MOHD. HANIF QUARESHI & OTHERS v. THE STATE OF BIHAR

Citation: [1959] 1 S.C.R. 629; 1958 INSC 50

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: VIVIAN BOSE , T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR, S.K. DAS, P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR

Judgment date: 1958-04-23

Case summary

1958 INSC 50. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1958-04-23. MOHD. HANIF QUARESHI & OTHERS v. THE STATE OF BIHAR. Read the judgment and case details on...

Judgment text

MOHD. HAN! ]' QU ARES HI & OTHERS v. April 23. THE STATE OF BIHAR (and connected petition) (S. R. DAs C. J. , VENKATARAMA AIYAR, S. K. DAs, GAJENDRAGADKAR . and VIVIAN BosE JJ. ) Cow slaughter-Legislation placing total ban-If Constitutional • -Directive Principles of State Policy, value of-Fundamental rights ~ -Reasonable restrictions--Test-Intervention in Supreme Court proceedings, when permissible-Bihar Preservation and Improvement of Animals Act, r955 (Bihar II of r956)-U. P. Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, r955 (U. P. I of r956)-C. P. and Berar Animal Preservation Act, r949 (C. P. and Berar Lll of r949)-Constitution of India, Arts. r4, r9, 48-Supreme Court Rules, 0. XLI, r. 2. The Bihar Preservation and Improvement of Animals Ac':, l95S, put a total ban on the slaughter of all categories of animals of the species of bovine cattle. The U. P.

Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955, put a total ban on the slaughter of cows and her progeny which included bulls, bullocks, heifers and • calves. The C. P. and Berar Animal Preservation Act, 1949, placed a total ban on the slaughter of cows, male or female calves of cow, bulls, bullocks, and heifers and the sla1,1ghter of buff;lloes (male or female, adults or calves) was permitted only under a certificate granted by the proper authorities. No exception was made in any of these Acts permitting slaughter of cattle even for bow1 fide religious purposes. These three Acts were enacted in pursuance of the directive principles of State policy contained in Art. 48 of the Constitution. The petitioners, who were engaged in the butcher's trade and its subsidiary undertakings, challenged the constitutional validity of the three Acts on the grounds that they infringed their funda- · mental rights guaranteed under Arts. 14, r9(r)(g) and 25 of the Constitution.

The respondents contended that the impugned . Acts were constitutional and valid as they were made in consonance with the directive principles of Art. 48 ·which were superior to the fundamental rights and that the impugned Acts did not offend Art. 14, l9(1)(g) or 25 : . Held, (i) that a total ban on the slaugh. ter of cows of all ages and calves of cows and of she-buffaloes, male and female, was quite reasonable and valid; • (ii) that a total ban on the slaughter of she-buffaloes or breeding bulls or working bullocks (cattle as well as buffalo~). as long as they were capable of being used as milch or draught cattle, was also reasonable and valid; and . • ·~ (iii) that a total ban on the slaughter of she-buffaloes, bulls 630 SUPR. EME COURT REPORTS [1959] , s and bullocks (cattle or buffalo) after they ceased to be capable 95 of yielding milk or of breeding or working as draught animals /lt! ohd. Hanif was not in the interests of the general public and \vas invalid.

Quarcshi The directive in Art. 48 for taking steps for preventing the v. . slaughter of animals is quite explicit and positive and contem- The- State 0! Biha~-plates a ban on the slaughter of the several categories of animals specified therein, namely, CO\VS •and calves and other cattle which answer the description of milch or draught cattle. The protection is confined only to cows and calves and to those animals which are presently or potentially capable of yielding milk or of doing work as draught cattle but does not extend to cattle \Vhich at one ti1ne were milch or draught cattle but which have ceased to be such. The directive principles of State policy set out in Part IV of the Constitution have to conform to and run as subsidiary to the fundamental rights in Part III. State of Madras v. Smt. Champakam Dorairajan, [1951] S. C. R. ·525, followed. The ban on the slaughter of cows even on the Yd ~irban day did not violate the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Art.

25 as it had not been established that the sacrifice of a cow on that day was an obligatory overt act for a Mussalman to exhibit his religious belief and idea. f Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay, [1954] S. C. R. 1055, applied. The impugned Acts which affected only the butchers who slaughtered cattle and not the butchers who slaughtered sheep or goats, did not offend Art. 14 of the Constitution. The different categories of animals being susceptible of classification into separate groups on the basis'of their usefulness to society, the bntchers who kill each category may also be placed in distinct classes according to the effect produced on society by the carrying on of their respective occupations.

This classification is based on an intelligible differentia which places the petitioners in a well defined class and distinguishes them from those who slaughter sheep or goat~ and this differentia has a close connection with the object sought to be achieved by the impugned Acts, namely, the preservation, protection and improvement of livestock. In determining the question of the: reasonableness of restrictions imposed •m the fundamental rights conferred by Art. r9(r)(g) the Court cannot proceed on a general notion of what is reasonable in the abstract or even on the consideration of what is reasonable from the point of view of the person or persons on whom the restrictions are imposed. What the Court has to do is to consider whether the restrictions imposed are reasoll'able in the interests of the general public. The test of reasonableness lias been laid down in State of Madras v. V. G. Row, [1952] S. C. R. 597 at 602. It should also be remembered that the legislature • ~. -.

is the best judge of what is good for the community. Though a constitutional question cannot be decided on the grounds of the sentiment of a section of the people, it has to be ta){en into consideration, though only as one of the elements, in arriving at a judicial verdict as to the reasonableness df the restrictions. The effect ~f the impugned Acts on the fundamental rights The of the petitioners under Art. r9(r)(g) is direct and instantaneous as soon as the Acts are brought into force, and it has to be determined whether they can be justified under cl. (6) of Art. 19. The country is in short supply of milch cattle, breeding bulls and working bullocks, and a total ban on the slaughter of these which are essential to the national economy for the supply of milk, agricultural working power and manure is a reasonable restriction in the interests of the general public.

But a total ban on the slaughter of useless cattle, which involves a wasteful drain on the nation's cattle feed which is itself in short supply and which would deprive the useful cattle of much needed nourishment, cannot be justified as being in the interests of the genend public. Under 0. XLI, r. z, of the Supreme Court Rules intervention is permitted only to the Attorney-General of India or the Advocates-General for the States. There is no other provision for permitting a third party to intervene in the proceedings before the Supreme Court. In practice, however, the Supreme Court, in exercise of its·inherent powers, allows a third party to intervene when such third party is a party to some proceedings in the Supreme Court or in the High Courts where the same or similar questions are in jssue, for the decision of the Supreme Court will conclude the case of that party. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 58, 83, 84, 103, 117, 126, 127, 128, 248, 144 & 145 of 1956 & 129 of 1957.

Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of ]'undamental Rights. H. J. Umrigar, N. H. Hingorani and A. G. Ratna-parkhi, for the petitioners in all the petitions except Petition No. 103 of 1956. The impugned Acts infringe the fundamental rights under Art. 19(l)(g;J of the petitioners who are butchers, tanners, gut merchants, curers and cattle dealers to carry on their respective tr! i. des. Where, as in the present case, the enactment on th~ . face of it violates a fundamental right the burden lies on those who support it to show that it falls within the purview of cl. (6) of Art. rn. Saghi1~ ·,. Ahmed v. The State of U. P. , ([1955] 1 S 0. R. 707 at 726); • Chiranjitlal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India, ([1950] Hanif S. C. R. 869 at 891-892). The impugned Acts put a total ban on the trade and business of the petitioners who kill only cattle.

Total prohibition of a trade Bihar which is not immoral or obnoxious can never be reasonable restriction within the meaning of cl. (6) of Art. 19. Chintaman Rao v. The State of JJ1~adhya Pradesh, ( [1950] S. C. R. 759 at 765); R. M. Sheshadri v. The District Magistrate ( [1955] 1 S. C. lt. 686 at 689, 690); Coovei:jee B. Bhar-ucha v. The Exc·ise Commissioner, ( [1954] S. C. R. 873); Rashid Ahmed v. The llfunicipal Board, Kairana, ( [1950] S. C. R. 566). Total ban on the slaughter of cattle is not in the interests of the general public. Animal husbandry will suffer by a totc;l ban. There is shortage of fodder and pasture in the country and the useless anp uneconomic cattle will depri vc the useful cattle of these things. Setting up of Gosadans for the uneconomiu cattle will be a tremendous waste of public money. [Counsel referred to Yarious official reports in t. his · connection.

] The impugned Acts create an odious discrimination between butchers and persons dealing solely in cows, bulls, etc. , and those dealing in sheep and goats, and offend Art. 14. Those Acts which single out the petitioners' community which kills only cows, bulls, etc. , are hostile and discriminatory legislation. Ye Cong Eng v. Trinidad, (70 L. Ed. 1059 at 1071); Fowler v. Rhode Island, (97 L. Ed. 828); Lane v. Wilson, (83 L. Ed. 1281 at 1287); Ligget Go. v. Baldrige, (73 L. Ed. 204). The impugned Acts '1lso contravene Art. 25 as they prohibit the M ussalmans from performing the religious practice of the community to sacrifice the cow on the · occasion of. Bakr Id. Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bomba. y, ([19,'54] S. C. R. 1055 at 1063). The directive principles of State policy set out in 1 Art. 48 can never override fundament'11 rights. 1he State of JJ! ladras v. Sm. Chainpakani Dorairajan,. ([1951. J . S. C. R. 525 at 530); Saghir Ahmed's Case, ( [1955] l S. C. R.

'/07 at 727). The impugned Acts traverse (" beyond th? diructi ve principles in Art. 48. & .. The Bihar and the Madhya Pradesh Acts which affect inter-State trade in cattle and beef offend Art. 301 and are void as the assent of the President was not taken before enacting them. Frank Anthony and ](. L. Mehta, for the petitioners The State in Petition No. 103 of 1956. Section 9 of the U. P. Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act makes the slaughtering of cattle a cognisable and non-bailable offence. This and other provisions of the Act are ex facie restrictions on the right of the petitioners to carry on their trade. The onus is on the respondents to show that the restrictions are reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public. Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, ( [1950] S. C. R. 759 at 763); Saghir Ahmed v. The State of U. P. , ( [1955] 1 S. C, R. 707 at 726). The legislation is colourable and mala fide and is inspired by religious motives. State of Madras v. 'V. G.

Rao; ( [1952] S. C. R. 59. 7). Article 48 in so far as its imposes blanket ban on cow would have to yield to Art 19 (1) (g). The restrictions in the Act amount to total prohibition and extinction of the trade of beef butchers. Saghir Ahmed's case; Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. The State of U. P. , ( [1954] S. C. R. 803), Fairmout Creamery Co. v. 111innesota, (71 L. Ed. 893 at 897). The impugned Act offends Art. 14 as it discriminates against the beef butchers. These butchers have a legal right to slaughter cow for food or sacrifice. Naubahar Singh v. Qadir Bux, (A. I. R. 1930 All. 753); Shahbazkhan v. Umrao Pilri, (I. L. R,. 30 All. 181); Emperor v. Mirhammad Yakub, (I. L. R. 32 All. 571). C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, with Mahabir Prasad, Advocate-General of Bihar and S. P. Varma (respondent in Petitions Nos. 58, 83 and 84 of 1956), and with R. H. Dhebar, for the State of Bombay (respondent in Petition No. 117 of 1956).

The legislature has thought fit that slaughter of cattle should be stopped in the interests of animal husbandry and publiC"policy. It is not for the Court to say that such a policy should not have been adopted. Bot. h on th~ ·~ question of policy and the ex1ent of the restrictions the Uourt should interfere only if it is convinced that in n'o view of the matter could the restrictions be reasonable. There are two conflicting opinions on this controversial matter, i. e. , whether there should be Bika•·total ban or only partial ban. In such a case the opinion of the legislators must prevail and the Court should not interfere where there is controversy as to facts. State of 1l1adras v. V. G. Rao, ( [1952] S. C. R. 597 at 606); The State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh, ( [1952] S. C. R. 889 at 941); Arumughwn v. State of Madras, (I. L. R. [1953] Mad. 937).

Unless it can be said that the restrictions have no bearing on the object sought to be achieved the legislation must be upheld. Article 37 enjoins the State to apply the directive principles of State policy in Part IV. of the Constitution in making laws. , The legislation is in accordance with the direction givei1 in Art. 48 . • . The objeut of the legislation is not to c()ntrol any trade or industry but to improve the breed of cattle and to· organise animal husbandry and agriculture. Unless the legislation directly hits trade or business it does not infringe Art. 19 (1) (g). A. K. Gopalan v. The State, ( [1950] S. C. R. 88 at 101); Ram Singh v. The State of Delhi, ( [1951] S. C. R. 451 at 455-457); R. S. Ram Jawaya Kapur v. The State of Punjab, ( [1955] 2 S. C. R. 225); State of Bombay v. R. M. D. Chamarbaugwala, (A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 699 at 721). B. Sen and R. H. Dhebar, for the State of Bombay (respondent in Petitions Nos.

126 to 128 and 248 of 1956), and for the State of Madhya Pradesh (respondent in Petition No. 144 of 1956). JJ1. Adhicai·y, Advocate-General . for the State of Madhya Pradesh and I. N. Shroff, for the State of Madhya Pradesh (respondent in Petition. No. 145 of 1956), adopted the arguments of C. K. Daphtary. H. N. San1Ja. l, Additional Solicitor-General of India, G. C. Ma. th·~r and G. P. Lal, for the State of U. P. (respondent in Petitions Nos. 103 of 1956 and '129 of l957). T. he provisions of the U. P. Act have a reasonable relation to the purpose in view i. e. the directive in Art. 48 and consequently the Act . cannot be said to offend Art. 19 (1) (g). Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya, Pradesh, ( [Hl50] S. C. R. 759 at 763). According to t. he facts and figures given in the Gosamvardhan Enquiry Committee's Report the cattle population The was actually decreasing and total ban on slaughter was necessary to protect and preserve the cattle. The State of U. P.

had made ample provisivns for looking after the decrepit cattle, and such cattle also was not une9onomic as it yielded hides and manure. The U. P. Act which prohibits the slaughter of cattle but not that of buffaloes does not offend Art. 14 as the discrimination is based upon proper classification. The buffalo does not require any protection. The female buffalo is in no danger as its yield of milk is very high. The he-buffalo is not very useful for draug"ht purposes and there is no, need to protect it. Besides, the buffalo population is steadily increasing. The u: P. Act does not violate Art. 25. Article 25 of our Constitution is similar to Art. 8 of the Irish Constitution. There is no religious compulsion on the Mussalmans to sacrifice a cow on Bakr Id Day. Thakurdas Bhargava, as amicus curiae. The directive principles of State policy in Part IV of the Constitution are superior to fundamental rights and the enactments which are in pursuance of the directions given by Art. 48 are va.

lid and constitutional even though they may infringe the fundamental rights of the petitioners. The total ban on cow slaughter in the impugned Acts is justified and is in the interest:> of the general public. The facts and figures given in the official reports are inaccurate, and there is no real shortage of fodder or pasture land. There is shortage of milk in the country and it is essential to protect the cow. The bullock takes the 11J. rgest share in meeting the power requirement for our agricultural production. Cow dung manure contributes about rupees 63 crores per year to our national income. H. J .. Umrigar, in reply. Frank Anthony, also replied. Bi ....... • 1958. April 23. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hanif DAS C. J. -These 12 petitions under Art. 32 of our . Constitution raise the question of the constitutional 1 Bi •ar l 'd 't f th 1 1 · 1 t · t b va 1 1 y o ree severa eg1s a ive enac ments ann- J.

ing the slaughter of certain animals passed by the States of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh respectively. The controversy concerning the slaughter of cows has been raging in this country for a number of years and in the past it generated considerable illwill amongst the two major communities result-ing even in riots and civil commotion in some places. We are, however, happy to note that the rival contentions of the parties to these proceedings have been urged before us without importing into them the heat of communal passion and in a rational and objective way, as· a matter involving constitutional issues should be. Some of these petitions come from Bihar, some from U. P. and the rest from Madhya. Pradesh, but as they raise common questions of law, it will be convenient to deal with and dispose of them together by one common judgment. Petitions Nos. 58 of 1956, 83 of 1956 and 84 of 1956 challenge the validity of the Bihar. Preservation and Improvement of Animals Act,.

1955 (Bihar II of 1956), hereinafter referred to as the Bihar Act. In Petition No. 58 of 1956 there are 5 petitioners, all of whom are Muslims belonging to the Quraishi community which is said to be numerous and an important section of Muslims of this country. · The members of the community are said to be mainly engaged in the butchers' trade and its subsidiary undertakings such as the sale of hides, tannery, glue making, gut making and blood-dehydrating, while some of them are also engaged in the sale and . purchase of cattle and in their distribution over the various areas in the State of Bihar as · well as in the other States of the Union of India. Petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 are butchers and meat vendors who, according to the petition, only sl~ghter cattle and not sheep or goats and are called " Kasais" in contradistinction to the "Chicks" who slaughter S. CJ. R. SUPREME. COURT REPORTS 637, only sheep and. goats.

After slaughtering the cattle these petitioners sell the hides to tanners or hide merchants who are also members of their community and the intestines are sold to gut merchants. It is said that there are approximately 500 other Kasais in The State Patna alone apart from 2 lacs of other Kasais all over the State of Bihar. The correctness of these figures is not admitted by the respondent State but we do not' doubt that the number of Kasais is considerable. Petitioner No. 3 is the owner of a tanning factory and Petitioner No. 4 is a gut merchant, while Petitioner No. 5 is the General Secretary of Bihar State Jamiatul Quraish.. In petition No. 83 there are 180 petitioners residing at different places in the State of Bihar who are all Muslims whose occupation is that of Kasais or cattle dealers or exporters of hides .. In Petition No.

84 there are 170 petitioners all residents of Patna District who are also Muslims belonging to the Quraishi community and who carry on business as Kasais or dealers of cattle.. All the petitioners · in these three petitions are citizens of India. The Bill, which was eventually passed as the Bihar Act, was published in the Bihar Gazette on April 20, 1953. The scheme of the Bill, as originally drafted, was, it is said, to put a total ban only on the slaughter of cows and calves of cows below three years of age. The Bill was sent to a Select . Committee and it!? scope appears to have been considerably enlarged, as will be seen presently. The Bill, as eventually passed by the Bihar Legislature, received the assent of the Governor on December 8, 1955, and was published in the Official Gazette on January 11, 1956, Section 1 of the Act came into force immediately upon such publication, but before any notification was issued under sub-s. (3) of s.

1 bringing the rest of the Act or any part of it into force in the State'or any part of it, •the present petitions were filed in this Court challenging the consti- · tutional validity of the Act. On ap:elications for an ~nterim order restraining the State of Bihar from issu" ing a ntitification under s. 1(3) of the Act bringing the Act into operation having been made in these petitions, . • the respondent State . by and through the learned Solicitor General of India, gave an undertaking not to issue such notification until the disposal of these petitions and, in the premises, no order was considered necessary to be made on those applications. Bihar Petition N 0. 103 of 1956 has been filed by two petitioners, who are both Muslims residing in Uttar Pradesh and carrying on business in that State, the first one as a hide merchant and the second as a butcher. Petitioners in Petition No. 129 are eight in number all of whom are Muslims residing and carrying on business in Uttar Prad.

esh either as gut inerchants or cattle dealers, or Kasais or beef vendors or bone dealers or hide merchants or cultivators. All the petitioners in these two applications are citizens of India. By these two petitions the petitioners challenge the validity of the Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955 (U. P. I of 1956), hereiirnfter referred to as the U. P. Act and pray for a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent State of Uttar Pradesh not to take any steps in pursuance of the U. P. Act or to interfere with the fundamental rights of the petitioners. Petitions Nos. 117 of 1956, 126 of 1956, 127 of 1956, 128 of 1956, 248 of 1956, 144 of 1956 and 145 of 1956 have been filed by 6, 95, 541, 58, 37, 976 and 395 petitioners respectivly,allof whom are Muslims belonging to the Quraishi Community and are mainly engaged in the butchers' trade and its subsidiary undertaking such as the supply of hides, tannery, glue making, gut-making and blood-dehydrating.

Most of them reside at different places which, at the dates of the filing of these petitions were parts of the State of Madhya Pradesh, but which or parts of which have, in the course of the recent re-organisation of the States, been transferred to and amalgamated with the State of Bombay. In consequence of such re-organisation of the States the State of Bombay has had to be substituted for the respondent State of Madhya Pradesh in the first five petitions and to be added in the sixth petition, for ·a part of the district in which the petitioners resill. ed had . been su transferred, while the ·State of Madhya Pradesh continues to be the respondent in the seventh petition. By these petitions the petit. ioners all of whom are citizens of India, challenge the va. lidity of the G. P. and Berar Animal Preservation Act, 1949 (C. P. and Berar LII of 1949), as subsequently amended. The In order to appreciate the arguments advanced for ana.

" against the constitutional validity of the three impugned Acts ~t will be necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the · Constitution under or pursuant to which they have been made. Reference must first be made to Art. 48 which will be found in Chapter IV of the Qonstitution which enshrines what are called the directive principles of State policy. Under Art. 37 these directive principles are not enforce-aJ;>le by any court of law but are nevertheless funda-me:qtal in the governance of the country and are to be applied by the State in making laws. Article 48 runs thus:- " Organisation 48. The State shall endeavour of agriculture · and to organise agriculture and animal husbandry. animal husbandry on mbdern and scientific lines and shall, in particular, take step§ for preserving and improving the breeds, and prohibiting the slaughter, of cows and calves and bther milch and draught cattle.

" The principal purpose of this articlt>, according to learned counsel for the petitioners, is to direct the State to endeavour to organise agriculture and animal husbandry on mod~rn and scientific lines, and the rest of t~e provisions of that article are ancillary to this principal purpose. They contend that the States are required t. o take steps for preserving and improving the breeds and for prohibiting the sl~ughter of the animals specified therein ~nlly with a view to implement that principal purpose, that is to say, only as parts of the general scheme for organising our agriculture and animal husbandry oh modern and scientific lines. • Learned· counsel for the petitioners refer to the marginal nofo to Art. 48 in support of their contention ·,, on this part of the case. · They also rfly on entry 15 , • in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.

That entry reads: "Preservation, protection and im~· provement of stock arid prevention of animal diseases; veterinary training and practice. " There is no B;~. , separate legislative head for prohibition of slaughter of animals and that fact, they claim, lends support to their conclusion that the prohibition of the slaughter of animals specified in the last part of Art. 48 is only ancillary to the principal directions for p1'eserv:i,tion, protection and improvement of stock, which is what is meant by organising· agriculture and animal husbandry. Learned counsel for. , the respondents :i,nd Pandit Thakurdas Bh:i,rgava, who appears as amicus cnriae, on the other hand, m:i,intain that the article contains three distinct and separate directions, each of which should, they urge, be implemented indel'eii-dently and as a separate charge. It is not necessary for us, on this occasion, to express a final opinion on this question.

Suffice it to say that there is no conflict between the different parts of this article and indeed the. two last directives for preserving and improving the breeds and for the prohibition of slaughter of certain specified_ animals represent, as is indicated by the words "in particular", two special aspects of the preceding general directive for organising agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines. \Vhether the last two directives· are ancillary to the first as contended for by learned counsel for the petitioners or are separate and independent items of directives as cbimcd by counsel on the other side, the directive for taking steps for preventing the slaughter of the anim11ls is quite explicit and positive 11nd con-te111,pl11tes a ban on the slaughter of t,he several ca. tego-ries of a. nimals specified therein, namely, cows and rnilves and otper cattle which answer the description of milch or draught cattle.

The protection recommended by this part of the directive is, in our opinion, confined only to cows and calves and to those :i,nimals which are presently or potentially capable of yielding milk or of doing work as draught cattle but doe's not, from the' very nature of the purpose for which it is obviously recommended, extend to cattle which at ~· . , ... one time were milch or draught cattle but which have ceased to be such. It is pursu1J. nt to these directive principles and in exercise of the powers conferred by Arts. 245 and 246 of the Constitution read with entry 15 in List . II of the Seventh Schedule thereto that the The Legislatures of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh have respectively enacted the statute$ which are challenged as unconstitutional.

In order properly to appreciate the meaning and scope of the impugned Acts it has to be borne in mind that each one of those Acts is a law with respect to "preservation, protection and improvement of stock '', and their constitutional validity will have to be judged in that context and against that background. Keeping this consideration in view, we proceed now to examine the relevant provisions of the three Acts. Tlte title of the Bihar Act is "An Act to provide for the preservation and improvement of certain animals in the State of Bihar. " Sub-section (3) of s. l provides that that section shall come into force at once and the remaining provisions of the Act or any of them shall come into force on such date as the State Government may, by notification, appoint and-that different dates may be appointed for different provisions and for different areas.

Section 2 is the definition section and the following definitions are to be noted: "(a) "Animal" means- (i) bull, bulloc1', cow, heifer, buffalo, calf, sheep, goat and any other ruminating animal; (ii) poultry ; and · (iii) elephant, horse, camel; ass, mule, dog, swine and such other domesticated animals as may be specified in this behalf by the State Government bv notification in the Official Gazette; " . {b) ............................... ~················· .. •··••········••• (c) "bull" means an uncastrated ma! e above the age of three years belonging to the species of bovine cattle; • . (d) "bullock" means a castrated male above the age of ~hree years belonging to the species specified in clause (c); {e) "calf" means a female or a ·Castrated or • uncastrated male, of the age of three years and below belonging to the species specified in clause (c) ; lian1f (f).

· · · ·" ·''' """' "'""' · · ·' · · ·' · · ·' •·" ••· ""'" •"' "" · •• (g) " cow " means a female above the age of three Biha. years belonging to the species specified in clause (c); ................................................................... Section 3, which is the principal section for the purposes of the Bihar Petitions, runs as follows : "3. Prohibition of slaughter of cow, calf, bull or bullock. Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or in any usage or custom to the contrary, no person shall slaughter a cow, the calf of a cow, a bull or a bullock ; Provided that the State Government may, by general or special order and subject to such conditions as it may. think fit to impose, allow the slaughter of any such animal for any medicinal or research purposes. " Section 4 provides for penalties for contravention or attempted contravention or abetment of contravention of any of the provisions of s. 3.

The remaining · provisions in the following three chapters are not material for our present purpose. It will be noticed that the words" bull", "bullock"," calf" and" cow" have been defined in els. (c), (d), (e) and (g) of s. 2 as belonging to the species of bovine cattle. The expression "species of bovine cattle" is wide enough to include and does in ordinary parlance include buffaloes, (male, or female adults or calves). Therefore, the corresponding categories of buffaloes, namely' buffalo bulls, buffalo bullocks, buffalo calves and she-buffaloes must be taken as included in the four defined categories of the species of bovine cattle and as such within the prohibitiDn embodied in s. 3 of the Act. It is to be noted, however, that the allegations in the petitions and the affi~avits in opposition proceed on the assump-tion that buffaloes (male or female adults or calves) were not within the protection of the section and, .

indeed, when the attention of learned counsel for the petitionel's was drawn to the reference to the " species of bovine cattle '. ' in each of the four definitions, they st. ill made an attempt to support the latter view by suggesting that if buffaloes wore to be included within the words defined in els. (c), (d), (e) and (g), then there v. ras no necessity for specifying it separately in the definition of" animal" in cl. (a). This argument does The not appear to us to be sound at all, for, then, on a parity of reasoning it was wholly unnecessary to specify "heifer" in the definition of ",animal".. If " heifer " is not to be included in the definition of "cow" because "heifer" is separately enumerated in the definition of" animal " then an astounding result will follow, namely, that the operative part of s. 3 will not prohibit the slaughter of " heifer " at all-a result which obviously could not possibly have been intended.

The obvious reason for the enumeration of the different categories of animals in the definition of "animal" must have been to provide a word of wide import so that all those sections where tho wider word "animal" is used may apply to the different kinds of animals included within that term. If the intention of the Bihar legislature was to exclude buffaloes (male or female adults or calves) from the protection of s. 3 then it must be said that it has failed to fulfil its intention. The U. P. Act is intituled "An Act to prohibit the slaughter of cow and its progeny in Uttar Pradesh. " The preamble to the Act recites the expediency "to prohibit and prevent the slaughter of cow and its progeny in Uttar Pradesh". Although the U. P. Act has been made under entry 15 in List II and presumably pursuant to the directives contained in Art. 48 nowhere in the Act is there any express reference whl). tever to the "preservation, protection or improvement of stock.

" Section 2 defines "beef" as meaning the flesh of cow but does not include the flesh of cow contained in sealed containers and imported as such in Uttar Pradesh. Clause (b) is very important, for it defines "cow " as including a bull, bullock, heifer, or calf. Section 3, which is the operative section runs thus: • . " 3. Notwithstanding anything contained in any . • other law for the time being in force or any usage or custom to the contrary, no person shall slaughter or cause to be slaughtered or offer or cause to be offered for slaughter any cow in any place in Uttar Bihar Pradesh. " Two exceptions are made by s. 4 in respect of cows suffering from contagious or infectious disease or which is subjected to experimentation in the interest of medical or public health research. Section 5 prohibits the sale or transport of beef or beef products in any form except for medicinal purposes and subject to the provisions of the exception therein mentioned.

Section 6, on which counsel for the State relies, provides for the establishment, by the State Government or by any local authority wherever so directed by the State Government, of institutions as may be nec~ssary for taking care of uneconomic cows. Under s. 7 the State Government may levy such charges or fees, as may be prescribed for keeping uneconomic cows in the institutions. Section 8 provides for punishment for contravention of the provisions of ss. 3, 4 and 5. Section 9 makes the . offences created by the Act cognisable and non-bailable. Section 10 gives power to the State Government to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the Act. It should be noted that the U. P. Act protects the " cow", which, according to the definition, includes only bulls, bullocks, heifer and calves. There is no reference to the species of bovine cattle and, therefore, the buffaloes (male or female adults or calves) are completely outside the protection of this Act. The C.

P. and Berar Act of 1949 was originally intituled " An Act to provide for preservation of certain animals by controlling the slaughter thereof," and the pi;eamble recited that it was " expedient to provide for the preservation of certain animals by controlling the slaughter thereof. " " Animal" was defined in s. 2 as meaning an animal specified in the schedule. The schedule specified the following categories of animals, namely, (1) bulls, (2) bullocks, (3) cows, (4) calves, (5) male and. female buffaloes and (6) buffalo calves. Sectiqn 4 originally prohibited the slaughter . • of an " animal " without certificate. There was then no total ban on the slaughter of any animal as defined. In 1951, the C. P. and Berar Animal Preservation Act, 1949, was amended by the Madhya Pradesh Act XXIII of 1951. By this amending Act the words The State " by prohibiting or " were added to the long title and the preamble before the word " controlling " and a new clause was added to s. 2 as cl.

(i) (a) defining "cow" as including a female calf of a cow and sub-s. I of s. 4 was amended so as to read as follows : "(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any usage to the contrary, no person- (a) shall slaughter a cow; or (b) shall slaughter any other animal unless he has obtained in respect of such other animal a certificate 1n writing signed by the executive authority and the veterinary officer for the area in which the animal is to be slaughtered that the animal is fit for slaughter. " Thus a total ban was imposed on the slaughter of cows and female calf of a cow and the male calf of a cow, bull, bullock, buffalo (male or female adult or calf) could be slaughtered on obtaining a certificate. The Act was further amended in 1956 by Act X of 1956 substituting for the amended definition of" cow" introduced by the amending Act of 1951 as cl. (l)(a) of s. 2 of the C. P.

and Berar Animal Preservation Act, 1949, a new definition of " cow " as including a male or female calf of a cow, bull, bullock or heifer and a new schedule specifying only (1) cows, (2) male and female buffaloes and (3) buffalo calves was substituted for the original schedule to the Act. Shortly put the position in Madhya Pradesh has been this: while ·under the C. P.

and Berar Animal Preservation Act, 1949, as it originally stood, the slaughter• of all categories of animals mentioned in the original schedule were only controlled by the requirement of a certificate from the appropriate authority before the actual slaughter, by the amending Act XXIII of 1951, a total ban was imposed on the slaughter of "cows:' which· was then defined as including only a ~emale calf of a • cow and the slaughter of all other categories of Hanif animals coming within the original schedule was controlled and finally after the amending Act X of 1956, there is now a total ban on the slaughter of" cows" Bihar which by the new definition includes a male or female calf of a cow, bull, bullock or heifer so that the male and female buffaloes . and buffalo calves (male and female) can still be slaughtered but on certificate issued by the proper authorities mentioned . in the Act. The Madhya Pradesh Act X of 1956, amending the C. P.

and Berar Animal Preservation Act, 1949, received the assent of the Governor on · May 18, 1956. The C. P. and Berar Animal Preservation Act, 1949, as amended up to 1956, is hereinafter referred to as the Madhya Pradesh Act. To sum up, under the Bihar Act there is in the State of Bihar a total ban on slaughter of all categories of animals of the species of bovine cattle. In Uttar Pradesh there is, under the U. P. Act, a total ban on the slaughter of cows and her progeny which include bulls, bullocks, heifer or calves. The buffaloes (male or female adults or calves) are completely outside the protection of the Act.

In the present Madhya Pradesh and the districts which formerly formed part of Madhya Pradesh but have since been transferred to the State of Bombay and where the Madhya Pradesh law including the Madhya Pradesh Act still applies, there is a total ban on the slaughter of cow, male or female calves of a cow, bulls, bullocks, or heifers and the slaughter of buffaloes (male or female adults or calves) are controlled in that their slaughter is permitted under certificate granted by the proper authorities mentioned in the Act. No exception has been made in any of these three Acts permitting slaughter of cattle even for bona fide religious purposes such as has been made, say, in the Bombay Animal Preservation Act, 1948 (Born. LXXXI of 1948).

As already stated the petitioners, who are citizens of India, and Muslims by religion, mostly belong to the Qnraishi community and are generally engaged in the · butchers' trade and its subsidiary undertakings such as supply of h~des, tannery, glue making, gut making • and blood de-hydniting, Those, who carry on the butchers' trade, are mostly~ Kasais \vh. o, the l? etitioners L h l say, kill only cattle uut not sheep or goat w ic l are slaughtered by other persons known as Chicks. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners challenge the The constitutional validity of the Act. s respectively a pplic-able to them on three grounds, namely, that they offend the fundamental rights guaranteed to them by Arts. 14, 19(1)(g) and 25. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent States, of course, seek to support their respective enactments by controverting the reasons advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners.

Bharat Go-Sevak Samaj, All India Anti- Cow-Slaughter Movement Committee, Sarvadeshik Arya Pratinidhi Sabha and lVI. P. Gorakshan Sangh put in petitions for leave to intervene in these pro-ceec! ings. Under Order XLI, rule 2, of the Supreme Court Rules intervention is permitted only to the Attorney-General of India or the Advocates-General for the States. There is no other express provision for permitting a third party to intervene in the proceedings before this Court. In practice, however, this Court, in exercise of its inherent powers, allows a third party to intervene when such third party is a party to some proceedings in this Court or in the High Courts where the same or similar questions are in issue, for the decision of this Court will conclude the case of that party.

In the present case, however, the petitioners for intervention are not parties to any proceedings and we did not think it right to permit them formally to intervene in these proceedings ; but in view of the importance of the questions involved in these proceedings we · have heard Pandit Thakurdas Bhargava, who was instructed by one of these petitioners for intervention, as amicus cY,riae. 'Ve ate deeply indebted to all learned counsel <1ppearing for the parties and to Pan~it Thakurdas Bhargava for the valuable assistance they have given us. Before we actually take up and deal with the alleged infraotion of the petitioners' fundamental rights, it is necessary to dispose of a preliminary question raised by Pandit Thakurchi. s Bhargava. It will be recalled • that the impugned Acts were made by the States in discharge of the obligations laid on them by Art.

48 to d 1 d en eavour to organise agricu ture an animal husbandry and in particular to take steps for preserving and Bi/1ar improving the breeds and prohibiting the slaughter of certain specified animals. These directive principles, it is true, are not enforceable by any court of law but nevertheless they are fundamental in the governance of the country and it is the duty of the State to give effect to them. These laws having thus been made in discharge of that fundamental obligation imposed on the State, the fundamental rights conferred on the citizens and others by Chapter III of the Constitution must be regarded as subordinate to these laws. The directive principles, says learned counsel, are equally, if not more, fundamental and must prevail. We are unable to accept this argument as sound. Article •13(2) expressly says that the State shall not make any bw which takes away or abridges the rights conferr. ed by Chapter III of our Constitution which enshrines the fundamental rights.

The directive principles cannot over-ride this categorical restriction imposed on the legislative power of the State. A harmonious inter-pretation has to be placed upon the Constitution and so interpreted it means that the State should certainly implement the directive principles but it must do so in such a way that its laws do not take away or abridge the fundamental rights, for otherwise the protecting provisions of Chapter III will be " a mere rope of sand ". As this Court has said in the State of Madras v. Smt. Champakam Dorairajan (1) , "The directive principles of State policy have to conform to and run as subsidiary to the Chapter on Fundamental Rights". Coming now to the arguments as to thll violation of the petitioners' fundamental rights, it will be convenient to take Ul' first the complaint founded on Art. 25(1). That article runs as follows : "Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all.

, persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right free,ly to profess, practise and propagate religion". (1) [1951) S. C. R. 525, 531 . • After referring to the provisions of cl. (2) which lays down certain exceptions which are not material for our present purpose this Court has, in Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. 'l'he State of Bombay (1) explained the meaning and scope of this article thus: The State "Thus, subject to the restrictions which this article imposes, every person has a fundamental right under our Constitution not merely to entertain such religious belief as may be approved of by his judgment or conscience but to exhibit his belief and ideas in such overt acts as are enjoined or sanctioned by his religion and further to propagate his religious views for the edification of others. It is immaterial also whether the propagation is made by a person in his individual capacity or on behalf of any church or institution.

The free exercise of religion by which is meant the performance of outward acts in pursuance of relgious belief, is, as stated above, subject to State regulation imposed to secure order, public health and morals of the people. " What then, we inquire, are the materials placed before us to substantiate the claim that the sacrifice of a cow is enjoined or sanctioned by Islam ? The materials before us are extremely meagre and it is surpris-ing that on a matter of this description the allegations in the petition should be so ·vague. In the Bihar Petition No. 58 of 1956 are set out the following bald allegations : "That the petitioners further respectfully submit that the said impugned section also violates the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution in-as-much as on the occasion of their Bakr Id Day, it is the religious practice of the petitioners' community to sacrifice a cow on the said occasion.

The poor members of the community usually sacrifice one cow for every 7 members whereas it would require one sheep or one goat for each member which would entail considerably more expense. As a result of the total ban imposed by the impugned section the petitioners would not even be allowed to make the said sacrifice which is a practice and custom in their religion, enjoined upon them by the Holy Quran, and practised by all Muslims from time immemorial and recognised as such in I. ndia. " The allegations 'in the other petitions are similar. fahar These are met by an equally bald denial in pn. ra. 21 of the affidn. vit in opposition. . No affidavit has been filed by any person specially competent to expound the relevant tenets of Islam. No reference is made in the petition to any particular Surah of the Holy Quran which, in terms, requires the sacrifice of a cow. , All that was placed before us during the argument we. re Surah XXII, Verses 28 and 33, and Surah CVIII.

What the Holy book enjoins is that people should pray unto the Lord and make sacrifice. We have no affidavit before us by any l\faulana explaining the implications of those verses or throwing any lig~t on this problem. \Ve, however, find it laid down in Hamilton's translation of Hedaya Book XLIII at p. 592 that it is the duty of every free Mussulman, arrived at the age of maturity, to offer a sacrifice on the Yd Kirban, or festival of the sacrifice, provided he be then possessed ofNisab and be not a traveller. The sacrifice established for one person is a goat and that for seven a cow or a camel. It is therefore, optional for a Muslilll; to sacrifice a goat for one person or a cow or a camel for seven persons. It does not appear to be obligatory that a person must sacrifice a cow. The very fact of an option seems to run counter to the notion of an obliga. tory duty.

It is, however, pointed out that a person with six other members of his family may afford to sacrifice a c9w but may not be able to afford to sacrifice seven goats. So there may be an econo. mic ·compulsion 'although there is no religious compul. sion. lt is als,p pointed. out that from time immemorial the Indian Mussalmans have been sacrificing cows and this practice, if not enjoined, is certainly sanctioned by their religion and it amounts to their practice 6f religion protected by Art. 25. While the petitioners claim that the sacrifice of a cow is essential, the State denies the obligatory nature of the religious practice. The fact, emph~sised by the respondents, cannot be . • disputed, namely, that many Mussalmans do not sacrifice a cow on the Bakr Id Day. It is part of the known history of India that the Moghul Emperor Bahar saw the wisdom of prohibiting· the slaughter of cows as and by way of religious sacrifice and directed The his son Humayun to follow this example.

Similarly Emperors Akbar, Jehangir, and Ahmad Shah, it is said, prohibited cow slaughter. Nawab Hyder Ali of Mysore made cow slaughter an offence punishable with the cutting of the hands of the offenders. Three of the members of the Gosamvardhan Enquiry Committee set up by the Uttar Pradesh Government in 1953 were Muslims and concurred in the unanimous recommendation for total ban on slaughter of cows. We have, however, no material on the record before us which will enable us to say, in the face of the foregoing· facts, that the sacrifice of a cow on that day is an obligatory overt act for a Mussalman to exhibit his religious belief and idea. In the premises, it is not possible for us to uphold this claim of the petitioners. The next complaint is against the denial of the equal protection of the law. It is thus formulated: The petitioners are Muslims by religion and butchers (1) [1954] S. C. R. 1055, 1062-1063. • (Kasais) by occupation and they carry on the trade of selling beef.

The impugned Acts prejudicially affect only the Muslim Kasais who kill cattle but not others who kill goats and sheep and who sell goats' meat and mutton. It is, therefore, clear that only the Muslim Kasais, who slaughter only cattle but not sheep or goats, have been singled out for hostile and discriminatory treatment. Their further grievance is that the U. P. Act makes a distinction even between butchers who kill cattle and butchers who kill buffaloes and the Madhya Pradesh Act also makes a like discrimination in that slaughter of buffaloes is permitte~, although under certificate, while slaug):iter of cows, bulls, bullocks and calves are totally prohibited. In the premises the petitioners contend that the law which permits such discrimination must be struck down as violativ~ of the salutary provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution. The meaning, scope and effect of Art.

14, · which is the equal protection clause in our Constitution, has anif been explained by this Court in a series of decisions in cases beginning with Ohiranjitlal Choudhury v. The 1 Bihar Union of India ( ) and ending with the recent case of Ram Krishna Dalmia and . others v. Sri Justice S. R. Tendolkar ('). It is now well established that while Art. 14 forbids class legislation it does not forbid reasonable clitssification for. the purposes of legislation and that in order to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii) such differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought t·o be achieved by the statute in question.

The classification, it has been held, may be founded on different bases, namely, geographical, or according to obj°ects or occupations or the like aud what is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. The pronouncements of this Court further establish, amongst other things, that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and that the burden is upon him, who attacks it, to show that there has been a clear violation of the constitutional· principles. The courts, it is accepted, must presume that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to pro-blems made manifest by experience and tliat its discri-minations are based on adequate grounds.

It must be borne in mind that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest and finally that in ord('r to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the Court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing" at the · time of legislation. We, therefore, proceed to examine the impugned Acts in the light of the principles thus x958 enunciated by this Court. The impugned Acts, ·it may be recalled,. have been Mohd. H::•if made by the States in discharge of the obligations im- Qu:;es ' posed on them by Art. 48. In order to implement the The State. of Bihar directive principles the respect. ive Legislatures enacted the impugned Acts in exercise of the powers conferred Das c. J. on them by Art. 246 read with entry 15 in List II of the Seventh Schedule.

It is, therefore, quite clear that the objects sought to be achieved by the impugn- , ed Acts are the preservation, protection and improvement of livestocks. Cows, bulls, bullocks and calves of cows are no doubt the most important cattle for the agricultural economy of this country. :Female buffaloes yield a large quantity of m~lk and are, therefore, well looked after and do not need as much protection as cows yielding a small quantity of milk require. As draught cattle male buffaloes are not. half as useful as bullocks. Sheep and goat give very little milk compared to the cows and the female buffaloes and have practically no utility as draught animals. These different categories of animals being susceptible of classification into separate groups on the basis of their usefulness to society, the butchers who kill each category may also be placed in distinct classes according to the effect produced on society by the carrying on of their respective occupations.

Indeed the butchers, who kill cattle, according to the allegations of the petitioners themselves in their respective petitions, form a well defined class based on their occupation. That classification is based on an intelligible differentia which places them in a well defined class and distinguishes them from those who kill goats and sheep and this differentia has a close connection with the object sought to be aqhieved. by the impugned ~ct, namely, the preservation, protection and improvement of our livestock. The attainment of these objectives may well necessitate that the slaughterers of cattle should be dealt with more stringently than the slaughterers of, say, goats and sheep. The impugned Acts, therefore, have adopted a classification on sound and in. telligible: basis and can quite clearly stand the t~st laid down in z95B the decisions of this Court. Whatever objections Mohd.

Hanif there may be against the validity of the impugned Quareshi Acts the denial of equal protection of the laws does v. . not, prima facie, appear to us to be one of them. In 0 The State 1 Biha• any case, bearing in mind the presumption of consti- Da-;-;;_ J. tutionality attaching to all enactments founded on the recognition by the court of the fact that the legislature correctly appreciates the needs of its own people there appears to be no escape from the conclusion that the petitioners have not discharged the onus that was c on them and the challenge under Art. 14 cannot, therefore, prevail. Learn\ld counsel for the petitioners then take their final stand on Art. 19(1)(g). Immediately learned counsel for the respondents-counter the charge by say-ing that Art. 19(1}(g) can hit only the law which, purports to directly violate its provisions. The impugned Acts, we are reminded, have been made in implementa-tion of the directive principles laid down in Art.

48 and are laws with respect to matters set forth in entry 15 of List II and it is emphasised that the sole purpose of these enactments is to secure the preservation, protection and improvement of stock and that its real aim is not to take away or abridge the rights guaranteed by Art. ·19(1 )(g). If at all, these enactments may only indirectly and incidentally affect those rights but that circμmstance cannot alter their real nature and purpose. Reliance is placed in support of this contention on the following observations of Kania C. J. in A. K. (1) [1950] ~. C. R. ~9· (2) [1959] S. C. R. 279. • ' 1 Gopalan v. The State ( ). " If there is a legislation directly attempting to control a citizen's freedom of speech or expression, or his right to assemble peaceably and without arms, etc. , the question whether that legislation is saved by the relevant savjng ·clause of artiqle 19 will arise.

If, however, the legislation is not directly in respect of any of these subjects, but as a result of the operation of other legislation, for instance, for punitive or preventive detention, his right under any ·of these sub-,clauses is abridged, the question of the application of article :19 does not arise. The true approach is only to consider the directness of the legislation and not what will • (I) [1950JS. C. R. ' 88, IOI. be the result of the detention otherwise valid, on the mode of the detenue's life. " This part of the argument advanced on behalf of the respondents is further sought to be reinforced by the fact that the above observations of Kania C. J. had The subsequently been adopted by this Court in Ram Singh 1 v. The State of Delhi ( ). Those observations of Kania C. J. should, in our opinion, be read in the context of the facts of those cases. It should be remembered that both these cases arose out of orders made under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950.

Article 22, which is to be found in Chapter III of the Constitution, recog-nises the necessity for preventive detention, however odious it may be. The purpose of the Act under whicl'i. the detention orders had been made in those cases, was to wevent the persons concerned from acting in any manner prejudicial to one or other of the three important matters specified therein. The effect of the execu-tion of the orders was to deprive those persons of their liberty according to procedure established by law. Preventive detention, like punitive detention, having taken away the personal liberty of those persons they could not claim the rights under Art. 19(l)(a)to (e) and (g) for those were the rights of free men.

It was, therefore, considered that the primary and direct object of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, being, inter alia, to secure the security of the State and maintenance of law and order, its impact on the fundamental rights was indirect and, therefore, the Act could not be challenged for breach of the fundamental rights under Art. 19(1). The position in the cases now before us is quite different. The last part of the directive principles embodied in Art. 48 require the State to take steps for prohibiting the slaughter of the specified animals and this directive can only be carried out br prohibiting the petitioners and other butchers (Kasais) from slaugh-· tering them. There can be no mistake about the directness of these legislations vis-a-vis the petitioners and other butchers and the effect of these legislations on their rights is direct and instantaneous as soon as they are brought into force. The title of the'U. P. Act (1) (1951] S. C. R. 451, 456-457.

• does not even attempt to conceal the directness of its impact on the butchers of Uttar Pradesh. The argument of learned counsel for the respondents on this point cannot be accepted and the question of the alleg- Bihared violation of Art. 19(l)(g) has to be dealt with on merits. The complaint of the petitioners under Art. 19 (1) (g) is that the impugned Acts, if enforced, will compel them at once to close down their business and will, in effect, amount to a complete denial of their right to carry· on their occupation, trade or business in spite of the mandatory provisions of Art,. 19(l)(g). The objec-tion iS elaborated thus: The livelihood of a butcher of battle depends on the existence of many factors. First he has to purchase the cattle which he will slaughter. The statistics will show that a large number of ,. attle are slaughtered for food every year. According to Table II on p.

24 of the Report on the Marketing of Cattle in India 18,93,000 heads of cattle and 6,09,000 buffaloes were slaughtered in the year 194. 8. Taking that 7 goats are the equivalent in flesh of 1 cow or buffalo these butchers who slaughter 25,02,000 bovine cattle will have to find 7 times that number of goats or sheep, that is to say, they will have to have 1, 75,14,000 extra goats and sheep per year. This it is said, is not available in India. Then the butchers will have to find buyers for this enormous quantity of goats' meat or mutton the price of which, according to the figures given at p. 12 of the Expert Committee's Report, is very much higher than that of beef.

Poorer people may afford to buy beef occasionally but goats' meat Or mutton will be beyond their reach and consequently there will not be a market for sale of the meat of so many goats and sheep and the butchers will have to reduce the number of goats and sheep for purposes of slaughter and that will reduce their income to a negligible figure. Further, what will they do with the skins of so many goats, and sheep ? They will not have ready sale in the market as hides. of co,ys and buffaloes have, for the latter are used in the manufacture of. boots, shoes, suit cases, belts and other leather goods while the. skins of goats and sheep will be. useless • • for such purpose. The same considerations will apply to the guts.

There is, therefore, no escape, say learned counsel for the petitioners from the inevitable conclusion that a total ban on the slaughter of all· animals belonging to the species of bovine cattle will bring The about a total prohibition of the business and occupation of the butchers (Kasais). Clause (6) of Art. 19, no doubt, protects the operation of the existing laws in so far as they impose and do not prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interest of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by Art. 19(l)(g). But restrictions, they say, cannot extend to total prohibition and reference is made to the observations to be found in some of the decisions of this Court. The contention is that the State may regulate but cannot annihilate a business which. a citizen has a right to carry on. The rival contention is thus formulated: The dictionary meaning of the word " butcher " is " slaugh-terer of animals for food, dealer in meat".

It is one of the three well-known occupations included in the homely phrase, " the butcher, the baker, the candle-stick maker". 'The expression" butcher", as popularly understood now, has no reference to any particular animal. The term is now applicable to any person who slaughters any animal for food. Taken in this larger sense, the facts alleged in the petitions do not, according to learned counsel for the respondents, indicate that any of the impugned Acts has the effect of completely stopping the petitioners' businesses. They seek to illustrate their point thus : Take the case of piece-goods merchants. · Some may deal in country made piece-goods and others may import and sell piece-goods manufactured, say, in England or Japan. Some may deal in dhotis and saris and others may confine their activities to the purchase anti sale of long cloth or other varieties of piece-goods. They are, however, all piece-goods merchants.

Suppose in the interest of our indigenous textile industry and to protect the best interests of the general public it becomes necessary to stop the import of fore,ign cloth. altogether. Such stoppage will not prevent any cloth • merchant f~om carrying on his trade or business as cloth merchant, for he can still deal in cloth and piece- £ goods manu actured in India. Will any piece-goods merchant, whose business was only to import foreign Bihar piece-goods for sale in India, be heard to complain that the stoppage of import of foreign cloth has completely prevented him from carrying on business as a piece goods merchant and, therefore, such stoppage of import of foreign cloth being more than a mere restriction . violates his fundamental right under Art. 19(l)(g)? Where, they ask, will the argument lead us ? Suppose that the import of one particular variety of piece-goods, say saris, is stopped but import of dhotis and all other varieties of piece-goods are allowed.

On a reasoning at par with that urged in the last case-should not a dealer who imports only that variety of piece-goods the import of which' has been stopped be entitled to say that his business has been completely stopped ? Suppose the State in the interest of Khadi and cottage industries imposes a ban on the manufacture or sale of cloth of a very fine count, will a merchant who deals only in fine cloth be entitled to say that as he deals only in fine cloth, the ban haR completely prohibited the carrying on of his business? The truth of the matter, they submit, is that the ban on the import of foreign cloth or on the manufacture of cloth of very fine count is only a restriction imposed on the piece-goods business, for the ban affects one or :more of the segments of that business but leaves the other segments untouched. .

There is, therefore, only some restriction imposed on piece-goods merchants in that they cannot deal in certain kinds of piece-goods, but they are not wholly prevented from carrying on piece-goods business. The position, they say, is the same in the case of butchers (Kasais). " The butchers' bustness, they point out, has several segments and a ban on one segment may be complete prohibition of the activities of that segment, for restriction is complete as far as it extends, but in the larger context of the butchers' business such a ban,· they &ubmit, operates only as a restriction. Far less, it is said, can a dealer in hides, complain that the ban . . • imposed on the slaughter of cattle and buffaloes prevent him from carrying on his business as a hide merchant, for he can still carry on his business in -fallen hides. Indeed the statistics collected in the l~eport of Marketing of Hides in Intlia, Second Edition, The p.

9, show that the percentage of fallen hides to the total cattle population is 8. 8 whereas the percentage of slaughtered hides to the total cattle population is 1. 4. The same argument has been advanced regarding gut merchants and other dealers in subsidiary things. It is not necessary for us to dilate upon or to express any opinion on the rival contentions as abstract pro-positions. The matter has to be dealt with objectively. What do the Acts actually provide ? In Uttar Pradesh the petitioners can freely slaughter buffaloes (male or female adults or calves) and sell their meat for food. It is• also open to them to slaughter goats ,and s4eep and sell the meat. Therefore, so far as the butchers of Uttar Pradesh are concerned, there is obviously no total prohibition of their occupation but only some restrictions have been imposed on them in respect of one part of their occupation, namely, the slaughter of cows, bulls, bullocks, and calves of cows.

In Madhya Pradesh the Act, it is true, totally forbids the slaμghter of cows including bulls, bullocks and cows but perll! its the slaughter of buffaloes (male or female adults or calves) under certain conditions. Therefore, in Madhya ! Pradesh also there is no law totally prohibiting the carrying on of the business of a butcher. In Bihar there is, no doubt, a total ban against the slaughter of all animals belonging to the species of bovine cattle which includes buffaloes (male or female adults or calves) but it is still possible for the butchers of Bihar to slaughter goats and sheep and sell goats' meat and mutton for food. As will be seen hereafter the total ban on the slaugliter of bulls, bullocks, buffaloes (male or female adults or calves) irrespective of their age or_ usefulness is, in our view, not a reasonable restriction imposed on the butchers (Kasais) in the interest of the general public and that being, therefore, void, no question can arise, even iu.

Bihar, of any total prohibition of the rights of ·butchers to carry on their occnpatioh or business. · In this view of the matter we need express no final opinion on the B"h vexed question as to whether restrictions permissible ••under cl. (6) of Art. '19 may extend to total prohibition. . That question: was left open by this. Court in Saghi1· 1 Ahmed v. '/. 'he State of U. P. and others ( ) and in The State of Bombay v. R. Jf. D. Chamarbaugwala (') and in the view we have taken on the facts and construc-tion of the several Acts under consideration, does not call for an answer _in disposing of these :petitions. The question that calls for an· answer from us is. whether these restrictions are reasonable in the interests of the general public. · Clause (6) of Art. 19 protects a law which imposes in the interest of the general public reasonable re~tric tions on the exercise of the right · confeiTed by sub. cl. (g) of cl. (1) of Art. 19.

Quite obviously it is left tO the court, in case of dispute, to determine the reason. ableness of the restrictions imposed by the law. In determining that question the court, we conceive, cannot proceed on a general notion of what is reasonable in the abstract or even on a consideration of what is reasonable from the point of view of the person or persons on whom the restrictions· are imposed. The right conferred by sub-cl. (g) is expressed in general language and if there had been no qualifying provision like cl. (6), the right so conferred would have been all absolute one. To the person who ·has this right any ·restriction will be irksome and Iimy well be regarded by him as unreasonable. But the question cannot be decided'on that basis. 'Vhat the court has to do is to consider whether· the restrictions imposed are reasonable in the interests of the general public. . In the State of. Madms v. V. G.

Ro:w (') this court has laid dO\vn the test of reasonableness in the followihg terms: · " It is important in this context t. q. bear ih 1i1iiid that the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, sl). on1d be applied to each individual statute impug1ied, (1) [1955J 1. S. C. R. 707, 724. . . (2f[1957] S:C:R. 874. . .. • (~) [1952] S. C. R. 591, 607. ' · and no abstract standard, or general pattern, of reasonableness can be laid dowi1 as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed , the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and. urgency of the evil sought to be remedied The thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the pre-vailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial . verdict.

In evaluating such elusive factors and forming their own conception of what is reasonable, in all the circumstances of a given case, it is inevitable that the social philosophy and the scale of values of the judges participating in the decision should play an important part, and the limit to their interference with legislative judgment in such cases can only be dictated by their sense of responsibility and self-restraint and the sobering reflection that the Constitution is meant not only for people of their way of thinking but for all, and that tho majority of the elected representatives of the people have, in autho-rising the imposition of the restrictions, considered them to he reasonable. " These observations have been adopted by this Court in later cases, e. g. , The State of West Bengal v. Subodh 1 Gopal Bose ( ) and Ebrahim, Vazir Mavat v. The State of. Boinbay (2). In this connection it will also be well to remember the observation of ~Iahajan J. in The State of Bihar v.

Maharajadhiraj Sfr Kaineshwar Singh of Dharbnngha Ci), namely, that "the legislature is the best judge of what is good for the community, by whose suffrage it comes into existence .... ". This should be the proper approach for the court but the ultimate responsibility for determining the validity of the law must rest with the court and the court must not shirk that solemn duty 'cast on it by the Constitution. We have, therefore, to approach the problem now before us in the light of the principles laid down by this Court. The avowed object of each of the impugned Acts is to ensure the preservation, protection, and improvement 01' the cow and her progeny. ·This solicitude (1) [1954) S. C. R. 587, 627. (2) [1954] S. C. R 933, ~49-950. (3) (195·•] S. C. R. 889, 941. • a. rises out of the appreciation of the usefulness of cattle in a predominantlv. agricultural societv. Early Aryans . J recognised its importance as one of the most indispensable adjuncts of agriculture.

It would appear that in Bihai Vedic times animal flesh formed the staple food of the people. This is attributable to the fact that the climate in that distant past was extremely cold and the Vedic Aryans had been a pastoral people before they settled down as agriculturists. In Rg. Vedic times goats, sheep, cows, buffaloes and even horses were slaughtered for food and for religious sacrifice and their flesh used to be offered to the Gods. Agni is called the " eater of ox or cow " in Rg. Veda (VIII. 43, 11). The slaying of a great ox (Mahoksa) or a "great Goat" (Mahaja) for the entertainment of a distinguish-ed guest has been enjoined in the Satapatha Brahmana (Ill. 4. 1~2). Yagnavalkya also expresses a similar view (Vaj 1. 109). An interesting account of those early days will be found in Rg. Vedic Culture by Dr. A. C. Das, Ch. 5, pp. 203-5, and in the History of Dharmasastras (Vol. II, Part II) by P. V. Kane at pp. 772- 773. Though the custom of slaughtering of - cows and bulls.

prevailed during the Vedic period, nevertheless, even in the Rg. Vedic times there seems to have grown up a revulsion of feeling against the custom. . The cow gradually came to acquire a special sanctity and was called " Aghnya" (not to be slain). There was a school of thinkers amongst the Rsis, who set their face against the custom of killing such useful animals as the cow and the bull.. High praise was bestowed on the cow as will appear from the following verses from Hg. Veda, Book· VI, Hymn XXVIII (Cows) attributed to the authorship of Sage Bhardvaja : "1. The kine have come and brought good for-tune; let them rest in t! ie cow-pen and be happy near . . us. Here let them stay prolific, many coloured, and yield through many morns their milk for Indra. 6. 0 cows, ye fatten e'en the worn and wasted, and make the unlovely beautiful to look on. Pros. per my house, ye with auspicious voices, your power is glorifie:J. in our assemblies. 7.

Crop goodly pasturages and be prolific ; drink 1958 pure sweet water at good drinking places. Never be thief or sinful man ymu master, and Mnhd. Hanif • Qua res hi may the dart of Rudra still avoid you. " v. (Translation by Ralph Griffith). Verse 29 of Hymn 1 Thi; State of Bina, in Book X of Atharva Veda forbids cow slaughter in the following words : · Das c. J. "29. The slaughter of an innocent, 0 Kritya, is an awful deed, Slay not cow, horse, or man of ours. " Hymn 10 in the same Book is a rapturous glorification of the cow: "30. The cow is Heaven, the cow is Earth, the cow is Vishnu, Lord of life, The Sadhyas and the Vasus haYe drunk the out-pourings of the cow. 34; Both Gods and mortal men depend for life and being on the cow. . She hath become this universe; all that the sun surveys is she. " P. V. Kane argues that in the times of the Rg. Veda only barren cows, if at all, were killed for sacrifice or meat and cows yielding milk were held to be not fit for being killed.

It is only in this way, according to him, that one can explain and reconcile the apparent conflict between the custom of killing cows for food and the high praise bestowed on the cow in Rg. Vedic times. It would appear that the protest raised against the slaughter of cows greatly increased in volume till , the custom was totally abolished in a later age. The change of climate perhaps also make the use of beef as food unnecessary and even injurious to health. Gradually cows became indicative of the wealth of the owner. The Neolithic Aryans not having been acquaint-ed with metals, there were no coins in current use in the earlier stages of their civilisation, . hut as they were eminently a pastoral people almost every family possessed a sufficient number of cattle and some of them exchanged them for the necessaries of their life. The value of cattle (Pasu) was, therefore, very great with tne early Rg. Vedic Aryans.

The ancient Rom-ans also used the word pecus or pecu (pasu) in the sense of wealth or money. The . English words, "pecuniary " and " impecunious'', are derived from the Latin root peens or peen, originally meaning cattle. rl'h · f l o possession o catt e in those days denoted wealth and a man was considered rich or poor according to Bihar the large or small number of cattle that he owned. li1 the Ramayana King Jan1ika's wealth ·\vas described by reforcnce to the large number of herds that he owned. It appears that the cow was gradually raised to the status of divinity. Kautilya's Arthasastra has a special chapter (Ch. XXIX) dealing with the "sμper-intendent of cows" and the duties of the owner of cows are also referred to in Ch. XI of Hindu Law in its sources hy Ganga Nath Jha.

·There can be no gainsaying the fact that the Hindus in general hold the cow in great reverence and· the idea of the slaugh, ter of cows for food ·is repugnant to their notions· and this sentiment has in the past even led to comn"mnal riots. It is also a faqt. that after the recent partition of the country this agitation against the slaughter of cows has been forth er intensified. W h~le we agree th! tt the constitutional question before us cannot be decided on grounds of mere sentiment, however passion-ate it may be, we, nevertheless, think that it has . to be taken into consideration, though only 11s one of many clements, in arriving at a judicial verdict as to the reasonableness of the restrictions. Cattle in India, it is said, has a treble rnle to play, namely, (i) to produce milk for food, (ii) hulls for draught and (iii) manure. for agriculture. It is neccs-sary to advert to the arguments advanced under each head.

According to the 1951 census there were 15,60,00,000 heads of cattle and 4,00,00,000 of buffaloes making a total of 19,60,00,000 or roughly 20,00,00,000 of animals belonging . to the species of bovine cattle. In India there are 123 heads of cattle including lmlfaloes per square. mile and,43 heads to every 100 persons. Out of the total cattle population of 15,60,00,000 and buffalo population of 4,00,00,000 there were in Bihar 1,52,97,000 cattle and 33,16,000 buffaloes, in Madhya Pradesh 1,48,58,000 hends of . cattle and 26,00,000 buffaloes and in Uttar Pradesh 2,35,13,000. heads of cattle and 92,50,000 buffaloes . • The toth. l distribut. ion of cattle and buffaloes, accord; ing to age,' s~·x and work, was as follows:- 11'1 ales Cattle H4faloes :Breeding bulls 6,52,000 3,06,000 T'

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