M/S. WILLIAM JACKS & CO. LTD. v. THE STATE OF BIHAR

Citation: [1963] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 352; 1962 INSC 337

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: S.K. DAS , J.L. KAPUR, A.K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH, RAGHUBAR DAYAL

Judgment date: 1962-11-21

Case summary

1962 INSC 337. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1962-11-21. M/S. WILLIAM JACKS & CO. LTD. v. THE STATE OF BIHAR. Read the judgment and case details on...

Judgment text

352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) SUPP. 1962 M/S. WILLIAM JACKS & CO. LTD. v. THE ST ATE OF BIHAR (S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR, A. K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH and RAGHUBAR DAYALJJ. ) Saks Pa:x:-8ak8 in the ooum of inter-state tra&-property passed in Calcutta-Actual delivery given to purchaser in Bihar far consumption-whether taz could be levied under Bihar Act-Whether the Bales Pa:x: Continuance Order, 195J saves 8Uch taz-Deftnitian of sale in the Bihar Sales Paz Act-Whether the sale wmea within lhed,,ftnition-Canstitution of India, Art. 206 (1) and (2), Bihar Bales Pa:x: Act, 1947 (Bihar 19 of 1947) ss. 25, 33-Pke Bale. arliament by Jaw made under Art. 286(2) provided otherwise, a State could not impose or authorise tl:). e imP,OSition, of any. tax on sales or purcha>es of goods. when such sales or pur-chases took place in the,. cqurse of inter-State trade or commerce notwithstanding that tlie goods under such sales were ! lCtually delivered in that State for consumption there:.

see Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. v. Strite of Bihar ('). Curiously however this case escaped the attention pf the learned member of the Board of Revenue, Biliar, for if he had noticed it he would not have based himself on the Unit,ed Motor11 case (') as he had dorie. The appellant thereafter moved the Board of Revenue under s. 25 of the Bihar Act for referring two questions to th«" High Court for decision and a reference was accordingly made. (1953) s. c. R. 1069. (2) 11955) 2 S. C. R. 603. The present appeal iS against the judgment of the High Court given on the reference. There are two appeals before u. ~. They arise out of two assessment orders made in r~pect of two different periods. The High Court heard the two references together and dealt with them by one judgment. The questions framed iu each case were in identical terms and perhaps, therefore, were not con-fined to the period with which each case was con-cermd.

A3 we have said l'arlier, two questions had been referred to the High Court but the appellant has not in this Court challenged the answer ~iven by the High Court to the second question. We are, therefor<', concerned in tht'Se appeals only with the first question which is in these terms : "Whether the sales by the petitioner of (sic. ) goods which were actually delivered in Bihar as a direct result of such sales for the purpose of consumption in Bihar during the period January 26, 1950 to September 30, 1951, were sales which took place in the course of inter- State trade or commerce within the meaning of Article 286(2) of the Constitution of India (as it stood prior to the passing of the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956) and as such were not liable to the levy of Bihar Sales· Tax, or whether in view of the s'.

lbsequent pa'ISing by Parliament of the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956 (Act VII of 1956) such sales became liable to the levy of Bihar Sales Tax for any part of the above period, say from April 1, 1951, up to September 30, 1951. " The High Court answered this qu"Stion in these words: "A3 regards the first question, it is clear that for the period from the January 26, 1950, to March 31, 1951, the assessment 1162 is covered by the Sales Tax Continuance Order, 1950, promulgated by the President, and the M/1. WUli.. . , Jdl Ill c;.. Lii. assessment of the tax for this period is not •• liable to be attacked on the ground that there TM 511114 of Bih•• is a violation of the provisions of Article 286(2) s. ,rr. r, J. of the Constitution. For the second ,period, namely, from April 1, 1951, to September 30, 1951, the assessment is covered by the provisions of the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956, and the imposition of sales-tax for this period also is legally valid.

" The question in this appeal is whether the High Court was right in its view that the assessment between January 26, 1950 to March 31, 1951 is covered by the Sales Tax Continuance Order, 1950. There is no dispute now that the Sales Tax Validation Act, 1956 validated the collection of the tax on sales made during the period (rom April 1, 1951 to September 30, 1951. In view of the judgment of this Court in the Bengal Immunity Company case (') a dispute as to whether the sales by the appellant could be taxed by a Bihar law was no longer open .. It was because of this that the dispute took a different tum and was based on the Sales Tax Continuance Order, 1950. The contention of the appellant is this : The Sales Tax Continuance Oder, 1950 was made in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to cl. 2 of Art. 286 of the Constitution.

That proviso was in these terms : "Provided that the President may by order direct that any tax on the sale or purchase of goods which was being lawfully levied by the Government of any State immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall, notwithstanding that the (I) ( 1955] 2. S. C. R. 603, imposition of such tax is contrary to the provisions of this clause, continue to be levied until the thirty-first day of:March 1951. " Clause (2) of the Sales Tax Continuance Order, 1950 reads as follows : "Any tax on the sale or purchase of goods which was being lawfully levied by the Government of any State immediately before the commencement of the Constitution of India shall, until the thirty-first day of March, 1951, continue to be levied notwithstanding that the imposition of such tax is contrary to the provisions of clause (2) of the Article 286 of the said Constitution. " Clause (2) of Art.

286 of the Constitution, it will be remembert'd, prohibited a State law from taxing a sale in the course of inter-State trade. Now, a tax which can be legitimately levied under the Order of 1950 must be a tax which was being lawfully levied by a State Government immediately before January 26, 1950. It is said by the appellant that before this date neither the Bihar Sales Tax Act nor any other Act purported to tax a sale of the kind with which we are concerned. If no Act did so, then no question of its lawfully levying a tax on such sales could at all arise. There was no tax as contemplated by the Order and none, therefore, the levy of which the Order continued. Learned counsel for the appellant drew our attention to the definition of sale in the Bihar Act a8 it stood at the relevant time. It was only a sale which came within the definition that the Act purported to tax.

Learned counsel's contention is that the sales in this case do not come within the definition and, therefore, were not taxed by. the Bihar Act at all. Now the definition of sale in the Act is in these terms : M /1. Willio. /M1 at Co. Lu. Y. "sale" means, with all its grammatical varia- n. Stal• of •ihar tions and cognate expressions, any transfer of S.. lar, J.

property in goods for cash or deferred pay· ment or other valuable consideration, includ· ing a transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of contract but does not in· elude a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge: Provided that a transfer of goods on hire· purchase or other instalment system of payment shall, notwithstanding the fact that the seller retains a title to any goods as security for pay· ment of the price, be deemed to be a sale : Provided further that notwithstandin1 anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930 (Ill of 1930), the 1ale of any goods- (i) which arc actually in Bihar at the time when, in respect thereof, the contract of sale as defined in section 4 of that Act is made, or (ii) which are produced or manufactured in Bihar by the producer cir manu· facturer thereof, shall, .

wherever the delivery or contract or sale in made, be dceined for the purposes or this Act to have taken place in Bihar : Provided further that the sale of good1 in respect of a forward contract, whether goods under such contract are actually delivered or not, shall be deemed to have taken place on the date originally agreed upon for delivery. It is obvious that the sales with which this case is concerned did not come within this definition at all nor even under the last proviso in it and these sales were not taxed by the Bihar Act. Then there is s. 33. That section provides as follows : 8. 33. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act,- (a) a tax on the sale or purchase of goods shall not be imposed under this Act- (i) where such sale or purchase takes place outside the State of Bihar; .......................................... ..........................................

(2) The explanation to clause (I) of Article 286 of the Constitution shall apply for the interpretation of sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of sub-section ( l). Now, it has been held by this Court in M. P. V. Bundararamier & Co. v. 1'he State of And! ira 1 Pradesh ( ) that an enactment of this kind did in fact impose a tax on the class of sales covered by the explanation to Art. 286(l)(a) but that the imposition was conditional on the ban mentioned in Art. 286(2) being lifted by law of Parliament as provided therein. We do not think that the respondent State can derive any advantage from this provision. It was inserted in the Bihar Act by the Adaptation of Laws (Third Amendment) Order, 1951, and was brought into force from January 26, 1950. Even though on the ban being lifted it might have been possible under (I) (1958] s. o. R. U22.

this provision to tax the explanation sales, that is, the sales of the kind with which this case is concerned, that cannot assist the respondent State in this case for since s. 33 only came into force from January 26, 1950, s. 33 could not be a law levying a tax on any sales immediately before the commencement of the Constitution and the levy of tax under it, therefore, could not have been continued under the provisions of the Sales Tax Continuance Order, 1950. It follo'ivs that the. sales were not taxed by the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 194 7 before the Constitution came into force. It is not contended that the Government of Bihar had been taxing these sales before January 26, 1950, under any other provision. We, therefore, think that the High Court wa, in error in holding that the levy of the tax on the sales by the appellant between January 26, 1!! 50, and March 31, 1951, with which this case is concerned, was covered by the Sales Tax Continuance Order, 1950.

We will set aside the judgment of the High Court in so far as it so holds and answer the 9uestion which we have earlier set out in so far as it is outstanding, in the negative. In our view, these sales were not liable to tax. We think it right here to point out that the question as framed might suggest that the Court was asked to decide whether the sales were sales within the meaning of Art. 286(2) of the Constitution. But as we have said earlier, that was not the point of the question. The courts below have held that the sales were in the course of inter-State trade in which the goods were actually delivered in Bihar for consumption there and that view has not been disputed in ·this Court. The appeal will, therefore, be allowed. We do not make any order as to costs as the appellant abandoned in this Court its contest to one of the two questions that had been referred and as.

it had not in the High Court contended that the Sales Tax Conti- JMb nuance Order, 1950, did not apply to the sales for the reason on which it based itself in this Court. A. ppeal allowed. BISWAMBHAR SINGH AND ORS. STATE OF ORISSA (B. P. SINHA. , c. J. , P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANonoo, K. C. DAS GUI'TA and J. C, SHAH, JJ. ) Sortrtign-Zamindar whtther •ov. rtign-Elatu-ln,. ,. _ mtdiariu-Oonatitutionality of Acl XVII of 1954-TM Oriaao E•lalt8 Abolilion Act, 1962 (Orisaa 61of1962), u. 2 (vJ, 2 (11). When the Orissa Estates Abolition Act came into force in February 1952, the appellants along with another person moved the High C',ourt under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the constitutionality of the Act. The High Court held that the Act was valid and the lands of the appellants could be taken over by the State. When the case came to this C.

ourt in appeal, it held that the Act did not apply to the proprietors of Hemgir and Sarpgarh as they were not intenne-diaries as defined in s. 2 (h) of the Act. The Zamindar of Nagra was held to be an intermediary as he had acknowledged overlordship of the Raja of Gangpur, The Orissa legislature passed Act XVII of 1954 and changed the definitions of 'estate' and 'intermediary' to cover the cases of the proprietors of Hemgir and Sarpgarh. The appellant. , the Zamindars of Hemgir and Sarpgarh, moved the High Court for a writ of mandamus against the State of Orissa and the Collector of Sundargarh. The appellants claimed sovereign status and contended that the Amend-ing Act did not apply to them, Their petition• ~e dismiaKd

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