M/S. KASTURI AND SONS (PRIVATE) LTD. v. SHRI N. SALIVATEESWARAN AND ANOTHER
Citation: [1959] 1 S.C.R. 1; 1958 INSC 19
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI , BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, SYED JAFFER IMAM, J.L. KAPUR, P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR
Judgment date:
Case summary
1958 INSC 19. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1958-03-19. M/S. KASTURI AND SONS (PRIVATE) LTD. v. SHRI N. SALIVATEESWARAN AND ANOTHER. Read the...
Judgment text
THE SUPREME COURT REPORTS . i. ------------ ----- ---·---- M/8. KASTURI AND SONS (PRIVATE) LTD. v. Mwrch 19. SHRI N. SAL1VATEE8WARAN AND ANOTHER (BHAGWATI, B. P. SINHA, JAFER IMAM, J. L. KAPUR and GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ. ) Workfog journalist-Claim against employer for recovery of dues-Referrncc by State Got•emment to specified aut/1ority-Jf a11t/1oril)' also empowered to determine amount duc-Jl'orking ]ouma-lists (Conditio•n of Service) and Misceltaneo11s Prot·isions Act, 1955 (45 of z955): s. z7. The respandent No. l was a journalist supplying news to the petitioner's newspaper on payment of a fixed monthly honorarium. Contrary to the petitioner's instructions the respondent No. l left India and thereupan the petitioner terminated the arrangement. Upan his retur~ to ~ndia the respondent No .. r requested the peti .. tioner to reconsider its decision but the petitioner declmed to do so. The respandent No. x applied to the State Government under s.
17 of the Working Journalists (Conditions of Sen·ice) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 claiming a large sum of money from the petitioner. The State Government nominated respondent No. 2 as the authority under s. 17 of the Act and referred the claim to him. The petitioner disputed the whole claim and contended that the respondent No. 2 had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upan the merits of the disputed claim: Held, that the authority specified under s. 17 of the Act had no jurisdiction to determine the amount due as the section merely provided ! or a procedure to recovc,r an amount from the etnployer which had previously been J · Gajendragadkar ment m rep y to t e rst respon ent s c aim. By his application the first respondent had claimed a sum of Rs. 1,57,172-8-0 from the petitioner. In his written statement, the petitioner disputed the whole of the claim made by the first respondent and traversed all the material allegations made by him in support of his claim.
The petitioner also contended that the second respondent had no jurisdiction to go into the matters arising· from the first respondent's application. It was also urged by the petitioner alternatively that, even if the second respondent had jurisdiction to deal with the matter, he had the discretion to decline to consider the matter and leave it to be tried in the ordinary courts. The petitioner requested the second respondent to exercise his discretion and direct the first respondent to establish his claim in the appropriate civil court. The petitioner's written statement was filed on October 18, 1956. The second respondent decided to deal with the question of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue. He heard both the parties on this preliminary issue and, by his order dated November 12, 1956, he recorded his conclusion that he had jurisdiction to deal with the matter and that it was unnecessary to direct the first respondent to establish his claim in the ordinary civil ·court.
Accordingly the matter was adjourned to December 1, 1956, for hearing on the merits. It is this order which is challenged by the petitioner before us by his present petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution. The petitioner's case is that s. 17 of the act provides only for a mode of recovery of any money due to a working journalist. lt does not empower the State Government or the authority specified by the State Government to act as a forum for adjudicating '/ upon the merits of the disputed claim. That being so, the second respondent has no jurisdiction to deal M;s. Kastunand · h h · f. th fi t d t' 1' · t Ltd. wit t e merits o e rs respon. en s c aim a. g~ms the petitioner. In the alternative, the petit10ner Salivatees- contends that, if s. 17 confers jurisdiction on the Another State Government or the authority specified by the State Government to adjudicate upon disputed claims J. mentioned in the said section, the said section would be ·ultra vires and void.
On these alternative pleas, two alternative reliefs are claimed by the petitioner. The first relief claimed is that a writ in the nature of the writ of prohibition or other suitable writ or direc-tion be issued restraining the second respondent from exercising any powers under s. 17 of the act and proceeding with the enquiry into the application filed by the first respondent and forwarded to him by the State Government and issue him a certificate. The other relief JJlaimed is that this court should be pleased to order and direct that s. 17 of the act is ultra vires and void on the grounds set out in the petition. It would be necessary and convenient to construe s. 17 of the act first and determine its true scope and effect. The larger question about the vires of this act and the validity of the decision of the Wage Board set up by the Central Government under s.
8 of the act have been considered by us in the several petitions filed by several employers in that behalf before this Court. We have held in those petitions that, with the exception of s. 5 (1) (a) (iii) which deals with the payment of gratuity to employees who voluntarily resign from service, the rest of the act is valid. That is why the question about the vires of s. 17 need not be considered in the present petition over again. The main point which remains to be considered, however, is : Does s. 17 constitute the State Government or the authority specified by the State Government into a forum for adjudicating upon the merits of the claim made by newspaper employee against his employer under any of the provisions of this act ? Section 17 provides : "Where any money is due to a newspaper employee from an employer under any of the provisions S. C. R.
SUPREME COURT HEPORTS 5 of this Act, whether by way of compensation, gratuity or wages, the newspaper employee may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make. . . ,,ons an apphcat. 10n to the State Government for the recovery of the money d. ue to him, and if the State Shri Government or such authority as the State Govern- waran ment may specify in this behalf is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate for (hat GaJelld. -agadkar amount to the collector and the collector shall proceed to recover that amount in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue. " It is clear that the employee's claim against his employer which can form the subject matter of an enquiry under s. 17 must relate to compensation awardable under s. 4 of the act, gratuity awardable under s. 5 of the act, or wages claimable under the decision of the Wage Board. If the employee wishes to make any other claim against his employer, that would not be covered by s. 17.
As the marginal note shows, the section deals with the recovery of money due from an employer. The employee contends that the process of recovery begins with the making of an application setting out the claim and ends with the actual recovery of the amount found due. On this construction, the dispute between the employee and his employer in regard to any claim which the employee may make against his employer would fall to be determined on the merits right up from the start to the issue of the certificate under this section. In other wordR, if a claim is made by the employee and denied by the employer, the merit:S of the claim together with tlw other issues that may arise between the parties have to/be considered under this section. On this argument s. 17 proviuP~ a self-contained procedure for the enforcement of tlw claims covered by it.
On the other hand, the case for the petitioner i~ that the section provides for a procedure to recover the amount due from an employer, not for the deter. mination of the question as to what amount is due. The condition precedent for the application of s. 17 is a prior determination by a competent authority or the court of the amount due to the employee from his employer. It is only if and after the amount due to •Lntdd the employee has been duly determined that the stage . . h d/ h d · · h. 1s reac e to recover t a·t amount an 1t 1s at t 1s N. Salivatees-stage that the employee is given the additional advan- Another tage provided by s. 17 without prejudice to any other mode of recovery available to him. According to . f. this view, the State Government or the authority specified by the State Government has to hold a summary enquiry on a very narrow and limited point : Is the amount which is found due to the employee still due when the employee makes an application under s.
17, or, has any amount been paid, and, if yes, how much still remains to be paid? It is only a limited enquiry of this type which is contemplated by s. 17/ Within the scope of the enquiry permitted by this section are not included the examination and decision ·of the merits of tl\e claim made by the employee. When the section refers to the application made by the employee for the recovery of the money due to him, it really contemplates the stage of execution which follows the passing of the decree or the making of an award or order by an appropriate court or authority. In our opinion, the construction suggested by the petitioner should be accepted because we feel that this construction is more reasonable and more consis-tent with the scheme of the act. It is significant that the/State Government or the specific authority mentioned in s. 17 has not been clothed with the normal powers of a court or a tribunal to hold a formal enquiry. It is true that s. 3, sub-s.
(1) of the Act provides for the application of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to or in relation to working journalists subject to sub-s. (2); but this provision is in substance intended to make working journalists workmen within the meaning of the main Industrial Disputes Act. This section cannot be read as conferring on the State Government or the specified authority mentioned under s. 17 power to enforce attendance of witnesses, examine them on oath, issue commission or pass orders in respect of discovery and inspection such as can be passed by the boards, courts S. C. lt. RVPRE. ME COUHT ltEPORTi-l 7 or trilrnnals under the Ind1rntrial Disputes Act. Lt is obvious that t,he relevant provisions of s. 11 of the . I J)' A 1947 h' I c h · l ' In d US(rm 18pUtes ct, . , \\' IC l eon1er t e 81LIC sons powers on the conciliation officers, boards, eourts and tribunals rest.
The question which still remains to be considered is: Wh~t would be the proper order to make on the present petition in view of our conclusion that the S. C. R. 8UPREME COURT REPORTS 11 sc spondent cannot be ventilated by a petition/ under Art. 32. This position is fairly conceded by the h1rned counsel for the petitioner. He, however, itrgucd thiit, if we construe s. 17 in his favour and hold that the second respondent had no jurisdiction to cnt. ertain the first wspondent's application, his purpose would be pffcrtively served even though teehnically his petition may ultimately be dismissed on the ground that it is not. compl'tent undC'r Art. 32 of the Constitution. In our opinion, there is considerable force in this contention. We would accordingly hold that t·he second respondent has no jurisdi dismissed. There would be no order as to costs. Petition di. tmissed.
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