MR. 'C' v. THE ADVOCATE-GENERAL OF MADRAS
Citation: [1957] 1 S.C.R. 1092; 1957 INSC 45
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: B. JAGANNADHADAS , BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR
Judgment date:
Case summary
1957 INSC 45. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1957-05-06. MR. 'C' v. THE ADVOCATE-GENERAL OF MADRAS. Read the judgment and case details on LawSphereX.
Judgment text
constituencies and different dates have to be fixed for holding the actual elections in different constituencies according to the various exigencies relating to the particular lccalities in which the constituencies are situate. No good ground has been established for holding that there has been anv discrimination such as is prohibited by Art. 14 of the Constitution. In so far as the alleged discrimination, if any, in breach of the equal protection clause of the Constitution may be said to be calculated to raise anv doubt in connection with the election of the President it will, at best, be a non-compliance with the prov1s10ns of the Constitution which may or may not, after the conclusion of the entire election, be made a ground, under s. 18 of the Presi-dential and Vice-Presidential Election Act, 1952, for calling the election in question as to which we need formulate no final opinion at this stage.
We express no opinion on the merits of any of the controversies between the parties, but, for the foregoing reasons, we hold that the present petitions are premature and cannot be entertained at this stage. We, therefore, dismiss the petitions Nos. 63 and 64 of 1957. Civil Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 563 and 564 of 1957 will also stand dismissed. Petitions dismissed. MR. 'C' v. THE ADVOCATE-GENERAL OF MADRAS (JAGANNADHADAS, B. P. SINHA and GA JENDRA- GADKAR JJ. ) Professional misconduct-Advoratc borne on the rolls of a l--! igh Court and Supre1ne Court-Debarred by l-! igh Court on Bar Cott:1cil's ref;ort-Sumnions by Supreme Cottrt-Procedure-Supremc Court R;des, 0. IV, r. 30. The appellant, an Advocate ,vhose nan1e was borne on the rolls of the Madras I-Iigh Court and of the Supren1e Co11rt, \vas found guilty of gross profes. sional misconduct by the 1vfadr:Js High Court on the report of the Bar Council Tribunal and debarred from practmng in that Court.
The charge against him was that he did not utilise a particular sum of money entrusted to him by his client to clear a mortgage in order to secure a clear title for him in completion of a transaction of sale, for that purpose. nor account for it. The appellant preferred an appeal by special leave and this Court, being apprised of the order passed by the General Madras High Court, issued a Rule under r. 30, 0. IV of. the Supreme Court Rules. It was found by this Court that the charge against the appellant was fully supported by a large volume of: evidence on record, both oral and documentary. Held, that the appeal must be dismissed and the Rule made absolute and the appellant's name removed from the roll of Advocates of this Court. I It is a great privilege to be an Advocate of this Court and only such persons as can satisfy a very high standard of integrity of character can be enrolled as such. An Advoi:ate who is found .
to have fallen from that standard and is debarred by the High Court cannot be considered fit to practise in this Court. Proceedings under r. 30, 0. IV of the Supreme Court Rules should be treated as a natural sequel to proceedings in the High Court under the Bar Councils Act and although an order made by the High Court under that Act is not to be automatically followed by this Court, it is not necessary that this Court should start a fresh inquiry on evidence. It would be enough for it to generally examine the record prepared by the Bar Council Tribunal and take into account the findings nf the High Court based on such report. Reasonable opportunity must, however, be afforded to the Advocate of being heard against the action proposed to be taken against him and adducing such additional evidence as this Court may think proper.
The Attorney General or any other Advocate representing the Legal Profession generally or the complainant or the aggrieved party may also be heard before the final decision is arrived at; In the matter of an Advocate, Case No. XVI of 1942, decided on March 23, 1943, In re: D. A. Slianmugasundaraswami, an Advocate, Misc. Case No. X of 1948, decided on January 24, 1949, In the matter of Mr. 'G', a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court, (1955) 1 S. C. R. 490 and In the matter of 'D', an Advocate of the Supreme Court, (1955) 2 S. C. R. 1006, referred to. CIVIL APPELLATE JuRrsmcTmN: Civil Appeal No. 146 of 1956. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 3, 1954, of the Madras High Court in Referred Case No. 69 of 1954. M. S. K. Aiyanger, for the appellant. • R. Ganapathy Iyer and T. M. Sen, for respondents Nos. 1 and 2. 1957. May 6. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINHA J.
-This appeal by special leave and the summons under rule 30 of Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1950, have been heard together and will be disposed of by this Judgment. The appellant was an advocate of the Madras High Court of more than 25 ·years' standing, and was enrolled as an advocate of the then F~deral Court in the year 1939. As will presently appear, he has had a chequered career at the Bar. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court, presided over by the Chief Justice of that Court, by its judgment and order, dated December 3, 1954, has directed that the appellant's name be removed from the roll of advocates of the Madras High Court, for "grave professional misconduct". This Court, having been apprised of the result of the proceedings against the appellant in the High Court, issued notice to him to show cause why he should not be suspended from practice in view of the findings recorded by the High Court. It appears that the appellant was engaged by one K. T.
Appannah, ordinarily residing in Bangalore city, who will hereinafter be referred to as the complainant, to complete a transaction of sale between the complainant and the owner of a house property in the city of Madras, whom we shall call, in the course of this judgment, as the vendor, after scrutinizing the title deeds in respect of the property which was the subiect-matter of the transaction of sale. Before the appellant was engaged by the complainant, the bargain had been srruck and the sale price of the property had been fixed at Rs. 15,000 out of which Rs. 1,300 had been paid to the vendor by way of earnest money. A retired Government servant named Sundararajayya who was a relation of the complainant, and used to live near about the appellant's residence, had also helped the complainant in acquiring the property, and in that connection, used to give instructions to the appellant on behalf of the complainant.
On May 11, 1951, the complainant sent, by way of a demand draft, the' sum of Rs. 1,400, to the appellant, to meet the costs of stamp for the sale deed, and registration, and a fee of Rs. 150 to the appellant for his work in connection with the transaction. In the course of the enquiry into the title to the property, it was discovered that there was a mortgage on the property, of Rs. 5,500, on the basis of a registered mortgage-deed which had been filed in Court in connection with a litigation in respect of that very property, pending on the original side of the Madras High Court. By negotiation, it was settled that Rs. 5,500, out of the sale price, shall be reserved for the . discharge of the mortgage debt, and that the remaining amount of the consideration, will be paid to the vendor on completion of the sale -transaction and delivery of vacant possession of the property. The appellant wrote to the complainant that the latter should send him a demand draft for Rs.
5,600, in his name, for payment to the mortgagee, aforesaid, when the mortgage bond, properly discharged, would be handed over to the appellant, acting for the complainant. In due course, on or about June 26, 1951, a demand draft in the name of the appellant, for Rs. 5,600, was sent by the complainant for the express purpose of discharging the mortgage debt, aforesaid. On August 21, 1951, a cheque for Rs. 1,200, on September 26, 1951, a cheque for Rs. 500, and on October 19, 1951, a demand draft for Rs. 5,500, all in the narri. e of the appellant, were sent by the complainant, in order to put him in funds for completing the. transaction of sale and for payment of the consideration money to the vendor. On July 9, 1951, the sale~deed was executed by some of the executants, and on September 6, 1951, it was executed by the remaining executant, and registered. Hence, it would appear that between May 11, 1951, and Octo-her 24, 1951, the complainant had paid to the appellant, the sum of Rs.
15,200, which was sufficient to pay the outstanding amount of the consideration for sale . ' namely, Rs. 13,700, including the mortgage amount, afnresaid, of R. s. 5,500, besides the costs of stamp and registration and the appellant's fees. But it appears that the vendor's portion of the consideration money, was paid by the appellant on November 23, 1951, after some avoidable delay due to him, and vacant delivery of possession given to the appellant as stipulated between the parties. It appears further that the complainant was in need of raising money on the security of the newly-acquired property, and, therefore, was anxious t'> receive all the documents of title including the mortgage bond duly discharged. But the appellant, for reasons of his own, went on postponing the payment of the mortgage money on some pretext or the other.
On being pressed for the mortgage-deed, duly discharged, being handed over to the complainant, and as a result of a protracted correspondence, the appellant sent, to the complainant, on June 26, 1952, a number of documents including "cancelled mortgage documents. " It should be added here that the mortgage transaction of Rs. 5,500, ha• l been entered into by the owner of the property in order to discharge previous mortgages on the same property. All these documents had to be withdrawn from the High Court where they had been in the custody of the Court as already indicated. Unfortunately, Sundararajayya died on June 28, 1952. As a result of further correspondence, the complainant came to realise, to his cost, that the mortgage debt of Rs. 5,500 had not been paid to the mortgagee, as arranged between the appellant and the complainant who had put him in funds with the express purpose of obtaining a clear title to the property which he had agreed to purchase.
Thus, the complainant was reduced to the necessity of filing a regular petition of complaint in the High Court on November 14, 1952. In that petition of complaint, the complainant made copious quotations from the letters addressed by the appellant to him and made reference to the fact that the mortgagee had already instituted a suit in court for recoverv of the mortgage mane. ,', and had impleaded the compbinant as party defenchnt to the rnit. The gravamen of the charge against the appelbnt was that he had not discharged the outstanding mortgage on the property purchased, for which he had been supplied with ample funds by the complainant and that he had not disclosed how and . in what manner, the complainant's money, meant for the purpose, had been utilized by the appellant.
In answer to the notice issued to him on February 16, 1953, the appellant submitted a long statement by way of an explanation which runs into about 43 pages in print, which is more in the nature of an argument in justification of his conduct than a statement of facts. The High Court referred the complaint, for inquiry and report, to the Bar Council. Three mem-bers of the Council constituted the Tribunal which held a very elaborate inquiry. After recording both oral and documentary evidence, the Bar Council made its report on May 5, 1954, holding that : '· ...... both the charges have been fully established and that the respondent has not only not used the moneys of the complainant for the purpose for which the, money was sent, but that the respondent has not accounted at all for the sum of rupees, 5,000; which was ndmittedly cashed by him and brought into his bank account though not in his professional account.
" In course of its report, the Tribunal found that the appellant had received all the amounts sent by the complainant, as set out above. It also pointed out that an unfortunate feature of the case was that the mortgage bound in question which was one of the "cancelled mortgage documents'', had not been produced before it. The non-production of the crucial document was explained to the Tribunal by counsel for the complainant. It was. stated that the mortgage-dccd in question, along with other document>, had been left by the complainant with his counsel ancl that the-whole bundle of papers inclucling tho>e documents had "disappeared from his office". One can onlv surmise as to who may have been responsible fo~ secreting those documents, or for who>e benefit. thev h:id been stolen away, as alleged by counsel for the complainant.
Another ugly aspect of the proceedings was that a number of letters, admittedly written by the appelbnt to the complainant in connection with the tramaction of sale. had been found bv the High Court to have been 4-81 ! ;. C. Ind1a'59. tampered with or bodily substituted. The Tribunal observed with particular reference to exhibit C-12, which was alleged to have been substiruted for the original, that the learned counsel for the complainant had not persisted in the charge that it had been substituted; and that he did not press the charge that there had been certain alterations in some other letters which formed part of the voluminous correspondence that passed between the appellant and the complainant. It may be observed here that no specific "charge" had been drawn up against the appellant in respect of those letters.
Hence, when the Tribunal stated that the 'charge' had been withdrawn, it only meant to s2y that the learned counsel for the complainant did not persist in his allegations about those alterations or the wholesale substirution of exhibit C-12 about which we will have to say something more in the course of this judgment. The Tribunal examined, in some detail, the particular defence of the appellant with reference to the sp ssession they arc seized, is not discrimin2tive in character and does not violate equal protcCtion of law guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution. Budhan Chaudhury and Others v. The State of Bihar, (1955) I S. C. R. 1045, applied. Purushottam Govindji Halai v. Shri B. M. Desai, (1955) 2 S. C. R. 889 and A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M. Venkitachalam Potti and another (1955) 2 S. C. R. 1196, referred to.
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