and that those who were desirous of competing their candidature would be restricted to an appointment to Grade III of the Central Secretariat alone. We are not giving the facts of other two writ petitions since the common question di! cided was the same. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J while speaking for the Constitution Bench in that case has held: "If, as must must be, it is conceded that the existencies, convenience, or necessity or a particular department might justify the imposition of a total ban on the employees in that department, from seeking employment in other departments, a partial ban which permits them to seek only certain posts in the I' s_ame department cannot be characterised as illegal as being discriminatory.

The mere fact therefore that under the rules officers in certain other departments are permitted to compete for a Class I post is no ground by itself for considering such a variation as an unreasonable discrimination, violative of AIticles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution as not based on a classification having a rational and reasonable rela:tion to the object to be attained. Of course, no rule imposes a· ban on these employees resigning their posts and competing for posts in the open competition along with 'open market 'Candidates.

" As we have repeatedly held that each of the civil services, namely IAS, IFS, IPS, Group 'A' Services and Group 'B' Services is a separate and determinate service forming a distinct ~dre and that each of the services is founded on intelligible differentia which on rational grounds distinguishes persons grouped together from those left out and that the differences are real and substantial having a rational and reasonable nexus to the objects sought to be achieved and that there is no question of unfairness or arbitrariness in the ex~cutive action in adding the second proviso to the substantive rule 4 of CSE Rules. When the submission of the learned coun- + sel for the appellants is carefully examined in the backdrop of the legal principles and the factual position, we are in full agreement with conclusion arrived at by the Tribu~al that the impugned second proviso to Rule 4 is not violative of Articles 14 or 16 of the Constitution ofIndia.

In Summation: The impugned second proviso tci Rule 4 of the CSE Rules introduced by Notification No. 13016/4/86- AIS(l) dated 13. 12. 1986 is legally and constitutionally valid and sustainable in law and the said proviso neither travels beyond the intent of the main rule, namely, Rule 4 of the CSE Rules nor it is ultra-vires Regulation 4 (iii-a) of Regulations, 1955 that it is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable and that there is a dynamic and rational nexus between the impugned second proviso and the object to be achieved. There is no discrimination whatsoever involved on account of the introduction of the second proviso in question and the said proviso is not ultra-vires Article 14 or Article 16 of the Constitution of India. Before parting with the judgment, we feel that it has become neces- -sary to give a specific direction to the respondents inclusive of the Union Public Service Commission in pursuance of the earlier directions given in . our order dated 7. 12.

1990 (vide Annexure 'A') which directions were given in pursuance of various interim orders passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi and thereafter finaUy in its final In the result for the reasons aforementioned the judgments of the . Tribunal are confirmed subject to the above directions and all the appeals i--. are dismissed accordingly. No orderas to costs. ORDER We have heard all the learned counsel appearing in their respective appeals and also the learned Additional Solicitor for respondents for a very considerable length of time. The . main thrust of the argument ad-. vanced on behalf of all the appellants is that the second proviso to Rule 4 of the Civil Services Examination Rules (published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part-I Section, dated December 17, 1988) is offending Artide 14 of the Constitution of India and is contrary to law.

As the above question requires a careful examination with regard to the individual cases listed for consideration and as we are informed that the Central Services Examination Commences on 17. 12. 1990, we are constrained to give the following directions on the 'basis of the conclusions arrived at by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi in its judgment dated 20th August 1990. The relevant conclusions as they appear from the concluding portion of the judgment of the Tribunal are as fol- -+lows:- S(ii). A candidate who has been allocated to the I. P. S. or to a Central Services, Group '