MST. GULAB BAI v. MANPHOOL BAI
Citation: [1962] 3 S.C.R. 483; 1961 INSC 258
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA , P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, RAGHUBAR DAYAL
Judgment date:
Case summary
1961 INSC 258. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 1961-09-05. MST. GULAB BAI v. MANPHOOL BAI. Read the judgment and case details on LawSphereX.
Judgment text
3 S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS The concept of joint tenancy known to Ehglish law . with the right of survivorship is unknown to Hindu law except in regard to cases specially re-cognized by it. In the present case, the uncle and the two nephews did not belong to the same branch. The acquisitions made by them jointly could not be impressed with the incidents of joint family property. They can only be co-sharers or co-tenants, with the result that their properties passed by inheritance and not by survivorship. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismiss~d. MST. GULAB BAI v . . MANPHOOL BAI (B. P. SINHA, C. J. , P. B. GAJENDRAGADJLl. R and RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ. ) Res Judicata-'Suit', Meaning of-If can denote part of a suit or an issue in it-Code of Oi. ~l Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908), s. 11. · The respondent had sued the appellant 2 on a rent note in the Munsiff's court for recovery of Rs. 700/- as arrears of rent and' ejectment.
That suit was dismissed on the prelimi-nary objection of defect of party as appellant 1, a co· lessor in the rent note, had not been made a party. The respondent then brought the present suit in the Civil Judge's court for recovery of Rs. 2400 as arrears of rent from and for ejectment of appellant 2, maki. ng appellant 1 a pro-forma defendant in the suit. The appellant 2 pleaded that the su:t was barred by res judicata and could not be decreed since appellant l had not joined 'the responclenc in the clai1n. The High Court, iri finally decreeing the suit in second app~al, . held· that it was not barred by res judicata since the Munsiff had not the pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit and that appellant I on a true construction of the. rent note, . was not a a co-lessor with the respondent. It was urged on behalf of the appellants in this Court that the word 'suit' in s.
11 of the Code of Civil Procedure should be liberally, and not literally, construed so as to include part of the suit or an issue -- SUl'REi\IE COURT REPORTS [1962] raised in the suit and that since the MunsiiT \vj10 had tried the previous suit was competent to try that part of the subsequent suit \ ... ·h1ch forn1P. d the relevant issue in the earlier suit the present suit \\·as barred by res judica/a. ' Heid, that the High Court was right in hold in~ that tLe present suit was not barred by r'!. s judicata. ·- The \\·ord 'suit' occurring in s. 11 of the Code of Civil Proccdt1rc mu~c be literally, and not liberally, construed so as to mean the entire suit and not a part of it or an issue arising in ic. The le,;islative history of that ;ection clearly shows that thrrc is no scope fur any liberal construction of that \\'Ord. Durliess of King•lon's case, 2 Smith Lead. Cas. 13th Ed. 644, . l! i•ir Rag! 1obardial '" Rajah /:,'/,eQ Baksi. Singh, ( 1882) LR. 9 I. A.
197 and Gokul ManJar '" l'udmanund Singh, (1902) J. L. R. 29 Cal. 707, discussed. Mussamut Bdun '" MusMmut Bahun, 8 W. R. 175, liam Dayal \'. Janlcida. s, (1900) I. LR. 24 Born. 45G, Shibo Raul '" Baban Raul, (l! J08) 1. L. R. 35 Cal. 353, referred to. Sh,ikh . Haqaood Ali v. ! I. llunter, A. l. R. 19{3 Oudh. 338, considered. C1nL APPELLATE JomsDICTIO:\ : Civil Appeal No. 201/HJ50. Appeal from tho judgment and decree dated January 2, 1952, of tho Rajasthan High Court in D. R. Civil Second Appeal No. 459 of 1949. S. N. A. ndlcy, Rameshu-ar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants Nos. 2 and 3. N. C. Cltatte1jee and .! Ifohan Belwri ],al, for respondent. 1961. September 5. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGAllKAn, J. -This appeal by a certificate given by the Raja;; than High Con rt arises fron~ the suit filed by the respondent. l\Ist. ~fanphool Bat against appellant 2 Lacln Ram for the recovery of the arrears of rent and for eojectment.
To this Ruit the respondent joined appellant l lier mother-in-law Guiab Bai as a proforma defendant. 'fhe property in question is a shop situated in the Johri Bazar at Jaipur. This property originally belonged to Chhogalal, ancl after him it devolved on his 3 S. C. R. SUPREMECOURT REPORTS 48fi adopted son. Phool Chand. The case for the respon· 1961 dent is that her husband Lal Chand had been adopt· Mst. Gulab Bat. ed by appellant 1 after the death of her husband v. ManjJhool Bai Phool Chand. Appellant 2 had executed a rent nQte (Ex. 24) in favour of Lal Chand in Samvat. Year Gajeri"iragarlka'r], 1939. On Lal Chand's death the respondent held the property as his widow and as such she served ! ) sent suit having regard to the limits of his pecuniary jurisdiction, and so one of the conditions prcscrib· ed by s. 11 of tho Code of Ci,·il Procedure is absent.
Section 11 requires, inter ali:a, that the prior dcci- Rion of the material issue should haYe been given by a court competent t-0 try tho subsequent suit, and that is tho basis on which tho respondent ha. s aucceilSfully urged before the High Court that the pica of res j11dicatr1 cannot be sustained. It has been urged before us by l\Ir. Rameshwar Nath that in construing the material clause in s. 11 the High Court was in error in putting a literal construe- I9GI tion on the words "subsequent suit". The High Court M•t. Guiab Bai should have construed the said words liberally and v. should have held that the words "suit" in~ludes Manphool Bai even a part of a suit. If this contention is right Gaj. adrngadkar J.
then the relevant issue decided in the earlier litiga-tion would be a part of the subsequent snit, and since the Mnnsiff who tried the earlier suit, was competent to try this part of the subsequent suit the requisite condition is satisfied and the suit is thus barred by res judicata. Thus the narrow question which calls for our decision is whether the word "suit" in the context can be liberally construed to mean even a part of the suit. Let us first read s. l l. which runs thus : "No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them, claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent. to try such subsequent suit or the suit in' which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court.
" The appellant's argument is that in construing the chuse "in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which issue has been su bse-quently raised" it would be relevant to remember that this clause is really intended to emphasise the consideration that the Court which tried the earlier suit and the Court in which the subsequent suit is filed ghould be Courts of concurrent jurisdiction, and the concurrence of jurisdiction should be tested by reference to the matter in issue which has been tried in the earlier suit and which also falls to be decided in the subseq1nnt suit. In support of this argument reliance has been placed on the classical ·i I statement of the general princ. iple of res judicata .. , T .. . ... . . "! ' ~- 490 f1962J enomciated in the Dnche.. ss of Kingsto1~'s case('). In that oaso it was observed that from the variety of Ca.
BPS relative to judgments being given in evidence in civil suiti;, these two deductions seem·to follow as generally true : "Firnt, that the judgment <>fa Court of concurrnnt jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is as a plea, a bar, or as cvidonce, conclusive between the same parties, upon the Rame matter, directly i. J1 question, in another Court, secondly, thnt the judgment of a Court of exclusive jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is in like manner conclusivti upon the ·same ·matter, between the same partiC! l, coming incidenmll~, in queition in another Court for a different purpose". The basis of the rule of res judicata . is that. an individual should not be vexed twice for the same cause, and the libPral 'construction of tho word "suit" would be consistent with ·this bal!
is, otherwise if tho competonoo of the ealilier Court is ;going to be judged by reforence to itti eompctenee to try the entire Ru it as subsequently instituted, in many cases where the matter directly and substantially in issue has been tried between the parties by the earlier Court it may have to he tried again. in a &ubsequont suit because the earlier Court had no jurisdiction to try the subsequent suit l1aving regard to it11 . pecuniary jurisdiction. That, it is urged, would be anomalous and inconsistent with the prinoi1ile underlying the doctrine of res judicata. The word "suit" has not been defined in the Code, but there can . be little doubt ·that in the r. ontnxt the •plain and grammatioal meaning of the word would include 'the whole of the euit and not a part of tho suit, so that 1iiving the word 'fsuit'' its ordinatiy meaning . it woukl be difficult to·aeccpt the argumont that a pa.
rt of the suit or an issue in a suit iR int~nded to bo covered by the saiil word in ·the matj)rial clause. J'hc argument that thoro should be finality of decisions and,thnt a 11erson ! ii) 2 Smith Lead. Cas. , 13th Ed. , 'PP·:6H,. 645. should not be vexed twice over with the same cause can have no material bearing on the construction of the· word "suit". Besides if considerations of anomaly are relevant it may be urged in support of the literal construction of the word "suit" that the finding recorded· on a material issue by the Coul't of the lowest jurisdiction is intended not to bar the trial of the same issue in a sn bsequent suit filed before a Court of unlimited jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would itself introduce another kind of anomaly.
Therefore, it seems to us that as a matter of construction the suggestion that the word "suit'' should be liberally construed cannot be accepted; This position would be abundantly clear if we consider the legislative history·and· background of s. lh In that connection it would be relevant to cite the material provisions in regard to re& jiulicata. contained in the earlier Codes. Section 2 which dealt with res judicata in the Code of 1859 (Act VIII. of 1859) read thus : "The Civil Courts shall not take cogni-sance of any suit brought on a cause of action which, shall h:we been heard and determined by a. Couro of competent jurisdiction in a fomner suit: bctw-0en the same parties or between parties under whom they claim. " In the Code of 1877 (Act X of 1877) s.
13· pro- 1 vided' that "no Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and sulistantially in issue has been heard· and finally decided by a Court of competent jurisdiction; in a former suit between the same parties, . or· between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title". Then followed the Code of 1882 (Act XIV ofl882) in which s. l'3 doa,lt with the principle of es judicata. Section 13 is stlbstantially in the same erms as s. 11 of the present Code of 1908 (. A:ct V f 1908). ' ! j .... , .... • ' - • ;.. ~' $ • ::\·- It The question about the construction of the word "competent jurisdiction" occurring in s. 2 of the Cocle of 1859 as well as s. 13 of the Code of 1877 foll to be considered in Jfisir Raghobardial v. R,~jah Shoo Baksh Singh('). In that case the Privy Council took the \•iew that the expression "c part of it or a ma. terfal1issuo ariBing· in it.
Severai· decisions have been cit~d before us where this·qucstion has been. considered. We do not tliink any useful purpose would be served by refurring to them. It may ! Jo enough t:o stat. tl that; in a lllrgc majority of' decisions the word "suit/' ha. 'l 1 been liloraHy construed [vi<lo : Ram: D~(J/, v. Jrmkidas (') and Sliibo Root v. Baban• Ri:iutt(•),] though in somo oasee and under special cireumstances• w lihcra,J: cou8ttncth;m has been. accepte<l1[vide : Slie. ii! h< .! Jfaq. sooi. ' AU v. ; ll. Hunter·(')]. \Ve· must acoordingJy' hi! Jld that tho High. Uourt wali ! light in coming to tl1c conclusion that the present" suit is not barred by res judic. ala. That takes us to the· quelltion of tlie oons-tmetiun of'tlro rent note: The ffigli· Court Has l! eltl (Ii 2'Stnitltllead. <! 111t. i3th·Ed. , pp. 6414, 6+5. (2) ( t'llO) It L. R. 2ltBbm; +56;. (31 (19031 l. L. R. 35 Cal. 353. (+l A1l. R:. IOll•Olltlh ·3! 18' - il! }i) . 3'S:C. R. that on a fair. and .
reasonable construction of the document it. must be held that the :t'ent note has been passed by appellant 2 in ,favoi1r of the res· pondent . alone though incidentally out of respect Qqj,... ,. ,.. ,. ,, . the name of appellant . 1 has been introduced. in it. In our opinion this conclusion is right. It . is 'true that the rent note has been executed in favour of 'both appellant 1 and the respondent; but it is significant . that the rent note stipulates . that 'vhen tihe rent is paid by appe'llant 2 he has to obtain a receipt from the owner. The word "owner" is u11ed in·singular and ·not plural, and ·that indicates that the rent note proceeded on the assumption that". the pniperty which was the subject-matter of the rent note belonged to one owner and not two. There is another clause in the rent note which is clearer Rtil!. This clause reads "therefore, I have executed in my proper senses this rent note on a stamped paper valued Rs.
5/· in the names of · each of the two, mother-in· law and the daughter· in-law, Sethanji Gulab Bai widow of Phoolchandji in the capacity of being elder in the family and Sethanji Manphool Bai alias Bhanwar Bai widow of Lalchandji the heir in the family and the owner of the property which will stand and may he used in times of need. " This clause makes it perfectly clear that the inclusion of the name of appellant 1 was merely formal and it was intended to •how respect to the elderly lady in the family. It also shows that the respondent was treated as the owner of the property as the heir of her deceased husband Lal Chand. Reading this clause together with the earlier clause as to the receipt for the payment of rent which we h'ive already considered it is absolutely clear that the name of appellant 1 was not included in the rent note because she had any right to the property let out but solely as a matter of respect which the rc~pondent showed to appellant 1.
Therefore, in our opinion, the con· tention that the rent note has been passed by 196] appellant 2 in favour of the respondent and } 4 JI. st. CiJ•i' .! ci trppellant I ·cannot be eustairicd. If that be tho v. true position there can be no doubt whatever that Al cnjJhHI B•i appellant 2 i~ precluded from disputing the title G~i~rt'1a,-'l•r ]. of the respondent in the present proceedings. As the High Court ha8 pointed out the sequence of events leading to the e::rncution of the snit rent note unambiguously ~hows that appellant 2 has · 1 recognised the rMpondent as the lessor and as such the principl<lll of Ii. l! G of the Evidence Act clearly apply. The reault is the appeal iaila and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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